Poll: Is conceptual thought possible without language?

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Qoeleth:

Yet, which would have preceded the other: the comparison of the similarities or differences of the objects, or, the sounds naming the objects?

If I were hazard a guess, I would say that a caveman would not fear a stable object. I should think that sudden, excessive motility, on the part of an object, would be a cause of fear, especially if it was a real leopard. In the poor guy’s future, the very sight of a leopard would likely re-stimulate the experience of the first encounter. But, if the first encounter was with the inanimate leopard, I have no doubt that the caveman would still exercise a great deal of caution until the mobility of the thing was known.

Let’s take another example. It’s twilight. You are walking up the street toward your house. In the middle of the dark road is an object, but you cannot clearly make out what it is. It is quite stationary at this point. Do you not still approach it with some trepidation? But, as soon as the object moves, mere “trepidation” vanishes and your mind moves from an analysis of the object to a speedy reaction toward, or away from, it. Now, if this were our language-less caveman, do you think he’d react to what the name signified, or rather, to what that mobile object might appear to be in picture-thought? I’d say he’s fully thinking “picture-thought.”

God bless,
jd
I agree, he wouldn’t react to the verbal name. But, at the same time, we would react to the individual thing (or the perception of the thing)- without any conceptualisation, as far as I would define conceptualisation.
 
I haven’t read what others have posted, but perhaps think about concepts in one language that don’t exist in another. For example in English “Love”. In Greek “Agape” “Eros” and “Philia”. Does someone who does not know of the others still have the concept?

Or what about the Japanese relationship terms sempai and kohai. These don’t exist in the English speaking world and are kind of hard to explain. Think someone who;d not your superior/subordinate but outranks/ranks below you. Does that concept even exist in an English speaker’s mind before having to accommodate for its existence in another language?

Maybe this doesn’t help too much but some thoughts…

-J. S. S. P.
These are good examples- by enriching our vocabulary of words, we seem to enrich our vocabulary of concept.

My idea is that an impression or thought becomes a concept when it becomes defined, and so repeatable. Now, to define an idea into a concept, would seem to make it at least a quasi-linguistic element, if not an actual word.
 
These are good examples- by enriching our vocabulary of words, we seem to enrich our vocabulary of concept.

My idea is that an impression or thought becomes a concept when it becomes defined, and so repeatable. Now, to define an idea into a concept, would seem to make it at least a quasi-linguistic element, if not an actual word.
Thats interesting… why do you define a concept as something repeatable? and what exactly do you mean by that? that it can be expressed to, or shared with, another?
 
Thats interesting… why do you define a concept as something repeatable? and what exactly do you mean by that? that it can be expressed to, or shared with, another?
I think repeatability ability to be communicated are necessary. Let me give an example- a person who has never seen or heard of a peacock before goes into a forest and sees one walk by. What it creates in his mind would be ‘an impression’, but is not yet (I would think) a concept of a peacock.

If he sees one on several occassions, or even mentally repeats his initial impression, it may become a concept- as during the process the idea becomes defined. Now, once the idea is defined (forming a proto-language, at least), he can then communicate the concept ‘peacock’. As soon as it becomes a shared concept, it would seem necessary that language accompanies the concept.
 
I think repeatability ability to be communicated are necessary. Let me give an example- a person who has never seen or heard of a peacock before goes into a forest and sees one walk by. What it creates in his mind would be ‘an impression’, but is not yet (I would think) a concept of a peacock.

If he sees one on several occassions, or even mentally repeats his initial impression, it may become a concept- as during the process the idea becomes defined. Now, once the idea is defined (forming a proto-language, at least), he can then communicate the concept ‘peacock’. As soon as it becomes a shared concept, it would seem necessary that language accompanies the concept.
I guess I see that in order to share this concept language is necessary but I’m still not sure why you think of a concept as requiring language in and of itself. I thought a concept was simply a concrete idea in the mind. I guess thats why I’m curious why you connect it with the ability to be communicated, are you simply including more in the notion of a ‘concept’ than I am? or do you see the ability to be communicated as something that is necessarily linked with a concrete idea/thought/notion ie concept?
 
I guess I see that in order to share this concept language is necessary but I’m still not sure why you think of a concept as requiring language in and of itself. I thought a concept was simply a concrete idea in the mind. I guess thats why I’m curious why you connect it with the ability to be communicated, are you simply including more in the notion of a ‘concept’ than I am? or do you see the ability to be communicated as something that is necessarily linked with a concrete idea/thought/notion ie concept?
I would understand a ‘concept’ as an idea that is repeatable. When a person sees a leopard, he will register an impression and an idea. But if he is able to recall that idea, and think about ‘leopard’ again, it would then be ‘the concept of a leopard.’ I would see such repeatability as involving a kind of communicability- even if it is only communicability to one’s future self, initially.

