Possible to prove?

[wolpertinger]

FelixBlue:

But that’s not the point. I’m more interested in having an accurate conversation.

Let’s cut to the chase then. You present a long involved argument that revolves around the meaning of agnosticism, which to me amounts to saying that instead of taking a pragmatic stance, I must needs take a philosophical position to an absurd conclusion. In other words, rather than answering to what my position is, you argue against what you think my position should be. I’ll grant you that language is a constrained medium of communication and I don’t have the time to exhaustively dot the i’s and cross the t’s.

This is the gist of my objection to your linguistic argument. Your original argument qualifies as a straw man, because you misrepresented my position without being fully aware of it.

What we should really discuss is epistemology, just to get all the unstated premises out of the way. Now, my working definition of knowledge is justified true belief.

The core of our failure to communicate lies in our respective understanding of knowledge; by definition, a theist accepts god’s existence as an axiomatic truth and therefore puts more weight on true belief than justification; the school of thought I belong to admits that truth is an ultimately elusive quality and therefore emphasises justified belief over truth.

This gives rise to exhanges like this one:

Atheist: I believe with a high degree of confidence that proposition P is true.
Theist: Ah! So you say P is true! Prove it!
Atheist: (shakes head in confusion) Prove what?

I see in this an attempt to insist on a burden of proof, where I have not made a claim that is open to proof. You see an excuse or an evasion. And round and round we go.

What you should do, obviously, is to instead ask why I think my belief is justified. As far as god’s existence is concerned, I have already given you the answer.

Another general problem I have is that I increasingly get the impression that your side takes liberties with semantics.

Case in point, the matrix. All I have said is that I cannot conclusively rule out that we live in a Matrix. I have not expressed an opinion on how likely such a scenario is or even that I am willing to seriously entertain the idea, only that I find myself unable to principally rule it out. You turn around and ask me what makes me suspect that live in a matrix situation. Do you see my problem?

In the end, it does seem the burden of proof is on you. My language, my senses, logic, other people (if they are real), pain, etc. tell me that there is a world outside my brain. What real proof do you have?

As stated above, you are mistaken about the burden of proof. But how do you know, however, that anything outside and independent of your mind exists? You must have utter and complete trust and faith in the perceptions relayed to you by your senses, don’t you? How can you know with absolute certainty that it isn’t all a trick of your mind or that your perceptions aren’t a complete fabrication by an external agent? If such an external agent may exist, would it qualify as god?

Myself, I don’t lose sleep over this question until I have reason to suspect that it is more than a thought experiment.

By the way, you know that I cannot grant your definition of god, because it blantantly begs the question.

Premise: I exist
Definition: God is that without which nothing else could exist.
Conclusion: Therefore, by definition, God exists.

 

[wolpertinger]

FelixBlue:

Continued…

Now that God exists (at least in this elementary form), it seems you should no longer be “indifferent” to God’s existence (as he is the necessary being behind your contingent being). Further, it seems as though we do have a sufficient epistemology (unless you are willing to chunk logic and the idea of meaning). Lastly, I have given you reason to believe…one among many others that could be marshalled.

Since I must reject your definition of god, your argument for god is not sound. Further, I am not convinced that we have established a mutually agreeable epistemolgy.

To convince, you have to demonstrate the validity of your proposition within my worldview; conflating yours with mine like your linguistic approach does not qualify.

Finally, just to make this explicit - there is a profound difference between absolute certainty and a probabilistic statement.

 

[FelixBlue]

Wolpertinger:

I hope you believe me when I say it is not my intention to conflate my world view with yours. I agree that if I am doing such a thing, then I would be wrong to do so. Even so, I remain confused:

1. When you say a “justified belief”, what exactly do you mean by “justified” and “belief”? Will you spell that out explicitly for me?
2. Precisely how does your position of justified belief differ from my generalized agnostic statement, “It appears that…such and such…”?
3. If truth is a quality, as you say, then is it a quality of something, or is it merely a free-floating thing? What do you mean by quality?
4. How is “justifying” something (a belief) different from proving a proposition?
5. Why are we having this conversation if we are not both interested in arriving at somekind of (I hope demonstrated…I assume justified) conclusion?
6. You are right in that I jumped to the conclusion that you actually believed in a Matrix situation when you only insinuated it may be the case. Still, what is your hunch on what is really going on? If not a Matrix, what is your best bet? And why?

