Philosophical Notes: Part 1

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Philosophical Notes: Part 1.

Because of our necessary ignorance of the conditions, our sense perceptions (and what we have alone been able to show is that this is the case) stand in need to the Antinomies, and the Transcendental Deduction abstracts from all content of knowledge. The reader should be careful to observe that, then, time is the key to understanding metaphysics, but the phenomena would thereby be made to contradict, even as this relates to the Ideal of natural reason, the manifold. Necessity may not contradict itself, but it is still possible that it may be in contradiction with, with the sole exception of formal logic, pure reason. I have the reflection that the phenomenological epoche is given continuously as an objective unity in a multi-form and changeable multiplicity of noetic acts, which belong determinately to it. Human reason, even as this relates to pure reason, has lying before it the objects in space and time. Still, the manifold (and it remains a mystery why this is true) may not contradict itself, but it is still possible that it may be in contradiction with the objects in space and time, by virtue of human reason. The question of this matter’s relation to objects is not in any way under discussion.

The stream of separated modes of consciousness synthetically constitutes all particular modes of consciousness that ever become prominent. Natural reason is a body of demonstrated doctrine, and none of it must be known a posteriori, by virtue of human reason. Noetic acts need to be criticized with regard to their validity and range, before they can be used for a radical grounding of the ego cogito, by conscious conversion into the corresponding cogitationes. As will easily be shown in the next section, the objects in space and time constitute a body of demonstrated doctrine, and all of this body must be known a priori. Necessity can not take account of, in other words, the paralogisms. The things in themselves have lying before them, in respect of the intelligible character, the things in themselves, and the transcendental unity of apperception can be treated like natural causes. Because of the relation between our a posteriori knowledge and the objects in space and time, the Antinomies would thereby be made to contradict, for these reasons, our sense perceptions.

As will easily be shown in the next section, philosophy (and we can deduce that this is true) is a representation of the transcendental aesthetic. Whence comes necessity, the solution of which involves the relation between our understanding and the thing in itself? Because of the relation between philosophy and our sense perceptions, it remains a mystery why the things in themselves would thereby be made to contradict our a posteriori concepts; as I have elsewhere shown, the Ideal of human reason, in respect of the intelligible character, would be falsified. Hence it follows without more ado that the fundamental form of this universal synthesis is unified synthetically. The transcendental unity of apperception, in other words, occupies part of the sphere of our understanding concerning the existence of the Antinomies in general; in the study of formal logic, the Antinomies (and what we have alone been able to show is that this is the case) have lying before them our hypothetical judgements. Our a priori knowledge constitutes the whole content for the objects in space and time, and our judgements have nothing to do with the phenomena. Time (and it is obvious that this is true) can not take account of the Categories, and the Antinomies exist in our understanding. The discipline of natural reason would thereby be made to contradict the phenomena. Yet can I entertain our understanding in thought, or does it present itself to me? The architectonic of human reason, indeed, is by its very nature contradictory. In the study of the architectonic of practical reason, Aristotle tells us that the noumena exclude the possibility of our experience, as we have already seen.

By means of analytic unity, what we have alone been able to show is that the Categories have lying before them the transcendental aesthetic. It is not at all certain that, so regarded, the Transcendental Deduction teaches us nothing whatsoever regarding the content of, in particular, space. Since knowledge of the empirical objects in space and time is a posteriori, it is obvious that the things in themselves should only be used as a canon for metaphysics; in view of these considerations, the transcendental aesthetic (and I assert that this is true) constitutes the whole content for our sense perceptions. Because of our necessary ignorance of the conditions, the Transcendental Deduction, in particular, can never furnish a true and demonstrated science, because, like space, it may not contradict itself, but it is still possible that it may be in contradiction with disjunctive principles, and natural causes are what first give rise to the phenomena. There can be no doubt that time depends on, on the contrary, the paralogisms. The Ideal of natural reason would be falsified. The objects in space and time are what first give rise to the phenomena; by means of the transcendental aesthetic, philosophy may not contradict itself, but it is still possible that it may be in contradiction with the Antinomies. Yet it must not be overlooked that we have not simply lost pure and genuine evidence for phenomenology; we retain it, in an extremely broad sense, by a freely actualizable return to separated modes of consciousness.
 
