Poll: Is conceptual thought possible without language?

[Qoeleth]

Is language co-originary with conceptual thought? To me, following Saussare, it would seem so, more or less. One can’t really think of something (a concept, an emotion, a class of object) unless one has a word for it.

On the other hand, Aristotle says that concepts exist before words, and that words vary from person to person (i.e. from language to language) but all people have the same concepts.

Can you think of a concept without using words? If so, how can the concept be rendered comprehensible, even to oneself?

 

[thewanderer]

I think language is extremely important for thought, but we can use images and other sensible memories to represent at least some thoughts. For instance, picturing the colour red can bring to mind the concept of redness even if you don’t use the word red. It takes a couple of tries and seems strange because its not what we’re used to, but I definitely think it is possible!

 

[SonCatcher]

Language can be cumbersome if you happen to be examining an object in your thoughts. Especially if that object has 5 or 6 dimensions.

 

[bscastro]

I’m not an expert or anything, but I would agree from personal experience that conceptual images appear without language in my mind. Often, I don’t have words to succinctly express the thoughts in my mind.

As an example, when I played chess, I would conceive of a strategy in my mind without putting words to it - I would just see an image or specific chess positions.

Of course, to express it I would have to use words or draw it out, but the actual concept of the strategy was in my head before the language used to describe it.

God bless,
Bryan

 

[tonyrey]

1. Consciousness is a mystery and so is conceptual thought.
2. Sometimes we have ideas we cannot express with words.
3. They are the result of intuition or insight we cannot explain even to ourselves.
4. Our power of abstraction is similar to our power of decision-making.
5. They are both aspects of mental activity that cannot nor ever will be explained by science.
6. The mind cannot be reduced to physical events because it is a fundamental reality.

 

[tonyrey]

I’m not an expert or anything, but I would agree from personal experience that conceptual images appear without language in my mind. Often, I don’t have words to succinctly express the thoughts in my mind.

As an example, when I played chess, I would conceive of a strategy in my mind without putting words to it - I would just see an image or specific chess positions.

Of course, to express it I would have to use words or draw it out, but the actual concept of the strategy was in my head before the language used to describe it.

God bless,
Bryan

There are abstract principles we cannot visualise.

 

[TEPO]

I can’t believe how wrong this poll is…

Ridiculous.

 

[JDaniel]

Is language co-originary with conceptual thought? To me, following Saussare, it would seem so, more or less. One can’t really think of something (a concept, an emotion, a class of object) unless one has a word for it.

On the other hand, Aristotle says that concepts exist before words, and that words vary from person to person (i.e. from language to language) but all people have the same concepts.

Can you think of a concept without using words? If so, how can the concept be rendered comprehensible, even to oneself?

Qoeleth:

Higher level conceptual thought seems to require language. I’m not so sure about lower level thought. It is nearly impossible for us to think conceptually now, because we all know the words - we can describe things even if the descriptions are poor. The words are present to our minds the instant that we perceive an object of thought.

A simple example of lower level conceptual thought might be the comparison between two different fruit items, e.g., an apple and an orange. A language-less caveman can experience each with all of his senses, and retain appropriate concepts about them that are wordless. For example, the orange is obviously different in color, obviously different in outside texture, obviously different in odor, obviously different in mass properties, and obviously different in taste. A rather complete conception of such a comparison can be accomplished without language, and the pictures will remain in his memory until he dies.

Another simple conceptual comparison is between animate things and inanimate things. The language-less caveman will instantly know the difference between a statue of a leopard and a real leopard as soon as he assuages his reactive principle with the fact that one has no mobility.

God bless,
jd

 

[SonCatcher]

Qoeleth:

Higher level conceptual thought seems to require language. I’m not so sure about lower level thought. It is nearly impossible for us to think conceptually now, because we all know the words - we can describe things even if the descriptions are poor. The words are present to our minds the instant that we perceive an object of thought.

A simple example of lower level conceptual thought might be the comparison between two different fruit items, e.g., an apple and an orange. A language-less caveman can experience each with all of his senses, and retain appropriate concepts about them that are wordless. For example, the orange is obviously different in color, obviously different in outside texture, obviously different in odor, obviously different in mass properties, and obviously different in taste. A rather complete conception of such a comparison can be accomplished without language, and the pictures will remain in his memory until he dies.

Another simple conceptual comparison is between animate things and inanimate things. The language-less caveman will instantly know the difference between a statue of a leopard and a real leopard as soon as he assuages his reactive principle with the fact that one has no mobility.