So, the person sees a leopard, formulates an idea of it, files the idea in his brain, and then communicates it to his future self when next he thinks about ‘the concept of a leopard’.

So I feel that repeatability in the same defined form is what makes a concept- and this repeatability requires communicability.

Exploring my own mind- I can’t find in there any concepts which don’t have words (or combinations of words) which would make them communicable.

Does anyone feel they have non-communicable, but nevertheless definite, concepts in their minds?
 
I would understand a ‘concept’ as an idea that is repeatable. When a person sees a leopard, he will register an impression and an idea. But if he is able to recall that idea, and think about ‘leopard’ again, it would then be ‘the concept of a leopard.’ I would see such repeatability as involving a kind of communicability- even if it is only communicability to one’s future self, initially.

So, the person sees a leopard, formulates an idea of it, files the idea in his brain, and then communicates it to his future self when next he thinks about ‘the concept of a leopard’.

So I feel that repeatability in the same defined form is what makes a concept- and this repeatability requires communicability.

Exploring my own mind- I can’t find in there any concepts which don’t have words (or combinations of words) which would make them communicable.

Does anyone feel they have non-communicable, but nevertheless definite, concepts in their minds?
Well, they may not always be communicable to others without words, but I still think that the concept of a colour, for example, can be held by the mind without using language. Using the memory of what it looks like one can make present to oneself again without words the definite idea of a particular colour.

I kind of like the way that you add repeatability, I think that is implicit in the notion of a deffined idea. However, I still don’t see that as requiring words for a concept to be held.
 
These are good examples- by enriching our vocabulary of words, we seem to enrich our vocabulary of concept.

My idea is that an impression or thought becomes a concept when it becomes defined, and so repeatable. Now, to define an idea into a concept, would seem to make it at least a quasi-linguistic element, if not an actual word.
Qoeleth:

I think that the initial perceptic of an apple, by a language-less caveman, formed a perfect picture in his memory, that can - without much effort - be used again and again for comparisons. By perceptic I mean the whole 10 yards, sight, smell, taste, feel, and whatever might be audible about an apple. Further, I think that sooner or later our caveman happened upon another caveperson. The grunts that issued forth, when pointing at the apple, sounded like “apple!” Of course, they may only have sounded like grunts. 🤷

God bless,
jd
 
Qoeleth:

I think that the initial perceptic of an apple, by a language-less caveman, formed a perfect picture in his memory, that can - without much effort - be used again and again for comparisons. By perceptic I mean the whole 10 yards, sight, smell, taste, feel, and whatever might be audible about an apple. Further, I think that sooner or later our caveman happened upon another caveperson. The grunts that issued forth, when pointing at the apple, sounded like “apple!” Of course, they may only have sounded like grunts. 🤷

God bless,
jd
JD
I love this answer; it corresponds exactly to how I think about the subject of language. If I may interject in your conversation let me explain how the “model of dual reality” that we have been discussing on your “Space” thread applies to the phenomenon of memory/language.

The presence of a spiritual component allows animals dual memory: a material memory located in the neuronal circuitry of the brain and a “perceptual” memory located in the spiritual substance called nous. Nous is manifested as consciousness. The material memory stores “signs”. Signs are sensations that have meaning (a scream, a smile, a red light, etc). Animal behavior is predicated on the meanings attached to specific percepts. Thus nous provides animals with sentient capability. Sentient capability is the source of much, but not all, of animal behavior. It is manifested as mental activities such as awareness, focus, recognizance, perception and decision making.

It is in the material memory that humans differ from the rest to the animal kingdom. Humans’ material memory, in addition to signs, also stores symbols (words, notes, and numbers), which provide the language capability that allows rational behavior (thought, reflection, invention, free will, etc.). Although humans are animals, we are seldom aware of our sentient capability since most of our waking hours are dominated by thought, the manipulation of symbols. Without a capability of storing and manipulating symbols, animals rely solely on percepts, a combination of a sign and meaning.

I agree that it was a “caveman” in whom a verbal sign first became a symbol and an animal became a man and I am sure that you would agree that the recipient of the meaning associated with the first word was already present in the mind of the first woman as a percept. God, of course, implement this affair with a simple adjustment in a configuration of s-points in a single s-frame.

Yppop

P.S. I can’t continue with our discussion on “Space” until I answer my old buddy, Greylorn, otherwise known as TOPITA.
 
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