Possible worlds

[R_Daneel]

The concept of possible worlds is quite sensible. We can observe our existing world and come to the conclusion that it could be different. Where there is a pine tree, there could be an oak tree instead or maybe no tree at that location at all. There is no logical or physical necessity that everything “should be” the way it is. From this observation one can create the concept of a “possible world”.

The defintion of a possible world is a hypothetical state of affairs which is different from our existing one. Usually there is an added stipulation that a hypothetical world cannot contain a logical contradiction. This addition is not really necessary, since no physical or logical state of affairs can contain a contradiction. We can create a proposition like “Joe is a married bachelor”, but such propositions are empty constructs without meaning.

Now, if we imagine all the possible worlds, a question arises: “is there anything at all which exists across all the possible worlds, a something which has global existence”? Philosophers like to call this type of hypothesized existence “necessary existence”. I am not fond of this terminology, since the word “necessary” has some “unnecessary” overtones. It would be much better to call it “global” existence.

Of course, the answer could be decided if we could examine all the possible worlds and find an ontological entity which appears in each and every one of them. Alas, the number of possible worlds is infinite, and so it is impossible to examine all of them. But to prove the opposite, namely that there is nothing which exists “globally” of “necessarily” is a simple task. All we have to do is find two possible worlds which have nothing in common, and the concept of global or necessary existence goes out the window. And such possible worlds are easy to find.

As far as we know today, all matter is composed of elementary particles, called “quarks”, see en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quark. We can imagine two simple worlds, one, which contains an “up quark” (W1) and another one, which contains a “down quark” (W2). The intersection of these two worlds (W1 * W2) is a null world, which contains nothing at all. Therefore we can conclude that there is no “global (or necessary) existence”. Once again, the speculations of the philosophers can be discarded as nonsensical and empty speculation, without merit.

Some people object to this example, by stipulating that concepts like “2 + 2 = 4” must have global existence. The trouble is that concepts have no ontological existence. Concepts do not exist outside the minds, which are complex enough to form such concepts.

Others try to question, why should one restrict existence to physical existence. In the definition of a possible world there is no stipulation that all existence must be physical. It can be anything, which exists ontologically. For example, if one assumes that ghosts or angels or demons (or other non-material entities) exist, they are welcome to this line of thought. It will not help them. In such a case one may posit a hypothetical world with one “angel” in it, and another one with one “demon” in it. These two worlds have nothing in common - so again, there is no “global or necessary existence”. Of course there is no need to assume that such beings “exist”, but if someone wishes to do it, that is quite all right.

Of course, even if one considers such “non-material beings”, it is still true that purely physical entities also exist, so whether one entertains “ghost-like entities” or not, the proposed W1 and W2 are valid possible worlds, and that is all that is needed to get rid of the concept of “necessary existence”.

The final conclusion is that the proposed distinction between “local or possible” and “global or necessary” existence is invalid. Existence is just that: “existence”, and no further qualifiers are “necessary”.

 

[tonyrey]

The concept of possible worlds is quite sensible. We can observe our existing world and come to the conclusion that it could be different. Where there is a pine tree, there could be an oak tree instead or maybe no tree at that location at all. There is no logical or physical necessity that everything “should be” the way it is. From this observation one can create the concept of a “possible world”.

The definition of a possible world is a hypothetical state of affairs which is different from our existing one. Usually there is an added stipulation that a hypothetical world cannot contain a logical contradiction. This addition is not really necessary, since no physical or logical state of affairs can contain a contradiction. We can create a proposition like “Joe is a married bachelor”, but such propositions are empty constructs without meaning.

Now, if we imagine all the possible worlds, a question arises: “is there anything at all which exists across all the possible worlds, a something which has global existence”? Philosophers like to call this type of hypothesized existence “necessary existence”. I am not fond of this terminology, since the word “necessary” has some “unnecessary” overtones. It would be much better to call it “global” existence.

