Per se VS. accidental?

[thinkandmull]

I don’t believe there is a difference between per se and accident infinite remotion.

Aquinas says you could not do a task if it depended on your moving hand, which depended on your moving arm, which depended on your head, which depended on your twin’s soul, which depended on something else ect ect ect.

Now, suppose you woke up some morning and you saw a the dominoes series just finish: the last domino goes down. Suppose someone walked over and said “That series has been going on for all time, and just ended now.” That would be just like the situation described by Aquinas: one thing dependent on another going back forever. But that is exactly what the Kalam cosmological argument says is impossible, and yet Aquinas thinks there could have always been motion.

Aquinas response to the Kalam is here:

**Objection 6. Further, if the world always was, the consequence is that infinite days preceded this present day. But it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium. Therefore we should never have arrived at this present day; which is manifestly false.

Reply to Objection 6. Passage is always understood as being from term to term. Whatever bygone day we choose, from it to the present day there is a finite number of days which can be passed through. The objection is founded on the idea that, given two extremes, there is an infinite number of mean terms.**

I don’t see how we can defend Aquinas’s answer. The argument is not about the finite parts, but the infinite sum.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I don’t believe there is a difference between per se and accident infinite remotion.

Aquinas says you could not do a task if it depended on your moving hand, which depended on your moving arm, which depended on your head, which depended on your twin’s soul, which depended on something else ect ect ect.

Now, suppose you woke up some morning and you saw a the dominoes series just finish: the last domino goes down. Suppose someone walked over and said “That series has been going on for all time, and just ended now.” That would be just like the situation described by Aquinas: one thing dependent on another going back forever. But that is exactly what the Kalam cosmological argument says is impossible, and yet Aquinas thinks there could have always been motion.

Aquinas response to the Kalam is here:

**Objection 6. Further, if the world always was, the consequence is that infinite days preceded this present day. But it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium. Therefore we should never have arrived at this present day; which is manifestly false.

Reply to Objection 6. Passage is always understood as being from term to term. Whatever bygone day we choose, from it to the present day there is a finite number of days which can be passed through. The objection is founded on the idea that, given two extremes, there is an infinite number of mean terms.**

I don’t see how we can defend Aquinas’s answer. The argument is not about the finite parts, but the infinite sum.

Please give an exact reference to these answers.

Linus2nd

 

[inocente]

I don’t see how we can defend Aquinas’s answer. The argument is not about the finite parts, but the infinite sum.

But if the Earth revolved on its axis an infinity of times, there would still be no infinite sum, for one revolution is much like the rest.

Please give an exact reference to these answers.

Googled it. “I answer that, By faith alone do we hold, and by no demonstration can it be proved, that the world did not always exist” - 1 46 2 at newadvent.org/summa/1046.htm#article2.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

But if the Earth revolved on its axis an infinity of times, there would still be no infinite sum, for one revolution is much like the rest.

Googled it. “I answer that, By faith alone do we hold, and by no demonstration can it be proved, that the world did not always exist” - 1 46 2 at newadvent.org/summa/1046.htm#article2.

Thanks. I’m too tired to think about it right now. I’ll just watch for awhile.

Linus2nd

 

[lmelahn]

I don’t believe there is a difference between per se and accident infinite remotion.

Aquinas says you could not do a task if it depended on your moving hand, which depended on your moving arm, which depended on your head, which depended on your twin’s soul, which depended on something else ect ect ect.

Now, suppose you woke up some morning and you saw a the dominoes series just finish: the last domino goes down. Suppose someone walked over and said “That series has been going on for all time, and just ended now.” That would be just like the situation described by Aquinas: one thing dependent on another going back forever. But that is exactly what the Kalam cosmological argument says is impossible, and yet Aquinas thinks there could have always been motion.

Aquinas response to the Kalam is here:

**Objection 6. Further, if the world always was, the consequence is that infinite days preceded this present day. But it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium. Therefore we should never have arrived at this present day; which is manifestly false.

Reply to Objection 6. Passage is always understood as being from term to term. Whatever bygone day we choose, from it to the present day there is a finite number of days which can be passed through. The objection is founded on the idea that, given two extremes, there is an infinite number of mean terms.**

I don’t see how we can defend Aquinas’s answer. The argument is not about the finite parts, but the infinite sum.

Hello, thinkandmull.

