Per se VS. accidental?

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That’s Aquinas’s argument and it doesn’t fly. An infinity can still be made up of finite units
In the example of a planet spinning on its axis forever, you appear to be saying you think there is a counter somewhere which will force the planet to stop when it reaches an infinite number of revolutions. There isn’t. And that’s Thomas’ argument.
 
Thus, in the inertial motion of Newton it would be the generator of the form of the object which is in motion which is the cause of the motion. The object itself moves naturally through the form generated by the generator of the form.
Suppose there is a body at rest (from the observer’s point of view)
This is off-topic but please indulge me.

Both of you are mixing concepts from Aristotle with modern science. As far as I’m aware, Aristotle thinks that his element earth wants to reach the center of planet Earth, which is his explanation for why objects fall. Modern science has shown that on the contrary, objects are acted upon, they are inert, hence the term inertia (and of course, the elements are not Aristotle’s water, earth, air and fire anyway). Aristotle also thinks there is a state of absolute rest, but modern science has shown that too is wrong, rest can only be relative to an observer, as Imelahn was careful to note.

One only has to look back through the thread to see that merging concepts from Aristotle with modern science in this way (while quietly ignoring his more obvious mistakes) results in a complicated patchwork which is, as the English say, neither use nor ornament. 🙂

Or, and this is the entire point of this post, am I missing something?
 
This is off-topic but please indulge me.

Both of you are mixing concepts from Aristotle with modern science. As far as I’m aware, Aristotle thinks that his element earth wants to reach the center of planet Earth, which is his explanation for why objects fall. Modern science has shown that on the contrary, objects are acted upon, they are inert, hence the term inertia (and of course, the elements are not Aristotle’s water, earth, air and fire anyway). Aristotle also thinks there is a state of absolute rest, but modern science has shown that too is wrong, rest can only be relative to an observer, as Imelahn was careful to note.

One only has to look back through the thread to see that merging concepts from Aristotle with modern science in this way (while quietly ignoring his more obvious mistakes) results in a complicated patchwork which is, as the English say, neither use nor ornament. 🙂

Or, and this is the entire point of this post, am I missing something?
I always find this an interesting question. Imelahn will answer for himself. But I will plow on until he finds time to step in. I won’t pretend to understand Relativity but irrespective of where observers are it is clear things are moving. Certainly Aristotle’s science was wrong. The point he was trying to make is that there are things which move naturally; that is, the motive principle for many of their acts lies within them and the source of this motive principle is their very nature, as determined by their form. And the form of all things is that interior principle which makes them both to be and to be what they are.

For example, the form of man is his soul. It is the soul which brings existence to man, which gives life to the body and which determines man to be what he is. The soul and the body, united in a single unit, comprise the nature of man ( his substance ) and it is the nature of man which is the source of all his natural activities.

Perhaps Imelahn will enlarge on my observations here, but that is how I would respond. The point to be made is not whether science finds this useful or even interesting. The point is that it is true and helps to explain who man is and this helps theology to explain how man fits into God’s plan as given in Revelation.

And while it is true that for centuries Revelation coupled with grace was forming God’s people, there are many things not specifically mentioned in Revelation. Shall we say that they were most certainly implied. But philosophy ( yes, and science too ) can and does throw much light on just who man is. In this way we can better understand better how we fit into the plan of Revelation.

Linus2nd
 
:twocents: How about:

Time is not a simple line of causalities.
It seems more, a symphony of events
unfolding and of varying lengths,
some repeated as an underlying rhythm,
others coming into and out of existence,
in relation to, and dancing with one another;
an interplay of cosmic proportions
known by God, the eternal Now,
from whose breath we are,
participating in our moment.
Worthy of a true poet. Very uplifting indeed.

Linus2nd
 
Every thing is copesetic now. It was your example of fire that threw me off.

