Possible worlds

[R_Daneel]

Sorry for the delay… will retrn asap

 

[Ashurie]

God is great and does wonderful things…I have no doubt that he has made other wonderful worlds like ours

 

[R_Daneel]

You keep wanting us to imagine this world having been stripped of most of its contents, and I agree that this is imaginable, or conceivable. But is it physically possible for that to happen? You say that yes, it is, because we don’t know of any physical law which would prevent it from happening. I’m not a physicist, so I’ll have to take your word on that count. But even assuming that current physics is unable to rule out such an event, why should that cause us to think that it is physically possible? It seems to me that the best we can say is that it might be physically possible.

Well, since we are not omniscient, we must go by the available evidence, and draw conclusions from it. Then we should use the highest possible certainty method: “is there any reasonable doubt that the conclusions are valid?”. We cannot do better than that. Now, the proposed mini-worlds are just one possible way to show that there is no “necessary being”, but it is a very simple one and not the only one.

Let’s present a few scenarios, and see what your thoughts are about them. Is there any reasonable doubt that the following worlds are possible?

1. Suppose that a tree in your neighborhood would be missing?
2. Suppose that there would be an additional tree in you neighborhood, which is not there in this world?
3. Suppose that the planet Pluto would be missing?
4. Suppose that there would be an additional planet?
5. Suppose that a whole existing galaxy would not be there?
6. Suppose that an additional galaxy would be out there, somewhere?
7. Suppose that the whole Milky Way would be missing?
8. Suppose that all the galaxies except the Milky way would be missing?
9. Suppose that all the electrons would be replaced with positrons and all the protons would be replaced by anti-protons?

The point is that we cannot say that any physical object is “necessary”. Each and any one of them could be missing, and the resulting world would still be physically possible. Of course all the theists would agree, and they look for a “necessary being” in the non-physical realm. The trouble is that they are unable to show the presence of a non-physical ontological object in this world. Mind you, concepts, ideas, etc. are not ontological objects.

The conclusion is that there is no reasonable doubt that stripping all the existing ontological objects, and keeping just one quark would somehow not be physically possible. And since there are more than one quarks (elementary particles) we can reach at least 2 (or 6) mini-worlds, which have nothing in common.

 

[R_Daneel]

Do the rules of logic exist across all possible worlds?

No. The laws of logic are conceptual constructs, and they do not exist in any world where there are no sufficiently advances beings who can conceptualize them.

The approach in this second quote is impossible for a simple reason. Suppose we find two possible worlds that are different in every internal way. They share nothing in common apparently. However, there is one thing that the necessarily share in common- they are both possible worlds. It is simply impossible to find two possible worlds that have nothing in common- because they have their possible worldliness in common.

Tricky, but not good. The fact that something is a “possible world” is not same as the propostion: “world X is a possible world”. Propositions are not ontological objects, and they do not “exist” the same way as ontological objects do.

To have the category of “nothing” is itself an ontological concept that relates it to other things. By talking about any two possible worlds, whatever they be, you are placing them in relation by their possible worldliness. That in of itself is found in every possible world. For your argument to work, you must posit two possible worlds that have nothing in common. Can you propose two possible worlds that do not each share possible worldliness?

Ontological objects are material objects for the materialists. For the theists there are other, non-physical ontological objects, like angels, demons, gods, ghosts, etc. The relationships between ontological objects, concepts about ontological objects are not ontological objects themselves. I do not wish to exclude a-priori the existence of non-physical ontological objects from consideration.

Of course that does not help the theists. We can contemplate two possible worlds, one constructed of purely material objects, the other one of purely non-physical ontological objects. They have nothing is common. One is physical, the other is non-physical. So the idea of a necessary being (ontological object) is found to be vacuous again.

 

[R_Daneel]

please give me a chance to talk about this subject with you haha

:bowdown2:I am but a mere individual, looking to better my wisdom

Please let’s get into specifics. Your previous post was a bit too esoteric to my taste.

 

[Sarpedon]

No. The laws of logic are conceptual constructs, and they do not exist in any world where there are no sufficiently advances beings who can conceptualize them.

What is being conceptualized?

Tricky, but not good. The fact that something is a “possible world” is not same as the propostion: “world X is a possible world”. Propositions are not ontological objects, and they do not “exist” the same way as ontological objects do.

I am not making a proposition. All possible worlds are in fact possible worlds. This is something they have in common. It does not matter whether I make a proposition or not.

