Ok. I don’t want to get too much into this since it’s not my main point, but I can’t help observing one thing. In the examples you cited (putting down a horse or dog), there is generally a presumption against doing this without a very good reason. In both you examples, you give such reasons. The simple fact that I own the horse or dog does not give me the moral right to put it down. In fact, I expect we would say that I have an obligation to protect the animal’s well-being and that putting it down may only be done for a compelling reason (the animal is suffering and will not heal).
Now, if you are comparing the case of the fetus to this, it seems you would have to agree that one does not have the ability to abort on demand, but only for a compelling reason. So, even if you are granting less than I would like, your examples still seem to imply that there is a strong presumption against aborting a fetus except for a compelling reason.
I can understand how you’d draw this implication from the examples I raised, but the only analogy I wished to call attention to was an action’s being lamentable but not morally forbidden. I don’t think these actions need be such that their performance is only prudent or moral if they’re demanded by some compelling reason.
- If the being that was the fetus (F) no longer exists, what happened to it? When did it cease to exist. Every major organic part of F is still in organic existence (though transformed and developed). Every part of F has developed into me. All of me has developed from F. And by the basic metaphysical principle we are using, if a being has once existed and has never ceased to exist, it exists today. This seems to be the case with the being that was the fetus.
I think the fetus became me when it developed the in principle ability to access mental states, like pain.
- At most this would force you to choose between which is more warranted, the claim that I was once a fetus or the claim that souls do not exist. Given the strength of the argument that I was once a fetus, one might easily make that choice.
I suppose some might find substance dualism more plausible than that they weren’t fetuses.
- But would it require even this? The problem with your objection is that it could work just as well against the claim that I am the same being I was 10 years ago, as the claim that I am the same being I was as a fetus.
I’m not sure what objection you have in mind. The whole material continuity thing was my attempt to figure out what you thought persisted throughout the changes. As I suggested, it doesn’t seem like material could perform this job since the material that composed the embryo is probably entirely different from that which composes the fetus. You called me out on this, suggesting material replaces approximately every 7 years, I’m not really in a position to defend my original claim. But, I still don’t think material could be the thing which subsists throughout change since the fetus would be composed of matter that didn’t form the embryo. So, we’d have to ad hocly select which matter persists. Even then, it’d eventually all get swapped out.
In short, it seems that if I accept your argument against the claim that I was once a fetus, I will also be forced to accept the absurd claim that I was never once a child.
I’m not sure which argument you’re talking about. I only suggested matter couldn’t be a candidate for the persisting thing since matter swaps periodically.
Now, I actually agree with some of your points about the metaphysics of personal identity. I haven’t fully decided but actually suspect that you have given a good argument for the existence of the soul (might be fun to try out on another thread). Since, I swap out all the particles in my body every 10 years, and still remain me, the existence of a soul does strike me as a good way of explaining the continuity of personal identity over time.
This is actually an adaptation of the
Theseus Ship paradox made by Chisolm. He called this adaptation the Entia Successiva argument. Zimmerman uses a version of it in
Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion.
It seems pretty vulnerable to parodies though:
Between time t1 and t2, the USS Enterprise will have each of its composing particles replaced by a different one. Yet, the USS Enterprise persists throughout this change. Therefore, the Enterprise is other than its composing particles: therefore the USS Enterprise is immaterial.