You know I tried that Jester site, got signed up as an " individual researcher " ( ha, ha ), got the article put on a shelf, but never could figure out how to read it online. Then I discovered it was an article by Weisheipl that was included in his book, which I have - and which I paid $140 for. ( sounds extreme but I spent a month reading it in a local science library, Linda Hall, and I wanted that book. It was the cheapest price I could find and I got it out of the Neatherlands of all places. ).

P.S. My Nephew has been accepted for the seminary for K.C., Mo. Since he is in his mid 30s he will start seminary life with two years of pre-theology in Connecticut.

Linus2nd
If you have a recent enough browser, you should be able to read it right there on line.(Just log in, and then go to MyJSTOR->Shelf. Scroll to the bottom the page and click on “READ”.)

That is good news regarding your nephew. I will be sure to keep him in my prayers.
 
If you have a recent enough browser, you should be able to read it right there on line.(Just log in, and then go to MyJSTOR->Shelf. Scroll to the bottom the page and click on “READ”.)

That is good news regarding your nephew. I will be sure to keep him in my prayers.
Thanks for the prayers, he will need them.

I finally figured out MyJSTOR. Did you look up the article or did someone else? I practiced serching for the same article, just for practice. I found it and a lot of other entries which didn’t apply. I didn’t understand that. Well it’s a work in progress for me and will have to wait for awhile.

Linus2nd.
 
lmelahn, you are making this way to technical. In the very article in question Aquinas speaks of instantaneous motion. So even if we have an infinity of intermediate causes which must move simultaneously, they could still act together in an instant, and it would be no different from motions being remoted infinitely back in the past, or doing an infinite number of tasks toward the future.

When speaking of points on a line (in his treatise on angels), Aquinas says you cannot number all the points on a line, yet you can do this through time. See my point?
Sorry, I re-read your question. I think I was sleeping when I first read it, so let me try again, and with less technical language. 🙂

First of all, we need to understand the difference between essential and accidental cause, and the key idea for understanding that is dependence.

If the effect would cease immediately when the cause ceases, then that effect depends essentially (per se) on its cause cause. Otherwise, no.

The problem with an infinite series of essential causes is that an infinite series has no beginning. There is nothing on which the effects can depend. Hence, the effects would not be produced.

If, however, the effect we are considering is only accidentally dependent on its cause, there there is nothing preventing the effect from continuing on, even after the cause has gone out of existence.

We saw some examples: if I take cold iron, and place it in fire, the fire will change the iron from cold to hot. That change could not take place unless the iron were in the fire. Remove the iron from the fire, and heating immediately ceases: the effect (the change from cold to hot) depends essentially on the fire.

On the other hand, remove the iron and, for a time, the iron will remain hot. What is the cause of the heat in the iron? In a way, it is the fire, but now the situation is slightly different: the heat in the glowing iron does not depend on the fire. I could put the fire out, and the iron would stay hot (for a time). (If I could stop it from interacting with its environment somehow, it would stay hot indefinitely.) Hence, the heat depends now only accidentally on the fire.

That is the difference. Whether it helps us in proving something about the temporal beginning of the universe, is a different matter.

Instantaneous action (Aquinas does not actually employ the expression “instantaneous motion”) would be an example of essential (per se) cause. However, motion entails temporal succession, which includes a mix of both essential and accidental causes (similar to our iron example).

But is that part, at least, clear?

(Let’s tackle the problem of infinity once this part is cleared up.)
 
Sorry. I was trying to say that in the case of natural movement that it was not true that the mover be in contact with the moved object " here and now. " You said, " An effect depends on its per-se cause for its very existence, right now. For example, iron that is heated in fire is hot because it is being heated (now) by fire. Remove the iron from the fire, and it begins to cool immediately—the iron is incapable of maintaining itself hot. "

I was objecting to " right now " and " ( now ) " This is true in the example you used but it would not be the case in natural movements or in the case of thrown or ijected objects or in the case of Newton’s inertial motion or in any case where momentum or impetus was the cause of continued motion.

