B
belorg
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Sure, if creation isnāt completely created by God, it removes the problem of predetermination. But it also removes the God of Christianity who is suposed to be the creator of everything.In other words, it does remove the problem of predetermination by God of all human choices - exactly what I asserted above.![]()
I argued for it.Ah. And why should I accept that agent causation entails complete randomness? You say it does, but that isnāt a sufficient reason.
If a nucleus decays then the nuclear decay is the mechanism for decay and there is no necssity for an antecedent cause. How is that different?I have no reason to compare a self-caused choice of a soul to the decay of the nucleus of an atom. You are imposing your own materialistic/reductionist worldview onto the metaphysic of the theist. If the soul is the immaterial enduring substance of man that is the mechanism for choice then there is no necessity for an antecedent cause.
What Iām saying is that either the immaterial enduring substance of person A is different form that of person B and therefore A makes different choices than B, or A and Bās immaterial enduring substances are the same, in which case if A makes a different choice than B that can only be based on pure random.
The precise cause of Aās choosing a and B choosing b is what exactly?Choices are non-deterministic in the sense that there is no antecedent cause to analyze, but that doesnāt mean they occur randomly. In fact, we can point to the precise cause of the choice, even if we canāt predict exactly what that choice will be outside of actually asking the agent.
I donāt know. Do you have a suggestion as to what causes choices if itās not the difference between A and B?Iām not getting this. Are you suggesting that random events are uncaused?