Philosophical Proof of a Creator/Beats Aquinas!

[Don_Schneider]

Dear Pat:

My argument is not that spacetime (your chain) could not have always existed, or just came into being. Rather, it is that it exists with undeniable causes and effects. That implies a sequential creation. In order for there to be a sequential creation, it (its entire structure as we know it) could not have always existed. It could indeed come into its completed existence en masse, exactly as do posts here. We type them letter by letter and then post them all at once. In this analogy, the CA forum is the lower dimensional spacetime, while the reality that we live and type within is the higher dimensional spacetime.

By the way, if a movie were cut so that the frames were presented wildly out of sequence, it would seem incoherent to us. However, to the characters within the movie it would not. Why? Because each individual frame of the film has its own inherent logic. (“The moment is structured that way.”) The characters would not realize that we are experiencing them jumping back and forth through time. This was exactly the scenario in Vonnegut’s *Slaughterhouse-Five *when Billy Pilgrim becomes “unstuck in time.” His consciousness apparently rises to a higher dimension and he can realize that he is jumping back and forth in time throughout his life.

 

[Dr.Bonnette]

To ReggieM:

St. Thomas did not argue for an eternal world, but he did argue that the eternity of the world was possible in his Opuscula, De Aeternitate Mundi. St. Bonaventure took the opposite position.

You write: “A world that always existed has no beginning. It is co-eternal with God. It would actually be a “necessary” thing - parallel to God since it has no origin. It never would have a time when it did not possess being. As such, it would not have a limit in time and thus not be dependent on God.”

The notion of infinity simply means “without end or limit.” Thus a world with no beginning in time is infinite with respect to prior duration. Still, that does not make it an Infinite Being. Just as a ring on my finger has no beginning or end, but still is a most finite being. There is a sense in which a world without beginning would be a “necessary being,” as St. Thomas seems to hypothesize in the tertia via. But that would be a necessary being whose necessity is caused from without, whereas the Necessary Being which is God is one whose necessity arises from within His very own essence. Thus, a world without beginning would still be a finite world, one very dependent upon God for its continued creation in existence by him at every moment of its duration – even should that duration have no beginning in time.

Indeed, St. Thomas does employ the hypothesis of an eternal world for the sake of argument in the tertia via. He does not personally believe the world is without temporal beginning, but only because that is an article of Christian faith, not because reason demands such. His arguments for God’s existence utterly prescind from arguments that regress back in time to any first beginning or cause. Rather, they proceed “vertically,” to the need for a First Mover, First Cause, Necessary Being, Most Perfect Being, and Governor of all creation – here and now existing as the sole adequate explanation of the various phenomena taken as the point of departure in each of the Five Ways.

 

[North_of_Nod]

Excellent essay! It was a pleasure to read. Everything in the physical world has a cause. To deny that fact is ignorant on so many levels. Atheism can hardly explain the “how,” let alone the “why.”

 

[Dr.Bonnette]

To Don re post 35:

Dear Don,

I have read this post and it sounds like we are on the same page in general. I would like to look at your own argument, but personal time is limited and an argument must always be given the best possible reading to be fair to its author.

God, of course, is utterly outside of time. The proofs for His existence entail showing precisely that the world cannot explain itself without Him. Naturalism fails because it claims Nature is self-sufficient when it is not. Not every being requires a cause, but every finite being does. That is why God Himself does not need a cause. Properly speaking, a cause is an extrinsic sufficient reason for the being or coming-to-be of another. An effect is a being whose sufficient reason for being is not totally within itself. Thus, analysis of every finite being reveals that is does not totally explain its own existence, which is why it is an effect needing an extrinsic reason or cause. God alone is His own sufficient reason for existing, and hence, needs no cause. That answers the oft-repeated objection that if all things need a cause, what is the cause of God? Not all things need a cause. Only effects need a cause and God is not an effect.

The two major controversies of our time revolve around (1) whether God exists, and (2) how theism remains credible in light of evolution theory. My first book, Aquinas’ Proofs for God’s Existence, addresses the first issue, and my recent work, Origin of the Human Species, addresses the second. Anyone interested in the latter can check out my web site: www.drbonnette.com . The latter book also contains a proof for God’s existence in chapter six, which deals with the origin and spiritual nature of the human soul.

P.S. Thank you for your kind comments. I pray they are deserved is some slight measure!

 

[JDaniel]

Just one point of clarification about St. Thomas’ causal arguments in the Five Ways.

The problem of infinite regress continues to puzzle many people. But one thing should be made clear regarding how St. Thomas approaches causal regress in the Five Ways, especially in the first three ways. The causal regress there is not a regress in time. The causes and effects which are found there exist simultaneously. That is why he says, “To take away the cause is to take away the effect.” Clearly, a father can die, but his son live. So that is not the kind of causality he is talking about. All movers and things moved do so simultaneously in the prima via, as do all causes and things caused co-exist in the secunda via.