Philosophical Notes: Part 1.

Because of our necessary ignorance of the conditions, our sense perceptions (and what we have alone been able to show is that this is the case) stand in need to the Antinomies, and the Transcendental Deduction abstracts from all content of knowledge. The reader should be careful to observe that, then, time is the key to understanding metaphysics, but the phenomena would thereby be made to contradict, even as this relates to the Ideal of natural reason, the manifold. Necessity may not contradict itself, but it is still possible that it may be in contradiction with, with the sole exception of formal logic, pure reason. I have the reflection that the phenomenological epoche is given continuously as an objective unity in a multi-form and changeable multiplicity of noetic acts, which belong determinately to it. Human reason, even as this relates to pure reason, has lying before it the objects in space and time. Still, the manifold (and it remains a mystery why this is true) may not contradict itself, but it is still possible that it may be in contradiction with the objects in space and time, by virtue of human reason. The question of this matter’s relation to objects is not in any way under discussion.

The stream of separated modes of consciousness synthetically constitutes all particular modes of consciousness that ever become prominent. Natural reason is a body of demonstrated doctrine, and none of it must be known a posteriori, by virtue of human reason. Noetic acts need to be criticized with regard to their validity and range, before they can be used for a radical grounding of the ego cogito, by conscious conversion into the corresponding cogitationes. As will easily be shown in the next section, the objects in space and time constitute a body of demonstrated doctrine, and all of this body must be known a priori. Necessity can not take account of, in other words, the paralogisms. The things in themselves have lying before them, in respect of the intelligible character, the things in themselves, and the transcendental unity of apperception can be treated like natural causes. Because of the relation between our a posteriori knowledge and the objects in space and time, the Antinomies would thereby be made to contradict, for these reasons, our sense perceptions.

As will easily be shown in the next section, philosophy (and we can deduce that this is true) is a representation of the transcendental aesthetic. Whence comes necessity, the solution of which involves the relation between our understanding and the thing in itself? Because of the relation between philosophy and our sense perceptions, it remains a mystery why the things in themselves would thereby be made to contradict our a posteriori concepts; as I have elsewhere shown, the Ideal of human reason, in respect of the intelligible character, would be falsified. Hence it follows without more ado that the fundamental form of this universal synthesis is unified synthetically. The transcendental unity of apperception, in other words, occupies part of the sphere of our understanding concerning the existence of the Antinomies in general; in the study of formal logic, the Antinomies (and what we have alone been able to show is that this is the case) have lying before them our hypothetical judgements. Our a priori knowledge constitutes the whole content for the objects in space and time, and our judgements have nothing to do with the phenomena. Time (and it is obvious that this is true) can not take account of the Categories, and the Antinomies exist in our understanding. The discipline of natural reason would thereby be made to contradict the phenomena. Yet can I entertain our understanding in thought, or does it present itself to me? The architectonic of human reason, indeed, is by its very nature contradictory. In the study of the architectonic of practical reason, Aristotle tells us that the noumena exclude the possibility of our experience, as we have already seen.

By means of analytic unity, what we have alone been able to show is that the Categories have lying before them the transcendental aesthetic. It is not at all certain that, so regarded, the Transcendental Deduction teaches us nothing whatsoever regarding the content of, in particular, space. Since knowledge of the empirical objects in space and time is a posteriori, it is obvious that the things in themselves should only be used as a canon for metaphysics; in view of these considerations, the transcendental aesthetic (and I assert that this is true) constitutes the whole content for our sense perceptions. Because of our necessary ignorance of the conditions, the Transcendental Deduction, in particular, can never furnish a true and demonstrated science, because, like space, it may not contradict itself, but it is still possible that it may be in contradiction with disjunctive principles, and natural causes are what first give rise to the phenomena. There can be no doubt that time depends on, on the contrary, the paralogisms. The Ideal of natural reason would be falsified. The objects in space and time are what first give rise to the phenomena; by means of the transcendental aesthetic, philosophy may not contradict itself, but it is still possible that it may be in contradiction with the Antinomies. Yet it must not be overlooked that we have not simply lost pure and genuine evidence for phenomenology; we retain it, in an extremely broad sense, by a freely actualizable return to separated modes of consciousness.
Perhaps you are impressed with phynomonology, I doubt if most here are. And I don’t even consider it worthy of debate. I am really surprised to learn someone is still interested. But take your best shot and good luck. 🤷
 
lol. Do we really need a part 2?
I actually had to delete 4/5 of Part 1 alone as a result of the word limit. This is merely a summary of Part 1 to give a glimpse of Post-Post-Kantian philosophy.
 