This is an important distinction because it is nearly universally true and has been so since the time of Aquinas that the phrase Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur has been interpreted to mean that it was always the case that there must always be a motor coniunctus and this is not true. And because of this misinterpretation modern philosophy of science has claimed that Thomas’ argument for God’s existence in First Way is not true.

Linus2nd
I think Fr. Weisheipl was correct in pointing out that Aristotle taught that a motor conjunctus is not required in all natural motions such as the falling or rising of heavy and light bodies. For example, if you dropped a rock, Aristotle thought that once the rock left your hand, the rock need not have any physical external mover to keep falling or moving. The rock has a natural accident which he called gravity which acts as a formal active principle of the continual motion of the rock but not as an efficient cause of the continual motion. The efficient cause of the falling rock’s motion is God, the first mover, who is the first cause of the substantial form of the rock and its accidents and who also keeps the very being of the rock and everything about it in existence at all moments of its existence.

Presently, we would hold that besides God there is an external phyical mover of the falling rock, namely, the earth’s gravity. However, we could still hold that the weight of the rock which is an accident (weight is synonymous with the Aristotlelian accident of gravity) is also a cause.

In the first way in the Summa Theologica, St Thomas does not restrict the argument to local motion or change of place but it includes other kinds of motion or change as well such as accidental alterations (cf. hot and cold). He also gives the definition of motion as the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. Potency and act are metaphysical concepts which divide being and every kind of being (first thesis of the 24 Thomistic theses). In this context, the older translation of the Summa Theologica by the fathers of the english dominican province (1911) or the new english translation by Fr Thomas Gilby et al, though not having the exact translation of “whatever is moved is moved by another” may be expressing the actual thought of Aquinas in the first way. Consequently, any kind of motion or change can be included in the first way according to not a few thomistic theologians.
 
I don’t believe there is a difference between per se and accident infinite remotion.

Aquinas says you could not do a task if it depended on your moving hand, which depended on your moving arm, which depended on your head, which depended on your twin’s soul, which depended on something else ect ect ect.

Now, suppose you woke up some morning and you saw a the dominoes series just finish: the last domino goes down. Suppose someone walked over and said “That series has been going on for all time, and just ended now.” That would be just like the situation described by Aquinas: one thing dependent on another going back forever. But that is exactly what the Kalam cosmological argument says is impossible, and yet Aquinas thinks there could have always been motion.

Aquinas response to the Kalam is here:

**Objection 6. Further, if the world always was, the consequence is that infinite days preceded this present day. But it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium. Therefore we should never have arrived at this present day; which is manifestly false.

Reply to Objection 6. Passage is always understood as being from term to term. Whatever bygone day we choose, from it to the present day there is a finite number of days which can be passed through. The objection is founded on the idea that, given two extremes, there is an infinite number of mean terms.**

I don’t see how we can defend Aquinas’s answer. The argument is not about the finite parts, but the infinite sum.
I believe other posters have pointed this out, but an accidental infinite regress series is linear in character and goes back in time. A member of this series need not actually exist in the here and now for some effect. For example, your great grandfather may have died before you were born from your parents. A per se series is vertical, every member of this series must exist in the here and now for the effect to actually exist in the here and now. If this per se series involved an infinite regress and which did not contain a first, at least outside the series, then how could you have an ultimate effect or final cause which effect is presumably the one your looking at here and now? An infinite series contains no first or last.
I don’t see how we can defend Aquinas’s answer. The argument is not about the finite parts, but the infinite sum.
In the reply to objection 6 you quote above, Aquinas may be arguing that what you call an infinite sum is not actually an infinite sum. An actually infinite sum has no beginning or end terms. However, if we suppose days had no beginning, each new day is making an addition to this supposedly infinite number of days. How do you make an addition to an infinite sum?
 