I am not criticizing the argument offered by the main author of this thread, but merely clarifying a much misunderstood element in St. Thomas’ famous Five Ways.

Dennis Bonnette, Ph.D.
Author, Aquinas’ Proofs for God’s Existence (Martinus-Nijhoff: The Hague, 1972.

Dr. Bonnette:

All due respect, but, this rendering of Aquinas’ arguments is incorrect. First of all, when Aquinas says, “To take away the cause is to take away the effect.” has nothing to do with temporality. It has to do with Aquinas’ understanding that matter and form cannot cause themselves to act, in other words, to cause their own effect. They absolutely require an agent, i.e., an efficient cause. In any causal event, i.e., one resulting in an effect, past, present, or future, there must exist, or have existed, or will exist, an agent. Take away the agent and you take away the effect. That the agent must co-exist with the other causes is irrelevant. The agent only had to exist to begin the cause-effect event.

It is important to remember that there are four types of efficient causes, (1) as a perfecting cause, i.e., which brings a substantial form into existence after other efficient causes have prepared the way of such an existence to be a suitable expression of the matter; (2) as a preparatory efficient cause, as indicated in (1); (3) as an instrumental efficient cause that works completely subordinated to a cause other than itself, such as a hammer is the instrument of a builder; and, (4) a counseling efficient cause, which occurs between men only, as when one man proposes something to another in order to get the other man to act.

Since cause is tied very closely to motion, each event has duration. Very few cause-effect events are simultaneous, for Aquinas, or for Aristotle, for that matter. So, it matters not the temporal duration of each and every cause-effect occurrence. What matters most is that all four causes are present - at their appropriate times - during the action.

Understood correctly, as the effector of a cause-effect event, efficient causality does not require any sort of continuum in nature, as does motion (and, therefore, time), although only very few cause-effect events occur simultaneously, as far as Aquinas is concerned.

The important thing to understand about Aquinas’ consideration regarding infinite regress, is his correct understanding that the word “infinite” did not mean linear or spacial infiniteness, both of which are mathematical (thus, formal) in nature, but, meant it from its proper definition as that which cannot ever be achieved. Since there can be no absolute infinity, in nature, whether of time, duration, or motion, but, only a potential infinity, then even a temporal “chain” of cause-effect events could not exist were it not for a primary, or first, cause-effect event, thus a first cause.

The word “chain” is hereinabove used to loosely describe the huge number of cause-effect events that have occurred, in nature, and will continue to occur, at least until the earth itself succumbs to entropy, like the rest of the universe. But, not to mean that there exists any necessary continuity, or connection, between such events in nature.

One other important thing with regard to the five ways: all five are to be understood together, not separately, although, to some extent they may be. To understand the second way properly, one must have full knowledge of all of the ways, but, in particular, the first way, in order to grasp that a set of cause-effect events can exist on a time continuum. Understood correctly, no strange, but, possible postulated temporal aspect needs to actually exist in order to know that Aquinas had it right the first time.

jd

 

[Dr.Bonnette]

To JDaniel:

In reply to my claim that the causal regresses in the Five Ways are simultaneous, you write:

"All due respect, but, this rendering of Aquinas’ arguments is incorrect. First of all, when Aquinas says, “To take away the cause is to take away the effect.” has nothing to do with temporality. It has to do with Aquinas’ understanding that matter and form cannot cause themselves to act, in other words, to cause their own effect. They absolutely require an agent, i.e., an efficient cause. In any causal event, i.e., one resulting in an effect, past, present, or future, there must exist, or have existed, or will exist, an agent. Take away the agent and you take away the effect. That the agent must co-exist with the other causes is irrelevant. The agent only had to exist to begin the cause-effect event. …
"Since cause is tied very closely to motion, each event has duration. Very few cause-effect events are simultaneous, for Aquinas, or for Aristotle, for that matter. So, it matters not the temporal duration of each and every cause-effect occurrence. What matters most is that all four causes are present - at their appropriate times - during the action.
“Understood correctly, as the effector of a cause-effect event, efficient causality does not require any sort of continuum in nature, as does motion (and, therefore, time), although only very few cause-effect events occur simultaneously, as far as Aquinas is concerned.”

In post 26, I had written regarding Aquinas’ Five ways: “Among others, the two most serious mistakes are: (1) failure to grasp the real relation of mover to thing moved, and (2) thinking the causal regress mentioned in the first three “Ways” goes back in time.”

While the distinctions you make regarding types of causes is illuminating, I am afraid you are making the same mistake so many make about the Five Ways, namely, thinking of the motion and causation as going back in time. This way of thinking hopelessly complicates the arguments and leads to erroneous conclusions about their force and validity.

