Possibility of resigning existence?

[Nihilist]

But this is a separate case. The punishment of Hell is, on the Catholic understanding, just. Given what someone in Hell did in life, it is a good that they are in Hell in the same sense that it is a good for someone who has committed a crime to be in prison. God wills what is good; God antecedently wills that all are saved but, given that some commit grave sins, God consequently wills that justice is dealt.

The Catholic retort here is that such a person simply does not understand what Heaven is like. If Catholics are correct about Heaven and the beatific vision, then it would be objectively irrational to forgo it to avoid 10,000 years in purgatory.

Quite, but I’ve argued against such views that life is not a good that one can permissibly reject.

Well, I do know that one can be tired with particular conditions of existence. I don’t doubt that there is some sort of existential fatigue, but whether it exists does not decide the question of whether it would ever override the absolute primacy of life in the ordering of natural human goods.

I am not sure which mystics you have in mind. I would take a philosophical rather than mystical approach. Existence is an analogical concept; God is “beyond worldly existence” if by ‘worldly existence’ we mean the sort of existence we enjoy. To be in Heaven is also to be possessed of a different mode of existence. One might say ‘beyond’ here if one fixes a particular sense of ‘existence,’ but one is only “beyond existence” in the sense that one is possessed of another (higher and more perfect–because in the presence of God) mode of existence.

I realise ‘existence’ is defined in numerous ways. Considering what existence means in normal usage, it is ‘being positioned in time and space.’ Conceivably, a disembodied res cogitans could be simply ‘positioned in time’, without being positioned in space.

I don’t see how something not positioned in time can be though of as existing- at least in the way the term is normally understood (e.g. “I exist, you exist, the sun exists”). I suppose a concept may be said to ‘exist’, while not locatable in time and space, but I think that form of ‘existence’ is only a metaphorical application of the same term.

Now, if God’s state, and the state of the soul in Heaven, are outside of both time and space- the use of the term ‘existence’ seems to be misleading.

Or, at least confining ourselves to the everyday use of the term existence (i.e. being located in time and space), I don’t see that an infinity of it would be desirable at all.

What do you mean by ‘existence’? Sentience? Perception? Capacity for action?

 

[polytropos]

I realise ‘existence’ is defined in numerous ways. Considering what existence means in normal usage, it is ‘being positioned in time and space.’ Conceivably, a disembodied res cogitans could be simply ‘positioned in time’, without being positioned in space.

I do not think that ‘being positioned in time and space’ is a definition of existence, or at least by the fact that all material things with which we are acquainted exist in time and space, we can’t infer that existing in time and space is an essential criterion of existence itself.

I would define a thing as existing just in case it possesses some actuality, in the Aristotelian sense. (Or: a thing exists insofar that it is in act.) That does not seem to clarify a whole lot. Whether the extension of ‘exists’ includes only things in time and space would depend on whether there is anything which is in act but is not in time and space (or could be). Aquinas’s Five Ways would be arguments for that conclusion, although for the present purposes all one would have to do is assert that Pure Actuality, or being which cannot change, is a coherent concept, whether or not it actually is instantiated. Such a thing would be outside of space and time, but would exist because it possesses actuality.

I don’t see how something not positioned in time can be though of as existing- at least in the way the term is normally understood (e.g. “I exist, you exist, the sun exists”). I suppose a concept may be said to ‘exist’, while not locatable in time and space, but I think that form of ‘existence’ is only a metaphorical application of the same term.

I agree the sense is not exactly the same. But the difference is analogical, not metaphorical. (And since you admit the space requirement could be dropped for res cogitans, then you seem to admit that analogical understandings of ‘exists’ are legitimate. Existence is modal. There are many things with material modes of existence. Other things could be said to have intentional modes of existence, such as my phantasm of the light switch in my room, or the universal of catness. If space can be dropped, why not time? We could only block that if we knew that being located in space and time were necessary conditions of existence, but by our experience we only know that they are sufficient.)

Another point is that prima facie, the fact that there is a timeline is contingent; it did not have to be that way. If we assume that God exists, then the existence of the timeline depends on God. How could the existence of a contingent timeline depend on something that does not exist? To speak of God as ‘beyond existence’ for that reason would just strike me as a different way of stating the analogical understanding that God exists but not in precisely the same mode that we do.

 

[Nihilist]

I do not think that ‘being positioned in time and space’ is a definition of existence, or at least by the fact that all material things with which we are acquainted exist in time and space, we can’t infer that existing in time and space is an essential criterion of existence itself.

I would define a thing as existing just in case it possesses some actuality, in the Aristotelian sense. (Or: a thing exists insofar that it is in act.) That does not seem to clarify a whole lot. Whether the extension of ‘exists’ includes only things in time and space would depend on whether there is anything which is in act but is not in time and space (or could be). Aquinas’s Five Ways would be arguments for that conclusion, although for the present purposes all one would have to do is assert that Pure Actuality, or being which cannot change, is a coherent concept, whether or not it actually is instantiated. Such a thing would be outside of space and time, but would exist because it possesses actuality.

