Please explain why the first cause/necessary being must be personal

[Luke_K]

There are NOT 2 things which fall into this category. There is no evidence whatsoever that disembodied minds exist and there is even less evidence that, should these minds exist, they stand in causal relations.
Let’s test this, danserr. use your own mind (let’s concede, FTSOTA, that your mind is immaterial, atemporal and non-spatial) and cause a particle to appear out of nothing. Can you do that? If not, your whole argument falls apart.

The disembodied mind is proposed only because there are no other options. It is not logically contradictory, only unfamiliar to us. The fact of the matter is, whatever the first cause is, it’s necessarily going to have unique properties apart from anything in the universe. Your challenge to danserr is irrelevant. It’s equivalent to arguing that because I am a living organism and I cannot fly on my own, no living organism can fly on its own.

Do you not think that your mind stands in a causal relation to your body? Is your mind unable to do anything with your body?

 

[danserr]

@ Belorg and Luke,

Since Luke answered your objection to my first argument for the personality of the first cause, I’ll say less about that. There is no contradiction entailed in saying that an unembodied mind exists; indeed, that is what a mind is.
– If the universe has a cause (the universe includes all time, space, and matter), that cause cannot be any of those things. Numbers do not stand in causal relation, minds do. Doesn’t your mind affect your body?

• Also, you’re suggestion that such a thing as an impersonal mind may exist seems to border on incoherent. A mind implies a personality.

Second, you seemed to misunderstand me here, so let me lay this reasoning out more clearly.

1. There are two types of causal explanations; scientific explanations in terms of laws and initial conditions, and personal explanations in terms of agents and volition.
   – For example, I say to my wife: why is the water on the stove boiling? She might say the heat of the flame is being conducted to the water increasing the kinetic energy of the water molecules until it is thrown off as steam. Or she might say “because I wanted some tea.” The first explanation is scientific, the second personal.
2. A first state of the universe cannot have a scientific explanation, since there is nothing before it, and so it cannot be accounted for in terms of laws operating on initial conditions. So if the universe has a cause, it must be accounted for in terms of an agent and volition, that is, a personal explanation.

Third, The person-hood of the first cause of the universe is implied by virtue of a temporal effect from a timeless cause.

You try to claim:

A personal cause (at least the one WL Craig has in mind, namely a being that is atemporal and unchanging sans the universe) cannot possibly create anything that begins to exist

Now this is just a bare assertion, you must support it. Why should an atemporal being be unable to cause something to exist? What is incoherent about the idea that a man sitting down from all eternity, decides to stand up? Craig thinks that this means that once God creates, he enters time and becomes temporal. I am not sure about that, but let’s grant it for the sake of argument. What is the problem. God is atemporal without creation, but temporal after creation. So, you see there is really nothing at all problematic about an atemporal being creating the universe.

So, the fact that an eternal cause produced an effect that is not eternal implies that the cause is personal. Otherwise, the cause would always be happening, therefore it would always be causing the effect. If the cause were always causing the effect, then we should be observing the universe as infinitely old. But we don’t. The only solution appears to be so say that a personal agent willed to create the universe. Like a man sitting down from all eternity deciding to stand up. A personal cause makes the best sense of this.

 

[meltzerboy]

Do you mean impersonal, as in force of nature or physics in the absence of a sentient being? Or do you mean an impersonal G-d such as theists may believe in? Either way, I suppose the answer is the first cause needn’t be personal. And further, there needn’t be a first cause. It depends on whether or not you believe in a personal G-d who created the Universe (or multiverse). In my view, no hypothesis, no matter how elegant, involving the existence of a personal or impersonal G-d, or the non-existence of a personal or impersonal G-d, can be conclusive. Reason and knowledge can only go so far; belief is ultimately a matter of spiritual faith and intuitive, emotional wisdom.

 

[belorg]

@ Belorg and Luke,

Since Luke answered your objection to my first argument for the personality of the first cause, I’ll say less about that. There is no contradiction entailed in saying that an unembodied mind exists; indeed, that is what a mind is.

I am not saying that there is a contradiction in a disembodied mind, I am saying that the claim that there are only two known non-physical , non-spatial and a-temporal causes is patently lase. A mind is NOT a ‘known cause’ of anything.
If, as Luke seems to imply, these are the only two logically possible options, he is wrong too. It os logically possible for thre to be a timeless, non-spatial and no,n-physical proto)unievsre that spontaneoulsy transformed into the universe or something like it.

– If the universe has a cause (the universe includes all time, space, and matter), that cause cannot be any of those things. Numbers do not stand in causal relation, minds do. Doesn’t your mind affect your body?

I do not think my mind effects my body, no. My mind is a part of my body.

Also, you’re suggestion that such a thing as an impersonal mind may exist seems to border on incoherent. A mind implies a personality.

That is a non-sequitur. A mind ilmplies intelligence of some sort, it does not imply personality at all.

Second, you seemed to misunderstand me here, so let me lay this reasoning out more clearly.

1. There are two types of causal explanations; scientific explanations in terms of laws and initial conditions, and personal explanations in terms of agents and volition.

No, that is not true. In quantum mechnaics, e.g. things are neither caused by agents and volition, nor by .
initial conditions. e.g. In order for a qunatum fluctuation to occur, the initial conditions must be present, but are not the cause for the fluctuation, because not these fluctuations do not occurs everywhere the conditions occur.