In the prima via, the famous principle "Quidquid movetur, ab alio movetur" does not mean, "Whatever is moved is moved by another," since in English this sounds like a mere tautology. What few grasp is that the two "moveturs" are not in the same “voice.” The first one is in middle voice (which is something in between potency and act) and the second one is in passive voice (indicating that something is being moved). Thus the correct meaning is “Whatever is in motion is being moved by another.” When applied to regress among moved movers in the prima via, St. Thomas says, “But this cannot proceed to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently no other mover, seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are moved by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is moved by the hand.” Please note that the example given is one of simultaneous causality, since hand and staff move together in time.

Describing the form of argument given in the Five Ways, St. Thomas tells us "…from every effect, the existence of its proper cause can be demonstrated…" Summa theologiae, I, 2, 2. Now a “proper cause” is a cause that operates simultaneously with its effect, for “…with the cessation of the cause, the effect also ceases…” S.T., I, 96, 3, ob. 3. When you are talking about accidental causes, regression to infinity is possible. St. Thomas says, “Hence it is not impossible for a man to be generated by man to infinity…” S.T., I, 46, 2, ad. 7. That is the sort of causality that is usually meant by those who think of a temporal regress among causes in the Five Ways. St. Thomas rejects that line of argument, since it can go back to infinity. This inference is confirmed by Fr. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, writing: "Hence a series of past causes, as grandfather, great-grandfather, and so on is a series of accidental causes and in Aristotle’s opinion was infinite in the past, that is, there was no first generator; but, according to St. thomas, this is not repugnant to reason…" Garrigou-Lagrange, The One God, p. 116.

Etienne Gilson also agrees: "…the impossibility of going back to infinity does not refer to an infinite regression in time, but in the present instant in which we are considering the world." Gilson, Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 64.

In his Summa Contra Gentiles, where he offers the corresponding proof to the prima via of the Summa Theologiae, St. Thomas makes explicit the simultaneity of movers and things moved: “But every body that moves something moved is itself moved while moving it. Therefore, all of the infinite multitude are moved simultaneously while one of them is moved.” C.G., I, 13. And again, “The mover and the thing moved must exist simultaneously. …But bodies cannot be simultaneous except through continuity or contiguity.” C.G., I, 13, para. 13.

The above should be sufficient to support my interpretation, which remains the same as it was in 1972 when I wrote my book, “Aquinas’ Proofs for God’s Existence.” Simultaneity of cause and effect apply to each of the Five Ways.

From the above, two inferences follow: (1) St. Thomas does not appear to think that God can be proven to exist by arguments which pursue a series of causes going back in time, and (2) St. Thomas employs proper causality as the essential principle in discerning God’s existence in each of the Five Ways, meaning that the cause and effect of which he is speaking must be simultaneous. The latter means that the principle of “no infinite regress among proper causes” refers to a chain of causes existing here and now, as Lagrange says, like gears in a clock – all operating simultaneously in ontological, not temporal, sequence.

 

[Erchomai_Kyrios]

I’m quite aware that Dr. Einstein had been a self-professed atheist. Ironic, isn’t it? If there are any atheists or agnostics reading here, can you refute my reasoning? I’m always educable.
wwwdnschneidercom.xbuild.com/#/miscellaneous-7/4526495432

Hi Don, I don’t think Einstein was a self professed atheist but I do think athiests like to claim him as one of theirs.
forums.catholic-questions.org/showthread.php?p=5293133#post5293133

In Christ, Erchomai Kyrios

 

[reggieM]

Dr. Bonnette,

Thanks for your time and care to give a detailed reply. That helped a lot and I appreciate your scholarship. By the way, I enjoyed reading the promo on your book on *Origin of Life *-- that does look excellent and it goes on my list of must-read material. The introduction from Dr. Behe is great to see. I agree with your point regarding the limits of ID theory. It can only go far enough to make a case for the presence of an Intelligent Designer in the universe and nature – but not provide enough information on the nature of the Designer. Since it uses only empirical science as a framework, it has a more narrow focus than natural theology would – or as do the classic teleological arguments of the past.

That was interested to read that St. Bonaventure took an opposite position on the possibility of an eternal world than did St. Thomas. I don’t feel so bad now with my mild criticism of the Angelic Doctor’s views on that point.

But the distinction you brought out was important also – St. Thomas was just arguing that an eternal world was “possible”, not that it was true or the most reasonable idea.

But I even question how an eternal world could really be possible. St. Thomas runs through several arguments in Summa Contra Gentiles, both pro and con an eternal world. Here is a summary quote that I considered (ch 38, 8,15,16)

Now, these arguments [opposing an eternal world], though not devoid of probability, lack absolute and necessary conclusiveness. Hence it is sufficient to deal with them quite briefly, lest the Catholic faith might appear to be founded on ineffectual reasonings, and not, as it is, on the most solid teaching of God. It would seem fitting, then, to state how these arguments are countered by the partisans of the doctrine of the world’s eternity.

