Practical reasoning version of Pascal's wager

[polytropos]

(1) Premise: The nature of practical reasoning is to undertake actions that direct one’s life toward the good.
(2) Premise: The good is that which one understands to be desirable for him.
(3) Law of Excluded Middle: The good is either normative or it is not.
(4) Law of Excluded Middle: One either believes that the good is normative or does not.
(5) Premise: If the good is not normative, then it is permissible not to act in accordance with it.
(6) Premise: If the good is normative, then one ought to act in accordance with it, whether one believes that it is normative or not.
(7) From (5): If one believes that the good is not normative, then it is permissible to act as though the good is normative.
(8) From (6): If one believes that the good is normative, then one ought to act as though the good is normative (ie. it is impermissible to act as though the good is not normative).
(9) Premise: One’s belief in the normativity or non-normativity of the good may be false.
(10) From (7) and (9): If one believes that the good is not normative and is defeasible, then one ought to act as though the good is normative.
(11) From (8) and (9): If one believes that the good is normative and is defeasible, then one ought to act as though the good is normative.
Therefore,
(12) From (1), (4), (10), and (11): One should behave as though the good is normative.

In my opinion (1) and (2) provide a good basis for metaethics. They don’t seem very controversial to me as they are stated.

By normative in (3), I mean objective. People tend to have different understandings of that term. I do not merely mean universal, as in that which all should adhere to. An atheist keen on separating himself from relativism might say that rape is “objectively” wrong. What he means (probably) is that the moral wrongness of rape is universal. My definition of normative/objective is stronger. A good is normative if and only if it is literally binding on all persons. What I have in mind is the way in which religions like Catholicism and Buddhism entail consequences for certain actions (whether in an afterlife or some reincarnative cycle). This article expresses the idea well. For the atheist mentioned previously, rape is universally wrong, but it is not normatively wrong, ie. there is no “cosmic” sense in which it is wrong. The universe doesn’t care.

Another way of construing normativity is as a good intrinsic to the universe, above and beyond what “one understands to be desirable for him” (2). There is good qua desirable by definition, but if the good is normative, then there is some standard of good to which one intrinsically ought to conform his desires.

One might argue that I cannot use the law of excluded middle for (4), since an agnostic might be “neutral” on the issue of whether the good is normative or not, but that does not seem to be an issue. It seems that one can view the premise in terms of behavior. One falls under the former disjunct of believing in normativity if and only if one behaves according to some normative system.

(5) and (6) are analytic and follow from the definition of normativity. Normative good is that to which all ought to conform. Non-normative good is that which one desires but is not binding beyond that (and which one might hold to be “universal”). (7) and (8) are restatements of (5) and (6) in more deontic terms.

(9) is the important premise. The degree to which one accepts it is the degree to which one will accept the conclusion. If one does not believe that his judgments about the good are defeasible, then he will not be persuaded that it is in his interest to behave as though the good is normative.

I have stated the argument in terms of normativity rather than any particular faith tradition, since one of the common objections to Pascal’s wager is that the disjunction between atheism and Christianity is incomplete. I’m not really concerned too much with that. As I said before, Buddhism, for example, might be considered normative as well as Catholicism.

I’ve sought to avoid the other major objection to Pascal’s wager that it is too self-interested. Pascal offers his wager in terms of eternal reward/damnation, which are comparably larger merits/demerits than the end of life for the naturalist (which is merely the end of consciousness). While I’ve construed normativity in terms of “cosmic consequences,” it is not the consequences that are motivating here. It is the fact that the good is either intrinsically binding or “accidentally” binding. If one accepts that under naturalism it is only accidentally binding, then there is no reason not to behave as though it is intrinsically binding (other than absolute certainty that it is not intrinsically binding). This is just a prudential way of seeking the good given our limited epistemic circumstances; given that we are defeasible, it is wise for us to behave as though our actions have intrinsic merit or demerit, rather than as though they do not.

I doubt every naturalist will be convinced of (9) or of the claim that good is accidentally binding given naturalism. (However, the latter claim can be supported, IMO; see the Leff article. But that isn’t the point of this thread.) I am fine with that. The argument should only work for people in a peculiar epistemic situation, and there are no philosophical arguments that are binding on all rational people. Likewise, it is faith-neutral since people will differ which normative traditions are plausible (if any). As an atheist I’d always believed that Catholicism was most plausible. Others, surely, disagree. But the argument’s conclusion is not meant to be, “Become a Catholic.” It is supposed to be motivation for considering normative traditions.