The key difference between per se (essential) and per accidens (accidental) causality is dependence.

An effect depends on its per-se cause for its very existence, right now. For example, iron that is heated in fire is hot because it is being heated (now) by fire. Remove the iron from the fire, and it begins to cool immediately—the iron is incapable of maintaining itself hot.

A cause can also be “per se” if it needs to be that particular cause. For example, only a sculptor can sculpt a statue. If I need a statue, calling a plumber (unless he happens to be a sculptor) is useless. However (a least to some degree) which sculptor is indifferent. If I needed a marble statue carved, I could just as easily have asked Michelangelo as Bernini.

A cause can only be “per se” if it is present (or contemporary, for past or future causes) and if that particular cause is needed.

All other kinds of cause are per accidens. They just “happen to be” accidit eos esse] the causes of their effects.

Or, better said, a cause is “per se” to the degree that it is present and indispensible, in and of itself, for the effect to occur here and now.

That is the idea.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Hello, thinkandmull…[snip]…

A cause can only be “per se” if it is present (or contemporary, for past or future causes) and if that particular cause is needed.

Fr. James A. Weisheipl, O.P. ( R.I.P. ) in Nature and Motion in the Middle Ages would disagree and he makes a good case that both Aristotle and Aquinas agree with him. He points out that according to Aristotle an accompanying mover is only necessary in motions which are contrary to nature. In things which move naturally, it is the generator of the form which is the mover or agent of motion ( the per se mover ).

Thus, in the inertial motion of Newton it would be the generator of the form of the object which is in motion which is the cause of the motion. The object itself moves naturally through the form generated by the generator of the form.

Again, a thrown ball is moved by an imparted impetus, where the impetus is a kind of secondary form altering the form of the ball. In this case there are two effecient or per se causes. One is the one who throws the ball and causes the impetus. The second is the generator of the form which allows the infulence of the impetus.

Likewise the natural motions of living things are accounted for by the generator of their natures.

In each of these cases there is no motor coniunctus, the objects move naturally.

Linus2nd

 

[lmelahn]

Fr. James A. Weisheipl, O.P. ( R.I.P. ) in Nature and Motion in the Middle Ages would disagree and he makes a good case that both Aristotle and Aquinas agree with him. He points out that according to Aristotle an accompanying mover is only necessary in motions which are contrary to nature. In things which move naturally, it is the generator of the form which is the mover or agent of motion ( the per se mover ).

Thus, in the inertial motion of Newton it would be the generator of the form of the object which is in motion which is the cause of the motion. The object itself moves naturally through the form generated by the generator of the form.

Again, a thrown ball is moved by an imparted impetus, where the impetus is a kind of secondary form altering the form of the ball. In this case there are two effecient or per se causes. One is the one who throws the ball and causes the impetus. The second is the generator of the form which allows the infulence of the impetus.

Likewise the natural motions of living things are accounted for by the generator of their natures.

In each of these cases there is no motor coniunctus, the objects move naturally.

Linus2nd

I am not sure what what I said is in contradiction with what you said. The causality of God is a in a different order (the order of being) from secondary causality (which operates in the order of becoming).

God is not a motor coniunctus, but He does impart being on His creatures. From His point of view, He does so in a single act; from our point of view, it is a continuous action on His part (creatio continua).

Creation is, naturally, an example of a per se cause—indeed, the per se cause par excellence.

Actually, I think the per se/per accidens distinction bolsters Fr. Weisheipl’s thesis.

Suppose there is a body at rest (from the observer’s point of view)—a billiard on a pool table, say. The observer throws a cue ball at the billiard.

Before the impact, is the cue ball exercising any causality on the billiard? No.

During impact, is the cue ball exercising any causality? Yes—at that moment, it is the per-se cause of billiard’s change in velocity.

After impact, is the cue ball exercising any causality on the billiard? No, not anymore. The cue ball is now only a per accidens cause of the billiard’s velocity.

No need for a motor coniunctus.

(I should point out that, as far as I can tell, it was Aquinas who first applied per se and per accidens to causes; for Aristotle, those terms had a logical meaning.)

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I am not sure what what I said is in contradiction with what you said. The causality of God is a in a different order (the order of being) from secondary causality (which operates in the order of becoming).

God is not a motor coniunctus, but He does impart being on His creatures. From His point of view, He does so in a single act; from our point of view, it is a continuous action on His part (creatio continua).