… However, a more effective approach toward proving the non-eternity of the world can be made from the point of view of the end of the divine will, as we have previously indicated. For in the production of things the end of God’s will is His own goodness as it is manifested in His effects. Now, His power and goodness are made manifest above all by the fact that things other than Himself were not always in existence. For this fact shows clearly that these things owe their existence to Him, and also is proof that God does not act by a necessity of His nature, and that His power of acting is infinite. Respecting the divine goodness, therefore, it was entirely fitting that God should have given created things a temporal beginning.

The preceding considerations enable us to avoid various errors made by the pagan philosophers: the assertion of the world’s eternity; the assertion of the eternity of the world’s matter, out of which at a certain time the world began to be formed, either by chance, or by some intellect, or even by love or by strive. For in all these cases something beside God is claimed to be eternal; and this is incompatible with the Catholic faith.

With this, St. Thomas says that arguments against an eternal world (and in favor of a finite world with a beginning) do not show enough to be absolute or necessary, even though they have some probability. He then says that the idea of an eternal world goes against the Catholic Faith and we should argue against it on that basis.

That is where it appeared confusing because it doesn’t seem like the points supporting a non-eternal world come from Catholic revelation and St. Thomas does not reference revealed truth in his response. So, that was my first uneasyness with his reply. He urges his readers to argue against an eternal world anyway and he gives arguments in support of that.

The notion of infinity simply means “without end or limit.” Thus a world with no beginning in time is infinite with respect to prior duration. Still, that does not make it an Infinite Being. Just as a ring on my finger has no beginning or end, but still is a most finite being.

I’ve been thinking about your example for a couple of days since you posted it.
I’m probably reading too much into this, but there are two ways that I could look at the infinity of your wedding ring.

1. As a circle it contains an infinite number of points
2. As a circle, it has no beginning or end

I was arguing with an atheist about one of these aspects recently – that of point 1, where there are an infinite number of points. His claim was that there is an infinite number of universes, as if arrayed on a circle (thus, the cosmological coincidences that even atheists know cannot be the result of chance are “explained” by an infinite number of attempts to achieve those coincidental results).

But the argument here seems the same as others regarding infinity. In order to traverse the circumference of the circle you have to move point-to-point. There are only an infinite number of points because the points have no minimum size – they continue get smaller infinitely. But like any attempt at order on an actual infinite progression - a “next” event can never be added because nothing can reach the end of it to add an event.

… continued in next post

 

[reggieM]

… continued from previous

On the other point, that is similar. We can consider your ring “infinite” because we can travel around the ring endlessly and find no beginning or end. But the act of travelling around the ring creates a beginning – the moment and place you started going around the circle.

As I see it, this makes an infinitely cyclical world impossible. But for some reason, St. Thomas uses that as an argument in favor of an eternal universe.

I guess the last point goes back to St. Thomas’ conclusion where he says that since arguments in favor of a universe that began in time “lack absolute and necessary conclusiveness” but then he refers to those arguments as being “probable”. In this, I think he’s saying that there’s no way to prove absolutely either way. If that is the case, then the more probable would be the most reasonable solution. As I see it, the arguments in favor of an eternal world, while “possible” in a very remote way (that I cannot see myself) could not be compared to the opposite arguments which are highly probable in comparison.

There is a sense in which a world without beginning would be a “necessary being,” as St. Thomas seems to hypothesize in the tertia via. But that would be a necessary being whose necessity is caused from without, whereas the Necessary Being which is God is one whose necessity arises from within His very own essence.

Thanks for that subtle distinction – I will need to read more about it since I hadn’t heard that before. I was thinking that it could not be possible to have more than one necessary being, since God’s existence would be dependent on that being to some extent.

 

[Dr.Bonnette]

To ReggieM:

Thank you for your own detailed and well-reasoned post above. And for your kind remarks on mine.

I confess that I don’t really have the time or desire to post such detailed and referenced responses most of the time. I am happy to comment “off the top of my head,” but if I have to start doing proper citations and references to prove every point, I would rather devote my time to preparing papers for publication! Still, since I was challenged as to the central truth of my claims about the Five Ways, and since these fora are public and all over the internet, I felt I had to respond somewhat apodictally.

I have remarked earlier about the value of the Thomistic tradition in the schools. I am no genius, but I was blessed to be given good formation by scholars who have direct contact with that living tradition which is Thomistic in nature. Indirectly, through some of their immediate disciples, I have been taught by some of the greatest modern Thomists, beginning with Garrigou-Lagrange, Gilson, and Maritain. I studied directly with Charles De Koninck at Notre Dame. This is important.

It is much like the problem of reading Scripture without Tradition. Scholars “outside, looking in” at St. Thomas often misread his meaning – just as those trying to read Scripture without the guidance of the Magisterium and Tradition often misread its meaning. There is no substitute for “thinking with the Church,” and there is no substitute for “thinking with” the Thomistic tradition.