I think Fr. Weisheipl was correct in pointing out that Aristotle taught that a motor conjunctus is not required in all natural motions such as the falling or rising of heavy and light bodies. For example, if you dropped a rock, Aristotle thought that once the rock left your hand, the rock need not have any physical external mover to keep falling or moving. The rock has a natural accident which he called gravity which acts as a formal active principle of the continual motion of the rock but not as an efficient cause of the continual motion. The efficient cause of the falling rock’s motion is God, the first mover, who is the first cause of the substantial form of the rock and its accidents and who also keeps the very being of the rock and everything about it in existence at all moments of its existence.

Presently, we would hold that besides God there is an external phyical mover of the falling rock, namely, the earth’s gravity. However, we could still hold that the weight of the rock which is an accident (weight is synonymous with the Aristotlelian accident of gravity) is also a cause.

In the first way in the Summa Theologica, St Thomas does not restrict the argument to local motion or change of place but it includes other kinds of motion or change as well such as accidental alterations (cf. hot and cold). He also gives the definition of motion as the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. Potency and act are metaphysical concepts which divide being and every kind of being (first thesis of the 24 Thomistic theses). In this context, the older translation of the Summa Theologica by the fathers of the english dominican province (1911) or the new english translation by Fr Thomas Gilby et al, though not having the exact translation of “whatever is moved is moved by another” may be expressing the actual thought of Aquinas in the first way. Consequently, any kind of motion or change can be included in the first way according to not a few thomistic theologians.
I think we also may need to make a distinction between a physical conjoined mover, i.e., something created in the physical universe, and a metaphysical conjoined mover such as God. Take, for example, what St Thomas says here in ST,I,q.8, art.1, in the body of the article:

God is in all things; not, indeed, as part of their essence, nor as an accident, but as an agent is present to that upon which it works. For an agent must be joined to that wherein it acts immediately and touch it by its power; hence it is proved in Phys. vii that the thing moved and the mover must be joined together. Now since God is very being by His own essence, created being must be His proper effect; as to ignite is the proper effect of fire. Now God causes this effect in things not only when they first begin to be, but as long as they are preserved in being; as light is caused in the air by the sun as long as the air remains illuminated. Therefore as long as a thing has being, God must be present to it, according to its mode of being. But being is innermost in each thing and most fundamentally inherent in all things since it is formal in respect of everything found in a thing, as was shown above (Q[7], A[1]). Hence it must be that God is in all things, and innermostly.
 
In the example of a planet spinning on its axis forever, you appear to be saying you think there is a counter somewhere which will force the planet to stop when it reaches an infinite number of revolutions. There isn’t. And that’s Thomas’ argument.
No, my point is it doesn’t make sense to have a metronome going forever without it having been in a first position
 
Sorry, I re-read your question. I think I was sleeping when I first read it, so let me try again, and with less technical language. 🙂

First of all, we need to understand the difference between essential and accidental cause, and the key idea for understanding that is dependence.

If the effect would cease immediately when the cause ceases, then that effect depends essentially (per se) on its cause cause. Otherwise, no.

The problem with an infinite series of essential causes is that an infinite series has no beginning. There is nothing on which the effects can depend. Hence, the effects would not be produced.

If, however, the effect we are considering is only accidentally dependent on its cause, there there is nothing preventing the effect from continuing on, even after the cause has gone out of existence.

We saw some examples: if I take cold iron, and place it in fire, the fire will change the iron from cold to hot. That change could not take place unless the iron were in the fire. Remove the iron from the fire, and heating immediately ceases: the effect (the change from cold to hot) depends essentially on the fire.

On the other hand, remove the iron and, for a time, the iron will remain hot. What is the cause of the heat in the iron? In a way, it is the fire, but now the situation is slightly different: the heat in the glowing iron does not depend on the fire. I could put the fire out, and the iron would stay hot (for a time). (If I could stop it from interacting with its environment somehow, it would stay hot indefinitely.) Hence, the heat depends now only accidentally on the fire.

That is the difference. Whether it helps us in proving something about the temporal beginning of the universe, is a different matter.

Instantaneous action (Aquinas does not actually employ the expression “instantaneous motion”) would be an example of essential (per se) cause. However, motion entails temporal succession, which includes a mix of both essential and accidental causes (similar to our iron example).