The only thing that possible worlds have in common is that they are possible!

Of course, the answer could be decided if we could examine all the possible worlds and find an ontological entity which appears in each and every one of them. Alas, the number of possible worlds is infinite, and so it is impossible to examine all of them. But to prove the opposite, namely that there is nothing which exists “globally” of “necessarily” is a simple task. All we have to do is find two possible worlds which have nothing in common, and the concept of global or necessary existence goes out the window. And such possible worlds are easy to find.

The question of necessity arises only with regard to an existing world.

As far as we know today, all matter is composed of elementary particles, called “quarks”, see en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quark. We can imagine two simple worlds, one, which contains an “up quark” (W1) and another one, which contains a “down quark” (W2). The intersection of these two worlds (W1 * W2) is a null world, which contains nothing at all. Therefore we can conclude that there is no “global (or necessary) existence”. Once again, the speculations of the philosophers can be discarded as nonsensical and empty speculation, without merit.

Your transition from possible worlds to this existing world invalidates your argument.

Some people object to this example, by stipulating that concepts like “2 + 2 = 4” must have global existence. The trouble is that concepts have no ontological existence. Concepts do not exist outside the minds, which are complex enough to form such concepts.

. Facts (truths) must exist outside the mind because there are truths no one is aware of - given that we are not omniscient!

Others try to question, why should one restrict existence to physical existence. In the definition of a possible world there is no stipulation that all existence must be physical. It can be anything, which exists ontologically. For example, if one assumes that ghosts or angels or demons (or other non-material entities) exist, they are welcome to this line of thought. It will not help them.

That is a predictable conclusion from a physicalist! You are assuming that this world is entirely physical and has a physical origin.

In such a case one may posit a hypothetical world with one “angel” in it, and another one with one “demon” in it. These two worlds have nothing in common - so again, there is no “global or necessary existence”. Of course there is no need to assume that such beings “exist”, but if someone wishes to do it, that is quite all right.
Of course, even if one considers such “non-material beings”, it is still true that purely physical entities also exist, so whether one entertains “ghost-like entities” or not, the proposed W1 and W2 are valid possible worlds, and that is all that is needed to get rid of the concept of “necessary existence”.

Another transition!

The final conclusion is that the proposed distinction between “local or possible” and “global or necessary” existence is invalid. Existence is just that: “existence”, and no further qualifiers are “necessary”.

So you conclude that this world is necessary because it exists? If that is the case can you indicate anything in the world which exists necessarily? If not why should the sum of the unnecessary parts be necessary?

 

[R_Daneel]

So you conclude that this world is necessary because it exists?

Quite obviously the whole OP went waaaay above your head. No, this is not the conclusion at all. The conclusion is that to speak of “necessary existence” is exactly as meaningless as to speak of “the color of middle-C”.

 

[Anselm33]

The concept of possible worlds is quite sensible. We can observe our existing world and come to the conclusion that it could be different. Where there is a pine tree, there could be an oak tree instead or maybe no tree at that location at all. There is no logical or physical necessity that everything “should be” the way it is. From this observation one can create the concept of a “possible world”.

The defintion of a possible world is a hypothetical state of affairs which is different from our existing one. Usually there is an added stipulation that a hypothetical world cannot contain a logical contradiction. This addition is not really necessary, since no physical or logical state of affairs can contain a contradiction. We can create a proposition like “Joe is a married bachelor”, but such propositions are empty constructs without meaning.

Now, if we imagine all the possible worlds, a question arises: “is there anything at all which exists across all the possible worlds, a something which has global existence”? Philosophers like to call this type of hypothesized existence “necessary existence”. I am not fond of this terminology, since the word “necessary” has some “unnecessary” overtones. It would be much better to call it “global” existence.