That is why I know the importance of reading the Quinque Viae as primarily metaphysical proofs, not as cosmological speculations. St. Thomas was writing his own brief versions of what were primarily Aristotle’s arguments, and giving them to mature students already well versed in philosophy. Since God’s existence should be the very foundation of his magnum opus of theology, you would expect a lengthy and detailed presentation of the proofs for God. Instead, St. Thomas offers five short paragraphs – essentially, one to each way. (In the original Latin, they are not neatly divided into paragraphs!) He never intended full explanation and defense of each argument. Rather, they are shorthand expressions offered to good students he knew would know how to fill in the details (without making the sorts of errors made by modern-day readers).

My point is that we need the guidance of the Thomistic tradition in reading these texts, relying on major commentators such as John of St. Thomas, Sylvester of Ferrara, Cardinal Cajetan, Dominico Banes, A.D. Sertillanges, Garrigou-Lagrange and more recent scholars of the same school to whom have been handed down the proper methods of reading and understanding what St. Thomas intended to express.

The Five Ways must be read in terms of metaphysics: the science of being as being. That is why the prima via is argued almost entirely in terms of potency and act, since these are the primary insights of existential metaphysics. This is why the quarta via must be understood in terms of being and its transcendental modes.

By the way, if you want to find my book, make sure you don’t look up “Origin of Species,” since you will be getting Darwin himself. I plagiarized his title somewhat by calling mine, “Origin of the Human Species” – hopefully to promote sales a bit!

I have not commented directly on your own analysis above, since I think it is already well put and quite on target. But I confess I was not anticipating such a detailed explication of my little example of a ring as an expression of infinity. I was just noticing that it has no real beginning or end. The fact that our mind begins to trace it at a given point on its circumference does not mean that it itself has such a beginning point.

 

[nkbeth]

Hi Don, I don’t think Einstein was a self professed atheist but I do think athiests like to claim him as one of theirs.
forums.catholic-questions.org/showthread.php?p=5293133#post5293133

In Christ, Erchomai Kyrios

I looked at your post that you linked to. I thought it might be useful to repeat *here * the quote from Einstein that you included in that post:

From article by Walter Isaacson article “Einstein and Faith”, Time 4/5/2007.
time.com/time/magazine/ar…607298,00.html
Walter Isaacson:

Shortly after his 50th birthday, Einstein also gave a remarkable interview in which he was more revealing than he had ever been about his religious sensibility. It was with George Sylvester Viereck …
…
[Viereck asks “Do you believe in God?”. Einstein replies:]

“I’m not an atheist. I don’t think I can call myself a pantheist. The problem involved is too vast for our limited minds. We are in the position of a little child entering a huge library filled with books in many languages. The child knows someone must have written those books. It does not know how. It does not understand the languages in which they are written. The child dimly suspects a mysterious order in the arrangement of the books but doesn’t know what it is. That, it seems to me, is the attitude of even the most intelligent human being toward God. We see the universe marvelously arranged and obeying certain laws but only dimly understand these laws.”

 

[reggieM]

Dr. Bonnett – many thanks again for your insightful reply. Garrigou-Lagrange and Gilson are two of my favorite authors. I hope to complete reading a larger part of their collected works. You were truly blessed to have that background. I’m afraid most of the interest and expertise is lost these days. I won’t even begin the topic of the relativistic and secularizing attitudes which dominate many Catholic theology departments today. I’m just glad to see your great work getting visibility – and I hope it will prosper.

I’m in no position to question St. Thomas, of course. His brilliance has been proven to me countless times. I’m only just exploring this one consideration on an eternal world because I can’t see the possiblity of it.

I’m still thinking about the circle as an analogy for an eternal universe (St. Thomas alludes to that also when he mentions the rotation of the sun (as it was thought)).

I could go on further about that, but it’s probably a topic left for another time and place.

Many thanks again for your help.

 

[Don_Schneider]

Dear Biggie:

I am still chewing on your essay, but it seems to me you are arguing that the universe has a beginning by arguing that it is infinite, that its chronology is an accident of the perception of it and that it’s nature as a creation is only revealed in its completion (read that end) as in a completed work of art. Isn’t that taking the long way around?

Schick is throwing everything and the kitchen sink into his argument. You seem to be addressing the first several paragraphs. Does he have a problem with “first cause” or with “beginning”? It depends … if the evidence is in on the big bang, then the evidence is in on the issue of “beginning”. The universe has a beginning and we are arguing about cause. If, however, quantum electrodynamics, quarks, sparks and narcs reveal the existence of infinite chains that bring themselves into existence, then the universe has no beginning (or maybe so) therefore we need not be speaking of first cause (or maybe so). What horse is he on other than the one named No God No Matter What?

Assuming his Big Bang title reveals him to be of the understanding that the universe had a distinct beginning, then one must wonder if in his construct the lack of a perception of cause is the equivalent to the lack of cause. Or is the vote also in on the consummation of scientific knowledge?