But is that part, at least, clear?

(Let’s tackle the problem of infinity once this part is cleared up.)
Why can’t there be an instantaneous motion going infinitely fast, for example. The per se vs accidental distinction does not lead to any clarity
 
I think Fr. Weisheipl was correct in pointing out that Aristotle taught that a motor conjunctus is not required in all natural motions such as the falling or rising of heavy and light bodies. For example, if you dropped a rock, Aristotle thought that once the rock left your hand, the rock need not have any physical external mover to keep falling or moving. The rock has a natural accident which he called gravity which acts as a formal active principle of the continual motion of the rock but not as an efficient cause of the continual motion. The efficient cause of the falling rock’s motion is God, the first mover, who is the first cause of the substantial form of the rock and its accidents and who also keeps the very being of the rock and everything about it in existence at all moments of its existence.

Presently, we would hold that besides God there is an external phyical mover of the falling rock, namely, the earth’s gravity. However, we could still hold that the weight of the rock which is an accident (weight is synonymous with the Aristotlelian accident of gravity) is also a cause.

In the first way in the Summa Theologica, St Thomas does not restrict the argument to local motion or change of place but it includes other kinds of motion or change as well such as accidental alterations (cf. hot and cold). He also gives the definition of motion as the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. Potency and act are metaphysical concepts which divide being and every kind of being (first thesis of the 24 Thomistic theses). In this context, the older translation of the Summa Theologica by the fathers of the english dominican province (1911) or the new english translation by Fr Thomas Gilby et al, though not having the exact translation of “whatever is moved is moved by another” may be expressing the actual thought of Aquinas in the first way. Consequently, any kind of motion or change can be included in the first way according to not a few thomistic theologians.
If you read the Third Way, you’ll see Aquinas mentions the second way as support. The First Way needs the Second as support too. In fact, why can’t there just be an infinity of physical causes and nothing else. God is not part of the physical action. So then the first way is dependent on the Third Way. That’s fine with me. But I don’t see how, if motion could always have been, why there could not be an infinity of God’s, one greater than the other, which acts instantaneously without time per se
 
I believe other posters have pointed this out, but an accidental infinite regress series is linear in character and goes back in time. A member of this series need not actually exist in the here and now for some effect. For example, your great grandfather may have died before you were born from your parents. A per se series is vertical, every member of this series must exist in the here and now for the effect to actually exist in the here and now. If this per se series involved an infinite regress and which did not contain a first, at least outside the series, then how could you have an ultimate effect or final cause which effect is presumably the one your looking at here and now? An infinite series contains no first or last.

In the reply to objection 6 you quote above, Aquinas may be arguing that what you call an infinite sum is not actually an infinite sum. An actually infinite sum has no beginning or end terms. However, if we suppose days had no beginning, each new day is making an addition to this supposedly infinite number of days. How do you make an addition to an infinite sum?
Add odd numbers to all the even
 
I always find this an interesting question. Imelahn will answer for himself. But I will plow on until he finds time to step in. I won’t pretend to understand Relativity but irrespective of where observers are it is clear things are moving. Certainly Aristotle’s science was wrong. The point he was trying to make is that there are things which move naturally; that is, the motive principle for many of their acts lies within them and the source of this motive principle is their very nature, as determined by their form. And the form of all things is that interior principle which makes them both to be and to be what they are.

For example, the form of man is his soul. It is the soul which brings existence to man, which gives life to the body and which determines man to be what he is. The soul and the body, united in a single unit, comprise the nature of man ( his substance ) and it is the nature of man which is the source of all his natural activities.

Perhaps Imelahn will enlarge on my observations here, but that is how I would respond. The point to be made is not whether science finds this useful or even interesting. The point is that it is true and helps to explain who man is and this helps theology to explain how man fits into God’s plan as given in Revelation.