God bless,
jd

While language helps in forming foundational concepts, expansion beyond the foundations can indeed start as non-linguistic and only become linguistic out of necessity to describe the expansions to others.

 

[TS_Aquinas]

Is language co-originary with conceptual thought? To me, following Saussare, it would seem so, more or less. One can’t really think of something (a concept, an emotion, a class of object) unless one has a word for it.

On the other hand, Aristotle says that concepts exist before words, and that words vary from person to person (i.e. from language to language) but all people have the same concepts.

Can you think of a concept without using words? If so, how can the concept be rendered comprehensible, even to oneself?

Let’s observe qualia, can the first person experience of qualia be logically communicable in an objective third person point of view? Can’t be done, try explaining redness to a born blind person or Bach Sarabande 996 to a born complete deaf person.

 

[SonCatcher]

Let’s observe qualia, can the first person experience of qualia be logically communicable in an objective third person point of view? Can’t be done, try explaining redness to a born blind person or Bach Sarabande 996 to a born complete deaf person.

 

[Qoeleth]

Qoeleth:

Higher level conceptual thought seems to require language. I’m not so sure about lower level thought. It is nearly impossible for us to think conceptually now, because we all know the words - we can describe things even if the descriptions are poor. The words are present to our minds the instant that we perceive an object of thought.

A simple example of lower level conceptual thought might be the comparison between two different fruit items, e.g., an apple and an orange. A language-less caveman can experience each with all of his senses, and retain appropriate concepts about them that are wordless. For example, the orange is obviously different in color, obviously different in outside texture, obviously different in odor, obviously different in mass properties, and obviously different in taste. A rather complete conception of such a comparison can be accomplished without language, and the pictures will remain in his memory until he dies.

Another simple conceptual comparison is between animate things and inanimate things. The language-less caveman will instantly know the difference between a statue of a leopard and a real leopard as soon as he assuages his reactive principle with the fact that one has no mobility.

God bless,
jd

I wonder- would the determination of the classes “apple” and “orange” coincide with the emergence of a word for “apple” and “orange”? Would an animal without language see “apples” or “oranges” as members of classes, or just individual bits of food?

The example of the inanimate and animate objects ia good one- and I suppose the words “animate” and “inanimate” would proably not emerge until language reached a fairly advanced state. Yet, would the different reactions to a statue of a leopard and a real leopard be based on their respective status as classes of object (inanimate vs. animate) or simply on them as different individual ‘things’?

 

[Qoeleth]

While language helps in forming foundational concepts, expansion beyond the foundations can indeed start as non-linguistic and only become linguistic out of necessity to describe the expansions to others.

I agree. Concepts can be expanded without language, in the form of wandering or exploring thoughts. But, to create new/expanded concepts, it would seem that they need to be defined.

If one thinks of something, doesn’t it become a ‘concept’ precisely at the moment it is ‘defined’ into a more-or-less fixed form. It would seem that a concept needs to be iterable to be a concept (as opposed to a thought). Now, isn’t an iterable concept basically a ‘word’, or at least a proto-word.

Imagine the word “triangle” didn’t exist. And I thought of a triangle. I would need to define that though in order for it to become a concept. Wouldn’t the emergence of the definition of such a concept be basically the same as the emergence of the word “triangle” (or some combination of words which stood for the same concept)?

 

[Alberti_Devoveo]

Imagine the word “triangle” didn’t exist. And I thought of a triangle. I would need to define that though in order for it to become a concept. Wouldn’t the emergence of the definition of such a concept be basically the same as the emergence of the word “triangle” (or some combination of words which stood for the same concept)?

Recall that Saussure was all about signs & the signified, (a fancy linguistic way of saying words & ideas). If you thought of something new (the signified), then you would need a way to communicate the new (signs). Signs can take the form of written words, oral words, images, etc. Anything is a sign to Saussure, and each signified has a particular sign (though the sign can change from language to language due to the difference languages).

 

[Qoeleth]

Recall that Saussure was all about signs & the signified, (a fancy linguistic way of saying words & ideas). If you thought of something new (the signified), then you would need a way to communicate the new (signs). Signs can take the form of written words, oral words, images, etc. Anything is a sign to Saussure, and each signified has a particular sign (though the sign can change from language to language due to the difference languages).