– For example, I say to my wife: why is the water on the stove boiling? She might say the heat of the flame is being conducted to the water increasing the kinetic energy of the water molecules until it is thrown off as steam. Or she might say “because I wanted some tea.” The first explanation is scientific, the second personal.

The second is just as much a scientific explanantion as the first. Because the reaso why you wanted some tea is because some condition in your brain (or your mind) was such and such that it caused a line of events that lead to the water boiling.
You could of course say that the condition in your mind of wanting tea was not caused, but then you are stuck with an uncaused event, which shows the distinction between scientific and personal explanations is a false dichotomy. The real dichotomy would be between caused events and uncaused events.

1. A first state of the universe cannot have a scientific explanation, since there is nothing before it, and so it cannot be accounted for in terms of laws operating on initial conditions. So if the universe has a cause, it must be accounted for in terms of an agent and volition, that is, a personal explanation.

As I explained, an ‘agent and volition’ entails either a scientific explanation of why the agent is what it is, or it entails uncaused events. So, it does not get you any further.

Now this is just a bare assertion, you must support it. Why should an atemporal being be unable to cause something to exist?

Because a atemporal being, as Aquinas e.g. correctly undertsood, is changeless and immutable. Everything it knows, decides etc. it has been knwoing, deciding since eternity, IOW there is no ‘beginning’ to any desire, thoight or decision by such being. As a result, such being does not ‘begin’ to do anything. Everything it does it has been doing forever. So, it ‘has been causing’ the universe (and time) forever, hence, the unievsre (and time must be beginningless.

What is incoherent about the idea that a man sitting down from all eternity, decides to stand up?

The fact that this ‘deciding’ did not begin. That man has always decided to stand up, and consequently has always been standing up.

Craig thinks that this means that once God creates, he enters time and becomes temporal.

Which would make Aquinas turn around in his grave.

I am not sure about that, but let’s grant it for the sake of argument. What is the problem. God is atemporal without creation, but temporal after creation.

The very fact that there IS no after creation. creation did not begin, so how can there be anything after it?

So, you see there is really nothing at all problematic about an atemporal being creating the universe.

There is a whole lot problematic about it. WL Craig does not grasp the implications of his theory. His talk about a man sitting dowm from eternity and deciding to stand up entails the very temporality he desparately wants to avoid.

Otherwise, the cause would always be happening, therefore it would always be causing the effect.

No, becasue, unlike a persoanl God causing something, an impersoan cause need not be a sufficient cause. There is no contradiction in a condition existing timeless and time beginning when the first fluctuation occurs, e.g., because the condition under which the fluctuations occur is a necessary condition but not a sufficient one, whereas the eternal decision by God to make the universe ‘appear’ is a necessary and a sufficient condition for the unievsre to appear. IOW the sufficient condition for the unieverse to appear did not begin, which means the universe did not begin.
So, it is the other way round:: a personal cause woukl always be causing the effect, whereas an impersonal wouldn’t.

 

[Mark_David]

The simplest way to answer the OP is that there would be no secondary causes without a first cause. No first cause = no existence.

 

[danserr]

I am not saying that there is a contradiction in a disembodied mind, I am saying that the claim that there are only two known non-physical , non-spatial and a-temporal causes is patently lase. A mind is NOT a ‘known cause’ of anything.
If, as Luke seems to imply, these are the only two logically possible options, he is wrong too. It os logically possible for thre to be a timeless, non-spatial and no,n-physical proto)unievsre that spontaneoulsy transformed into the universe or something like
it.

You claim I am wrong in saying that there are only two known immaterial, non-spatial, non-temporal things. I claim that there are only two: minds and abstract objects. You claim that there are more, yet you are totally unable to give an example of this. Until you do so, I am rationally justified in my opinion that those are the only two candidates for the first cause of the universe. Since numbers do not stand in causal relation, we conclude that the cause of the universe must be an unembodied mind. Your claim that minds do not cause things is so radical and bold I do not believe you could find a single philosopher to support it. Your claim that the mind is simply part of the body may or may not be true (actually, you seem to be begging the question in favor of physicalism), but this does not prevent it from causing something. My mind causes my hands for move, for instance. God, a far more powerful unembodied mind (soul/self/etc.) causes the universe to exist out of nothing.

Your claim that a mind does not imply personality still seems to border on incoherant and you have not supported this claim. Please give an example if you wish to maintain this strange position.

Your last attempt is to claim that:

It os logically possible for thre to be a timeless, non-spatial and no,n-physical proto)unievsre that spontaneoulsy transformed into the universe or something like it.

Remember, in your first post, you seemed to be claiming that an unembodied mind is an incoherent concept, so Luke’s remark that it is logically possible was perfectly appropriate. Now you claim that perhaps an immaterial, non-spatial, atemporal nonmind created the universe. Certainly; but to say that such a thing is broadly logically possible is not to say that it is metaphysically or scientifically possible, and you give no reason for thinking that it is. We know that minds stand in causal relation. We no of nothing like you mention at all even existing. Can you give an example? If not, your suggestion is really just empty words. We have accounted for all the alternatives, you claim we have not, but do not suggest an alternative yourself. Unless, you can do so, your claim that some other sort of cause with those properties might exist is merely empty words. Like me saying that a non-even, non-odd number might exist.