On an analogous level, the problem is like this: can you demonstrate two objects that have nothing in common? You can’t, because they are both objects. Just as we can apply this to objects, we can apply it to possible worlds and other things as well.

Ontological objects are material objects for the materialists. For the theists there are other, non-physical ontological objects, like angels, demons, gods, ghosts, etc. The relationships between ontological objects, concepts about ontological objects are not ontological objects themselves. I do not wish to exclude a-priori the existence of non-physical ontological objects from consideration.

I find your assertion that we have to consider necessity in terms of ontological objects unsupported. Nevertheless, it is not necessary for me to deny your assertion- your argument can be seen to be false even when dealing solely with ontological objects.

Of course that does not help the theists. We can contemplate two possible worlds, one constructed of purely material objects, the other one of purely non-physical ontological objects. They have nothing is common. One is physical, the other is non-physical. So the idea of a necessary being (ontological object) is found to be vacuous again.

Suppose we have one possible world where we have an ontological object of an angel. Suppose we have another possible world in which we have an ontological object of a rock. Do these two worlds have anything in common? Yes- they each have one ontological object.

Of course, a rock is an ontological object just like an angel, because ontology refers to being and existence. Matter is just as much a part of ontology as anything else.

 

[GreggAlvarez]

The concept of possible worlds is quite sensible. We can observe our existing world and come to the conclusion that it could be different. Where there is a pine tree, there could be an oak tree instead or maybe no tree at that location at all. There is no logical or physical necessity that everything “should be” the way it is. From this observation one can create the concept of a “possible world”.

The defintion of a possible world is a hypothetical state of affairs which is different from our existing one. Usually there is an added stipulation that a hypothetical world cannot contain a logical contradiction. This addition is not really necessary, since no physical or logical state of affairs can contain a contradiction. We can create a proposition like “Joe is a married bachelor”, but such propositions are empty constructs without meaning.

Now, if we imagine all the possible worlds, a question arises: “is there anything at all which exists across all the possible worlds, a something which has global existence”? Philosophers like to call this type of hypothesized existence “necessary existence”. I am not fond of this terminology, since the word “necessary” has some “unnecessary” overtones. It would be much better to call it “global” existence.

Of course, the answer could be decided if we could examine all the possible worlds and find an ontological entity which appears in each and every one of them. Alas, the number of possible worlds is infinite, and so it is impossible to examine all of them. But to prove the opposite, namely that there is nothing which exists “globally” of “necessarily” is a simple task. All we have to do is find two possible worlds which have nothing in common, and the concept of global or necessary existence goes out the window. And such possible worlds are easy to find.

As far as we know today, all matter is composed of elementary particles, called “quarks”, see en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quark. We can imagine two simple worlds, one, which contains an “up quark” (W1) and another one, which contains a “down quark” (W2). The intersection of these two worlds (W1 * W2) is a null world, which contains nothing at all. Therefore we can conclude that there is no “global (or necessary) existence”. Once again, the speculations of the philosophers can be discarded as nonsensical and empty speculation, without merit.

Some people object to this example, by stipulating that concepts like “2 + 2 = 4” must have global existence. The trouble is that concepts have no ontological existence. Concepts do not exist outside the minds, which are complex enough to form such concepts.

Others try to question, why should one restrict existence to physical existence. In the definition of a possible world there is no stipulation that all existence must be physical. It can be anything, which exists ontologically. For example, if one assumes that ghosts or angels or demons (or other non-material entities) exist, they are welcome to this line of thought. It will not help them. In such a case one may posit a hypothetical world with one “angel” in it, and another one with one “demon” in it. These two worlds have nothing in common - so again, there is no “global or necessary existence”. Of course there is no need to assume that such beings “exist”, but if someone wishes to do it, that is quite all right.

Of course, even if one considers such “non-material beings”, it is still true that purely physical entities also exist, so whether one entertains “ghost-like entities” or not, the proposed W1 and W2 are valid possible worlds, and that is all that is needed to get rid of the concept of “necessary existence”.

The final conclusion is that the proposed distinction between “local or possible” and “global or necessary” existence is invalid. Existence is just that: “existence”, and no further qualifiers are “necessary”.

