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Guest
Interesting. You are relying on a principle that has its roots in Leibniz. It’s called the Identity of Indiscernibles IIRC. It says that if two things can’t be told apart (i.e. if they have exactly the same properties), they must be one and the same thing. Then a universe with just one particle in stasis with time would be the same as a universe with just one particle in stasis without time since you say they would be indiscernible from each other. But I would say that the very fact that one has time establishes that one is different from the other even though no change is measured across the dimension of time. It might render drawing the extra dimension superfluous in terms of data, but it could still ontologically be there.if you try to imagine a universe that is populated only by one, static, changeless particle, then i submit that there is no difference between imagining that universe and a universe with one, static, changeless particle, in which there is no time.
which means, to me, that you cannot, in fact, imagine time without change (if there is no difference between two things, then those things are the same).
But giving it some thought, I’m not so sure.
I’m also not sure about the truth of the Identity of Indiscernibles. Imagine a universe with just two particles absolutely identical to each other and nothing else existing in the universe in any way. Well the two particles would seem to be indiscernible from each other (since the universe here is not orientable with a distinction between left and right) yet they would obviously seem to be distinct particles. I believe some philosophers say that the distinction lies in this perhaps murky concept called haeccity.
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haeccity
plato.stanford.edu/entries/medieval-haecceity/
(the latter link relates the matter to the Identity of Indiscernibles)