S
smad0142
Guest
What are the philosophical proofs for the immortality of the soul?
- Status
U
UponTheAltar
Guest
I don’t know about philosophical but, scientific… maybe. It is fact taught by science that matter can never be destroyed. I know our soul isn’t exactly matter but, it is some sort of proof in my mind that certain things can be created and never destroyed. Energy is also very similar. I don;t know if you can destroy it once it is created (it disperses and gets weaker, I know that but, destroy it, I don’t know.). If I punch a wall, the energy I just created sets forth from my first and into the wall where it disperses and weakens but, continues to travel and is passed onto something else. Like with those metal swinging balls people have on their desks? Our souls seem like some sort of energy-matter. Maybe better compared to light…
I’m a lunatic!
I’m a lunatic!
A
awatkins69
Guest
Well, you could argue for the immateriality of the intellect. Take the argument of Saint Thomas Aquinas.
I got this from here by the way: maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2008/12/aquinas-on-intellects-independence-of-matter-summa-contra-gentiles-ii-49-8.html#more He explains it more in-depth than I do.
- No body is wholly and non-formally self-reflexive.
- Every intellect in act is wholly and non-formally self-reflexive.
Therefore - No intellect in act is a body.
I got this from here by the way: maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2008/12/aquinas-on-intellects-independence-of-matter-summa-contra-gentiles-ii-49-8.html#more He explains it more in-depth than I do.
G
Geremia
Guest
St. Thomas uses the term “incorruptible” (i.e., not able to be decomposed into parts) and “subsistent” (i.e., capable of existing independent of matter); see his Summa Theologiae articles “Is the human soul a subsistence?” and “Is the soul incorruptible?” These articles might require some more background on what exactly the human soul is; read this: “Immortality.”
A
AntiTheist
Guest
But it does change form. The energy that is shooting through your brain right now – the very physical energy that essentially is you – will never be destroyed, but it’s going to change form, such that it will not be “you” after your brain stops working. That energy will go off and do other things – it will feed insects, feed plants, make the soil rich with energy, etc.
As far as any actual investigations can tell, there’s no such thing as a soul, so all the reasoning you want to do about it is going to start from premises that, at the very best, cannot be demonstrated to be true.
Thus, all arguments for the immortality of the soul are at least unsound.
J
JohnDamian
Guest
I am going to give a very shortened version of “De spiritualitate et immortalitate animae humanae” because I cannot find an English Translation online and I don’t want to type out a hundred pages.
First; the A priori proof:
Reffering to de animae; we can see that the soul is “the act of the natural and organised body”. It is also the case that all philosophers assign rational to this function with the exception of Averroes in his commentary on bk III of de animae.
Now; Man Formally and properly understands; therefore the intellective soul is the proper form of man. The antecent is true see de anima & Nicomachean Ethics Bk I. It is simply put: “To know” or “to understand” is taken in a form that is transcendental of sense knowlege.
Firstly; this antecedent is the case because Man knows by an act of knowlege which is not organic; hence he knows in a proper sense. This consequent is true in light of the fact that intellection per se is a trancendental object over sense knowlege. All sensation being sense knowlege; thus organic and vise versa - contradicts a claim that knowlege is organic. The antecedent of this enthymeme is proved from the fact that every organ is determined to a kind of sensible; wheras we can see that the knowlege we have is not limited to a sensible - hence inorganic.
The second proof of the antecedent is the fact that we possess some immaterial knowlege; and no sense knowlege can be immatterial therefore, etc. ;
We posess some knowlege of an object under an aspect it could not have as an object of sense knowlege; therefore, etc - proof of the antecedent; (i) we experience in ourselves that we know the actual universal; (ii) we experience that we know being or quality in a more general notion than that highest characteristic of the primary object of even the highest sense faculty, (iii) we experience that we also know relations that follow from the nature of things, even when the latter are not capable of being perceived by the senses (iv) we experience what we distinguish the whole class of sensible objects from what is not such. (v) we experience that we know conceptual relations, which are second intentions such as that of the universal, the genus, the species etc. (vi) we also experience that we know the very act whereby we know these things and we experience this act within us etc. (vii) we experience that we assent to propositionssuch as first principles without a possibility of error (viii) we also experience that we learn the unknown from the known by means of discursive reasoning, so that we are undable to refuse our assent to the evidence of the reasoning process of to the conclusion that is inferred.
Proof of the consequent; First - If we formally possess such an act, since it is not our substance per se, for it is not always present in us, it follows that this act needs a proper subject.
Second proof; Considering the condition of the object of this act; for if any form inferoir to the intellective form functions, it is always with reference to an object having characteristics the opposite of above; etc.
Third proof; We can prove the same from the second operation characteristic of man - viz. volition (see Bk II, Dist, XXII, XXIII, q iii Opus Oxoniense).
Continued…
First; the A priori proof:
Reffering to de animae; we can see that the soul is “the act of the natural and organised body”. It is also the case that all philosophers assign rational to this function with the exception of Averroes in his commentary on bk III of de animae.
Now; Man Formally and properly understands; therefore the intellective soul is the proper form of man. The antecent is true see de anima & Nicomachean Ethics Bk I. It is simply put: “To know” or “to understand” is taken in a form that is transcendental of sense knowlege.
Firstly; this antecedent is the case because Man knows by an act of knowlege which is not organic; hence he knows in a proper sense. This consequent is true in light of the fact that intellection per se is a trancendental object over sense knowlege. All sensation being sense knowlege; thus organic and vise versa - contradicts a claim that knowlege is organic. The antecedent of this enthymeme is proved from the fact that every organ is determined to a kind of sensible; wheras we can see that the knowlege we have is not limited to a sensible - hence inorganic.