Daneel,
I am terrible with the qouting multiple paragraphs so I will try my best to stay in order.
Possibility does not make it probably. It is only possible. Is it possible that a cow will fast on Fridays? Of course it is possible… but it will not happen. And I agree that nothing SHOULD be the way it is because of the definition of should. However, that is only speculation because everything IS the way it is whether or not we like it. Well, sorry to this very short but I have to go and do my trumpet thing. I will continue this later. The idea is very interesting! I am certainly open for a candid and respectful discussion. I hope you are too.
Gregg

 

[R_Daneel]

On an analogous level, the problem is like this: can you demonstrate two objects that have nothing in common? You can’t, because they are both objects. Just as we can apply this to objects, we can apply it to possible worlds and other things as well.

Suppose we have one possible world where we have an ontological object of an angel. Suppose we have another possible world in which we have an ontological object of a rock. Do these two worlds have anything in common? Yes- they each have one ontological object.

Of course, a rock is an ontological object just like an angel, because ontology refers to being and existence. Matter is just as much a part of ontology as anything else.

In other words: “everything is a: thing”. God is a thing, and so is a rock. No big difference… they are both “things” or “objects”. Come on. To generalize to that level makes it meaningless. A world “made up” of a rock and a world “made up” of an ghost certainly can be said that they have “one thing” in common: they are both made up of one object. But this is an observation, a proposition, which is not an ontological object. Moreover, this proposition exists in in our world, not in those hypothetical worlds! When the idea of a “necessary being” is contemplated, we talk about specifics in those worlds, not ultra-generalities, “things”. In those worlds the concept of a “thing” does not exist, it only exists in our world.

From your reasoning it would follow that the “necessary being” is nothing more than a “thing”, because in every possible world there is a “thing” or some “things”. Of course your reasoning fails, as soon as you start to consider that the null-world is also a possible world, and that world does not contain anything. Don’t forget that the definition of a possible world is “a state of affairs, which is different from our one”.

 

[R_Daneel]

Possibility does not make it probably.

Correct. But the concept of a “different world” is simply the result of a thought experiment, and it has nothing to do with the “probability” of such state of affairs.

 

[lemondiesel]

Please let’s get into specifics. Your previous post was a bit too esoteric to my taste.

It’s hard to be specific when you’re talking about the set of all possibility. Theoretically, that set is the broadest set there is.

I guess I should try and decide whether you are interested in the reasoning behind the construction of possible world semantics, or if you may be wondering how all this fits into the analytic truths of epistemology regarding how we categorize information according to varying standards of evidence. Are you more concerned in particular w/ the analysis of necessity and possibility and maybe possible world semantics just came up in your studies, and it’s a more-complex than necessary analysis of those concepts for the questions you were considering?

It’s ****ed up to try and not be esoteric and talk about possible worlds at the same time. I’ll try harder though.

Also, I think that the reification mathematical concepts is I think a reaction of theorists to new understandings of modalities as the idea is to universally apply a scientific method to all things period.
I mean, if you accept possible worlds as concrete, but non-spatiotemporal, and as causally isolated instances of possibilities, you can construct a logical notation of everything there is in some way or another. It might not satisfy every philosophical inquiry, but it’s definitely an expansion of quantification per se.

 

[Sarpedon]

In other words: “everything is a: thing”. God is a thing, and so is a rock. No big difference… they are both “things” or “objects”. Come on. To generalize to that level makes it meaningless.

When I speak of “objects” I am talking about the ontological entities that we call “real.” If both God and a rock are real, then they can both be said to be ontological objects.

This does not make it meaningless at all. By defining ontological object as simply “partaking in being” or as being “real,” I make the term very simple and fundamental. If you define ontological object as a “physical object” you are bringing in additional assumptions about the material world. When we are dealing with simple reality, there is no need to define that reality as material things. That is getting ahead of ourselves, and it is multiplying assumptions.

Your argument only works if you can show two possible worlds that have nothing in common. For you to do that, you must show that they have no ontological being in common. Since ontological being concerns anything that is real, any real thing shared by the possible worlds refutes your argument. Simply being a possible world is a real state of affairs, and therefore a real ontological object. The “state of affairs” partakes in being.

A world “made up” of a rock and a world “made up” of an ghost certainly can be said that they have “one thing” in common: they are both made up of one object. But this is an observation, a proposition, which is not an ontological object.

It is not a proposition as a human proposition- rather, it is a state of relation. The state of relation would exist even if no people were around to comment on it. That state of relation is real (you admit that much), and therefore as a real entity, it is an ontological object.