I am not arguing that it is infinite. How can any infinite work be completed? I am arguing that since the structure of spacetime has undeniable order via causes and effects (the laws of physics) then the causes must have once existed prior to their exhibited effects. Therefore, spacetime could not have always existed. It just appears as if it has the same way characters within a novel would perceive their literary universe once completed. (Please reference my thought experiment contained within my proof.)

As far as particles bringing themselves into existence, wouldn’t there have to be an *a priori *existence for them to bring themselves into? Doesn’t that imply a sequence of before and after? Again, didn’t your parents have to exist before you did in order for you to be brought into existence?

 

[Don_Schneider]

Dear Dr. Bonnette:

I readily understand your time constraints. As I said, I feel privileged for you to have taken the time you have to share your knowledge and views here for the benefit of all.

I have greatly enjoyed your exchanges with JDaniel, which I am still digesting!

Thanks again.

Don Schneider

 

[Dr.Bonnette]

To Don Schneider:

Dear Don,

I finally have had the time to take a look at your article on God’s existence, and I hope you will still like me when I am finished giving my reactions!

You have already noted that some points of St. Thomas’ thought might deserve greater approval:

1. His arguments do not go back in time, as we have already discussed.
2. For him (and myself), effect does NOT follow cause. That was an error most forcefully introduced by David Hume, who argued that causality was merely an habitual association of mental impressions, and that if mental impression A normally was followed by mental impression B, we would come to think A was the cause of B. Of course, he rejected this form of “predictability,” and rightly so! For the metaphysician, cause is simultaneous with effect.

In the prima via we are talking about causes of coming-to-be, whereas in the secunda via, we are talking about causes of being. Again, we have already discussed some of this.

But the major point of your argument to which I wish to draw your attention is its central dependence on the relativity of the space-time continuum. This entails two problems for me: (1) We are now asked to draw a metaphysical conclusion (God’s existence) from a physical (not even philosophy of nature, but simply experimental physics) argument. This is inherently improper, and indeed partakes the same criticism leveled at ID theory on this point. Physics as such cannot produce metaphysics. You can use physical data (that is, data drawn from sense experience, such as the fact of motion) to mount a metaphysical argument. But to use a physical theory to mount a metaphysical argument is an insufficient foundation.

Moreover, (2) the inference of multiverses arising from the allegedly inherently relativistic nature of the Cosmos which is based on Einstein’s theory is itself debatable as a philosophical premise. Australian philosopher/theologian Fr. Austin M. Woodbury has written a paper attacking the assumption lying at the root of relativity itself, namely, that motion between two particles is entirely relative, that is, that it makes no difference in absolute terms as to which particle is deemed to have moved as long as the relation between the two is changed. I cannot go into it fully here, but should that basic philosophical premise be successfully challenged, then the entire foundation of your argument becomes questionable.

These are just a few initial observations after a quick reading of your argument, and I offer them with the greatest intention of Christian charity – but tempered by our common need to seek the truth above all. Perhaps, I am also moved by the conviction that St. Thomas has already provided us with consistently metaphysical arguments in his Five Ways which entirely avoid all dependence upon potentially evolving natural scientific theories.

 

[JDaniel]

To JDaniel:

In reply to my claim that the causal regresses in the Five Ways are simultaneous, you write:

Dr. Bonnette:

Thank you for your well-reasoned response to my difficulty with your position. I have finally figured out what it is that I object to. I object to the use of the word, “simultaneous” – especially because of today’s vernacular - not you. I know that it is how the Philosopher is translated, but, it just seems too bad that the English of today appears to add a certain urgency to that word that may not have been intended in the Latin used by Aquinas. The word, “simultaneous”, nowadays, implies a necessary instantaneous-ness of time, which is not (absolutely) necessary to the whole action of an infinite series or chain. Even Plato seemed to think of motion in a much wider sense, that included thought patterns and mental decisioning.

Perhaps a better word would be “contemporaneous”, as this word implies that slight time-slice differences would not shake the wholeness of the action of the causal series and would not make it appear as an “infinite” set of instrumental causes. St. Thomas is careful to make the distinction that the causal series is not a set of instrumental efficient causes in Summa Contra Gentiles, Book I, Chap. 13, translated by A. Pegis, On the Truth of Catholic Faith, (New York, 1955), I, 86 – 90. (See the following. )

“The third proof comes to the same conclusion, except that, by beginning with the superior, it has a reversed order. It is as follows. That which moves as an instrumental cause cannot move unless there be a principle moving cause. But if we proceed to infinity among movers and things moved, all movers will be as instrumental causes, because they will be moved movers and there will be nothing as a principle mover. Therefore, nothing will be moved.”

Would you agree that perhaps the use of “simultaneous” causes problems for onlookers of the first two proofs? It has for people I have spoken to. I have to use the analogy of the rear arm of a golfer, with it being held straight as the golfer brings the club down towards the ball. If the golfer bends his arm at the elbow, the lower part of the arm will pass by the ball later than the upper part, resulting in a poor shot, or a “topping” of the ball. However, holding both parts of the arm as straight as possible, together with the club, improves the odds of a well-hit ball. Now, that being said, an ever so slight bend at the elbow will probably not cause much problem. Of course, this is a very simplified analogy.