Actually, my definition of god does not beg the question. In your own scenario, the conclusion doesn’t follow from the definition. In fact, you (you’re mind, as in your epistemology) could be god. I think you’re making the mistake of confusing the idea that god exists with the idea of what god is. My definition only recognizes that god must necessarily exist without giving any content or essence to that god. Frankly, I’m just following Aquinas’ arguments for the existence of god: god as first cause (without which there can be no effects), god as unmoved mover (without which there can be nothing moved), necessary being (without which there can be no contingent being), etc. All of his arguments really boil down to necessary being. The question becomes can one get around the idea of being? Even in a matrix, or a radical solipsism (which I would not dare insinuate to be your positions!) one still finds the idea or “reality” of being.

Regarding your insistence on a profound difference between absolute certainty and a probable statement, I totally and unequivocally agree. You are right. The problem is, your epestimology (or rather, I should say, what I understand of your epistemology) de facto does not allow for absolute certainty or any kind of certainty. I would argue that we as humans live our lives not by the principle of absolute certainty but by the principle of relative certainty. That’s the best we can do. Why? Because we are finite. The finite cannot be certain in an absolute sense as this implies an infinity. So, with relative certainty, I cross the street after looking both ways. Etc.

Should we begin another thread on epistemolgy? Can we know? Will you? And will you give all your “justifications” for your belief?

 

[wolpertinger]

FelixBlue:

I hope you believe me when I say it is not my intention to conflate my world view with yours. I agree that if I am doing such a thing, then I would be wrong to do so. Even so, I remain confused:

There are a number of well-published epistemic theories; most if not all of which have elements that I am sympathetic to, but none of which I am willing to subscribe to without reservation. Remember that I said that justified true belief is my working definition only… Defining knowledge is not a trivial task and I myself haven’t fully thought out where I stand, if I ever will.

The basic point I am trying to make is very similar to what you describe as the principle of relative certainty near the end of your previous post. We cannot be absolutely certain of our sensory perceptions; since neither one of us wants to descend into solipsism, we find a way to cope with this uncertainty. I am absolutely certain e.g. with regards to analytical statements, but technically I can only accept what my senses tell me as provisionally true. With that in mind, whatever I understand knowledge to be caters to this qualification.

Regarding proof, I can or should be able to prove beliefs that I hold to be absolutely true; anything that I don’t hold to be absolutely certain is not amenable to proof. I cannot show the proposition “you exist” to be true beyond a doubt, therefore I cannot prove it. However, I feel justified (within my intellectual rights) to hold that the balance of my perceptions strongly suggest that you do indeed exist.

Unless I subscribe to solipsism and declare myself god, I find myself principally unable to answer “god exists” with certainty, which is equivalent to strong agnosticism in the theological sense.

I disagree, by the way, that weak atheism requires what you call a generalized agnosticism. If I accept my perceptions of the world unquestioningly, but yet find no evidence or reason to support the proposition “god exists”, I am justified to not hold to it.

More later…

 

[Gottle_of_Geer]

If God is not a being with certain qualities, is such a being God - or a god - in any sense worth discussing ?​

If by God is meant a Universal Cause - that is a rather pallid God; hardly a being with whom one can be in communion, or even pray to. IOW, a god who is too abstrart and remote to bother with.

And even if one can have a relationship with such a being, we are still a very long way from the One Who is “the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob”.

Undifferentiated divine-ness is not Brahma; Brahma is more remote than Amun or Isis or Osiris; none of these is the God of Abraham; and the God of Abraham is very different in seeming, at least, from “the God and Father of Our Lord Jesus Christ”.

Besides, there are several theisms and “-olatries”.