From your reasoning it would follow that the “necessary being” is nothing more than a “thing”, because in every possible world there is a “thing” or some “things”. Of course your reasoning fails, as soon as you start to consider that the null-world is also a possible world, and that world does not contain anything. Don’t forget that the definition of a possible world is “a state of affairs, which is different from our one”.

Your whole argument is predicated on your belief that ontology is tied to everyday objects. That’s not the case. Ontology is concerned with being and existence, by its very definition. As such, any real entity falls under ontology. There is no reason we cannot consider relations and “states of affairs” as ontological categories. If they are real, then that satisfies the most basic definition of an ontological object- that which partakes in existence. Unless you are willing to say that relations are not real, you are going to have a hard time excluding them from the science of the real.

 

[R_Daneel]

This post is directed to Lemondiesel, too! (And everyone else, who might be interested. )

When I speak of “objects” I am talking about the ontological entities that we call “real.” If both God and a rock are real, then they can both be said to be ontological objects.

Good starting point. Of course it raises the question of “what is real?”.

There is one thing we can agree upon: “physical objects are real, physical objects exist”. At least I hope we can agree upon that. Now, physical objects have properties, and if there are more than one physical objects, then they enter into relationships. One could say that properties and relationships are “real”, therefore they are also ontological objects. I disagree with this concept. They may be ontological “entities”, but not “objects”.

To speak of the numeral “one” as a real object simply dilutes the concept of “ontological object” to become meaningless, or incoherent. To speak of “distance” as an object, which “exists” is similarly meaningless. How would a married bachelor fit into this framework? The thought is “there”, it is real, it exists, but what about its referent? The concept of a married bachelor is “real”, but are there married bachelors?

I do not exclude or wish to exclude non-material, yet real objects. I have no idea what they could be, and what is “real” about them, but I do not exclude them from our contemplation. But concepts, ideas, numbers, letters do not belong to this category. They are mental constructs, they are abstractions. Their existence cannot be separated from the mind, which makes the abstractions, even though the “stuff” those minds abstract might really be “there”. I emphasize the “might” here. One can think of “square circles” or “multi-dimensional physical spaces” or “benevolent devils” or “sour tasting yellow sounds”, but these concepts have no referents.

It is not a proposition as a human proposition- rather, it is a state of relation. The state of relation would exist even if no people were around to comment on it. That state of relation is real (you admit that much), and therefore as a real entity, it is an ontological object.

Based upon what I said above we both agree and disagree. I agree that “distance” is there, even if there is not one to observe it, or realize it, but I do not agree that “distance” exists as an “object”. For “distance” to be meaningful, there must be two objects. (We all know what sound two palms make, but what sound can one palm make? Just kidding here…) The reason is that in such a case we would have to accept that “in front of”, or “behind” (spatially speaking), or “before” and “after” (temporally speaking) also have ontological existence, which is clearly nonsense. In order to speak of “in front of”, we need not only two actual objects, but also an observer, and his point of view.

I know that some philosophers assert that “abstract objects” exist, and we merely “discover” them. I disagree with this notion, too. If we would accept this approach, then Shakespeare did not “invent” Hamlet, he merely “discovered” an independently “existing abstract object” we call Hamlet. Which is clearly nonsense.

Your whole argument is predicated on your belief that ontology is tied to everyday objects. That’s not the case. Ontology is concerned with being and existence, by its very definition. As such, any real entity falls under ontology. There is no reason we cannot consider relations and “states of affairs” as ontological categories. If they are real, then that satisfies the most basic definition of an ontological object- that which partakes in existence. Unless you are willing to say that relations are not real, you are going to have a hard time excluding them from the science of the real.

And the question comes up again: “what is real?”, or “what does partake in existence?”. It all hinges upon the concept of “object”. I suggest that “objects” are “active” in the sense that they can enter into relationships, while concepts are “inert” in the sense that they cannot enter into relationships. (Can the number “one” be related to the sound of “middle-C”?)

I suggest this approach:

1. Physical existence is real, physical entites are objects. (P-existence)
2. Physical objects have properties and relationships. These exist, but they are not objects.
3. Concepts about reality also exist, but they are not objects. (C-existence)
4. Non-physical objects are assumed to exist as real entities. (X-existence)
5. Non-physical objects are assumed to be able to enter into relationships. In other words, they can be active.

Can we build upon this approach, or is this approach unacceptable?