For my second point I argued that:

There are two types of causal explanations; scientific explanations in terms of laws and initial conditions, and personal explanations in terms of agents and volition.

This is my position. Now you suggest that quantum physics furnishes a counterexample because it is not accounted for by agents and volition (obviously), nor by laws and initial conditions because it is indeterminate.

• This is problematic because, first, it begs the question in favor of indeterminate views of quantum physics. Many scientists, however, are unhappy with this (copenhagen) interpretation and are exploring deterministic theories like those of David Bohm, so quantum physics is not a proven counter-example. Next quantum physics is indeed a scientific explanation because, as you admit, it requires initial conditions. It does not come “from nothing” but from the quantum vacuum, which is actually a rich sea of fluctuating energy subject to physical laws, hence a scientific explanation is perfectly proper. This is as opposed to the universe, which really does come from nothing, and so if it has a cause it cannot be accounted for in terms of agents and volitions, but must be accounted for in terms of a personal explanation.

-You also claim that there is no distinction between personal and scientific explanations. This is very strange and radical. Do you really see no distinction between

1. Laws operation on initial conditions, and
2. agents and volitions?

At any rate, the problem you try to raise with my personal desire for tea being uncaused is not problem at all, since, at most it shows that God does not require a cause, which we already knew.

 

[danserr]

As to an atemporal being being unable to cause something, I have shown that this is not problem because it is possible that God is timeless without creation, but with creation, enters time. It is like a man sitting down from all eternity who decides to stand up. This is easily accounted for by a personal agent, but not accounted for otherwise.

You main objection to this is to say nothing more that that Thomas Aquinas would disagree with WLC. Very well, so what? John Duns Scotus, Aquinas’s contemporary, disagreed with him as well. I love Aquinas, but he is not infallible. At any rate, as an objection to my view, you simply quoting Aquinas is not very persuasive.

With this understanding, the rest of your objections evaporate.

Because a atemporal being, as Aquinas e.g. correctly undertsood, is changeless and immutable. Everything it knows, decides etc. it has been knwoing, deciding since eternity, IOW there is no ‘beginning’ to any desire, thoight or decision by such being. As a result, such being does not ‘begin’ to do anything. Everything it does it has been doing forever. So, it ‘has been causing’ the universe (and time) forever, hence, the unievsre (and time must be beginningless.

Except that such a being entering time with creation solves this problem perfectly well. The man sitting from eternity always willing to stand up, and then does. By doing so, he enter time. Not terribly traumatic.

You claim, more strangely,

There is nothing after creation, because creation did not begin.

But as we see, creation did begin. The universe came into being a finite time ago. Therefore, anything after the first state of the universe can be considered properly to be after creation.

here is a whole lot problematic about it. WL Craig does not grasp the implications of his theory. His talk about a man sitting dowm from eternity and deciding to stand up entails the very temporality he desparately wants to avoid.

But he has no problem with the idea that God is timless without creation and temporal after creation. Which seems perfectly understandable.

No, becasue, unlike a persoanl God causing something, an impersoan cause need not be a sufficient cause. There is no contradiction in a condition existing timeless and time beginning when the first fluctuation occurs, e.g., because the condition under which the fluctuations occur is a necessary condition but not a sufficient one, whereas the eternal decision by God to make the universe ‘appear’ is a necessary and a sufficient condition for the unievsre to appear. IOW the sufficient condition for the unieverse to appear did not begin, which means the universe did not begin.
So, it is the other way round:: a personal cause woukl always be causing the effect, whereas an impersonal wouldn’t

So I have show that a personal cause need not always be causing the effect. Think of the illustration of the man sitting from eternity who decides to stand up. This is a perfectly coherent idea, once you accept the idea that God might be atemporal without creation and temporal after.

• In your scenario, what causes the first fluctuation? I assume the non-mind, non-spatial, non-temporal- immaterial cause you allude to earlier. But as I have said, this is just empty words unless you can suggest something. An impersonal cause will have always been causing the effect. As long the the temperative is below 0 C, then it will always be causing water to freeze. The same principle applies.

 

[belorg]

You claim I am wrong in saying that there are only two known immaterial, non-spatial, non-temporal things. I claim that there are only two: minds and abstract objects.

I actually claim that there are others, not necessarily more. I am claiming that the first one (abstravt objects) only exists in a very special sense of existing and that the second (an immaterial mind) is not known to exist at all. It might exist, but it most certainly is not known to exist. to claim it is is patently false.

You claim that there are more, yet you are totally unable to give an example of this

.

I gave you an example, you don’t like it, but I did give you one.

Until you do so, I am rationally justified in my opinion that those are the only two candidates for the first cause of the universe.

As soon as you can show your second candidate is known to exist, you are reationally justified.

Your claim that minds do not cause things is so radical and bold I do not believe you could find a single philosopher to support it.

I don’t claim that minds do not cause things. I ckaim that minds are not known to cause things. Once you give an example of a disembodied mind causing somthing, I’ll concede. But you haven’t even begun doing that.

Your claim that the mind is simply part of the body may or may not be true (actually, you seem to be begging the question in favor of physicalism), but this does not prevent it from causing something.