Thoughts?

 

[davidv]

quote=polytropos Premise: The nature of practical reasoning is to undertake actions that direct one’s life toward the good.

[/quote]

To me this premise is very week in that it connects two things which are not necessarily connected, namely thinking and acting. Did mean to write “The purpose of…” rather that “The nature of…”

Sin is a good example of reasoning determining that something is wrong, yet the action taken is contrary to this determination.

 

[Charlemagne_III]

Could you please phrase the question you want to discuss more briefly and directly, and especially as it relates to Pascal, one of my favorite thinkers?

 

[polytropos]

To me this premise is very week in that it connects two things which are not necessarily connected, namely thinking and acting. Did mean to write “The purpose of…” rather that “The nature of…”

Sin is a good example of reasoning determining that something is wrong, yet the action taken is contrary to this determination.

This seems to me like a fairly traditional definition of practical reasoning. Most authors take the case of sin to be a misapprehension of the good. The will acts to achieve what the intellect regards as good, but it can be weakened into mistaking what is actually good with its other concupiscent desires.

 

[polytropos]

Could you please phrase the question you want to discuss more briefly and directly, and especially as it relates to Pascal, one of my favorite thinkers?

I am just presenting my version of Pascal’s wager. I’ve modified it in certain ways (so that the motivation is behind practical reasoning, for example, rather than reward and punishment). Other than the historical basis of Pascal making a similar argument, it does not really pertain to him.

 

[davidv]

This seems to me like a fairly traditional definition of practical reasoning. Most authors take the case of sin to be a misapprehension of the good. The will acts to achieve what the intellect regards as good, but it can be weakened into mistaking what is actually good with its other concupiscent desires.

I had not encountered a meaning of the phrase “practical reasoning” other than that implied by the common meanings of the words making it up. In what contexts would the meaning described be considered traditional?

 

[polytropos]

Well, practical reasoning is just the reasoning employed in action to achieve one’s ends. That is all in the spirit of Aristotle and Aquinas on ethics. Sin is a case where one’s view of the ends is distorted. Fuller clarification.

 

[Charlemagne_III]

Well, practical reasoning is just the reasoning employed in action to achieve one’s ends. That is all in the spirit of Aristotle and Aquinas on ethics. Sin is a case where one’s view of the ends is distorted. Fuller clarification.

Yes, distorted, but not in the Socratic sense. Sin is not merely a mistake, it is a willful mistake. Socrates made the error of assuming that if we knew a thing to be wrong, we would not do it. That flat out flies in the face of reality. Aristotle certainly thought so, and so did Aquinas, as I recall. The Socratic rationale has been invoked by relativists for centuries. Even the Jesuits invoked it, as Pascal argued in his open letters against Jesuitical casuistry. It is the basis for the corrupt argument that, when conscience and the Church disagree, conscience trumps the teachings of the Church.

 

[balto]

I am just presenting my version of Pascal’s wager. I’ve modified it in certain ways (so that the motivation is behind practical reasoning, for example, rather than reward and punishment). Other than the historical basis of Pascal making a similar argument, it does not really pertain to him.

Your argument makes sense to me, and I agree that it is stronger than Pascal’s original argument in that it avoids self-interest. You’d be hard pressed to find someone who is orienting their life towards that which they personally consider to be evil.

I think the next question to ask is since we’re all acting like morality is objective does that mean that morality is truly objective? If yes, then I guess we need to start resolving all the contradictions between competing moralities. If not, then we can’t criticize anyone else’s morality since nobody has a morality that’s “right” in any way.

 

[balto]

Yes, distorted, but not in the Socratic sense. Sin is not merely a mistake, it is a willful mistake. Socrates made the error of assuming that if we knew a thing to be wrong, we would not do it. That flat out flies in the face of reality. Aristotle certainly thought so, and so did Aquinas, as I recall. The Socratic rationale has been invoked by relativists for centuries. Even the Jesuits invoked it, as Pascal argued in his open letters against Jesuitical casuistry. It is the basis for the corrupt argument that, when conscience and the Church disagree, conscience trumps the teachings of the Church.