 

[R_Daneel]

Adding a few more thoughts, since the previous post is now not editable any more. Next to attributes (or properties) and relationships there are also activities to be considered. Is “walking” an “ontological object”? Is the gravitational force an “ontological object”? Activities cannot be considered “objects”, even though they exist in reality.

So, summarized, there are actual objects, the properties of objects, the relationships between objects and the activities of the objects - none of which can be considered “objects” on their own right. Yet, they are part of the physical reality.

 

[awatkins69]

Forgive me, because I haven’t read the whole thread. Also, sorry if I don’t reply very much, since I’m pretty busy lately.

Prima facie, I think you’re making some very controversial assertions. Preliminarily, it seems to be the case that null-state is a non-world, not a possible world. But how does this work? I assume you use the usual definition of “possible”, “necessary”, etc.

Let S = Something exists and N = nothing exists. We assume that N is possibly true.

1. If N is possibly true, then S, is only true contingently.
2. There are some possible worlds in which S is false and possible worlds in which S is true. (From 1)
3. In the worlds in which S is true, something exists.
4. In the worlds in which S is false, something exists, viz. S, since something can only have a property (e.g. “falsity”) if it exists.
5. Every proposition is either true, or if not true, then false.
6. Every world has something in it (at least S).
7. Hence, it is not possible that nothing exists.
8. Thus, necessarily, something exists.

It seems to be the case that this holds in your world. In a null-world, S is neither false nor true? Or can something have a property without existing? Or is falsity not a property? And you don’t think tautologies are true necessarily?These are just a couple of things, the truth of which I am fairly certain of. Saying that propositions can exist only in minds doesn’t solve the problem. In fact, it seems to be evidence for the Divine Mind.

 

[GreggAlvarez]

The concept of possible worlds is quite sensible. We can observe our existing world and come to the conclusion that it could be different. Where there is a pine tree, there could be an oak tree instead or maybe no tree at that location at all. There is no logical or physical necessity that everything “should be” the way it is. From this observation one can create the concept of a “possible world”.

The defintion of a possible world is a hypothetical state of affairs which is different from our existing one. Usually there is an added stipulation that a hypothetical world cannot contain a logical contradiction. This addition is not really necessary, since no physical or logical state of affairs can contain a contradiction. We can create a proposition like “Joe is a married bachelor”, but such propositions are empty constructs without meaning.

Now, if we imagine all the possible worlds, a question arises: “is there anything at all which exists across all the possible worlds, a something which has global existence”? Philosophers like to call this type of hypothesized existence “necessary existence”. I am not fond of this terminology, since the word “necessary” has some “unnecessary” overtones. It would be much better to call it “global” existence.

Of course, the answer could be decided if we could examine all the possible worlds and find an ontological entity which appears in each and every one of them. Alas, the number of possible worlds is infinite, and so it is impossible to examine all of them. But to prove the opposite, namely that there is nothing which exists “globally” of “necessarily” is a simple task. All we have to do is find two possible worlds which have nothing in common, and the concept of global or necessary existence goes out the window. And such possible worlds are easy to find.

As far as we know today, all matter is composed of elementary particles, called “quarks”, see en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quark. We can imagine two simple worlds, one, which contains an “up quark” (W1) and another one, which contains a “down quark” (W2). The intersection of these two worlds (W1 * W2) is a null world, which contains nothing at all. Therefore we can conclude that there is no “global (or necessary) existence”. Once again, the speculations of the philosophers can be discarded as nonsensical and empty speculation, without merit.

Some people object to this example, by stipulating that concepts like “2 + 2 = 4” must have global existence. The trouble is that concepts have no ontological existence. Concepts do not exist outside the minds, which are complex enough to form such concepts.

Others try to question, why should one restrict existence to physical existence. In the definition of a possible world there is no stipulation that all existence must be physical. It can be anything, which exists ontologically. For example, if one assumes that ghosts or angels or demons (or other non-material entities) exist, they are welcome to this line of thought. It will not help them. In such a case one may posit a hypothetical world with one “angel” in it, and another one with one “demon” in it. These two worlds have nothing in common - so again, there is no “global or necessary existence”. Of course there is no need to assume that such beings “exist”, but if someone wishes to do it, that is quite all right.

Of course, even if one considers such “non-material beings”, it is still true that purely physical entities also exist, so whether one entertains “ghost-like entities” or not, the proposed W1 and W2 are valid possible worlds, and that is all that is needed to get rid of the concept of “necessary existence”.