If I may clarify Saussare- his meaning of ‘sign’ was a little different from the usual one, where the ‘sign’ point to/stands for the signified. He regarded the “sign” as a complex of both the the signifier and the signified. So, the signified (e.g. the three sided-shape) and the signified (the word “triangle”), together form the unity of ‘the sign.’

His contention was that concepts remain nebulous and undefined, until defined in words or other signifiers.

 

[TS_Aquinas]

If I may clarify Saussare- his meaning of ‘sign’ was a little different from the usual one, where the ‘sign’ point to/stands for the signified. He regarded the “sign” as a complex of both the the signifier and the signified. So, the signified (e.g. the three sided-shape) and the signified (the word “triangle”), together form the unity of ‘the sign.’

His contention was that concepts remain nebulous and undefined, until defined in words or other signifiers.

But what of signs that can only be defined to the agent by first person experience? “Mary’s Room” thought experiment comes to mind.

 

[JDaniel]

I wonder- would the determination of the classes “apple” and “orange” coincide with the emergence of a word for “apple” and “orange”? Would an animal without language see “apples” or “oranges” as members of classes, or just individual bits of food?

Qoeleth:

Yet, which would have preceded the other: the comparison of the similarities or differences of the objects, or, the sounds naming the objects?

The example of the inanimate and animate objects is good one- and I suppose the words “animate” and “inanimate” would probably not emerge until language reached a fairly advanced state. Yet, would the different reactions to a statue of a leopard and a real leopard be based on their respective status as classes of object (inanimate vs. animate) or simply on them as different individual ‘things’?

If I were hazard a guess, I would say that a caveman would not fear a stable object. I should think that sudden, excessive motility, on the part of an object, would be a cause of fear, especially if it was a real leopard. In the poor guy’s future, the very sight of a leopard would likely re-stimulate the experience of the first encounter. But, if the first encounter was with the inanimate leopard, I have no doubt that the caveman would still exercise a great deal of caution until the mobility of the thing was known.

Let’s take another example. It’s twilight. You are walking up the street toward your house. In the middle of the dark road is an object, but you cannot clearly make out what it is. It is quite stationary at this point. Do you not still approach it with some trepidation? But, as soon as the object moves, mere “trepidation” vanishes and your mind moves from an analysis of the object to a speedy reaction toward, or away from, it. Now, if this were our language-less caveman, do you think he’d react to what the name signified, or rather, to what that mobile object might appear to be in picture-thought? I’d say he’s fully thinking “picture-thought.”

God bless,
jd

 

[AthenaC]

My personal experience has been thus:

1. When I was fluent in only one language, that one language was the only mode of communication I knew, and so my thoughts and language were inextricably linked.
2. When I became at least somewhat fluent in 2 or 3 languages, I really internalized the patterns of expression and the concepts in the other languages. What this did for me was to essentially remove the inherent bias in my native language, and my thoughts began to separate from language. After this point, I would think in word-less concepts and before I spoke would have to then figure out: a) which language I wanted to speak; and b) how to express myself in that language.

 

[JSSebastianoP]

Is language co-originary with conceptual thought? To me, following Saussare, it would seem so, more or less. One can’t really think of something (a concept, an emotion, a class of object) unless one has a word for it.

On the other hand, Aristotle says that concepts exist before words, and that words vary from person to person (i.e. from language to language) but all people have the same concepts.

Can you think of a concept without using words? If so, how can the concept be rendered comprehensible, even to oneself?

I haven’t read what others have posted, but perhaps think about concepts in one language that don’t exist in another. For example in English “Love”. In Greek “Agape” “Eros” and “Philia”. Does someone who does not know of the others still have the concept?

Or what about the Japanese relationship terms sempai and kohai. These don’t exist in the English speaking world and are kind of hard to explain. Think someone who;d not your superior/subordinate but outranks/ranks below you. Does that concept even exist in an English speaker’s mind before having to accommodate for its existence in another language?

Maybe this doesn’t help too much but some thoughts…

-J. S. S. P.

 

[Edmundus1581]

While language helps in forming foundational concepts, expansion beyond the foundations can indeed start as non-linguistic and only become linguistic out of necessity to describe the expansions to others.

I agree with this. In my experience, personal insight comes between verbalising a problem and the relevant knowledge, and verbalising the insight. The insight however comes quickly and non-verbally.

Francis Bacon:

“Reading maketh a full man, conference a ready man and writing an exact man”[/bacon]

And all three prepare the mind for non-verbal insight.