So what would demonstrating there is a god, or God, achieve ? what difference to one’s life does it make, to be persuaded by reasoned demonstration that there is or are a God or gods ? ISTM that accepting theisms ought to make an existential difference to theists, and not be mere intellectual constructions, such as crossword-puzzles. ##

 

[kepha1]

Official debate in progress:
Does God Exist?
Debate: Apolonio Latar vs. James Stephen Brown
The resolution is: “Does the Christian God exist?”

Warning: brain required
bringyou.to/apologetics/p46.htm

Apolonio is inviting comments that might help him that you can post here:
http://www.envoymagazine.com/forum/topic.asp?TOPIC_ID=866

---

 

[john_doran]

wolpertinger:

The basic point I am trying to make is very similar to what you describe as the principle of relative certainty near the end of your previous post. We cannot be absolutely certain of our sensory perceptions; since neither one of us wants to descend into solipsism, we find a way to cope with this uncertainty. I am absolutely certain e.g. with regards to analytical statements, but technically I can only accept what my senses tell me as provisionally true. With that in mind, whatever I understand knowledge to be caters to this qualification.

what is “absolute certainty”, and why do you (seem to) think it is so important?

Regarding proof, I can or should be able to prove beliefs that I hold to be absolutely true;

why?

when you say “hold to be absolutely true”, do you mean something like “hold with maximal certainty”?

However, I feel justified (within my intellectual rights) to hold that the balance of my perceptions strongly suggest that you do indeed exist.

this sounds pretty close to the reasoning that i use to justify my belief in god.

Unless I subscribe to solipsism and declare myself god, I find myself principally unable to answer “god exists” with certainty, which is equivalent to strong agnosticism in the theological sense.

how sure would you need to be? do you accept that belief in god would be more reasonable than not if you could be at least as sure about it as you are about the existence of other minds, or an external world?

 

[john_doran]

Steve Andersen:

I didn’t say that
I meant that is what an atheist would say.

i know - sorry if i wasn’t clear that i knew.

usually you don’t prove your assumptions
they’re the begining that you base the proof upon

well, you should be able to support your assumptions.

at the very least, if you articulate a principle that your assumptions actually violate, then something has gone deeply wrong with your reasoning, and either (or both) the principle or the assumption have to be revised or jettisoned.

in this case, you (or your putative atheist) suggested as a principle something like “only propositions that are capable of empiricial verification can be true”. but the problem, of course, is precisely that that principle is itself not capable of being empirically verified.

No I know those things because we can test for it and measure it
Belief is a different thing

actually, you can’t test whether or not your senses are reliable, since you need to use your senses to do the testing. similarly, you can’t test for an external world without first assuming there is one (the one that contains the test-equipment). also, you can’t test for “other minds”, since the only available data will always be consistent with the test-subjects being like robots or automatons, without any subjective inner life.

belief is ***all ***there is; it’s just that the certainty that accompanies those beliefs comes in different degrees.

my point is just that you (and everyone else) has a great deal of conviction (i.e. certainty) in beliefs for which we not only lack “rigorous proof”, but for whih such proof isn’t even possible.

and if that’s true, then simply pointing out that there’s no knock-down, drag-out argument for the existence of god doesn’t mean anything when it comes to how much certainty one may be warranted in having that god exists.

see what i mean? if the fact that you can’t prove to me that your sense are reliable or that there’s a real world doesn’t mean that you can’t be reasonably certain that your senses are reliable or that there really is a real world, then why can’t people believe just as strongly and with just as much warrant, in the existence of god, even if they can’t prove that he exists?

If the existence of God could be proven it wouldn’t take anything away from God but from the believers.

sure, but why?

 

[wolpertinger]

john doran:

what is “absolute certainty”, and why do you (seem to) think it is so important?

In the context of this discussion, I consider the meaning of ‘absolute certainty’ as self-evident. It is of some importance to me because I am absolutely certain about the truth value of some propositions, but less than absolutely certain about others.

why?

Intellectual honesty?

this sounds pretty close to the reasoning that i use to justify my belief in god.

Perhaps. Please note that I don’t object if anybody feels that their belief in god’s existence is justified.

how sure would you need to be?