Creation is, naturally, an example of a per se cause—indeed, the per se cause par excellence.

Actually, I think the per se/per accidens distinction bolsters Fr. Weisheipl’s thesis.

Suppose there is a body at rest (from the observer’s point of view)—a billiard on a pool table, say. The observer throws a cue ball at the billiard.

Before the impact, is the cue ball exercising any causality on the billiard? No.

During impact, is the cue ball exercising any causality? Yes—at that moment, it is the per-se cause of billiard’s change in velocity.

After impact, is the cue ball exercising any causality on the billiard? No, not anymore. The cue ball is now only a per accidens cause of the billiard’s velocity.

No need for a motor coniunctus.

(I should point out that, as far as I can tell, it was Aquinas who first applied per se and per accidens to causes; for Aristotle, those terms had a logical meaning.)

I left out part of your statment which made it unclear what I was driving at. You said,

" An effect depends on its per-se cause for its very existence, right now. For example, iron that is heated in fire is hot because it is being heated (now) by fire. Remove the iron from the fire, and it begins to cool immediately—the iron is incapable of maintaining itself hot.

A cause can also be “per se” if it needs to be that particular cause. For example, only a sculptor can sculpt a statue. If I need a statue, calling a plumber (unless he happens to be a sculptor) is useless. However (a least to some degree) which sculptor is indifferent. If I needed a marble statue carved, I could just as easily have asked Michelangelo as Bernini. "

I was pointing out that a motor coniunctus was only required in un-natural motions. That is, no mover is required to be touching the moving object " right now " in those beings which are moving naturally. In the examples I gave, the per se mover is the generator of the form of those beings and that generator is not a motor coniunctus.

Weisheipl was objecting to the abuse to which the phrase Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur has be subject to, nearly universally, since Thomas first enunciated his First Way. It is even misinterpreted in various translations of the Summa Theologiae. I know the Blackfriars edition which I have mistranslates it. And the mistranslations have led to the nearly universal misconception that every motion required an accompanying motor coniunctus.

P.S. Fr. Willam A. Wallace O.P., the noted Dominican Philosopher of Science and History passed away recently at age 95. He was still working well into his nineties. A great man.

Linus2nd

 

[lmelahn]

I left out part of your statment which made it unclear what I was driving at. You said,

" An effect depends on its per-se cause for its very existence, right now. For example, iron that is heated in fire is hot because it is being heated (now) by fire. Remove the iron from the fire, and it begins to cool immediately—the iron is incapable of maintaining itself hot.

A cause can also be “per se” if it needs to be that particular cause. For example, only a sculptor can sculpt a statue. If I need a statue, calling a plumber (unless he happens to be a sculptor) is useless. However (a least to some degree) which sculptor is indifferent. If I needed a marble statue carved, I could just as easily have asked Michelangelo as Bernini. "

I was pointing out that a motor coniunctus was only required in un-natural motions. That is, no mover is required to be touching the moving object " right now " in those beings which are moving naturally. In the examples I gave, the per se mover is the generator of the form of those beings and that generator is not a motor coniunctus.

Weisheipl was objecting to the abuse to which the phrase Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur has be subject to, nearly universally, since Thomas first enunciated his First Way. It is even misinterpreted in various translations of the Summa Theologiae. I know the Blackfriars edition which I have mistranslates it. And the mistranslations have led to the nearly universal misconception that every motion required an accompanying motor coniunctus.

P.S. Fr. Willam A. Wallace O.P., the noted Dominican Philosopher of Science and History passed away recently at age 95. He was still working well into his nineties. A great man.

Linus2nd

I think that Fr. Weisheipl is correct in rejecting the motor coniunctus, as I said, but what I said about per se causes does not imply a motor coniunctus.

Let’s return to our billiard ball:

(1) During impact (which is a “violent” action), the cue ball is the per se cause of the billiard ball’s change in momentum. (In Aristotelian terms, “momentum” is a quality of the substance.)

(2) After impact, the cue ball has ceased exercising any causality on the billiard ball. The billiard ball keeps on moving (it still has that increased momentum), but the cue ball is not the cause of it any longer.

That momentum still has a number of per se causes—namely, the substance (the billiard ball) in which it inheres; its destination, which is a kind of final cause; its formal cause as an accidental form; and so on. But the cue ball is not among those causes.