And while it is true that for centuries Revelation coupled with grace was forming God’s people, there are many things not specifically mentioned in Revelation. Shall we say that they were most certainly implied. But philosophy ( yes, and science too ) can and does throw much light on just who man is. In this way we can better understand better how we fit into the plan of Revelation.
Thanks for replying. Though my question wasn’t about science, or about Aristotle. It is specific to you and Imelahn. Both of you mix Aristotlean concepts with modern science, a bit of essence here, a bit of inertia there, a dab of potencia here, a dab of relativity there, which results in a complicated patchwork quilt which isn’t true to Aristotle or to modern science. You may not realize how complicated you make even the simplest of things by mixing the two systems ad hoc without any synthesis going on.

It is Imelahn’s and your mixing of the two systems of thought which intrigues me. It doesn’t generate any new knowledge, it just seems to obfuscate. Is it a desperate last attempt to rescue scholasticism or something?

btw the relativity only needs to be Galilean relativity, the kind used by all navigators for centuries.
 
Thanks for replying. Though my question wasn’t about science, or about Aristotle. It is specific to you and Imelahn. Both of you mix Aristotlean concepts with modern science, a bit of essence here, a bit of inertia there, a dab of potencia here, a dab of relativity there, which results in a complicated patchwork quilt which isn’t true to Aristotle or to modern science. You may not realize how complicated you make even the simplest of things by mixing the two systems ad hoc without any synthesis going on.

It is Imelahn’s and your mixing of the two systems of thought which intrigues me. It doesn’t generate any new knowledge, it just seems to obfuscate. Is it a desperate last attempt to rescue scholasticism or something?

btw the relativity only needs to be Galilean relativity, the kind used by all navigators for centuries.
I can only answer for myself. There is nothing " ad hoc " about A/T philosophy. It applies to all of existence. Some claiming to represent the views of modern science have claimed that since Hume A/T philosophy is no longer relevant. I have merely pointed out that it is indeed relevant even for science. In addition, it contributes to a more clear understanding of Revelation itself. It further contributes to a better understanding of human psychology by rescuing culture from incorrect interpretation of human psychology and how man understands reality, saving him from various forms of idealism, skepticism, and solipsism.

Linus2nd
 
I can only answer for myself. There is nothing " ad hoc " about A/T philosophy. It applies to all of existence. Some claiming to represent the views of modern science have claimed that since Hume A/T philosophy is no longer relevant. I have merely pointed out that it is indeed relevant even for science. In addition, it contributes to a more clear understanding of Revelation itself. It further contributes to a better understanding of human psychology by rescuing culture from incorrect interpretation of human psychology and how man understands reality, saving him from various forms of idealism, skepticism, and solipsism.
Sorry but you’re still misunderstanding what I’m asking. My question had nothing to do with Thomas, nothing to do with Aristotle, and nothing to do with science. My question was aimed only at you Linus and you Imelahn, as you are the only two people I have ever met who make your own complicated ad hoc mash up of Aristotle with modern science. So again, my question is about neither Thomas nor Aristotle, neither death nor life, neither angels nor demons, neither the present nor the future, nor any powers, neither height nor depth, nor anything else in all creation, except for your, Linus, personal mixing of Aristotle with modern science, and why you, Linus, only Linus, just Linus, no one but Linus, do it when it’s not being true to Aristotle or to modern science but just seems to complicate everything to no purpose.

I’m going out to look at the mountains now. It calms me. I may be gone sometime. 😃
 
Why can’t there be an instantaneous motion going infinitely fast, for example.
I have to think about that one, but I don’t think it is possible. Motion means a change that entails passing through intermediate stages in a continuous way. It seems to me that the only kind of instantaneous “motion” that there can be would be something that does not pass through any intermediate steps.

Do you see what I mean? I suppose that God could command iron to go from cold to hot without it passing through the intervening temperatures, or command a rock or something to disappear from one place and reappear in another at the same moment. However, this is discontinuous change, not exactly infinitely fast motion.