I don’t claim this at all. I think the mind is part of the body and IF it’s part of the bdoy it does not really cause anything in the way you want it to cause something.
If it isn’t part of the body then it might cause the body to do something, but this is still very far from it being able to make something appear out of nothing.

My mind causes my hands for move, for instance. God, a far more powerful unembodied mind (soul/self/etc.) causes the universe to exist out of nothing.

What’s the difference between one non-physical, non-temporal and non-spatial mind able to create out of nothing and another equally a-temporal, non-spatial and non-physical mind that’s unable to do that?

Your claim that a mind does not imply personality still seems to border on incoherant and you have not supported this claim. Please give an example if you wish to maintain this strange position.

Does a computer have personality?

Remember, in your first post, you seemed to be claiming that an unembodied mind is an incoherent concept, so Luke’s remark that it is logically possible was perfectly appropriate.

I have never claimed that. I have no idea what a disemboied mind means or whether it has any meaning at all, Sure it is logically possible. But so is my example.

Now you claim that perhaps an immaterial, non-spatial, atemporal nonmind created the universe. Certainly; but to say that such a thing is broadly logically possible is not to say that it is metaphysically or scientifically possible and you give no reason for thinking that it is.

I never claimed it was. Remember: Luke was saying a disembodied mind was logically possible. Sure it is, but so is my non-mind… So Luke’s claim that there are only two logically possible causes is false.

We know that minds stand in causal relation.

We do **NOT know **that. We know brains stand in causal relations. Some people **think **disembodies minds stand in causal relations.

We know of nothing like you mention at all even existing. Can you give an example?

Can you give an example of a disembodied mind that is known to cause anything at all?
If not, yopur suggestion is really just empty words.

For my second point I argued that:
This is my position. Now you suggest that quantum physics furnishes a counterexample because it is not accounted for by agents and volition (obviously), nor by laws and initial conditions because it is indeterminate.

• This is problematic because, first, it begs the question in favor of indeterminate views of quantum physics. Many scientists, however, are unhappy with this (copenhagen) interpretation and are exploring deterministic theories like those of David Bohm, so quantum physics is not a proven counter-example.

Of course it’s not a proven counter-exmaple. It’s a possible counter-example.

Next quantum physics is indeed a scientific explanation because, as you admit, it requires initial conditions. It does not come “from nothing” but from the quantum vacuum, which is actually a rich sea of fluctuating energy subject to physical laws, hence a scientific explanation is perfectly proper. This is as opposed to the universe, which really does come from nothing, and so if it has a cause it cannot be accounted for in terms of agents and volitions, but must be accounted for in terms of a personal explanation.

If quantum flcutuations are a scientific explaanation, we have a scientific explaannation for the universe.

-You also claim that there is no distinction between personal and scientific explanations. This is very strange and radical. Do you really see no distinction between

1. Laws operation on initial conditions, and
2. agents and volitions?

Superficially: I do see a difference, when we get to the bottom of things: no, it don’t see any.

At any rate, the problem you try to raise with my personal desire for tea being uncaused is not problem at all, since, at most it shows that God does not require a cause, which we already knew.

So, you can jsut assert that something does not need a cause. So, I’ll assert that the unievsre does not need a cause.

 

[belorg]

As to an atemporal being being unable to cause something, I have shown that this is not problem because it is possible that God is timeless without creation, but with creation, enters time.

I

I have never claimed that an atemporal being is unable to cause something, I have claimed that an a-temporal being is unable to cause something that begins. And whether the being, with creation, enters time or not is colmpletly irrelevent. Fact is that if the being enters time with creations,it has always been entering time and in fact isn’t timeless at all.
A timelss, being, as Aquinas correcty understood, is eternaly timeless.Tthe concept of ‘temporral a-temporality’ that WL Craig adhzeres to is clearly logically contradictory.

t is like a man sitting down from all eternity who decides to stand up. This is easily accounted for by a personal agent, but not accounted for otherwise.

It is only ‘accounted for’ if one conflates a-temporality with temporality.

You main objection to this is to say nothing more that that Thomas Aquinas would disagree with WLC.

If you think that is my main objection, then I advise you to read my posts before you reply. I do not really care that much about Aquinas. he was a smart guy, but, just as Aristotle, simply wrong on several accounts.

Except that such a being entering time with creation solves this problem perfectly well. The man sitting from eternity always willing to stand up, and **then **does. By doing so, he enter time. Not terribly traumatic.

As you can see by the part I have bolded, it is terribly traumatic. And you’ve just illustrated my point much more eloquently than I could. Then he stands up. IOW at that time he stands up. At which time, danserr? There is no time.

But as we see, creation did begin.

Which is impossible if an a-temporal person created it.

The universe came into being a finite time ago. Therefore, anything after the first state of the universe can be considered properly to be after creation.

Then there is also ‘befire’ creation. But there isn’t ‘before’ creation because theer wasn’t anything before creation. Creation did not begin.

But he has no problem with the idea that God is timeless without creation and temporal after creation. Which seems perfectly understandable.

He simply ingores the problems, that does not mean there aren’t any.

So I have show that a personal cause need not always be causing the effect.

Just like WL Craig, you have asserted this without any sort of argument.

Think of the illustration of the man sitting from eternity who decides to stand up.