There is, therefore, no need for a motor coniunctus. It is the natural tendency of the billiard ball to continue on until impeded by something else (e.g., the wall of the pool table).

(Maybe I am not understanding your objection here.)

P.S. Here is a link you might like: jstor.org/discover/10.2307/228456?sid=21106237014563&uid=3738296&uid=2&uid=4

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I think that Fr. Weisheipl is correct in rejecting the motor coniunctus, as I said, but what I said about per se causes does not imply a motor coniunctus.

Let’s return to our billiard ball:

(1) During impact (which is a “violent” action), the cue ball is the per se cause of the billiard ball’s change in momentum. (In Aristotelian terms, “momentum” is a quality of the substance.)

(2) After impact, the cue ball has ceased exercising any causality on the billiard ball. The billiard ball keeps on moving (it still has that increased momentum), but the cue ball is not the cause of it any longer.

That momentum still has a number of per se causes—namely, the substance (the billiard ball) in which it inheres; its destination, which is a kind of final cause; its formal cause as an accidental form; and so on. But the cue ball is not among those causes.

There is, therefore, no need for a motor coniunctus. It is the natural tendency of the billiard ball to continue on until impeded by something else (e.g., the wall of the pool table).

(Maybe I am not understanding your objection here.)

P.S. Here is a link you might like: jstor.org/discover/10.2307/228456?sid=21106237014563&uid=3738296&uid=2&uid=4

Sorry. I was trying to say that in the case of natural movement that it was not true that the mover be in contact with the moved object " here and now. " You said, " An effect depends on its per-se cause for its very existence, right now. For example, iron that is heated in fire is hot because it is being heated (now) by fire. Remove the iron from the fire, and it begins to cool immediately—the iron is incapable of maintaining itself hot. "

I was objecting to " right now " and " ( now ) " This is true in the example you used but it would not be the case in natural movements or in the case of thrown or ijected objects or in the case of Newton’s inertial motion or in any case where momentum or impetus was the cause of continued motion.

This is an important distinction because it is nearly universally true and has been so since the time of Aquinas that the phrase Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur has been interpreted to mean that it was always the case that there must always be a motor coniunctus and this is not true. And because of this misinterpretation modern philosophy of science has claimed that Thomas’ argument for God’s existence in First Way is not true.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I think that Fr. Weisheipl is correct in rejecting the motor coniunctus, as I said, but what I said about per se causes does not imply a motor coniunctus.

Let’s return to our billiard ball:

(1) During impact (which is a “violent” action), the cue ball is the per se cause of the billiard ball’s change in momentum. (In Aristotelian terms, “momentum” is a quality of the substance.)

(2) After impact, the cue ball has ceased exercising any causality on the billiard ball. The billiard ball keeps on moving (it still has that increased momentum), but the cue ball is not the cause of it any longer.

That momentum still has a number of per se causes—namely, the substance (the billiard ball) in which it inheres; its destination, which is a kind of final cause; its formal cause as an accidental form; and so on. But the cue ball is not among those causes.

There is, therefore, no need for a motor coniunctus. It is the natural tendency of the billiard ball to continue on until impeded by something else (e.g., the wall of the pool table).

(Maybe I am not understanding your objection here.)

P.S. Here is a link you might like: jstor.org/discover/10.2307/228456?sid=21106237014563&uid=3738296&uid=2&uid=4

Yes, that link is an article in Weisheipl’s book Nature and Motion in the Middle Ages.

Linus2nd

 

[lmelahn]

Sorry. I was trying to say that in the case of natural movement that it was not true that the mover be in contact with the moved object " here and now. " You said, " An effect depends on its per-se cause for its very existence, right now. For example, iron that is heated in fire is hot because it is being heated (now) by fire. Remove the iron from the fire, and it begins to cool immediately—the iron is incapable of maintaining itself hot. "

I was objecting to " right now " and " ( now ) " This is true in the example you used but it would not be the case in natural movements or in the case of thrown or ijected objects or in the case of Newton’s inertial motion or in any case where momentum or impetus was the cause of continued motion.

This is an important distinction because it is nearly universally true and has been so since the time of Aquinas that the phrase Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur has been interpreted to mean that it was always the case that there must always be a motor coniunctus and this is not true. And because of this misinterpretation modern philosophy of science has claimed that Thomas’ argument for God’s existence in First Way is not true.