I agree with all of this, but I think the point of the OP’s argument is to try to get a relativist to at least consider the idea that morality is objective. Someone who is adhering to a “my good is not the same as your good” modus operandi is not going to think that they sin because their definition of good is constantly changing. I agree that the real reason why people sin is because good is objectively fixed and we don’t want to align our wills to it for whatever reason.

 

[polytropos]

I think the next question to ask is since we’re all acting like morality is objective does that mean that morality is truly objective? If yes, then I guess we need to start resolving all the contradictions between competing moralities. If not, then we can’t criticize anyone else’s morality since nobody has a morality that’s “right” in any way.

I would say no, at least not without some other claims.

I’d also point out that the argument as I’ve construed it is not quite about morality. Certain normative traditions might entail morality (Catholicism, for example), but the claim I am making is more metaethical.

Another way of phrasing it is this: without some normative system, truth is not a virtue in an intrinsic sense (even if all human beings find it to be, for instance, a useful principle for the purposes of discourse). So one wager to take would be to act in accordance with some system which can hold truth to be a virtue, since if it is not a virtue, one is not bound to act truly.

 

[Charlemagne_III]

Another way of phrasing it is this: without some normative system, truth is not a virtue in an intrinsic sense (even if all human beings find it to be, for instance, a useful principle for the purposes of discourse). So one wager to take would be to act in accordance with some system which can hold truth to be a virtue, since if it is not a virtue, one is not bound to act truly.

Perhaps here “truth” is equated with a virtue when it is “truthfulness” that should be a virtue.

Truth is something we want to know. It is an end, rather than an act. Being truthful is the act of telling the truth or honestly searching for the truth.

I don’t know anyone who would disagree with the need to be truthful, whereas many people can disagree with what the truth of any particular matter really is.

The need to be truthful is founded also on the Golden Rule: “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.”

If we want others to tell us the truth, we must tell them the truth … or there will be deception all around.

I’m afraid, though, that we can not only deceive others when it suits our purpose, but we can also deceive ourselves. That is why the Reformation happened. The Reformers deceived themselves that the Church of Christ had fallen not only into scandal, but into heresy, and they were just the ones to put Humpty-Dumpty back together again. They didn’t do so well, did they, since now Humpty-Dumpty has cracked into thousands of broken shells.

 

[balto]

I’d also point out that the argument as I’ve construed it is not quite about morality. Certain normative traditions might entail morality (Catholicism, for example), but the claim I am making is more metaethical.

Yes, you’re right. I got ahead of myself.
Charlemange III:

I don’t know anyone who would disagree with the need to be truthful, whereas many people can disagree with what the truth of any particular matter really is.

Yeah I think this might be the problem. Maybe I’m wrong, but I think most people are already at where this version of Pascal’s wager will get them in that everybody at least adheres to a minimal system that says that they should seek truth or goodness that is acceptable by society’s standards to stay out of trouble. So they maybe already considered all of this and decided that society is the authority. They may not be motivated to seek further than that because giving up their comfortable societal position is not worth the unknown benefits of adhering to another normative system, unless that system already is within society’s bounds. To get them to consider changing to another system might require a positive strong argument for that particular system.
Charlemange III:

Could you please phrase the question you want to discuss more briefly and directly, and especially as it relates to Pascal, one of my favorite thinkers?

Two of my friends like him so much they named their dog after him

 

[Portofino]

(1) Premise: The nature of practical reasoning is to undertake actions that direct one’s life toward the good.
(2) Premise: The good is that which one understands to be desirable for him.
(3) Law of Excluded Middle: The good is either normative or it is not.
(4) Law of Excluded Middle: One either believes that the good is normative or does not.
(5) Premise: If the good is not normative, then it is permissible not to act in accordance with it.
(6) Premise: If the good is normative, then one ought to act in accordance with it, whether one believes that it is normative or not.
(7) From (5): If one believes that the good is not normative, then it is permissible to act as though the good is normative.
(8) From (6): If one believes that the good is normative, then one ought to act as though the good is normative (ie. it is impermissible to act as though the good is not normative).
(9) Premise: One’s belief in the normativity or non-normativity of the good may be false.
(10) From (7) and (9): If one believes that the good is not normative and is defeasible, then one ought to act as though the good is normative.
(11) From (8) and (9): If one believes that the good is normative and is defeasible, then one ought to act as though the good is normative.
Therefore,
(12) From (1), (4), (10), and (11): One should behave as though the good is normative.