To accept god’s existence as truth, absolutely certain - impossible in my worldview. To justify god belief, show me cause and I will tell you if it convinces me.

do you accept that belief in god would be more reasonable than not if you could be at least as sure about it as you are about the existence of other minds, or an external world?

No. Even if I accept without question that what I perceive as reality is the unvarnished truth, there is the hurdle of lack of evidence or even indication, as well as the problem that god belief would introduce more problems than it would solve.

If I were a solipsist, by definition I am god. If I accept the First Cause argument for the sake of argument only, then I have to conclude that the universe is god; anything else I would have to reject as pure speculation.

Obviously, for a suitable definition of god, even I can prove or at least justify that the entity or abstract thus defined exists. The problem with this approach is that I’d be crafting a definition to support a foregone conclusion, if that makes any sense. Another way to look at my objection is that ‘god’ is a very loaded term and playing the definition game seems inappropriate to me.

 

[wolpertinger]

john doran:

actually, you can’t test whether or not your senses are reliable, since you need to use your senses to do the testing. similarly, you can’t test for an external world without first assuming there is one (the one that contains the test-equipment). also, you can’t test for “other minds”, since the only available data will always be consistent with the test-subjects being like robots or automatons, without any subjective inner life.

My point exactly.

belief is ***all ***there is; it’s just that the certainty that accompanies those beliefs comes in different degrees.

Sort of my point, except I hold to certainty about the validity of analytical statements. E.g. “1 + 1 = 2” is absolutely true, given the rules and axioms of algebra.

my point is just that you (and everyone else) has a great deal of conviction (i.e. certainty) in beliefs for which we not only lack “rigorous proof”, but for whih such proof isn’t even possible.

Not me, if you equate ‘a great deal of conviction’ with ‘certainty’. This amounts to saying that a sufficient amount of belief makes something true.

and if that’s true, then simply pointing out that there’s no knock-down, drag-out argument for the existence of god doesn’t mean anything when it comes to how much certainty one may be warranted in having that god exists.

As far as I’m concerned, if you believe in god, you believe in god. As I have said early on, I view proofs of god’s existence mostly as a vehicle to affirm an existing belief than as a means to convince the unbelievers.

see what i mean? if the fact that you can’t prove to me that your sense are reliable or that there’s a real world doesn’t mean that you can’t be reasonably certain that your senses are reliable or that there really is a real world, then why can’t people believe just as strongly and with just as much warrant, in the existence of god, even if they can’t prove that he exists?

They can, as far as I’m concerned. The only thing I really ask for in return is to afford me the same courtesy and accept that I have my own strong contradictory beliefs.

Wait a minute, am I colluding with a theist to argue against a putative atheist argument?

 

[FelixBlue]

## If God is not a being with certain qualities, is such a being God - or a god - in any sense worth discussing ?

If by God is meant a Universal Cause - that is a rather pallid God; hardly a being with whom one can be in communion, or even pray to. IOW, a god who is too abstrart and remote to bother with.

And even if one can have a relationship with such a being, we are still a very long way from the One Who is “the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob”.

Undifferentiated divine-ness is not Brahma; Brahma is more remote than Amun or Isis or Osiris; none of these is the God of Abraham; and the God of Abraham is very different in seeming, at least, from “the God and Father of Our Lord Jesus Christ”.

Besides, there are several theisms and “-olatries”.

So what would demonstrating there is a god, or God, achieve ? what difference to one’s life does it make, to be persuaded by reasoned demonstration that there is or are a God or gods ? ISTM that accepting theisms ought to make an existential difference to theists, and not be mere intellectual constructions, such as crossword-puzzles. ##

You’re right in all that you imply. To prove *that *god exists if fairly meaningless relative to my life. However, in order to get to questions of essence (what, quidity) one has to first demonstrate existence (the that). So, the conversation at this point is merely a first step. To see the rest of the conversation, check out Thomas’ Summa Contra Gentiles (rather than the Summa Theologica) as he exhaustively takes on from the “that” of God to the “what” of God and finally to the God of Abraham and finally to the Trinity (including, of course, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ).

