Philosophical Dilemma of Free Will

[Ghosty]

Hmmm, I’ve never heard Catholics argue for the libertarian standpoint. In fact, I think the libertarian standpoint is logically inconsistant within its own framework; it’s an elaborate logical fallacy, IMO.

I think the resistance you’re seeing here is that Catholic theology doesn’t accept the premises of the philosophical questions your dealing with. So while the Catholic answer resembles the compatibalist conclusion, it doesn’t stem from compatibalist argument. Catholics tend to have a strong aversion to the assumptions that are required in “naturalist” philosophical discussions.

To put it another way, Catholics start with the assumption of “will”, because it is a theological truth. We then ask what does it mean for a will to be free? Naturalists, it seems, start with the assumption of what it means to be free, as freedom of motion can theoretically be observed, and then work on the naturalistically hazy concept of “will”.

One of the defining aspects of “will” in Catholic theology is that it comes from within, and it makes decisions, and decisions are, by definition, definative (how’s that for a sentance?). After all, what is a decisive action but the defining of reality? This assumption automatically rules out the logically inconsistant libertarian position, which asks us to accept the concept of decision, but rejects the definative nature of decision-making. When you factor in the concept of eternity existing alongside the temporal, as Catholics accept as revealed truth (and indeed God’s name “I Am that Is” is nothing less than a statement of this fact), the libertarian position becomes almost comical, IMO.

Catholics may sound like libertarians because of our absolute insistance on freedom of will, but our language must be understood on the premise that we understand will as being primary, and free being secondary; free is the adjective, after all. A will can’t be free from being a will, a defining thing, and still be a will. Libertarians argue for what you could call a “willful free”, whatever the heck that is

At the same time, we reject the assumptions of many compatibalists on theological grounds, so our view is sometimes hard to pigeonhole from naturalistic philosophical model; we’ll always be St. Thomas Aquinas no matter how much we quote Aristotle

Peace and God bless!

 

[Philthy]

michaelgazin:

It seems that the problem you are having is purely a semantics one. You agree with the comments I make (in a rather unwilling way i.e. ‘so what’), yet somehow continue to disagree because of the undesireable outcome agreed to.

No, that is not an accurate characterization. I disagree that God’s knowledge interferes with the exercise of free will. I am not running from an undesireable outcomes. Those undesireable outcomes do not support the original conclusion that “free choice is an illusion”; that is why I reply with “so what”.

michaelgazin:

So according to you we have freedom of will, freedom of choice, and we can’t choose anything besides the orange…so what? That is exactly what.

“Can’t choose” is not the best articulation of what happens. We **won’t **choose the apple, but we still exercise our free will even if the outcome of that free will choice is known in advance. And only because it is known in advance do we place a limit on the outcome of the execution of our free will; it does not mean free will has been eliminated. Keep wrestling with this.
You never commented on my time travel example, nor have you specified in what way God’s knowledge impairs our choice. You need to do that. All you have done, repeatedly, is realized that once we KNOW the outcome of a future event, then no other outcome is possible. That is simply what it means to KNOW something. That has no relationship to the existence of free will.

michaelgazin:

Here is the breakdown of your comments:

**michaelgazin: **it is impossible for me to choose any other option.
**philthy: **so what

More accurate to say that it is impossible for me to exercise my free will to do anything other than what we know will happen. If you could, that simply means it wasn’t known - nothing more. It doesn’t mean free will has been effected at all.

michaelgazin:

michaelgazin: it is simply an impossibility to choose anything besides the orange.
**philthy: **Correct.
So you are agreeing to the argument’s outcome.

I don’t think so. Lets find your arguments final conclusion and see if it matches up:

michaelgazin:

1. Therefore, freedom of choice is an illusion.

Simply because it is an impossibility to choose anything else does NOT mean that freedom of choice is an illusion. They are unrelated.

michaelgazin:

Regardless of the definition you apply to free will, your answers to the dilemma are quite clear:

**Freedom to will a choice contrary to God’s knowledge of your ultimate singular choice? **no

Here, again, you have simply stated what it means for God to know something. Obviously nothing will occur differently than Gods knowledge of it, that’s what it means to have knowledge of it. That reality, however, does not illiminate our free will in choosing, and doesn’t even CAUSE the choice, it simply reveals what the choice will be.

Sorry if you feel Im being argumentative…

Phil

 

[buffalo]

From the Catholic Encyclopedia -
Free Will

 

[RobNY]

michaelgazin: it is simply an impossibility to choose anything besides the orange.
**philthy: **Correct.
So you are agreeing to the argument’s outcome.

1. Therefore, freedom of choice is an illusion.

Perhaps this is the hangup-- it isn’t impossible to choose anything else because God knows you will choose something else, it is impossible to choose something else because you *already have *chosen something else. And since you have already chosen, it is impossible to choose anything else. (Because a choice, as such, is irreversible.)

Does this help, Michael?

Oh, and I’ve been wondering, would anyone like to co-found a Ghosty Fan Club?