I agree the sense is not exactly the same. But the difference is analogical, not metaphorical. (And since you admit the space requirement could be dropped for res cogitans, then you seem to admit that analogical understandings of ‘exists’ are legitimate. Existence is modal. There are many things with material modes of existence. Other things could be said to have intentional modes of existence, such as my phantasm of the light switch in my room, or the universal of catness. If space can be dropped, why not time? We could only block that if we knew that being located in space and time were necessary conditions of existence, but by our experience we only know that they are sufficient.)

Another point is that prima facie, the fact that there is a timeline is contingent; it did not have to be that way. If we assume that God exists, then the existence of the timeline depends on God. How could the existence of a contingent timeline depend on something that does not exist? To speak of God as ‘beyond existence’ for that reason would just strike me as a different way of stating the analogical understanding that God exists but not in precisely the same mode that we do.

I have some trouble understanding ‘Act’ in the case in which it used by Thomas, taking it from Aristotle. Obviously, the normal English use of act, action, actuality have some relation to it, but could you please explain it. I mean, when it is said God is ‘pure act’- it is not mean He is ‘pure action’. The Latin, ‘actus’, can either be a perfect participle from ‘agens’, or a noun based on the same root. But, that doesn’t seem to help much.

As for existing outside of time, Kant argues that time and space are a priori aspect of human cognition. In effect, we cannot conceive of ‘things’ without at least one, we cannot think outside of these things…

 

[polytropos]

I have some trouble understanding ‘Act’ in the case in which it used by Thomas, taking it from Aristotle. Obviously, the normal English use of act, action, actuality have some relation to it, but could you please explain it. I mean, when it is said God is ‘pure act’- it is not mean He is ‘pure action’. The Latin, ‘actus’, can either be a perfect participle from ‘agens’, or a noun based on the same root. But, that doesn’t seem to help much.

I would read it as “actuality” rather than “action.” A thing is in act inasmuch as it is. And there is relatively little point in defining act without defining potency, which is what a thing could be but is not presently. To say God is pure act is to say that he lacks all potency and therefore cannot change.

As for existing outside of time, Kant argues that time and space are a priori aspect of human cognition. In effect, we cannot conceive of ‘things’ without at least one, we cannot think outside of these things…

I think that the argument for transcendental idealism is difficult to spell out without committing a scope fallacy. (These issues are pretty common with idealism. Berkeley faces them in a similar way as well.)

To arrive at his transcendental idealism, Kant must conclude that sensibility has pure form essentiality; in other words, that sensibility can be essentially a priori. What he argues is that “Necessarily, if I know that ‘7+5=12’, then sensibility has a pure form.” But to get at the essence of pure sensibility, he needs, “Necessarily, sensibility has a pure form” (ie. the consequent must be necessary). But in general the inference here is not valid. He must argue from ‘L(if p then q) & p’ to ‘Lq’ (where ‘L’ = ‘necessarily’) but that is not valid. (Analogous arguments apply in the case of time rather than space; this is just what I’ve studied most recently.)

There are the additional issues that Kant’s intuitions about the structure of space and time are dubious. (Space is really non-Euclidean, for instance.) The intuition that space and time are contingent is, I think, stronger.

 

[Nihilist]

I would read it as “actuality” rather than “action.” A thing is in act inasmuch as it is. And there is relatively little point in defining act without defining potency, which is what a thing could be but is not presently. To say God is pure act is to say that he lacks all potency and therefore cannot change.

I think that the argument for transcendental idealism is difficult to spell out without committing a scope fallacy. (These issues are pretty common with idealism. Berkeley faces them in a similar way as well.)

To arrive at his transcendental idealism, Kant must conclude that sensibility has pure form essentiality; in other words, that sensibility can be essentially a priori. What he argues is that “Necessarily, if I know that ‘7+5=12’, then sensibility has a pure form.” But to get at the essence of pure sensibility, he needs, “Necessarily, sensibility has a pure form” (ie. the consequent must be necessary). But in general the inference here is not valid. He must argue from ‘L(if p then q) & p’ to ‘Lq’ (where ‘L’ = ‘necessarily’) but that is not valid. (Analogous arguments apply in the case of time rather than space; this is just what I’ve studied most recently.)

There are the additional issues that Kant’s intuitions about the structure of space and time are dubious. (Space is really non-Euclidean, for instance.) The intuition that space and time are contingent is, I think, stronger.

Could you please re-explain your comments on Kant?

I am believe there ‘is’ something beyond time and space (or, following Kant, that time and space are merely a priori conditions of our sensibility, and don’t ‘exist’ absolutely). But the use of the word ‘is’ is problematic here, and seems to be a confusion (since as soon as existence as predicated of something, it seems impossible to conceive of it as outside of time and space).

Isn’t it better to define ‘existence’ more precisely, in accordance with commun usage- to something existing in time and/or space? Or, to come up with a different word for God’s mode of ‘Being’?