 

[john_doran]

wolpertinger:

In the context of this discussion, I consider the meaning of ‘absolute certainty’ as self-evident. It is of some importance to me because I am absolutely certain about the truth value of some propositions, but less than absolutely certain about others.

well, it’s not evident to me: do you mean “as certain as it is possible for you to be”? or are you using “absolute certainty” as a sort of epistemological synonym for “true”?

in other words, is absolute certainty something you can possess, even about a proposition that is ultimately indemonstrable?

To accept god’s existence as truth, absolutely certain - impossible in my worldview. To justify god belief, show me cause and I will tell you if it convinces me.

…

No. Even if I accept without question that what I perceive as reality is the unvarnished truth, there is the hurdle of lack of evidence or even indication, as well as the problem that god belief would introduce more problems than it would solve.

so. you seem to be saying that you would need to be more certain about god’s existence than you would the world’s existence in order to have a belief in god’s existence.

can you explain why? i mean, as far as i can understand your post, you seem to suggest that the difference lies in the fact that there is insufficient (physical?) evidence for god’s existence but, a fortiori, sufficient evidence to warrant belief in an external world…

which, in turn, strikes me as enormously counterintuitive - what “evidence” is there for the existence of a mind-independent reality that isn’t - either in degree or in kind - just as good evidence for the existence of god?

If I were a solipsist, by definition I am god. If I accept the First Cause argument for the sake of argument only, then I have to conclude that the universe is god; anything else I would have to reject as pure speculation.

neither of those conclusions follows:

1. if you’re a solipsist, then you still neither created nor control reality; nor are you omniscient; nor are you eternal; nor…
2. if you accept the first cause argument, then you’d see that the whole point of the argument is that the universe can’t be god, since nothing an be the cause of itself.

Obviously, for a suitable definition of god, even I can prove or at least justify that the entity or abstract thus defined exists. The problem with this approach is that I’d be crafting a definition to support a foregone conclusion, if that makes any sense. Another way to look at my objection is that ‘god’ is a very loaded term and playing the definition game seems inappropriate to me.

fair enough. but you don’t have to start the journey of natural theology with the sort of baggage you’re describing: all you have to do is look to see what, if anything, can be concluded with reasonable certainty about the origins of the universe, and then see if those conclusions match those drawn or assumed by any other (philosophical) positions.

in short, you don’t need to begin with a definition of god in order to engage in the reasoning of natural theology - you just need to see what kind of being, if any, that sort of reasoning leads you, and then check post facto how closely that being resembles the gods of other worldviews.

for example, my own reasoning led me to believe that the universe required a cause; that the cause couldn’t have been material; that it must be eternal; that it must be omnipotent; that it must be personal; and that it must be unique.

once i was led inescapably to belief in a being with those characteristics, it didn’t take me long to realize that such a being fit the bill of “god” pretty closely…

 

[wolpertinger]

john doran:

well, it’s not evident to me: do you mean “as certain as it is possible for you to be”? or are you using “absolute certainty” as a sort of epistemological synonym for “true”?

The latter.

in other words, is absolute certainty something you can possess, even about a proposition that is ultimately indemonstrable?

I consider it absurd to be absolutely certain about something that cannot be demonstrated.

so. you seem to be saying that you would need to be more certain about god’s existence than you would the world’s existence in order to have a belief in god’s existence.

No. As certain. If nothing in the world as I know it supports god’s existence, then holding to that belief is unjustified, even if I cannot demonstrate the truth of this proposition one way or the other. In other words, even if I were inclined to accept god’s existence, I would find myself unable prove it (demonstrate with absolute certainty). As it is, I cannot even justify such a belief.

which, in turn, strikes me as enormously counterintuitive - what “evidence” is there for the existence of a mind-independent reality that isn’t - either in degree or in kind - just as good evidence for the existence of god?

I appear to have a world in front of my eyes. I do not appear to have god in front of my eyes, nor is there anything out that would compell me postulate god’s existence. Honestly, I do not understand what is counterintuitive about this.

neither of those conclusions follows:

1. if you’re a solipsist, then you still neither created nor control reality; nor are you omniscient; nor are you eternal; nor…

Where did these attributes come from all of a sudden? A solipsist’s mind is god (unless I misunderstand the definition), it just happens that this is a different type of god than the one you envision.