The decision and the sitting down occur in the same a-tempral mode. Therefore since he has been sitting from eternity, he has been decding from eternity to get up and has been getting up since eternity.

This is a perfectly coherent idea, once you accept the idea that God might be atemporal without creation and temporal after.

I don’t accept this idea, but even if I did, it would not make it a coherent idea.

• In your scenario, what causes the first fluctuation? I assume the non-mind, non-spatial, non-temporal- immaterial cause you allude to earlier.

Yes.

But as I have said, this is just empty words unless you can suggest something. An impersonal cause will have always been causing the effect.

Which is what yoy have asserted several times already, but it simply isn’t true.

As long the the temperative is below 0 C, then it will always be causing water to freeze. The same principle applies.

Even in this example this isn’t true. And it begs the question because there are necessary and sufficient causes but there are also necessary causes that are not sufficient. But God, by his very definition is both a necessary and a sufficient cause.

So he cannot possibly cauise anything to begin to exist, including His own temporality.

 

[danserr]

Belorg, I have a challenge/request for you. If you reply further, make your reply in paragraph form and minimize your use of quotes. When you quote every line, it just encourages you to break up my thoughts too much rather than considering them together; and it encourages you to just give a smart-aleck one line answer rather than considering the issue more thoroughly. Second, it will make it easier for me to follow your reasoning, which will help.

Since I have basically defended 3 main arguments for the person-hood of the first cause, I’m going to generally break this post into three points, with each argument in bold quotes.

1). The universe includes all time, space, and matter. If it has a cause, it must transcend space and time and so must be immaterial, atemporal (at least causally prior to the universe), and non-spatial. Only two things fall into this category, abstract objects (like numbers), and minds. Numbers do not stand in causal relation, therefore the cause of the universe must be an un-embodied mind.

You have several lines of attack here. You deny that an un-embodied mind could exist or could cause anything; and you claim that perhaps some other thing fitting that description (atemporal, non-spatial, immaterial) could have caused the universe. Finally, you try to claim that a mind does not imply a personality, which seems to me to border on incoherent.

First, I need to point out something you seem to have missed, namely that you are raising contradictory objections! Some of your objections are mutually exclusive, so which is it? For example, you claim that perhaps there is an atemporal, immaterial, non-spatial-non-personal cause of the universe, yet later in your post, you claim that the idea of an atemporal cause of the universe is incoherant! So you disagree with your own suggestion. This seems to me to suggest a certain insincerity on your part, since you obviously can’t mean what you are saying, since your own points are mutually exclusive.

Though you claim that the immaterial, atemporal, non-spatial cause of the universe need not be a mind, you have yet to suggest what it could be. You claim that you did, but did not repeat it, and I cannot find any counter suggestion on your part. If you have and I missed it, please reply again, so I may consider it. In the meantime, though, minds and abstract objects seem to exhaust the possibilities for an immaterial, atemporal, non-spatial cause of the universe. Since numbers do not stand in causal relation, the cause of the universe must be a mind.

You try to claim the mind that caused the universe may be non-personal (which contradicts your earlier suggestion that a non-mind may have caused the universe, you evidently can’t believe both of these, so which do you believe? I don’t want to waste time responding to ideas that you don’t even believe yourself). However, an impersonal mind is an incoherent idea. Your attempted counter-example of a computer is misguided. A computer is not a mind, nor is it analogous to one. A computer merely stores and retrieves data on being prompted by an outside agent (man). By the same logic, a library is a mind because it stores data. *A computer is not a mind *and is not analogous to a mind. If anything, it is closer to a brain (and even this is far from certain). A brain includes many physical parts like a computer, stores data, and retrieves that data and performs calculations in response to prompts from an agent, namely, the mind.(soul/self).

The other main part of your objection is to attack the idea of a mind as immaterial, non-spatial, and atemporal. You claim I must first prove that such a thing can exist. Not at all. (As a side note, in your previous post #27 you concede that you have never claimed that an non-mind, atemporal, and immaterial cause is metaphysically or scientifically possible, which means it cannot cause the universe). I have shown that such a thing must exist because it is the only possible cause for the universe (you have still not named an alternative). If the universe has a cause, that cause must be atemporal, immaterial, non-spatial. The only things this could be is an abstract object or a mind. Numbers do not cause things, we know this for certain, therefore the only remaining option is a mind. Therefore, we conclude that the cause of the universe is an un-embodied mind. This shows such a mind (and it must be very powerful) must exist. Your only route of escape would be to claim that such an idea is incoherent. But you concede that the idea of an un-embodied mind is perfectly coherent. So since logic demands the cause of the universe be an un-embodied mind and you concede that such a thing is logically possible, then we should believe that the cause of the universe is an un-embodied mind (soul/self).

 

[danserr]

**2). There are two types of causal explanations; scientific explanations in terms of laws and initial conditions, and personal explanations in terms of agents and volition. **

Your answers to my second argument for the person-hood of the first cause are not very satisfactory either… Here I need further explanation of your position because I find one of your point unclear. You suggest that “if quantum flcutuations are a scientific explaanation, we have a scientific explaannation for the universe.”
Why is this so? From the fact that quantum fluctuations are a scientific explanation it does not follow that we have a scientific explanation for the universe unless you are claiming that some quantum model of the universe explains the universe. If you are doing this though (and please be clear if you are, and only do so it you really believe this model, since I have no desire to waste my time considering views that you don’t even believe yourself), be very clear on how you think quantum fluctuations explain the universe.