Linus2nd

I think I see what you mean now, and perhaps my explanation was not clear.

I agree that what brings a natural object into motion (that which “moves” something in the active sense) need not be in contact with the thing that is “moved” (in the passive sense), once the thing has been set in motion. I am not arguing that point at all.

All that I am saying is that the movens (the active mover) is a per se cause only in the moments during which it is bringing the motus (the thing that is moved passively) from potency (e.g., rest) to act (e.g., rectilinear movement).

Once that change from potency to act is complete, the movens ceases to be a per se cause and becomes a per accidens cause. We can call it a per accidens cause because it used to be a per se cause.

In the case of the projectile motion, for example, the impetus is given at the beginning only (and any subsequent changes are caused by gravitation, wind resistance, or similar forces). The canon really does propel the cannonball into the air at first—and that is per se causality. Once the cannonball is clear of the cannon’s muzzle, the canon ceases to be a true cause of the cannonball’s motion at all. (Since it was a per se cause, we call it now a per accidens cause).

What is “causing” the motion of the cannonball after it is clear of the cannon? Only the intrinsic principles of the cannonball itself (apart from gravitation, wind resistance and similar forces).

By emphasizing that per se causes occur “now,” all I meant was that their effect ceases once they stop acting.

(Note that the effect of the cannon on the cannonball is to change its momentum. Once the cannonball is clear of the cannon, that effect ceases immediately. But of course the cannonball keeps whatever momentum it has gained, unless other forces—wind resistance, gravitation—change it anew.)

I suppose my example of the iron in the fire is leaving something understood: by acquiring heat, iron itself acquires an active potency to heat other things (like my hand, if I have the misfortune of touching it when it is still hot). However, the iron, unlike the fire, does not have an intrinsic principle that makes it hot. Rather, it receives its heat from outside itself (from the fire). So, as soon as the iron leaves the fire, although its natural tendency is to retain the heat, it immediately begins to act on other things. Since it has no capacity to produce heat, the heat dissipates gradually.

The projectile behaves similarly with respect to its momentum (with the difference that momentum has a direction): it acquires a lot of momentum by being fired from the cannon. It then loses or acquires momentum depending on the forces that act on it, and in which direction—but it would tend to keep its momentum if other things did not act upon it.

But those forces—for the duration of their action—are per se causes. We could say that in classical physics, an acceleration is always a sign of some per se cause of motion (i.e., something exerting a force).

 

[thinkandmull]

Fr. James A. Weisheipl, O.P. ( R.I.P. ) in Nature and Motion in the Middle Ages would disagree and he makes a good case that both Aristotle and Aquinas agree with him. He points out that according to Aristotle an accompanying mover is only necessary in motions which are contrary to nature. In things which move naturally, it is the generator of the form which is the mover or agent of motion ( the per se mover ).

Thus, in the inertial motion of Newton it would be the generator of the form of the object which is in motion which is the cause of the motion. The object itself moves naturally through the form generated by the generator of the form.

Again, a thrown ball is moved by an imparted impetus, where the impetus is a kind of secondary form altering the form of the ball. In this case there are two effecient or per se causes. One is the one who throws the ball and causes the impetus. The second is the generator of the form which allows the infulence of the impetus.

Likewise the natural motions of living things are accounted for by the generator of their natures.

In each of these cases there is no motor coniunctus, the objects move naturally.

Linus2nd

The generator of the form is God

 

[thinkandmull]

lmelahn, you are making this way to technical. In the very article in question Aquinas speaks of instantaneous motion. So even if we have an infinity of intermediate causes which must move simultaneously, they could still act together in an instant, and it would be no different from motions being remoted infinitely back in the past, or doing an infinite number of tasks toward the future.

When speaking of points on a line (in his treatise on angels), Aquinas says you cannot number all the points on a line, yet you can do this through time. See my point?

 

[thinkandmull]

But if the Earth revolved on its axis an infinity of times, there would still be no infinite sum, for one revolution is much like the rest.

Googled it. “I answer that, By faith alone do we hold, and by no demonstration can it be proved, that the world did not always exist” - 1 46 2 at newadvent.org/summa/1046.htm#article2.

That’s Aquinas’s argument and it doesn’t fly. An infinity can still be made up of finite units

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I think I see what you mean now, and perhaps my explanation was not clear.