The second proof of the antecedent is the fact that we possess some immaterial knowlege; and no sense knowlege can be immatterial therefore, etc. ;
We posess some knowlege of an object under an aspect it could not have as an object of sense knowlege; therefore, etc - proof of the antecedent; (i) we experience in ourselves that we know the actual universal; (ii) we experience that we know being or quality in a more general notion than that highest characteristic of the primary object of even the highest sense faculty, (iii) we experience that we also know relations that follow from the nature of things, even when the latter are not capable of being perceived by the senses (iv) we experience what we distinguish the whole class of sensible objects from what is not such. (v) we experience that we know conceptual relations, which are second intentions such as that of the universal, the genus, the species etc. (vi) we also experience that we know the very act whereby we know these things and we experience this act within us etc. (vii) we experience that we assent to propositionssuch as first principles without a possibility of error (viii) we also experience that we learn the unknown from the known by means of discursive reasoning, so that we are undable to refuse our assent to the evidence of the reasoning process of to the conclusion that is inferred.
Proof of the consequent; First - If we formally possess such an act, since it is not our substance per se, for it is not always present in us, it follows that this act needs a proper subject.
Second proof; Considering the condition of the object of this act; for if any form inferoir to the intellective form functions, it is always with reference to an object having characteristics the opposite of above; etc.
Third proof; We can prove the same from the second operation characteristic of man - viz. volition (see Bk II, Dist, XXII, XXIII, q iii Opus Oxoniense).
Continued…
J
JohnDamian
Guest
Continued…
The soul is immortal;
De animae bk II “intellect differs from the rest as what is eternal differs from what is perishable” – Even if someone objects to this; that it is something different and apart only insofar as its operations are concerned; according to de aminae BkI if it can be set apart by reason of it’s operations it can also exist apart.
In Bk III de animae; the senses differ from the intellect; because that shich stimulates the sense excessively impairs it; this is the contrary in the intellect; which is not impaired by function of it’s being; ths it follows that it is imperishable
In metaphysics Bk XIII c.i it flows that the causes that produce motion exist previously wheras those which are the essence, that is the substantial form, can exist simulatneously…
From De Generatione animalium; it remains for the intellect alone to enter from the outside; hence the intellect does not recieve existence by way of generation by reather from an extrnsic cause; consequently it cannot cease to exist by perishing - nor can any inferioir cause corrupt the soul since its existence does not come under the power of any such cause.
Also, as natural desires are never in vain; if the soul has a natural desire to be immortal; then this is not in vain.
In Meraphysics bk Viii matter is that in virtue of which a thing can exist or not exist; therefore whatever has no matter lacks the capacity to not exist ; therein a simple form such as a soul (or God) cannot be made not to exist.
In Nicomachean ethics Bk III an example of heroism shows that immortality can be known by natural reason; no one is obliged or able to seek his complete non existence for the sake of some virtuous good whether that good be something in himself or in another or a good of the community; from Augustine (iii cap. viii) a person cannot desire non existence.
It follows then that what perishes perishes by reason iof its contrary of because it lacks a prequisite for its existence. The intellective soul has no contrary; neither is the existence of the body a necessary prequisite for it’s existence; so as the soul possesses its own per-se existence then the soul cannot be destroyed.
I hope that helped. Apologies if it is too concise.
The soul is immortal;
De animae bk II “intellect differs from the rest as what is eternal differs from what is perishable” – Even if someone objects to this; that it is something different and apart only insofar as its operations are concerned; according to de aminae BkI if it can be set apart by reason of it’s operations it can also exist apart.
In Bk III de animae; the senses differ from the intellect; because that shich stimulates the sense excessively impairs it; this is the contrary in the intellect; which is not impaired by function of it’s being; ths it follows that it is imperishable
In metaphysics Bk XIII c.i it flows that the causes that produce motion exist previously wheras those which are the essence, that is the substantial form, can exist simulatneously…
From De Generatione animalium; it remains for the intellect alone to enter from the outside; hence the intellect does not recieve existence by way of generation by reather from an extrnsic cause; consequently it cannot cease to exist by perishing - nor can any inferioir cause corrupt the soul since its existence does not come under the power of any such cause.
Also, as natural desires are never in vain; if the soul has a natural desire to be immortal; then this is not in vain.
In Meraphysics bk Viii matter is that in virtue of which a thing can exist or not exist; therefore whatever has no matter lacks the capacity to not exist ; therein a simple form such as a soul (or God) cannot be made not to exist.
In Nicomachean ethics Bk III an example of heroism shows that immortality can be known by natural reason; no one is obliged or able to seek his complete non existence for the sake of some virtuous good whether that good be something in himself or in another or a good of the community; from Augustine (iii cap. viii) a person cannot desire non existence.
It follows then that what perishes perishes by reason iof its contrary of because it lacks a prequisite for its existence. The intellective soul has no contrary; neither is the existence of the body a necessary prequisite for it’s existence; so as the soul possesses its own per-se existence then the soul cannot be destroyed.
I hope that helped. Apologies if it is too concise.
S
smad0142
Guest
John could you try and put that all into laymen’s terms if that is possible?
J
JohnDamian
Guest
Well the two main points are thus;
The rational soul exists because not all of our knowlege is organic; thus not all of our knowlege can come from sensory experiences.
The rational soul is immortal; because the rational soul when stimulated to excess has the opposite effect of the senses when stimulated to excess - when one stimulates say; smell to excess the sense is inhibited; wheras this is not the case with the rational soul - thus we cannot experientially claim that the rational soul is inhibited by anything.
S
smad0142
Guest
Thank you John that was incredibly helpful.
- Status