Do you acknowledge, in this argument, that everything depends on one’s definition of the good? Someone who believes that his good is hedonism would be asked to wager that he has a normative obligation to engage in hedonistic behavior.

Someone who believes that his good is happiness would have a normative obligation to pursue happiness, and to believe that everyone is enjoined to pursue happiness.

Someone who believes, ironically, that the good is to “do what you will” has – somewhat paradoxically – a normative obligation to do what he wills, and – again, paradoxically – to create his own standards of conduct.

Premise 9, to me, can also be said of one’s conception of the good - one’s conception of the good may be true or false.

But the wager wouldn’t work in terms of the possibility of being mistaken as to what constitutes the good, unless one were enjoined to act as if everything were good and normatively binding.

And this would extend, even, to things that have no bearing on what we traditionally think of as morality – for example, I could be mistaken that there is not a normative obligation to drink coffee, or to listen to jazz music.

 

[polytropos]

Do you acknowledge, in this argument, that everything depends on one’s definition of the good?

In a sense yes. I would qualify that I am defining the good (or at least, apparent good) to be “that which one understands to be desirable for him.” I believe that is a rather encompassing definition. So someone might believe that hedonism is desirable for him. So hedonism would be his apparent good. Or someone might despise any form of sensuous pleasure, and his apparent good would be a rigorous asceticism.

Someone who believes that his good is hedonism would be asked to wager that he has a normative obligation to engage in hedonistic behavior.

Someone who believes that his good is happiness would have a normative obligation to pursue happiness, and to believe that everyone is enjoined to pursue happiness.

Someone who believes, ironically, that the good is to “do what you will” has – somewhat paradoxically – a normative obligation to do what he wills, and – again, paradoxically – to create his own standards of conduct.

Not exactly. I am not arguing that a person who has a commitment to hedonism should change his commitment to some form of normative hedonism. I am saying that if someone’s conception of the good is not normative, it is prudential for him to select (or at least seriously consider) a tradition in which the good is normative. He does not have to transfer his conception of good over to a normative framework.

So if there were a normative hedonistic tradition, then one could conceivably select it. But I’m not aware of any hedonistic traditions that are normative (as I have defined that term).

(Not to mention, it is also self-referentially inconsistent to make any form of relativism normative.)

(A Catholic qualification: Catholics believe that the good is normative, but that one must also obey his conscience. If one’s conscience tells him to be a hedonist, then he ought to be a hedonist, since to oppose one’s conscience just is to will what one perceives to be evil. The catch is that a bad conscience binds but does not excuse. The person who sincerely believes hedonism is bound to be a hedonist, but still sins in doing so. What this argument amounts to is that someone exercising prudence can and should narrow possible conceptions of good, ie. what they form their conscience to, to normative rather than non-normative traditions.)

Premise 9, to me, can also be said of one’s conception of the good - one’s conception of the good may be true or false.

Yes. I would say that this is implied by the way I have defined normative. I said, “Another way of construing normativity is as a good intrinsic to the universe, above and beyond what ‘one understands to be desirable for him’ (2). There is good qua desirable by definition, but if the good is normative, then there is some standard of good to which one intrinsically ought to conform his desires.” So if the good is normative, then it exists above and beyond anyone’s conception of some good or other. So if one believes that the good is non-normative but is wrong, then he has in fact misconceived the good.

On the other hand, one could believe that the good is normative and be wrong. There are two cases here. He could be wrong in believing that there is a normative good at all, or he could have the wrong normative conception of the good. The latter case is out of the scope of the argument. (It is part of the reason why I extended the scope of the argument beyond Christianity and atheism. Deciding which normative good one adheres to is a matter of prudence that a person would have to work out himself.) In the former case, though, holding that the good is normative when it is not is not intrinsically bad (since if there is no normative conception of the good, then the good does not exist above and beyond anyone’s conception of it. So it would be a sort of category error for one to “misconceive the good.”)

This is the asymmetry that the argument intends to leverage. If good is normative, then one should want not to be wrong about it (if he is prudent). If the good is not normative, then there does not exist an “extra-conceptual” good to be “wrong about,” so it is not of extreme consequence not to act according to some normative tradition.

But the wager wouldn’t work in terms of the possibility of being mistaken as to what constitutes the good, unless one were enjoined to act as if everything were good and normatively binding.

And this would extend, even, to things that have no bearing on what we traditionally think of as morality – for example, I could be mistaken that there is not a normative obligation to drink coffee, or to listen to jazz music.