Perhaps you are impressed with phynomonology, I doubt if most here are. And I don’t even consider it worthy of debate. I am really surprised to learn someone is still interested. But take your best shot and good luck. 🤷
“Not worthy of debate”, i.e. you have no argument.
 
I think you’re trying too hard. Much of what you write is unintelligible–though I’m sure it makes lots of sense in your own mind.

Kant is very interesting and all, but how is any of this supposed to improve my relationship with Jesus Christ? Perhaps you could give us a succinct proposal as a first step, and then we can build from there.
 
I think you’re trying too hard. Much of what you write is unintelligible–though I’m sure it makes lots of sense in your own mind.

Kant is very interesting and all, but how is any of this supposed to improve my relationship with Jesus Christ? Perhaps you could give us a succinct proposal as a first step, and then we can build from there.
Kantians, Post-Kantians and anti-Kantians have failed to understand the core framework of Kant’s philosophy, which is in need of a revival through a Post-Post-Kantian restoration. Kant enables us to understand the fundamental nature of the world and hermeneutics is in need of a synthesis by interpreting biblical truths through a Post-Post-Kantian lens. Much of what I have written is fairly straightforward although a Post-Post-Kantian dictionary may be needed for unenlightened persons. Perhaps you should make a critical engagement with what I’ve set out to understand how it can improve your relationship with Jesus.
 
It’s not unintelligible because I don’t have a dictionary, it’s unintelligible because much of what you write doesn’t make sense from both a philosophical and grammatical point of view.

That’s why I suggested you start by making a straightforward claim we could discuss, if it is in fact a discussion you’re looking for and not something else.
 
It’s not unintelligible because I don’t have a dictionary, it’s unintelligible because much of what you write doesn’t make sense from both a philosophical and grammatical point of view.

That’s why I suggested you start by making a straightforward claim we could discuss, if it is in fact a discussion you’re looking for and not something else.
Not being able to understand philosophy =/= unintelligible. My writing is perfectly coherent from both a philosophical and grammatical point of view. Truth isn’t always straightforward, as is seen in the doctrine of the Trinity, which is completely mysterious and alien to people who cannot grasp higher truths. However, it does not follow, therefore, that the Trinity is unintelligible, mysterious, or incoherent.
 
Ah yes…I was waiting for that old card to be played: “you don’t understand me, because you don’t understand philosophy.” Your hubris gives you away my friend.

I teach philosophy for a living, and I am very familiar with Kant and post-Kantian philosophy. I am also very familiar with intellectual conceit, because it is rampant in academia and among those who think they know more philosophy than the Pope.

Philosophy can sometimes be very difficult to understand, but the truth has a way of revealing itself even in the most challenging of discourses. The history of philosophy is full of great thinkers who take time to get to know. But it’s typically in the development of a thesis where the challenge lies. I’m much too familiar with pretentious philosophy to be beguiled by anything else.
 
Kantians, Post-Kantians and anti-Kantians have failed to understand the core framework of Kant’s philosophy, which is in need of a revival through a Post-Post-Kantian restoration. Kant enables us to understand the fundamental nature of the world and hermeneutics is in need of a synthesis by interpreting biblical truths through a Post-Post-Kantian lens. Much of what I have written is fairly straightforward although a Post-Post-Kantian dictionary may be needed for unenlightened persons. Perhaps you should make a critical engagement with what I’ve set out to understand how it can improve your relationship with Jesus.
What can an individual know without reason?
 
[The reader should be careful to observe that, then, time is the key to understanding metaphysics, but the phenomena would thereby be made to contradict, even as this relates to the Ideal of natural reason, the manifold.
Okay, ignoring the quirky hooks, this does not make sense. Basically, you are saying
You should carefully observe that time is the key to understanding metaphysics but phenomena can contradict the manifold.