Of course, the answer could be decided if we could examine all the possible worlds and find an ontological entity which appears in each and every one of them. Alas, the number of possible worlds is infinite, and so it is impossible to examine all of them. But to prove the opposite, namely that there is nothing which exists “globally” of “necessarily” is a simple task. All we have to do is find two possible worlds which have nothing in common, and the concept of global or necessary existence goes out the window. And such possible worlds are easy to find.

As far as we know today, all matter is composed of elementary particles, called “quarks”, see en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quark. We can imagine two simple worlds, one, which contains an “up quark” (W1) and another one, which contains a “down quark” (W2). The intersection of these two worlds (W1 * W2) is a null world, which contains nothing at all. Therefore we can conclude that there is no “global (or necessary) existence”. Once again, the speculations of the philosophers can be discarded as nonsensical and empty speculation, without merit.

Some people object to this example, by stipulating that concepts like “2 + 2 = 4” must have global existence. The trouble is that concepts have no ontological existence. Concepts do not exist outside the minds, which are complex enough to form such concepts.

Others try to question, why should one restrict existence to physical existence. In the definition of a possible world there is no stipulation that all existence must be physical. It can be anything, which exists ontologically. For example, if one assumes that ghosts or angels or demons (or other non-material entities) exist, they are welcome to this line of thought. It will not help them. In such a case one may posit a hypothetical world with one “angel” in it, and another one with one “demon” in it. These two worlds have nothing in common - so again, there is no “global or necessary existence”. Of course there is no need to assume that such beings “exist”, but if someone wishes to do it, that is quite all right.

Of course, even if one considers such “non-material beings”, it is still true that purely physical entities also exist, so whether one entertains “ghost-like entities” or not, the proposed W1 and W2 are valid possible worlds, and that is all that is needed to get rid of the concept of “necessary existence”.

The final conclusion is that the proposed distinction between “local or possible” and “global or necessary” existence is invalid. Existence is just that: “existence”, and no further qualifiers are “necessary”.

I don’t understand everything you’ve written above (my bad), but it does seem to be related to a theme from Catholic theology/philosophy, originated by the Jesuit Molina, “Middle Knowledge”. Here are some references that you may want to look into:en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Molinism
and “Divine Providence” by Thomas P. Flint

The notion is that God can see all possible alternatives, even though only one is chosen by an individual. Thus the apparent contradiction between God’s omniscience, omnipotence and human free will is resolved. (As my wife put it: when she taught a history class at Carnegie Tech, she knew who was going to fail and who would get A’s, even though the grade was up to the individual.)

 

[R_Daneel]

I don’t understand everything you’ve written above (my bad), but it does seem to be related to a theme from Catholic theology/philosophy, originated by the Jesuit Molina, “Middle Knowledge”. Here are some references that you may want to look into:en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Molinism and “Divine Providence” by Thomas P. Flint

The resemblance is not even superficial, since I am not talking about God, or God’s supposed knowledge. I am aware of the Molinist concept of “middle knowledge”, and it has nothing to do with existence. I simply talk about the concept of “necessary existence”, nothing more, which is purely philosophical idea.

 

[Totterman]

Jesus,our Lords peace be whit You.
A word is a word,all words means something,but together in sensible way they form a sentence,many senteses adds up to a letter,book,whatever. All words are possible,but not always right. And thats the best I can do whit my english that I have learned from TV and reading english books,I am from Finland. I hope I made moore sence then You did.

 

[davidv]

Jesus,our Lords peace be whit You.
A word is a word,all words means something,but together in sensible way they form a sentence,many senteses adds up to a letter,book,whatever. All words are possible,but not always right. And thats the best I can do whit my english that I have learned from TV and reading english books,I am from Finland. I hope I made moore sence then You did.

Thank you for this.

And yes, you made more sense.

 

[Anselm33]

Thank you for this.

And yes, you made more sense.

 

[danserr]

Your argument fails for the reasons we have discussed in the thread on the ontological argument. (below) There’s no need to rehash the whole thread, so I’ll just summarize the problems in brief.

forums.catholic-questions.org/showthread.php?t=502140&page=2

You begin with the assumption that God does not exist.

