I thought you was a Thomist?
lonergan.org/?p=642
When commenting on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Aquinas repeats what Aristotle says that form (forma) is ratio. Cf. Sententia super Metaphysicam, 8, 1, 1687. Form is an “intelligible structure.” In Aquinas, species as “intelligible species” (species intelligibilis) commonly refers to form. Form as species, as Lonergan speaks about it, refers to the “intelligibility of data.” Cf. Lonergan, Collection, p. 284. Or, to use a term that originally derives from Aristotle, form is eidos or morphê. Cf. Lonergan, Caring About Meaning, p. 45; Topics in Education, p. 171. For both Aristotle and Aquinas, eidos as form refers to what is known not through sense perception but through an act of the mind, through nous. Cf. Patrick H. Byrne, Analysis and Science in Aristotle (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), p. 198, p. 200. Even if some intellects can engage in acts of understanding without using any images or phantasms, no intellect is able to understand anything apart from an intellectual species or form. Cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 3a, q. 11, a. 2, ad 1. Form, like essence, refers to a principle of explanation but in a manner which says that by first understanding a form or intelligible species, one then understands what something is in terms of its essence. Form is the quo est; it is that “by which something is” (quo aliquid est). Cf. Sententia super Metaphysicam, 5, 10, 904. As the cause or mover (movens) of understanding, it is that “by which the understanding understands” (quo intelligit intellectus). Cf. Summa Theologiae, 1a, q. 85, a. 2. It exists as a principle or cause of understanding (it is a causa cognoscendi) whereby one moves from the order of knowing toward the order of being, reality. Cf. Summa Contra Gentiles, 1, 53, 2 & 4.