1. if you accept the first cause argument, then you’d see that the whole point of the argument is that the universe can’t be god, since nothing an be the cause of itself.

This assumes that the first cause is “eternal” in a sense of having always existed. Why? I don’t see any reason why the first cause must have existed before or after the act(s) of creation (ignoring that the meaning of ‘before’ requires explanation). It may have existed ‘before’, but why indefinitely so?

 

[john_doran]

wolpertinger:

The latter.

ahh…but therein lies the rub: there’s truth, and then there’s knowing that something’s true. and the perennial question of epistemology is how the twain shall e’er meet, you know?

this was descartes starting point, and if nothing else, his efforts demonstrated that the enterpise - the search for absolute, incontrovertible certainty - is impossible to complete.

I consider it absurd to be absolutely certain about something that cannot be demonstrated.

cool. so then you are not absolutely certain about the existence of the real world or other minds or the past or…

No. As certain. If nothing in the world as I know it supports god’s existence, then holding to that belief is unjustified, even if I cannot demonstrate the truth of this proposition one way or the other. In other words, even if I were inclined to accept god’s existence, I would find myself unable prove it (demonstrate with absolute certainty). As it is, I cannot even justify such a belief.

…

I appear to have a world in front of my eyes. I do not appear to have god in front of my eyes, nor is there anything out that would compell me postulate god’s existence. Honestly, I do not understand what is counterintuitive about this.

here’s where your position becomes confusing…

on the one hand, you say you don’t believe in god’s existence because you cannot demonstrate it with absolute certainty. but then you also seem to say that you ***are ***absolutely certain about the existence of things like the real world and the past and other minds.

the difficulty, of course, is that there are no good (i.e. indubitable) demonstrations of the existence of those things - i assume that you do not seriously propose the simple “appearance” of a real world as the incontrovertible evidence you require for your absolute certainty of its existence…

but then, if you can be absolutely certain about the existence of things for which you lack definitive proof, then lacking such proof cannot be sufficient reason for rejecting belief in the existence of other things. that is, if you believe in the past but can’t prove its existence, then not being able to prove the existence of god can’t be enough reason not to believe in that, either.

look. i realize that the kalam cosmological argument and all of the other arguments for god’s existence are not rationally compelling in any indisputable, impossible-to-doubt sort of way; but then there is absolutely nothing that is capable of that sort of defense…

where the rubber hits the road, if someone is going to be sanguine about the certainty of their unprovable belief in the external world or other minds or whatever, i just wonder why they would lean so heavily on the “but you can’t prove it” objection when it comes to theistic belief…

 

[john_doran]

This assumes that the first cause is “eternal” in a sense of having always existed. Why? I don’t see any reason why the first cause must have existed before or after the act(s) of creation (ignoring that the meaning of ‘before’ requires explanation). It may have existed ‘before’, but why indefinitely so?

the first cause argument is based on the idea that nothing can come into existence without a cause, an assumption that variously finds expression as:

A) everything that begins to exist has a cause

so. if the “first” cause just popped into being, then it would just be another thing - like the universe and everything in it - in need of a cause to explain its existence.

thus, if you accept the soundness of the argument, then its conclusion - that there must be a first, uncaused cause - ***entails ***that such a first cause did not itself begin to exist. which means that it has existed forever - i.e. from all eternity.

this is just another way of concluding that the first cause is a necessary being, which in turn means that it cannot not-be. which means that it can neither come into, nor go out of, existence. which means, basically, that it’s eternal.

 

[wolpertinger]

john doran:

ahh…but therein lies the rub: there’s truth, and then there’s knowing that something’s true. and the perennial question of epistemology is how the twain shall e’er meet, you know?

Has it been answered yet?

this was descartes starting point, and if nothing else, his efforts demonstrated that the enterpise - the search for absolute, incontrovertible certainty - is impossible to complete.