1). This means you assume that a necessary being (God) does not exist.
2).Then you use this assumption to “prove” that nothing exists necessarily.
3).You then infer from this that the term “necessary existence” is useless.

Basing an argument that nothing exists necessarily on the assumption that a necessary being (God) does not exist makes your argument hopelessly circular.

As a side note, the term is useful anyway because it conveys a coherent idea.

 

[R_Daneel]

You begin with the assumption that God does not exist.

I am still not assuming anything about God, no matter how many times you repeat it. I do not care about God. I only care about the concept of necessary existence, which is a purely secular concept - which ponders if there is a non-empty intersection among all the possible wolrds. This concept either stands on its own right or it does not. And it does not. Period.

As a side note, the term is useful anyway because it conveys a coherent idea.

Coherent, as in not self-contradictory, yes. Coherent, as meaningful, no. It is just about as “coherent” as contemplating God’s shoe-size. God’s shoe-size is not self-contradictory, but it is meaningless.

 

[hatsoff]

I am still not assuming anything about God, no matter how many times you repeat it. I do not care about God. I only care about the concept of necessary existence, which is a purely secular concept - which ponders if there is a non-empty intersection among all the possible wolrds. This concept either stands on its own right or it does not. And it does not. Period.

You and danssser are using different definitions for necessity. Your definition is:

The defintion of a possible world is a hypothetical state of affairs which is different from our existing one.

This seems to be reaching towards a sense of logical necessity, but that’s not the sort of necessity which the ontological argument uses. Instead, as danssser pointed out in the other thread, we need to be asking about metaphysical necessity.

Is it logically possible that a universe could exist with only a certain kind of quark? Sure! Is it metaphysically possible? Well that’s another question altogether!

 

[slywakka250]

Is it logically possible that a universe could exist with only a certain kind of quark? Sure! Is it metaphysically possible? Well that’s another question altogether!

I agree.

for instance, is a completely nihilistic universe possible?? Is it really sensible to say there is no meaning of any kind??

what about a universe where logic itself does not exist??

It seems somewhere, something is necessarily existent.

though I’m not completely convinced.

 

[R_Daneel]

You and danssser are using different definitions for necessity. Your definition is:

The defintion of a possible world is a hypothetical state of affairs which is different from our existing one.

Well, it is not MY definition, it is THE definition. There can be no other definition.

Is it logically possible that a universe could exist with only a certain kind of quark? Sure! Is it metaphysically possible? Well that’s another question altogether!

It is a bit more serious than that. The proposed world is not just logically possible, it is physically possible! Just like a possible world, which is composed of anti-matter (positrons and anti-protons). If something is physically possible, then it is also logically possible. Isn’t that obvious? How does the so-called “metaphysically possible” fit into this picture? If something is physically possible, but not metaphysically possible (by some metaphysical system), then the idea of metaphysical possibility is nonsense and/or the proposed metaphysical system is bogus.

The concepts of “contingent” and “necessary” labels for existence certainly make sense when one considers a particular causal chain. For example a grandparent → parent → child type of a chain. Within the chain the parent’s existence is contingent upon the existence (or prior existence) of the grandparent, and it is necessary in conjuction with the relationship to the child. So far, it makes perfect sense. Now to try to generalize this concept and apply it to the whole Universe is just another fallacy of composition. If we would consider your existence and my existence, there is no causal chain involved there, our existence is independent from each other. In that relationship the labels “contingent” or “necessary” simply do not apply.

Danserr’s error is an example of the “Napoleon fallacy” (I just invented this term, by the way). When Laplace wrote a book about the movements of celestial bodies, Napoleon asked him why does he not mention God is his book? Laplace answered: “Sire, I have no need for that hypothesis”. Just like the planetary movements can be contemplated and explained without a reference to God, the concept of possible world (and its ramifications) can and must be contemplated on its own right, without any reference to God.