Now, there is another problem entertained by those I have spoken with about the actuality of what Aquinas meant by a causal series. It is envisioned, in the physical realm, as an extremely tall, or rather, long, totem pole of causes, stretching into the heavens, above us, and into the whatever, below us. Physics understands spacetime as curved. Thus, the totem pole would probably be curved as well, since it is divisible and only “acting” as though it was indivisible. Therefore, the other end of the pole would seem to have to “catch up” if even only a nanosecond of time later.

Also, it is difficult for most people to wrap their minds around the fact that each and every one of these causal series emanates from one singular source.

With regards to accidental efficient causality, we interject another seeming paradox: that time is required for the effects to come to be in virtually every case. For example, the ripening of an apple spans several weeks. In other words, to move from green to red does not happen in a nanosecond. This slow movement from unripe fruit to ripened fruit would seem to be different than a piece of wood turning to ash. At the instant the fire involves itself with each divisible part of a larger piece of wood, it turns to ash because of fire. That it takes time for the larger piece of wood to be consumed is simply due to the fact that a larger piece of wood is an aggregate of thousands of tiny pieces which may be divided away from the larger, but yet retain the essence of the wood, in its smallness. To reach each of them is what takes time, not the contemporaneous change from wood to ash as each particle of wood is successively involved with the fire.

This thread has turned into an excellent one.

jd

 

[Dr.Bonnette]

Dear JDaniel,

After your graciousness in attempting to find a reasonable compromise with my interpretation of St. Thomas, I feel like a cad in having to reply: “Well, no…”

I used the word “simultaneous” because that is the exactly correct one. “Contemporaneous” just will not do. Searching the Latin will not help much either (although simul is employed by St. Thomas, since people would ask today whether he would change the meaning today because of our “new” understanding of physics (per some of your discussion).

There is little choice but to try to “unpack” a bit of the metaphysics.

As I mentioned in an earlier post, an effect is any being whose sufficient reason for being is not totally within itself, whereas a cause is the extrinsic reason which accounts for what that effect lacks within itself. In principle, a being might totally be an effect of a certain cause, or only partially thereof. However you account for it, the “reason” for a thing must add up to 100%, between what it itself explains and what something else explains of it which it itself fails to explain. I am not trying to depict any examples here, because I want you to start thinking in terms of “pure being,” not examples which notoriously confuse people. (When you give examples initially, people get all involved in the details of the examples, and then miss the universal abstract principles which we are trying to grasp.)

This all means that here and now (hic et nunc) every being which needs an extrinsic reason needs that reason at the very moment it is existing as an effect, or else, it both is (because we said it is!) and yet it is not (because it lacks a sufficient reason for being).

There are two kind of causes to be considered: (1) causes of coming-to-be (the stuff of the prima via), and (2) causes of being (the stuff of the secunda via).

The text you cite regarding instrumental causes has nothing to do with the issue at hand. It merely shows that in an infinite causal chain all intermediate causes may be considered as IF they were instrumental causes, which cannot act without a principal cause.

I understand your attempt to bring Einsteinian space-time considerations into your analysis of motion of any type, but, aside from the inherent problem of applying physical theory to any form of metaphysical analysis, the difficulty is that the physical processes involved simply do not matter at all! Abstract from them totally! Any process of coming-to-be entails effects here and now being produced which need causes operative here and now, or else, you really have an effect without a cause. Saying the cause existed in the past – even if it be but a nano-second ago – simply means that it does not exist at all as far as the being which is here and now coming-to-be is concerned – and that it simply does it no good in terms of explaining the fullness of its being or becoming at this moment in time.

There is much more analysis that needs to be done here, but what I see is a lot of excessive dependence on contemporary physics going on – a dependence which does not fully appreciate both the theoretical and epistemic limits of speculative natural science, even of the most recent vintage.

That is enough for now… and I pray I have not offended anyone in trying to explain all this. There is much more that could be said. I taught metaphysics for almost forty years, and it is hard to say in a brief blog what normally takes some 45 class hours to explain at merely an introductory level.

 

[JDaniel]

Dear JDaniel,

After your graciousness in attempting to find a reasonable compromise with my interpretation of St. Thomas, I feel like a cad in having to reply: “Well, no…”

I used the word “simultaneous” because that is the exactly correct one. “Contemporaneous” just will not do. Searching the Latin will not help much either (although simul is employed by St. Thomas, since people would ask today whether he would change the meaning today because of our “new” understanding of physics (per some of your discussion).

There is little choice but to try to “unpack” a bit of the metaphysics.