At any rate, if this is your position, then you are not really attacking my argument for the person-hood of the cause of the universe. Instead you are probably attacking the idea that the universe had a beginning or that, if it had a beginning, it had a cause. Some people do take these positions, but the purpose of this thread is to discuss, if there is a first cause, why must that cause be personal? And that it what I am discussing here.

You then try to insist, very radically, that there is no distinction between: laws operating on initial conditions, and agents and volition. Your attempt to deny this seems to be to claim that some sort of determinism/fatalism is true (though I don’t think you understand you are doing this), but even if this is the case, it seems obvious that there is a difference in type of explanation between me saying “I wanted hot chocolate” and “increasing kinetic energy is causing the water to boil.” Or between, “I wanted an apple,” and “gravity caused the apple to fall to the ground.” In the first place, the volition of an agent causes the apple to leave the tree, in the second, a law operating on a condition does. I do not see how you can deny the difference between these two, and I would be curious if you can find even one modern philosopher to support your view and what the reasoning is.

You last gasp here is an attempt at a tu quoque argument, to try to claim that I am inconsistent in claiming that the universe needs a cause but God does not. This is merely the internet popular “what caused God” nonsense. It is nonsense because the KCA runs:

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause
2. the universe began to exist
3. the universe has a cause

Now for the purposes of this thread we are assuming the steps one and two have been demonstrated, and we are doing conceptual analysis of step 3 to see if the cause must be personal. To answer you objection though is very simple. Everything that begins to exist requires a cause. The second premise then shows that the universe began to exist. It follows inevitably, therefore, that the universe has a cause.

• The first premise does indeed apply to God as well, but where God differs from the universe is in the fact that where we have evidence that the universe began to exist (and so requires a cause- from premise 1), we do not have any reason for thinking that God began to exist. None of the arguments for the beginning of the universe (Big Bang Cosmology, impossibility if formation of an infinite by successive addition) apply to God. Therefore, there is no reason for thinking that God has a cause.

 

[danserr]

3. A temporal effect from a timeless cause implies the person-hood of the first cause

Here let me quote directly and briefly Craig on this point:

how else could a temporal effect arise from an eternal cause? If the cause were simply a mechanically operating set of necessary and sufficient conditions existing from eternity, then why would not the effect also exist from eternity? For example, if the cause of water’s being frozen is the temperature’s being below zero degrees, then if the temperature were below zero degrees from eternity, then any water present would be frozen from eternity. The only way to have an eternal cause but a temporal effect would seem to be if the cause is a personal agent who freely chooses to create an effect in time. For example, a man sitting from eternity may will to stand up; hence, a temporal effect may arise from an eternally existing agent. Indeed, the agent may will from eternity to create a temporal effect, so that no change in the agent need be conceived.

So you can see how there need be no change at all in the agent because he may will from eternity to create a temporal effect. With creation, he enters time. Imagine the man sitting from eternity. In this case, time does not exist while he is still sitting (assuming he has always been sitting there and nothing else exists), but eternally willing to stand, he does and on standing, time begins to exist from that point, so that he can be said to stand from a certain point in time.

I have never claimed that God was atemporal before creation. If you go back and looks, I always say that God is atemporal without creation, and temporal after creation (I can say after creation, because time begins to exist with creation).

Now the main illustration I find useful is to say that a man sitting from eternity wills to stand up. (thank you for correcting my use of the word “then” in a previous post- but you see I can express the idea without using the word).

Since you mention Wes Morrison, I suggest looking at WLC’s reply to him posted here:
reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5321

here he says:

I am inclined simply to deny that God’s eternally willing to create the universe, properly understood, is sufficient for the existence of the universe. As J. P. Moreland explains, in the case of personal causal explanations, the salient factors are the existence of an agent with his relevant properties and powers, the agent’s intention to bring about some result, an exercise of the agent’s causal powers, and in some cases a description of the relevant action plan. So "a personal explanation (divine or otherwise) of some basic result R brought about intentionally by person P where this bringing about of R is a basic action A will cite the intention I of P that R occur and the basic power B that P exercised to bring about R."27 Notice that it is insufficient for P to have merely the intention and power to bring about R. There must also be a basic action on the part of P, an undertaking or endeavoring or exercise of P’s causal powers. Thus, it is insufficient to account for the origin of the universe by citing simply God, His timeless intention to create a world with a beginning, and His power to produce such a result. There must be an exercise of His causal power in order for the universe to be created. That entails, of course, an intrinsic change on God’s part which brings Him into time at the moment of creation. For that reason He must be temporal since creation even if He is timeless sans creation.28 Such an account of the origin of the universe will work only for agent causation, for only a libertarian agent could interrupt the static reign of being of the First Cause sans the universe. It is for that reason that we should conceive of the First Cause as personal.

God eternally willed to bring about the universe and had the power to do so, but this alone was not enough; instead, God also had to exercise his causal power. Now this would have brought about a change in God and brought Him into time, but very well. For the purpose of the argument, I grant that. So the man eternally sits down, eternally willing to get up, exercises his causal power and stands, thereby entering time.