I agree that what brings a natural object into motion (that which “moves” something in the active sense) need not be in contact with the thing that is “moved” (in the passive sense), once the thing has been set in motion. I am not arguing that point at all.

All that I am saying is that the movens (the active mover) is a per se cause only in the moments during which it is bringing the motus (the thing that is moved passively) from potency (e.g., rest) to act (e.g., rectilinear movement).

Once that change from potency to act is complete, the movens ceases to be a per se cause and becomes a per accidens cause. We can call it a per accidens cause because it used to be a per se cause.

In the case of the projectile motion, for example, the impetus is given at the beginning only (and any subsequent changes are caused by gravitation, wind resistance, or similar forces). The canon really does propel the cannonball into the air at first—and that is per se causality. Once the cannonball is clear of the cannon’s muzzle, the canon ceases to be a true cause of the cannonball’s motion at all. (Since it was a per se cause, we call it now a per accidens cause).

What is “causing” the motion of the cannonball after it is clear of the cannon? Only the intrinsic principles of the cannonball itself (apart from gravitation, wind resistance and similar forces).

By emphasizing that per se causes occur “now,” all I meant was that their effect ceases once they stop acting.

(Note that the effect of the cannon on the cannonball is to change its momentum. Once the cannonball is clear of the cannon, that effect ceases immediately. But of course the cannonball keeps whatever momentum it has gained, unless other forces—wind resistance, gravitation—change it anew.)

I suppose my example of the iron in the fire is leaving something understood: by acquiring heat, iron itself acquires an active potency to heat other things (like my hand, if I have the misfortune of touching it when it is still hot). However, the iron, unlike the fire, does not have an intrinsic principle that makes it hot. Rather, it receives its heat from outside itself (from the fire). So, as soon as the iron leaves the fire, although its natural tendency is to retain the heat, it immediately begins to act on other things. Since it has no capacity to produce heat, the heat dissipates gradually.

The projectile behaves similarly with respect to its momentum (with the difference that momentum has a direction): it acquires a lot of momentum by being fired from the cannon. It then loses or acquires momentum depending on the forces that act on it, and in which direction—but it would tend to keep its momentum if other things did not act upon it.

But those forces—for the duration of their action—are per se causes. We could say that in classical physics, an acceleration is always a sign of some per se cause of motion (i.e., something exerting a force).

Every thing is copesetic now. It was your example of fire that threw me off.

You know I tried that Jester site, got signed up as an " individual researcher " ( ha, ha ), got the article put on a shelf, but never could figure out how to read it online. Then I discovered it was an article by Weisheipl that was included in his book, which I have - and which I paid $140 for. ( sounds extreme but I spent a month reading it in a local science library, Linda Hall, and I wanted that book. It was the cheapest price I could find and I got it out of the Neatherlands of all places. ).

P.S. My Nephew has been accepted for the seminary for K.C., Mo. Since he is in his mid 30s he will start seminary life with two years of pre-theology in Connecticut.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

The generator of the form is God

Du bist recht.

Guten tag.

Linus2nd

 

[Aloysium]

. . . Aquinas says you cannot number all the points on a line, yet you can do this through time. . .

You can?
A photograph comes close to illustrating the possibility, but I don’t believe one can cut a line through time.
A camera takes an isolated frame created by the impact of light on a sensor.
Hubble records light from events billions of years ago.
As finite beings existing in and also outside of time, we exist in the moment witnessing time’s passage, remembering the past, imagining the future.

 

[thinkandmull]

Going from point A to B is going over an infinity of points. Aquinas thinks a movement on a line is different than the line itself. I don’t know. But the largest infinity of all would be eternal **time **, and I don’t think that’s possible. I would say to Aquinas “if that’s possible, than any infinity is possible”

 

[Aloysium]

Going from point A to B is going over an infinity of points. Aquinas thinks a movement on a line is different than the line itself. I don’t know. But the largest infinity of all would be eternal **time **, and I don’t think that’s possible. I would say to Aquinas “if that’s possible, than any infinity is possible”

:twocents: How about:

Time is not a simple line of causalities.
It seems more, a symphony of events
unfolding and of varying lengths,
some repeated as an underlying rhythm,
others coming into and out of existence,
in relation to, and dancing with one another;
an interplay of cosmic proportions
known by God, the eternal Now,
from whose breath we are,
participating in our moment.