As I said above, it is not about insisting that everything is normative, it is about the prudential affair of selecting a normative tradition. I don’t think tacking normativity onto generally non-normative conceptions of the good would qualify as prudent. I’m not saying that one should “retrofit” his conception of the good to a normative framework.

 

[Portofino]

Not exactly. I am not arguing that a person who has a commitment to hedonism should change his commitment to some form of normative hedonism. I am saying that if someone’s conception of the good is not normative, it is prudential for him to select (or at least seriously consider) a tradition in which the good is normative. He does not have to transfer his conception of good over to a normative framework.

Prudential in what sense, though? Namely, what would be the considered consequences of failing to adhere to a normative conception of the good? Would it have been the danger of having been mistaken? (“I hate being wrong”). What do you lose? If the risk you run is the danger of being immoral, where is the compelling logic whereby you ought not to run that risk? (the is/ought problem rears its head again, I think).

Or are we talking about it being prudential not to be wrong about morality being normative, because there may be unpleasant consequences in the form of suffering or punishment? If that is the case, it’s not enough to take the safer route by adopting some (traditional) normative conception of good. One would have to be sure that it’s the right normative conception of the good. Indeed, it’s not clear whether one would “score points” for having adhered to a normative conception of the good that was nonetheless the wrong one. One would be living normatively, and living wrongly, at the same time.

In terms of prudence, there is also the question of discerned probabilities. There is, indeed, a normative morality as prescribed by Islam and Judaism – well over a millennium old – according to which the eating of pork is a grave moral violation. If one considers that this may be moral and may be normative – because one’s own denial that it is not may be mistaken (proposition 9) – then it would be prudential to act as if the prohibition against pork were normative. But if one does not consider this possibility to be sufficiently probable, one likely will not feel sufficiently compelled to do so (this could apply to something like fornication, as well). In fact, subscribing to a version of a normative morality that is mistaken – “thou shalt not consume pork” – would entail losing something – namely, one would have deprived oneself of the pleasure of eating pork, for nothing. One does have something to lose, if one adheres to a normative morality and that morality turns out to have been non-binding (or, alternatively, morality turns out to be normative but one happens to have had a mistaken conception of what that normative morality consists in).

if the good is normative, then it exists above and beyond anyone’s conception of some good or other. So if one believes that the good is non-normative but is wrong, then he has in fact misconceived the good.

Yes, but if one believes that the good is normative, but has misconstrued the specific attributes of that good, then one also has misconceived the good. If adhering to a normative code of morality were prudential, it would not in itself be sufficiently prudential, but would have to go hand in hand with determining what the good consists in. But again, the question of the potential consequences of misconstruing the good are something that I think cannot be abstracted from the discussion; if one does not articulate the consequences to be considered, one will not likely motivate behavior (one will not persuade). Making an activity illegal but with no accompanying legal ramifications, would not likely be sufficient to motivate behavior, insofar as one has not articulated what one would stand to lose by behaving illegally, versus legally.

 

[polytropos]

Namely, what would be the considered consequences of failing to adhere to a normative conception of the good? Would it have been the danger of having been mistaken? (“I hate being wrong”). What do you lose? If the risk you run is the danger of being immoral, where is the compelling logic whereby you ought not to run that risk? (the is/ought problem rears its head again, I think).

The consequences naturally depend on the normative tradition one is considering. In Buddhism, there is karma and a reincarnative cycle. In Catholicism, there is hell.

That said, it is not strictly speaking the consequences that are at issue. Is/ought language seems to provide another useful way to frame the problem:

There either are genuine (let’s call them “cosmic,” as in “intrinsic to the universe”) “oughts” or there are not. If one believes that there are not, it is more prudent to behave as though there are than as though there are not.

This just has to do with what the nature of such moral obligations are (or would be, if they exist). They would be binding irrespective of consequences. For example, the dictates disclosed in Catholic natural law tradition are “oughts” even if it should be false that unrepentant sinners should be punished, or even if transgressing some moral law should only be venial and someone should go to heaven anyway. To obey them just is naturally perfective of us; to defy them is damaging to us as human beings. I think a similar case could be made for karmic cycles in Buddhism. There is the “punishment” of being reincarnated in a worse state, but even besides that, the moral laws disclosed by Buddhism are normative even without the punishment (it is an intrinsic good to abolish the self, for instance).