 

[tonyrey]

It seems somewhere, something is necessarily existent.
though I’m not completely convinced.

Something must exist because the idea that nothing exists exists! That does not mean something exists necessarily but it refutes nihilism - the belief that nothing exists. It also establishes the primacy of thought…

 

[hatsoff]

Well, it is not MY definition, it is THE definition. There can be no other definition.

Actually, philosophers often distinguish between different types of possibility, as I indicated previously.

In any case, there can always be another definition. Definitions know no bounds.

It is a bit more serious than that. The proposed world is not just logically possible, it is physically possible!

By physically possible do you mean to suggest that this (actual) world could be somehow stripped of all its contents except for one quark? What makes you think that’s physically possible?

If not, then what do you mean by physical possibility?

 

[R_Daneel]

Actually, philosophers often distinguish between different types of possibility, as I indicated previously.

In any case, there can always be another definition. Definitions know no bounds.

Yes, in a sense you are right. People can come up with all sorts of “definitions”. Especially philosophers. As Einstein said: “There are two things which are infinite: the Universe and human stupidity. And I am not sure about the Universe”. But I would suggest to stick with sensible definitions, shall we?

By physically possible do you mean to suggest that this (actual) world could be somehow stripped of all its contents except for one quark? What makes you think that’s physically possible?

The actual process is not really relevant, but the answer is “yes”. We can start with the existing world, which is clearly possible, and define two actions: adding something to the world, or subtracting (or taking out) something from the world. One can always add a new object to the world, which is at the end of a causal chain, or which is independent from all the existing causal chains. Conversely, one can always delete an object, which is at the end of a causal chain, or which is independent of any causal chains.

For example, we could “delete” all the other galaxies, and keep the Milky Way only. The resulting world would be another possible world. Then we could “delete” all the other Solar systems, except ours. Then we could delete all the planets, and keep only the Sun. Then we could strip away all the atoms, and keep one hydrogen atom. Furthermore, we could delete the electron and keep the proton only. And then delete all the quarks, and keep one. It does not matter if this process is hypothetical. We deal with hypothetical scenarios only, even when we stipulate that an oak tree could be “missing” from our back yard, and that would not invalidate the world…

If not, then what do you mean by physical possibility?

There is no known physical law which would indicate that the elementary particles (quarks) are physically contingent upon each other. That is why they are considered elementary.

 

[hatsoff]

R Daneel,

You keep wanting us to imagine this world having been stripped of most of its contents, and I agree that this is imaginable, or conceivable. But is it physically possible for that to happen? You say that yes, it is, because we don’t know of any physical law which would prevent it from happening. I’m not a physicist, so I’ll have to take your word on that count. But even assuming that current physics is unable to rule out such an event, why should that cause us to think that it is physically possible? It seems to me that the best we can say is that it might be physically possible.

 

[Sarpedon]

Usually there is an added stipulation that a hypothetical world cannot contain a logical contradiction. This addition is not really necessary, since no physical or logical state of affairs can contain a contradiction.

Now, if we imagine all the possible worlds, a question arises: “is there anything at all which exists across all the possible worlds, a something which has global existence”?

Do the rules of logic exist across all possible worlds?

Philosophers like to call this type of hypothesized existence “necessary existence”. I am not fond of this terminology, since the word “necessary” has some “unnecessary” overtones. It would be much better to call it “global” existence.

Calling necessary existence “global existence” entails the assumption of globes, by which I think you mean earths/planets/universes or something like that. At the level of something/nothing, adding additional assumptions about planets and such just makes things more complicated and bypasses the questions metaphysics is trying to answer- such as what is a universe? This is a minor point of terminology, though.

Of course, the answer could be decided if we could examine all the possible worlds and find an ontological entity which appears in each and every one of them.

All we have to do is find two possible worlds which have nothing in common, and the concept of global or necessary existence goes out the window. And such possible worlds are easy to find.