As I mentioned in an earlier post, an effect is any being whose sufficient reason for being is not totally within itself, whereas a cause is the extrinsic reason which accounts for what that effect lacks within itself. In principle, a being might totally be an effect of a certain cause, or only partially thereof. However you account for it, the “reason” for a thing must add up to 100%, between what it itself explains and what something else explains of it which it itself fails to explain. I am not trying to depict any examples here, because I want you to start thinking in terms of “pure being,” not examples which notoriously confuse people. (When you give examples initially, people get all involved in the details of the examples, and then miss the universal abstract principles which we are trying to grasp.)

This all means that here and now (hic et nunc) every being which needs an extrinsic reason needs that reason at the very moment it is existing as an effect, or else, it both is (because we said it is!) and yet it is not (because it lacks a sufficient reason for being).

There are two kind of causes to be considered: (1) causes of coming-to-be (the stuff of the prima via), and (2) causes of being (the stuff of the secunda via).

The text you cite regarding instrumental causes has nothing to do with the issue at hand. It merely shows that in an infinite causal chain all intermediate causes may be considered as IF they were instrumental causes, which cannot act without a principal cause.

I understand your attempt to bring Einsteinian space-time considerations into your analysis of motion of any type, but, aside from the inherent problem of applying physical theory to any form of metaphysical analysis, the difficulty is that the physical processes involved simply do not matter at all! Abstract from them totally! Any process of coming-to-be entails effects here and now being produced which need causes operative here and now, or else, you really have an effect without a cause. Saying the cause existed in the past – even if it be but a nano-second ago – simply means that it does not exist at all as far as the being which is here and now coming-to-be is concerned – and that it simply does it no good in terms of explaining the fullness of its being or becoming at this moment in time.

There is much more analysis that needs to be done here, but what I see is a lot of excessive dependence on contemporary physics going on – a dependence which does not fully appreciate both the theoretical and epistemic limits of speculative natural science, even of the most recent vintage.

That is enough for now… and I pray I have not offended anyone in trying to explain all this. There is much more that could be said. I taught metaphysics for almost forty years, and it is hard to say in a brief blog what normally takes some 45 class hours to explain at merely an introductory level.

Dr. Bonnette:

Thank you for your in-depth reply. I see now that in trying to respond to those critics that can only understand “causation” from some point of view imbedded in Physics, I have, myself, fallen into the trap of thinking purely physically about it. I suppose I would not have had this problem had the critics studied a more general science of nature before studying their particular field of modern science.

At the risk of sounding self-patronizing, I was coming around to the position you have described after posting my last post, while thinking about it. In fact, at the point of my last post, where I talked about the fact that each and every causal “chain” emanates from a single source, I began to realize that each one is in some way singular, discrete and thus simultaneous.

However, you have made it clearer to me.

Thank you;
jd

 

[Don_Schneider]

Dear Dr. Bonnette:

“2. For him [Aquinas} (and myself), effect does NOT follow cause. That was an error most forcefully introduced by David Hume, who argued that causality was merely an habitual association of mental impressions, and that if mental impression A normally was followed by mental impression B, we would come to think A was the cause of B. Of course, he rejected this form of “predictability,” and rightly so! For the metaphysician, cause is simultaneous with effect.”

I am still unclear as to what you mean by “cause is simultaneous with effect.” I *think you mean by that that the egg becomes fertilized the moment the sperm penetrates the egg. Thus, the cause and the effect occur at the same time. You are making a distinction here between the actual event and the antecedent forces involved, correct?

Obviously both the sperm and the egg existed before the child. You are not denying this, simply making a distinction between the two concepts, calling the former “causes of coming-to-be;” the latter, the “causes of being?” Correct?

I shall have to try to find the paper to which you referred authored by a priest that attacks the underlying assumptions of the theory of relativity. That would be quite interesting. If relativity is false, then obviously my proof also has no validity. But I must tell you, every empirical observation from experiments thus far performed upholds the theory.

Einstein was a true scientist. I have often used a quote by him when offering my own opinions about various matters, such as my dissenting (and unpopular) views concerning the causative factors of Tourette’s Syndrome. The quote is: “All it would take to disprove my theory is one observation to the contrary.” As stated, thus far there has been not a one.

 

[nkbeth]

About a point made in passing:

…
I am not trying to depict any examples here, because I want you to start thinking in terms of “pure being,” not examples which notoriously confuse people. (When you give examples initially, people get all involved in the details of the examples, and then miss the universal abstract principles which we are trying to grasp.)

I’ve certainly seen this confusion (most recently in another thread in this forum).
Yet St. Thomas certainly uses examples (as well as analogies), doesn’t he?
Of course even St. Thomas’ examples/analogies confuse people now because they are not always in accord with modern science. But an intelligent reader should be able learn from examples, as well as to rise above them. Don’t we proceed from the more familiar to the less familiar? Aren’t apt examples often helpful?

I taught metaphysics for almost forty years, and it is hard to say in a brief blog what normally takes some 45 class hours to explain at merely an introductory level.

I admire and respect you greatly for that. I had a year of St. Thomas many years ago, but I have retained little but a great respect for him.