Hence only a personal agent can explain how a temporal cause could arise from a timeless effect, and so the cause of the universe is atemporal without creation, and temporal subsequent to creation.

 

[ivebeenshown]

Why must time begin only with creation? If there were ever an instance where God existed prior to creation, it would be just that – prior, as in, before something else on a timeline. Time has no beginning or end. There is no ‘present’ without the past and the future.

 

[DianaCC]

Why must time begin only with creation? If there were ever an instance where God existed prior to creation, it would be just that – prior, as in, before something else on a timeline. Time has no beginning or end. There is no ‘present’ without the past and the future.

Don’t you think it’s possible that the past is only finitely long, yet there is no first moment of time? In mathematics, we can have a finite line segment that has no first point.

Also, if there is no change, then is there “time”?

 

[ivebeenshown]

Don’t you think it’s possible that the past is only finitely long, yet there is no first moment of time? In mathematics, we can have a finite line segment that has no first point.

I don’t understand. If we look at time like a number line, start at 0 and count backwards, the length would be infinite.

Also, if there is no change, then is there “time”?

Yes. We are in the created universe. Prior to its creation, even if time were experienced differently than on earth, it would still be PRIOR in time to something. The fact that change would occur places God’s pre-creation existence on a timeline.

 

[DianaCC]

I don’t understand. If we look at time like a number line, start at 0 and count backwards, the length would be infinite. … Yes. We are in the created universe. Prior to its creation, even if time were experienced differently than on earth, it would still be PRIOR in time to something. The fact that change would occur places God’s pre-creation existence on a timeline.

Why can’t time be like when you mark off “x > 1” on a number line, where you put an open dot at 1 and shade everything to the right of it? The shaded region does not extend past 1, yet there is no first point.

If there were “time” prior to God’s first creative act, then what sorts of things happened to measure “time”? Because there is no change in God.

 

[belorg]

I’ll start with your third post, danserr, I don’t know if I’ll have the time to reply to the other ones but I’ll try.

Here let me quote directly and briefly Craig on this point:

Quote:
3. A temporal effect from a timeless cause implies the person-hood of the first cause

Here let me quote directly and briefly Craig on this point:

Origibally posted by WL Craig:

No, ler’s leave out the worn-out example of ‘the man sitting down from eternity’

The main point is the words I’ve bolded. What Craig says is true IF a mechanical set was always operating under necessary and sufficient conditions. However, as QM shows, that is far from certain. So to say that a mechanically operating set operates under necessary and sufficient conditions is question-begging on the part of Craig.

So you can see how there need be no change at all in the agent because he may will from eternity to create a temporal effect.

I never claimed there need be a chnge in the agent, danserr.

I have never claimed that God was atemporal before creation. If you go back and looks, I always say that God is atemporal without creation, and temporal after creation (I can say after creation, because time begins to exist with creation).

After implies before, danserr.

Now the main illustration I find useful is to say that a man sitting from eternity wills to stand up. (thank you for correcting my use of the word “then” in a previous post- but you see I can express the idea without using the word).

Without the ‘then’, you’ll end up with a man in a quantum sate of half-sitting half standing (conparable to shrödinger’s cat)

Since you mention Wes Morrison, I suggest looking at WLC’s reply to him posted here:
reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5321

here he says:

God eternally willed to bring about the universe and had the power to do so, but this alone was not enough; instead, God also had to exercise his causal power. Now this would have brought about a change in God and brought Him into time, but very well. For the purpose of the argument, I grant that. So the man eternally sits down, eternally willing to get up, exercises his causal power and stands, thereby entering time.

Hence only a personal agent can explain how a temporal cause could arise from a timeless effect, and so the cause of the universe is atemporal without creation, and temporal subsequent to creation.

Here Craig merely tries to obfuscate things by adding steps in the process. But the simple fact is, that God’s will is a sufficient condition for the exercise of his power. And since this will didn’t begin, neither did the exercise of His power, and, consequently, neither did whatever was the result of this exercise.Now, Carig can try to add more steps, even a zillion ones, but that won’t save his argument.

I don’t know whether Morriston ever replied to this, but I cannot imagine he would be very impressed with this obvious attempt by Craig to hide the failure of his argument under an impressive looking word salad. I can say that I am not too impressed.

Let’s face it, danserr, the KCA is dead as a doornail.

 

[belorg]

Belorg, I have a challenge/request for you. If you reply further, make your reply in paragraph form and minimize your use of quotes. When you quote every line, it just encourages you to break up my thoughts too much rather than considering them together; and it encourages you to just give a smart-aleck one line answer rather than considering the issue more thoroughly. Second, it will make it easier for me to follow your reasoning, which will help.

My use of quotes is meant to make clear what exactly I am replying too, danserr, but if it bothers you’ I’ll try to minimize my use of them.

Now, your whole post seems to be based on a thorough misunderstanding of what I am claiming.
I am not claiming e.g. that an un-embodied mind cannot exist. I am merely saying that it cannot just be assumed that it exists. IOW an imaaterial mind, contrary to your claim is not known to exist…

Also I do not clailm that an atempral cause of the universe is incoherent. i clailm that a personal atemporal cause of the universe is incoherent. So, I don’t ‘disagree with my own suggestion’ at all.