The approach in this second quote is impossible for a simple reason. Suppose we find two possible worlds that are different in every internal way. They share nothing in common apparently. However, there is one thing that the necessarily share in common- they are both possible worlds. It is simply impossible to find two possible worlds that have nothing in common- because they have their possible worldliness in common.

The intersection of these two worlds (W1 * W2) is a null world, which contains nothing at all. Therefore we can conclude that there is no “global (or necessary) existence”. Once again, the speculations of the philosophers can be discarded as nonsensical and empty speculation, without merit.

To have the category of “nothing” is itself an ontological concept that relates it to other things. By talking about any two possible worlds, whatever they be, you are placing them in relation by their possible worldliness. That in of itself is found in every possible world. For your argument to work, you must posit two possible worlds that have nothing in common. Can you propose two possible worlds that do not each share possible worldliness?

 

[lemondiesel]

Yay!! Real Philosophy!

Finally! I hate being the one to have to bring up possible worlds.

Are you a fan of David Kellogg Lewis? Are you familiar w/ his modal realist stance?

I don’t think that possible worlds as hypotheticals work. I remember lewis arguing against erzatz possible worlds and insisting that they are concrete, causally isolated, non-spatiotemporal entities wholly distinct from one another. And that one isn’t derived from another etc…

I honestly can’t say I’m 100% sure why they have to be that way but that bastard spent years churning out proofs for ****.

They say that possible world semantics are the best way to analyze counterfactual conditionals too.

About concepts having no ontological existence, I think what you do is just broaden the categories such that everything can be reduced to certain properties, (in some cases these properties can be purely abstract).

Trope theorists try and solve the ontological debate regarding individuals and universals by saying that a trope is a concrete particularized instantiation of a universal, which can be repeated, but not duplicated.

Beautiful stuff, it really is.

I’m sorry to ramble so haphazardly, but I get happy like a kid at christmas when someone starts going into real metaphysics.

Also, if you think of “necessary” not as “something that’s the same across all worlds” then it gets real confusing. You should consider it in the Kantian sense that what’s “necessary” is instead that which is impossible for us to perceive according to the structure of our perceptual mechanisms.

Then you’ve got necessary a priori things like space and time, the prerequisites for perception and cognition. Also, things that are analytically necessary like identity theory. 1=1 is defined self referentially or tautologically and therefore, no matter what the world is really really like, the way we have to deal with it is in terms of the necessary truths that we postulate, and so some worlds are impossible. It’s not that there’s a possible world for everything, some are impossible. And things that are “necessary” are both a) by products or prerequisites of perception and cognition, and b) defined self referentially.

Now when you start talking about identities being drawn across possible worlds, things get confusing. But I have a paper on that too. Something about the trans-world heir-line, (which has to do w/ the origin of terms and concepts and I think involves some collaboration or inclusion at least of some of Kripke’s work).

If something is necessary in one world and not another, then either it’s a) not really necesary, or b) one of the worlds isn’t possible.

Also, I mean, I just keep sticking on your notion that something can be excluded from ontology. Tropes obtain in all instances of all objects in all possible worlds. You can have an ontology that only admits a singular type of entity and covers everything if you word it just right.

You’re trying to reduce philosophy into science w/ the quark thing. While reduction is a good thing in both science and philosophy, it only works one way. Quarks are just concrete particularized instantiations of universals which are repeatable but can’t be duplicated. So they’re really just tropes. Which are thus far the most efficient ontological entity when it comes to describing phenomena.

Also, Good question. Why should we restrict existence to physical objects? Non physical things clearly exist. Love, hate, possible worlds, concepts, ersatz possible worlds, mathematics, the relations between objects that are not the objects themselves etc… But it seems like you’re trying to categorize everything as quarks which are physical.

Sorry,
lemondiesel

 

[lemondiesel]

please give me a chance to talk about this subject with you haha

:bowdown2:I am but a mere individual, looking to better my wisdom