The final conclusion is that the proposed distinction between “local or possible” and “global or necessary” existence is invalid. Existence is just that: “existence”, and no further qualifiers are “necessary”.

Sorry I took so long. It kind of stinks to have no computer at my house. Anyway, back to my thoughts on this. Perhaps we have different definitions of a concept. I think we should start with this. You are right a concept exists, but I think you are wrong in thinking it only exists in the mind. There are material (concrete) and immaterial (abstract) concepts. A cow exists is a concept. The velocity of light is a concept. The words were created by us but not the concept. Let us take your example, 2+2=4. We discover truth. We do not invent anything. The concept in our mind is taken from the intelligibility of our world. I will just discard the possible worlds because it is pointless to me. As intelligent creatures, we have to take the intelligibility from the world and form it as a concept in the mind. 2+2=4 could very well have been called 7+7=2… But the value would stay the same (if 7=2 and 2=4 in your other possible world). We have to identify it like my name to identify me, like Orion to identify the constellation or pi to identify an external quantity not created by us. The intelligibility would still exist if we were all to not exist tomorrow. Am I being clear? I feel like I can barely understand myself. Do you follow me?

 

[lemondiesel]

This post is directed to Lemondiesel, too! (And everyone else, who might be interested. )

See you’re getting there. But with ontology, you don’t really talk about what’s real,** you talk about what exists**. And even relations and properties can have relations to properties in other objects.

The trick is to find something about physical objects that’s shared w/ all the non-physical objects in order to reduce one into the other as far as existence goes. With possible worlds, the problems people raise has to do w/ occam’s razor, they think it’s bad to multiply these worlds unnecessarily. But Lewis thinks that infinite worlds are necessary to describe infinite possibilities.

The way you can get around occam’s razor is to do it in your ontology, before you even start talking about sets of worlds. The idea is to have as few ontological entities as possible. So Lewis, along w/ several others have adopted something called “trope theory”, which reduces all objects both physical and non-physical to tropes, which gives you a singular ontological entity to deal with thus satisfying occam’s razor.

Now with a realism, in most cases, you’re stipulating that you’re only going to talk about things in a certain set. Like scientific realism deals only w/ the things inside the boundaries of science etc… Modal realism on the other hand takes modalities as real, which because of what they are, means that modal realism can encompass many, many other versions of realisms from every which way.

Long story short,** the only ontological entities that you need are tropes**, and since they are all of the same kind of object, you can multiply them as much as you want w/ out bringing in new kinds of entities into you ontology.

Even a possible world is a trope or a cluster of tropes. All physical and non-physical objects are tropes. So you can be a monist, (which in my opinion is philosophically favorable), but at the same time have access to all the entities that you need to appropriately describe the real notions of infinity that we encounter in the real world and in theory.

Also, worlds to which there are no referents are not possible. The set of worlds that are possible are those which adhere to the structure of some kind of language and no not contain analytic contradictions. A possible world has to be internally consistent, but it doesn’t have to have any correspondence to the world we’re in.

Now the thing that alot of people do is try to distinguish those worlds from this one by saying they’re “merely possible” and that this is the “real” one.

But you avoid some philosophical traps by instead referring to this world, (the world we’re in), as “actual” rather than “real”. If we want to reify modalities, then we can’t have them coming in degrees. They’re just real. So since we’ve got this problem of having equivalent proofs for apparently contradicting propositions, we have to categorize further, and introduce an empirical element, (by looking around at the world we’re in), and call this world “actual”.

That also fits right in w/ the fluidity of empirical science. If we refer to this world as “actual”, then later make new scientific discoveries then we don’t think that the world changed, we realize that it’s just our view that’s changed. This is what we mean when we say the term “actual” is indexical. It can be used in a statement at any possible world and be true so long at the person making the statement is referring to the world that they think they’re in. So when science tells us we’re wrong, what really happens is that we discover we’re not in the world we thought we were, so we then call this newly discovered world, “actual” and correctly so.

 

[Sarpedon]

Adding a few more thoughts, since the previous post is now not editable any more. Next to attributes (or properties) and relationships there are also activities to be considered. Is “walking” an “ontological object”? Is the gravitational force an “ontological object”? Activities cannot be considered “objects”, even though they exist in reality.

Suppose there is one world in which I choose one thing, and another world in which I choose another thing. Actions can indeed be part of the possible world scenario. The philosophy of free will and action is intimately tied up with possible world philosophy, so such questions are not removed from possible worlds.