Of course it is. Is there any doubt that “1 + 1 = 2”?

cool. so then you are not absolutely certain about the existence of the real world or other minds or the past or…

Technically, no. For all practical purposes, I don’t care.

on the one hand, you say you don’t believe in god’s existence because you cannot demonstrate it with absolute certainty. but then you also seem to say that you ***are ***absolutely certain about the existence of things like the real world and the past and other minds.

We fail to communicate.

Where have I said that I am absolutely certain that the real world exists? I am most definitely not absolutely, positively certain of it. What gives you absolute certainty that it does?

One last time: If I cannot have absolute certainty about anything external to my mind, how can I possibly be certain about god’s existence? Always assuming god is external to my mind…

I have repeated this point often enough to either concede that I am unable to articulate my thoughts clearly or to assume that there is another impediment to mutual understanding.

 

[FelixBlue]

Wolpertinger:

I remain confused. In all honesty, it seems as though you are uninterested in consistency (I don’t intend that, by the way, as an argument against your position). You seem to pick and choose what is relatively certain. You say you don’t prefer to slide into solipsism but give no reasons as to why it is not an accurate description of what is real. Why should your preference guide you in this case? And if preference is an ok MO for you, then why do you not prefer to accept all the apparent evidence (which you say you know of none, but surely this means that you know of some, but that it is not compelling) for some kind of god? Is it not really more accurate to simply say that you prefer there is no God?

Really…is this your preference?

Again, I don’t mean to insinuate that the theist position is all the sudden correct by the above question. But it does seem that you are not willing to argue and come to a conclusion based upon evidence. Evidence, you say, the weak atheist doesn’t wish to argue. OK…the conversations over. Yet, you are willing to proffer evidence (towards relative certainty) for other positions.

Where is the consistency?

Lastly, I should say that I don’t think it is the theist’s position that they can prove theism with absolute certainty. Instead, the claim is only made for relative certainty (the kind I have about many things most people–aside from a strong agnostic–would accept as real).

 

[insideitall]

I thought logic was with the T’s and F’s in math

Is this all basic philosophy? Avoided that class like the plague… and I’m glad I did cause I think my head would’ve asploded (had to skip the last ten entries here as it was) and I prolly woulda failed :whacky:

 

[john_doran]

wolpertinger:

Has it been answered yet?

depends on who you ask, i guess.

Is there any doubt that “1 + 1 = 2”?

it is certainly possible to doubt it and to do so consistently, although i, personally, do not.

but if a condition, for you, of absolute certainty is the provision of an indubitable proof, then you would be required to doubt it, since there is no such proof.

Where have I said that I am absolutely certain that the real world exists? I am most definitely not absolutely, positively certain of it.

well you didn’t say it in so many words, but i reasonably took it to be the implication of this statement of yours:

"In other words, even if I were inclined to accept god’s existence, I would find myself unable prove it (demonstrate with absolute certainty). "

since the lack of absolute certainty prevents you from accepting god’s existence, i assumed that your belief in an external world must have passed that particular muster.

if not, then you have yet to explain why you don’t have to be absolutely certain of the existence of an external world, but you do have to be absolutely certain of god’s existence…

What gives you absolute certainty that it does?

i don’t have what you call absolute certainty. i.e. i can’t demonstrate that there’s an external world.

One last time: If I cannot have absolute certainty about anything external to my mind, how can I possibly be certain about god’s existence? Always assuming god is external to my mind…

well, see, that’s precisely the converse of ***my ***question to you: if you can’t be absolutely certain about the existence of the real world, but yet you believe it, then why can’t you believe in the existence of god without absolute certainty?

my point reduces to this: you believe in plenty of things for which no indubitable proof exists - i.e. you have no beliefs for which your evidence or supporting reasoning is incapable of reasonable doubt - so why should the fact that arguments for god’s existence are similarly susceptible to reasonable doubt count against them?

 

[john_doran]

FelixBlue:

Lastly, I should say that I don’t think it is the theist’s position that they can prove theism with absolute certainty. Instead, the claim is only made for relative certainty (the kind I have about many things most people–aside from a strong agnostic–would accept as real).

bingo.

if the evidence for theism is at least as strong as the evidence on the basis of which one accepts other beliefs one has, then why not also accept theism?