Different traditions would naturally have to handle the “is/ought gap” in different ways. I do not see it as much of an issue, though. I believe the problem does not arrive given, for instance, Thomist metaphysics combined with proper metaethical principles (premises (1) and (2) in my argument).

I don’t think the problem need even cause issues for naturalists. John Searle gave the argument that the real intentional structure of a promise is “binding” in the respect that it literally gives reasons for actions (and, he has argued, is a natural human speech act). To promise to do X just is to give oneself reasons to do X. The promise, being a publically accessible, natural feature of language, is the is, to which reasons for action (the ought) are naturally associated.

One would have to be sure that it’s the right normative conception of the good. Indeed, it’s not clear whether one would “score points” for having adhered to a normative conception of the good that was nonetheless the wrong one. One would be living normatively, and living wrongly, at the same time.

I agree. As I pointed out earlier, “[Someone following the argument] could be wrong in believing that there is a normative good at all, or he could have the wrong normative conception of the good. The latter case is out of the scope of the argument. (It is part of the reason why I extended the scope of the argument beyond Christianity and atheism. Deciding which normative good one adheres to is a matter of prudence that a person would have to work out himself.)” My argument is not for any particular normative conception of the good. It is that it should be more prudent (if one grants his own defeasibility, which I assume is a skeptic’s wont) to adhere to some normative tradition than to none at all. If Buddhism is true, then I think you are right: Catholics don’t necessarily score any points over atheistic nihilists. But each person who admits that some normative tradition is better than none has, in my opinion, ample reasons to investigate normative traditions and select whichever seems most plausible.

In terms of prudence, there is also the question of discerned probabilities.

Probability would play a role, which is why I leave the selection of normative traditions open–I don’t presume to establish too much in one argument. As I pointed out, I also do not believe that my argument should convince everyone. But I do think it is a fair argument for someone who is agnostic between atheism (for instance) and some religion. Someone who rejects (9) (ie. someone who does not regard himself as defeasible) should not be convinced. But someone who finds a certain plausibility in Buddhism (say) is more warranted in committing to Buddhism (even in the absence of complete consequence) than sticking with naturalism. He may have to give something up in order to adhere to a normative system, but it seems like his valuation of those is part of a non-normative system, in which case it falls under the claims I have made.

If adhering to a normative code of morality were prudential, it would not in itself be sufficiently prudential, but would have to go hand in hand with determining what the good consists in. But again, the question of the potential consequences of misconstruing the good are something that I think cannot be abstracted from the discussion; if one does not articulate the consequences to be considered, one will not likely motivate behavior (one will not persuade).

Right, it is not sufficiently prudential, but that is another discussion (it is engaging with a particular normative tradition and trying to ascertain whether one finds it plausible). I would say, though, that whatever consequences for misconstruing the good by adhering to some incorrect normative tradition (when some other normative tradition is correct) are equally applicable to every non-normative tradition.

 

[Portofino]

That said, it is not strictly speaking the consequences that are at issue. Is/ought language seems to provide another useful way to frame the problem:

There either are genuine (let’s call them “cosmic,” as in “intrinsic to the universe”) “oughts” or there are not. If one believes that there are not, it is more prudent to behave as though there are than as though there are not.

I think semantics of the term “binding” may be confusing the issue here. If there is a normative morality, it is “binding” insofar as you posit it ought to be done, but not literally binding insofar as it impossible not to do it. In terms of articulating the substance of the “ought” that remains – even though it is not literally or physically binding, insofar as one is capable of not conforming to it, of disobeying it – I am left with an is/ought gap that simply says to me, “you ought to obey it, because that ought is intrinsic to the universe.” That’s not giving me reasons, in contrast to someone who says, “don’t go swimming on a full stomach because you may develop cramps.”

obey them just is naturally perfective of us; to defy them is damaging to us as human beings.

Here you are talking of consequences; but now you could invite Epicureanism into the fold – “the good is a means to happiness” – or to a more pragmatic sense of morality whereby choosing the good is the means to some advantage (“having an active social life, and satisfying relationships, is beneficial to your mental health”).

The dilemma, even if you posit that a normative good is naturally perfective, is that a non-normative sense of the good may still bring advantages – good psychology or self-help, or a wisdom tradition such as Epicureanism – while a normative sense of good – if mistaken – can bring palpable disadvantages.