So, summarized, there are actual objects, the properties of objects, the relationships between objects and the activities of the objects - none of which can be considered “objects” on their own right. Yet, they are part of the physical reality.

Right, but we aren’t just talking about “objects.” We are talking about “ontological objects.” Ontology is concerned with all things that exist. It is absurd to simply restrict ontological considerations to material objects. If you did that, you would claim that only individual objects can be real- and that makes a lot of things unreal. This isn’t some kind of Catholic Thomistic perspective- much of modern philosophy is concerned with the philosophy of action and free will (much of it very contrary to Catholicism), and this philosophy is very closely tied to possible world philosophy.

You made an ontological argument- that we can conceive of two worlds that have no shared ontological objects. If you choose to use the standard definition of ontology, then you run into numerous problems that I have mentioned. If you choose to define ontology as restricted to individual material objects, your argument works better, but is still inadequate. By restricting ontology to individual material objects, you place reality into a box. That may be legitimate, but you need to provide your justification for doing so. I do not think you will succeed, for no matter what you do, you cannot escape working under the overall frame of existence itself.

I suggest this approach:

1. Physical existence is real, physical entites are objects. (P-existence)
2. Physical objects have properties and relationships. These exist, but they are not objects.
3. Concepts about reality also exist, but they are not objects. (C-existence)
4. Non-physical objects are assumed to exist as real entities. (X-existence)
5. Non-physical objects are assumed to be able to enter into relationships. In other words, they can be active.

Can we build upon this approach, or is this approach unacceptable?

This is acceptable. Obviously there is debate within metaphysics over the exact breakdown, but we can accept this for our discussion. Despite this, my objection to your argument still stands exactly the same.

The whole philosophy of possible worlds is concerned with different possibilities for real entities, which we call “ontological objects” (i.e. a distinction in being). As such, all real entities are necessarily included. This includes your C existence and X existence. It does not matter what kind of existence they have, because merely having existence puts them in the framework of the possible world. This is why free will and action have a part to play in these scenarios- for actions are real, and therefore part of the possible world.

You could say that we can conceive of two possible worlds that share nothing in common, when material objects are the only things considered. This is valid, but pointless- because material objects are simply not the only real things. This has nothing to do with Catholicism- even a secular philosopher can acknowledge action and relations as being real, knowable things, and therefore part of the actual and possible worlds.

Under your initial logic, several things happen. If material objects are the only real things that can determine a world, then history is not the study of anything real. The past actions of people cease to be real. If relations are not real, then things do not actually stand in relation to each other. We know both history and relations concern actual, real things. Furthermore, we know that actions and relations do determine what possible world is in fact actual- for a world in which Washington fought for the British is a different, yet possible, world compared with our world.

In addition, placing material objects as the only determining factor in a possible world solves the theodicy perfectly. If evil proceeds from choice or action, and choice and action are not real, then clearly God is not responsible for something that isn’t actually real in the first place.

Finally, back to me objection to your argument- we cannot conceive of two possible worlds that share nothing in common. This is because no matter what they are, the possible worlds share possible worldliness. This is a state of relation, but a [Ireal* state of relation- and therefore a determining factor in the composition of those possible worlds.

 

[lemondiesel]

When you think about ontologies, think about the difference between a scientific one vs. a philosophical one. A scientific ontology, can sometimes only admit physical observable objects. Science recognizes it’s own limits, and it stays within them. So you can have a scientific ontology that doesn’t admit literally EVERYTHING that there is.

Now a philosophical ontology must supercede the scientific one. It’s gotta be general enough to assimilate everything from the scientific ontology and then further explain the things outside of the domain of science. Tropes are where it’s at. It’s just a form of reductionism. Like when people say, “there’s nothing metaphysical, it’s all a result of fluctuations in brain states, and therefore it’s all the brain, which is physical”. They’ve reduced mental states to brain states by pointing to correlations between the two that are repeatable.

So that’s what you wanna do in constructing an ontology. You just keep reducing **** into other **** until you’ve got something irreducible, like a trope. **** even strings are really tropes. Even quarks. It’s beautiful really because it allows you to have a simplified, yet generally accurate account of what exists, and from there you can figure out all the relations and whatnot to better understand something within that larger set.

Finally, a thread I can fully participate in http://cloudimages.grasscity.com/smilies/stonedsmilie.gif

 

[R_Daneel]

Sorry about the delay, but I am very busy these days… Will be back as soon as I can.