And I do not have to suggest what the immaterial non-perosnal cause of the unievsre could be, since I merely state this as a possibility, to show that it is not true that there there are only two possibilities.
But I have given you a suggestion: an a-temporal proto-universe operating under laws that resemble those of QM, in which it is possinle for there to be necessary conditions that are nevertheless not sufficient conditions.

When I say that the ‘mind’ that created the universe may be impersonal that’s just by way of conceding FTSOTA that a mind exists.

AS for ‘believing’ ideas. Farnkly, danserr, believing is something for a believer, which I am not. So, no, unlike you I do not believe in any of my suggestions. I merely treat them as suggestions. Believing them requires a leap of faith which I am not preperaed to take.

Your denial that a computer has a mind just begs the question. If a mind is immaterial, then of course a computer does not have a mind, but an immaterial computer-like being would have.

 

[belorg]

.

The other main part of your objection is to attack the idea of a mind as immaterial, non-spatial, and atemporal. You claim I must first prove that such a thing can exist. Not at all. (As a side note, in your previous post #27 you concede that you have never claimed that an non-mind, atemporal, and immaterial cause is metaphysically or scientifically possible, which means it cannot cause the universe).

Where do you get that? I have never claimed it is metaphysically or scientifically possible, but that does not mean I don’t think it is mrtaphysically possible (whether it’s zscientifically possible, I’ll leave to the scientists). I have never claimed this because, in the context of a reply to Luke that an immaterial mind is a logical possibility, all I need is something else that is logically possible.
So, if you want me to prove that it is scientifically possible, I require the same thing from you, that’s all. Now, can you do this or not?

The only things this **could be **is an abstract object or a mind. .

If my alternative is possible, which you concede it is, then this is patently false.

 

[belorg]

Your answers to my second argument for the person-hood of the first cause are not very satisfactory either… Here I need further explanation of your position because I find one of your point unclear. You suggest that “if quantum flcutuations are a scientific explaanation, we have a scientific explaannation for the universe.”
Why is this so? From the fact that quantum fluctuations are a scientific explanation it does not follow that we have a scientific explanation for the universe unless you are claiming that some quantum model of the universe explains the universe. If you are doing this though (and please be clear if you are, and only do so it you really believe this model, since I have no desire to waste my time considering views that you don’t even believe yourself), be very clear on how you think quantum fluctuations explain the universe.

There are several quantummodels that explain the universe, but I don’t belive any of them because I am not a believer.

At any rate, if this is your position, then you are not really attacking my argument for the person-hood of the cause of the universe. Instead you are probably attacking the idea that the universe had a beginning or that, if it had a beginning, it had a cause. Some people do take these positions, but the purpose of this thread is to discuss, if there is a first cause, why must that cause be personal? And that it what I am discussing here.

My position is that, if there is a cause for the universe, it may be impersonal. That’s it. Clear and simple.

You then try to insist, very radically, that there is no distinction between: laws operating on initial conditions, and agents and volition. Your attempt to deny this seems to be to claim that some sort of determinism/fatalism is true (though I don’t think you understand you are doing this), but even if this is the case, it seems obvious that there is a difference in type of explanation between me saying “I wanted hot chocolate” and “increasing kinetic energy is causing the water to boil.” Or between, “I wanted an apple,” and “gravity caused the apple to fall to the ground.” In the first place, the volition of an agent causes the apple to leave the tree, in the second, a law operating on a condition does. I do not see how you can deny the difference between these two, and I would be curious if you can find even one modern philosopher to support your view and what the reasoning is.

There are several modern philosphers who would support my view, but even if I was the only one doesn’t mean I am wrong.

And I do understand what I am doing here and it does not entail that some sort of determinism/fatalism is true. it might be true, but it does not need to be true.
As I said, superficially, there is difference between a apple falling due to gravity and an apple falling because I wanted it. the latter is a more complex process, but that does not mean there is any fundamzntal different between the two.

You last gasp here is an attempt at a tu quoque argument, to try to claim that I am inconsistent in claiming that the universe needs a cause but God does not. This is merely the internet popular “what caused God” nonsense. It is nonsense because the KCA runs:

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause
2. the universe began to exist
3. the universe has a cause

I’v’e already refuted the KCA, so if you want to argue for an uncaused God, you’ll have to come uo with something better.

Now for the purposes of this thread we are assuming the steps one and two have been demonstrated, and we are doing conceptual analysis of step 3 to see if the cause must be personal.

OK

To answer you objection though is very simple. Everything that begins to exist requires a cause. The second premise then shows that the universe began to exist. It follows inevitably, therefore, that the universe has a cause.

• The first premise does indeed apply to God as well, but where God differs from the universe is in the fact that where we have evidence that the universe began to exist (and so requires a cause- from premise 1), we do not have any reason for thinking that God began to exist.

Yes,w e do, actually. If we apply the reasoning of the KCA, then God began to exist in just the same way as the universe.

None of the arguments for the beginning of the universe (Big Bang Cosmology, impossibility if formation of an infinite by successive addition) apply to God. Therefore, there is no reason for thinking that God has a cause.

Thiose reasons only apply to a temporal universe, as they also apply to a temporal God, they do not apply to an a-temporal God, but neither do they apply to an a-tempôral universe.