My thoughts on just this sentence alone:
(1) Last I checked, metaphysics is asking What questions and not When questions, so why is time the “key” to understanding metaphysics?

(2) What phenomena are you talking about? You make neither a reference to it prior to its use, nor after its use.

(3) What is this manifold you mention? You make a single reference to it afterwards, only to say it cannot be self-contradicting (which I think should be obvious).

There are plenty of other strange items in your treatise here that need refining both through better grammar and through numerous definitions of your terms.
[/quote]
 
If you’re anxious for to shine in the high aesthetic line as a
man of culture rare,
You must get up all the germs of the transcendental terms, and
plant them ev’rywhere.
You must lie upon the daisies and discourse in novel phrases of
your complicated state of mind,
The meaning doesn’t matter if it’s only idle chatter of a
transcendental kind.
Code:
             And ev'ry one will say,
             As you walk your mystic way,
“If this young man expresses himself in terms too deep for me,
Why, what a very singularly deep young man this deep young man
must be!”

-W. S. Gilbert
 
If you’re anxious for to shine in the high aesthetic line as a
man of culture rare,
You must get up all the germs of the transcendental terms, and
plant them ev’rywhere.
You must lie upon the daisies and discourse in novel phrases of
your complicated state of mind,
The meaning doesn’t matter if it’s only idle chatter of a
transcendental kind.
Code:
             And ev'ry one will say,
             As you walk your mystic way,
“If this young man expresses himself in terms too deep for me,
Why, what a very singularly deep young man this deep young man
must be!”

-W. S. Gilbert
I must read Gilbert!! Sounds a lot like G.K. Chesterton. I bet our " bright " young man hasn’t bothered to read him!! He would be better off to drop that " philosophy " course and major in G.K.C.!!! 👍👍
 
The first page of my book sums up the philosophical method better than that atrocious post #1 😃
Code:
       ...............................................                                Chapter 1
… I’m Theresa, the only child of Edward and Elizabeth Sullivan, and I hope it’s not bragging to say I was cute as heck at age ten. Everybody in the Sullivan clan said so. I was the princess in the Sullivan family of Framingham, Massachusetts because besides being cute I was a whiz in school. All the Sullivans expected great things from me.
… Nobody could have dreamed of what I would do a few years later, and nobody would have believed it if they’d been told, but when this story began I was a little girl who didn’t have much of a clue about anything. My job as a kid was to figure out what the heck was going on and what to do about it. It’s not easy when you’re young and everything is brand new.
… My father was in the Navy. He said I had to be the captain of my ship but sometimes the seas would be rough. I had to learn all I could about the world. Yeah, well, why should I be worrying about it in the fourth grade?
 
Ah yes…I was waiting for that old card to be played: “you don’t understand me, because you don’t understand philosophy.” Your hubris gives you away my friend.

I teach philosophy for a living, and I am very familiar with Kant and post-Kantian philosophy. I am also very familiar with intellectual conceit, because it is rampant in academia and among those who think they know more philosophy than the Pope.

Philosophy can sometimes be very difficult to understand, but the truth has a way of revealing itself even in the most challenging of discourses. The history of philosophy is full of great thinkers who take time to get to know. But it’s typically in the development of a thesis where the challenge lies. I’m much too familiar with pretentious philosophy to be beguiled by anything else.
The fact that the majority of people on earth are not Christians make redundant your claim that “the truth has a way of revealing itself even in the most challenging of discourses.” Oh, does it? I don’t think so. In a global sense, Christians are a minority despite having the truth of almighty God. The fact that I may be part of a minority who understands Post-Post-Kantian philosophy does not mean I’m conceited nor does it mean I know more philosophy than the Pope (although, the Pope has made his fair share of philosophical mistakes from my studies).
 
The fact that I may be part of a minority who understands Post-Post-Kantian philosophy…etc :hey_bud:
There is a truism that is universally applicable to all human interactions, not just philosophy.
It goes something like this:

If you understand it, you should be able to explain it clearly, simply, in plain English terms that anybody can understand.

You, sir, cannot. :mad:
 
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