As far as really passing through the intermediate stages, infinitely fast, don’t think it can be done. Time is just the measure of change, so if you pass form one state to another in a continuous manner, it has to take a continuous stretch of time (even if it is a very small amount of time). “Speed” is the change in distance (or, in any event, the change in the quantity being measured) over time, so to get an infinite speed, you would need the change to occur in zero time—an impossible situation.

(Then, in the real world, you will end up coming against the limits imposed by relativity.)
The per se vs accidental distinction does not lead to any clarity
But did you see how the impossibility of infinite regress is much easier to justify when we consider only per-se causes? When the per-se cause ceases, the effect also ceases at the same moment. Accidental causes do not have this property—their effects can continue on even when the causes have ceased.
 
This is off-topic but please indulge me.

Both of you are mixing concepts from Aristotle with modern science.
Not exactly. I think that Aristotle’s principles—act/potency, substance/accident, matter/form, cause/effect, and so on—are still basically valid. Of course, his theory of four elements and the circular movement of the planets and so on has been superseded. We are aware of that.
As far as I’m aware, Aristotle thinks that his element earth wants to reach the center of planet Earth, which is his explanation for why objects fall.
That is correct. His theory is that heavy elements (water and especially earth) tend to downward movement. (The “light” elements—air and fire—tend to upward movement; they get mixed together, so to speak, because of the circular movement of the planets.) That theory has been superseded, as I mentioned, but his theory of causality—which does not depend on his cosmological theory—is not really undermined by the advent of Newtonian mechanics.
Modern science has shown that on the contrary, objects are acted upon, they are inert, hence the term inertia (and of course, the elements are not Aristotle’s water, earth, air and fire anyway). Aristotle also thinks there is a state of absolute rest, but modern science has shown that too is wrong, rest can only be relative to an observer, as Imelahn was careful to note.
Oddly enough, it was not Aristotle who thought there was absolute rest, as you might expect, but Newton. Newton was well known (and heavily criticized later on) for advocating an absolute space and time. He even proposed experiments for detecting them (although he does not seem to have carried them out, because if he had, he would have had to abandon absolute space and time).

Aristotle certainly considered the earth the center of the known universe, but if you read his Physics you realize that he understands that rest and movement are relative to the earth. He also broadens “rest” and “movement” to types of change that do not have to do directly with changes in position. For example, a heated lump of metal returns to a state of “rest” (coldness) after it is heated.

The idea of inertia and the application of forces actually fits quite nicely with the concepts of act and potency, as well as cause and effect.
One only has to look back through the thread to see that merging concepts from Aristotle with modern science in this way (while quietly ignoring his more obvious mistakes) results in a complicated patchwork which is, as the English say, neither use nor ornament. 🙂
Or, and this is the entire point of this post, am I missing something?
There is no problem in applying the perennially valid aspects of Aristotle’s thought to modern scientific advances. You just have to understand that Aristotle’s theory works on a different level, so to speak, from modern physics. (E.g., Aristotle’s “matter” and physical “matter” in modern physics are two very different concepts, and they should not be mixed up.)
 
Sorry but you’re still misunderstanding what I’m asking. My question had nothing to do with Thomas, nothing to do with Aristotle, and nothing to do with science. My question was aimed only at you Linus and you Imelahn, as you are the only two people I have ever met who make your own complicated ad hoc mash up of Aristotle with modern science. So again, my question is about neither Thomas nor Aristotle, neither death nor life, neither angels nor demons, neither the present nor the future, nor any powers, neither height nor depth, nor anything else in all creation, except for your, Linus, personal mixing of Aristotle with modern science, and why you, Linus, only Linus, just Linus, no one but Linus, do it when it’s not being true to Aristotle or to modern science but just seems to complicate everything to no purpose.

I’m going out to look at the mountains now. It calms me. I may be gone sometime. 😃
You are obviously objecting to something I said in post #23, but I can’t see what it is specifically. Perhaps you could cite the offending paragraph?

Linus2nd
 
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