An example I would use is that of eating a certain food in moderation, as part of a balanced diet – let’s say it provides essential vitamins and minerals. One can be an atheist and do this. One does not believe this is normative in a moral sense; nonetheless, one’s reasons for doing it are conditioned on what one perceives to be prudent behavior, which one can establish empirically, as it were (it provides essential vitamins and minerals; or it promotes strong teeth and bones). This more “physical” example is just by way of illustration; on an emotional level, a psychologist could counsel the importance of the forging of loving relationships for one’s inner sense of well being or for one’s maturation and development as an individual.

Following the example above, though, another individual subscribes to a normative system of morality which, in so uncertain terms, prohibits the consumption of that particular food. The believer adheres to that diet, which he believes to be moral – yet experiences health problems, and is malnourished. This is an example of someone who did not subscribe to a normative morality who nonetheless contributed to his “flourishing as a person”, and someone who did subscribe to a normative morality, engaging in something something deleterious to his flourishing as a person. Indeed, the normative aspect of the behavior, and the advantageous or disadvantageous, healthy or unhealthy ramifications of the behavior, prove to be well-separable.

the moral laws disclosed by Buddhism are normative even without the punishment (it is an intrinsic good to abolish the self, for instance).

I’m not sure about that (not that it’s the most essential point of your argument). My understanding is that the Buddhists believe it is an intrinsic good to abolish the self because the self has no reality and because, if you fail to correctly apprehend reality, you will suffer. If failing to apprehend reality entailed so suffering, if ignorance had no consequences, ignorance would not be an evil. In this sense I find Buddhism to be not dissimilar to Epicureanism.

Consequences, for me, are inseparable from the equation. If it gave the majority of people great joy to be stolen from – if it made them happy – if it produced feelings of euphoria and heightened self-worth, I have no doubt that such a hypothetical society would not outlaw stealing and that the punishment for stealing would not be severe (in fact, there might be a reward for stealing).

To promise to do X just is to give oneself reasons to do X. The promise, being a publically accessible, natural feature of language, is the is, to which reasons for action (the ought) are naturally associated.

I would agree insofar as it’s a self-imposed sense of duty or obligation. The sense of duty exists “in one’s mind,” as it were. If one can conceive of an obligation, then one can indeed feel obligated.

 

[Portofino]

But each person who admits that some normative tradition is better than none has, in my opinion, ample reasons to investigate normative traditions and select whichever seems most plausible.

I think some may find normative traditions, as they exist in fact, to be disadvantageous insofar as they do not allow sufficient flexibility – the “one size fits all” approach is found wanting – and also disadvantageous in the sense that some refuse to give common sense reasons for why the good is the good.

An example would be a normative tradition that says, “do not eat pork because it is displeasing to God.” No reason is given for the behavior – but yes, it is normative. To someone who values a rationale that seems “sensible”, this is a weakness in the moral commandment. Meanwhile, there is non-normative advice whereby one ought to limit the proportion of saturated fat or sugar in one’s diet. This would be one example of where a normative tradition will not necessarily make as favorable an impression as a non-normative conception of the good (it is not a moral obligation to eat a healthy diet, but if you want to be healthy, then you ought to eat a healthy diet). This is more satisfying because it gives you a why that is not tautological. It does not say, “do not eat pork because it is morally wrong to eat pork.”

I see both Epicureanism and – in my view of it, at least – Buddhism to be non-normative conceptions of morality that are nonetheless quite appealing. Anger, hatred, resentment are discouraged by Epicureans and Buddhists because they are toxic emotions. They do not simply settle for saying that they are “morally wrong” emotions, and leave it at that. In fact, there is no formulation, per se, of these emotions being “morally wrong” at all. Instead, there is a more common sense view according to whether such behavior or states of mind promotes well-being, or is injurious to well-being (nor is is
it a well being that is metaphysically elusive, but rather pragmatically grounded and empirically demonstrable). The ethical system of Spinoza is similar – some passions are “bad” because they lead to suffering (a very Buddhist conception), but not intrinsically bad. If “badness” (jealousy, anger, resentment) were a means to peace of mind and contentment, they would not be bad.

I suppose I’m one who is not convinced by a normative system of morality, but neither am I convinced that – by subscribing to a normative system of morality – one has everything to gain, nothing to lose

 

[polytropos]

I think semantics of the term “binding” may be confusing the issue here. If there is a normative morality, it is “binding” insofar as you posit it ought to be done, but not literally binding insofar as it impossible not to do it.

You seem to be right that the term “binding” is at issue here. If the Humean tradition is construing “ought” as “literally binding insofar as it impossible not to do it,” then its claims become absolutely trivial. (Or false. Ironically, physical force is “binding” in that sense.) But that seems to be much too strong of a conception of “ought,” for I am not aware of any normative tradition that takes an “ought” to mean that which one must obey. (Indeed, that would make morality pointless.)

An “ought,” it seems to me, need only be a fact-based, objective reason for action–the reason need not be compelling. (If that were the case, then free will would be false.)

In terms of articulating the substance of the “ought” that remains – even though it is not literally or physically binding, insofar as one is capable of not conforming to it, of disobeying it – I am left with an is/ought gap that simply says to me, “you ought to obey it, because that ought is intrinsic to the universe.” That’s not giving me reasons, in contrast to someone who says, “don’t go swimming on a full stomach because you may develop cramps.”

Let’s take the case of promising:

I would agree insofar as it’s a self-imposed sense of duty or obligation. The sense of duty exists “in one’s mind,” as it were. If one can conceive of an obligation, then one can indeed feel obligated.

Here the duty does not just exist conceptually/in one’s mind. Promising is a natural human speech act in which a human who says, “I promise to X,” undertakes to make it the case that X. Since the promise is a public, extraconceptual, intentional entity, it is objective and factual. The person who made the promise, then, has a objective, fact-based reason for action–the answer to the question “Why should I make it the case that X?” is “Because you promised to X.” He is not physically compelled to do it. The sky won’t fall if he does not. He could change his mind. He could even have made the promise planning to break it. But nevertheless to make a promise just is to get an ought from an is. Hence the dichotomy falters.

Here you are talking of consequences; but now you could invite Epicureanism into the fold – “the good is a means to happiness” – or to a more pragmatic sense of morality whereby choosing the good is the means to some advantage (“having an active social life, and satisfying relationships, is beneficial to your mental health”).

The dilemma, even if you posit that a normative good is naturally perfective, is that a non-normative sense of the good may still bring advantages – good psychology or self-help, or a wisdom tradition such as Epicureanism – while a normative sense of good – if mistaken – can bring palpable disadvantages.

I don’t think any defender of my argument need deny that “advantages” can come from both normative and non-normative conceptions of the good. Most relativists don’t kill people. Theists believe that there is a commandment against killing people, and it is not just an instrumental evil but an intrinsic evil (not just to the person killed, but to ourselves).

So we can acknowledge that Epicureanism and pragmatism are conceptions of the good, but they seem not to be normative in any significant sense. The point of the argument is not to say that they are instrumentally bankrupt–obviously they’re not–it’s to say that if there is some normative good, one misses it partly or entirely by subscribing to Epicureanism or pragmatism. Obviously within those conceptual schemes, one would regard a switch to some normative scheme as a “loss” of goods. But the purpose of switching to a normative tradition is that it is at least normative, whereas Epicureanism and pragmatism are not.

This is an example of someone who did not subscribe to a normative morality who nonetheless contributed to his “flourishing as a person”, and someone who did subscribe to a normative morality, engaging in something something deleterious to his flourishing as a person. Indeed, the normative aspect of the behavior, and the advantageous or disadvantageous, healthy or unhealthy ramifications of the behavior, prove to be well-separable.

I agree that the healthy aspects of a behavior are in some cases separable. But my argument is not really getting at that. It would seem to miss the point to say to a vegetarian (supposing the person is a vegetarian because adhering to some normative system, and that their vegetarianism does negatively influence their health in some way), “You’d be healthier if you ate meat.” In an empirical sense that may be true. But it is rather irrelevant to the question of whether eating meat is right.

I’m not sure about that (not that it’s the most essential point of your argument). My understanding is that the Buddhists believe it is an intrinsic good to abolish the self because the self has no reality and because, if you fail to correctly apprehend reality, you will suffer. If failing to apprehend reality entailed so suffering, if ignorance had no consequences, ignorance would not be an evil. In this sense I find Buddhism to be not dissimilar to Epicureanism.

In the bolded portion, do you mean to say “intrinsic good”? To say that abolishing the self is good only because it evades suffering, then it seems to be an instrumental good rather than intrinsic. If it is an intrinsic good, a good in itself, then it seems to meet my point. (I certainly don’t deny that it is instrumental also.)