We can agree on that, but not that it only reacts to external stimuli.
No, that’s true it may also have completely uncazused reactions.
True again, but then not having any a priori reason to believe does not justify a conclusion that it reacts the same as the material brain. Of course, there are a posteriori reasons to conclude that it doesn’t.
Since we have never seen an immaterial mind, there are no a posteriori conclusions.
It matters a great deal since it is the nature of this unpredictability we are exploring.
No, we are talking of predestination, not of predictablility.If I program a robot and ,as a result of this programming it kills you, then it does not matter whether I was able to predict this outcome or not, I predestined the robot to do what it did.
That would be weird if that is what I proposed, but it isn’t what I proposed. I do agree that certain behavior of individual quantum particles is not predictable, which at a minimum means we do not understand the causal mechanism at work. The problem is an epistemic one.
Or an ontological one. Maybe there is no ‘causal mechanism’ at work at all.
There is an ontological reality to what is happening, but we have insufficient understanding to explain it.
That’s a possibility, but it is also possible that there is no ontological reality at all to what is happening at a certain level.
On the other hand, we do not have the same problem of knowledge when it comes to human choices because a person can explain to you why he made a choice.
To a certain extent, yes. But does he know the ultimate cause of his decision?
You may not believe that this constitutes knowledge of the ontic nature of the human mind, but then you would have to give reasons for your belief.
No, it does not constitute knowledge of the ontic nature of the human mind, at most it constitutes knowledge of the immediate cause of the choice.
You do accept what other people tell you everyday about myriad subjects. Unless you want to tell me that you don’t believe anything anybody tells you unless you have independently verified it, you need to retract the statement.
I want to tell you I don’t
believe anything anybody tells me unless I have independently verified it. I sometimes do temporally accept what other people tell me but no, I do not
believe it.
Scientists out of necessity rely upon the findings of other scientists without independent verification.
Sure, but just as I they accept it until evidence to the contrary, and they do so because verifying everything yourself isn’t possible in reality. But they do not accept anything as a belief until they’ve personally investigated it.
Of course, we don’t even need to do this when it comes to the human mind. We have the experience of our own minds to rely upon.
Well, my mùind tells me something different than yours.
Sure. I am choosing to respond to your post right now, not as a random act or as a result of outside influences that compel me to do so.
That’s seem so, but is it really true?
I have just given you an example of a choice that is directed, not random.
The choice is directed, but is the choice to make that choice also directed?
If you respond to this post, I will in turn respond. Now you also have knowledge of an act that will occur in the future. Again, directed and predictable.
But you need things to be
unpredictable.
The primary definition of randomness is an unpredictable or undirected event. Even random events are caused. I dispute your definition in any case because it contains an ontological bias that there must be an “inherent” cause. Apparently that means a cause where events must necessarily follow from the nature of the being.
No, a cause where everything must necssarily follow from the nature of the being is an inherent cause, but not the only possible inherent cause. An inherent cause is a cause that is inherent to the agent. If this is predictable, then the effect necessarily follows. If it is not predicatble, the outcome is random.
I dispute that, and the definition of randomness does not require it.
No, the definition of randomness does not require it, but an event that the result of neither an inherent nor an external external cause is random. But I agree, there are random events that are caused. If I draw a lottery number out of a box containing a thousand tickets, the outcome is random, but I caused it.
Gentlemen, start your engines. My question is very similar to the one Timonator asked. Oh yes, I am surprised. So you experience your choices as undirected events that are determined by external forces outside of your control?
No, I don’t experinece my choice that way, but the logical conclusion that they are that way seems inevitable to me. That’s what compatibimism is all about. I do choose what to do but I don’t choose who I am and since my choice depends on who I am, the ultimate cause of my choice is not me but whatever is responsible for my being me. For a theist, that’s God, for an atheist, those are the laws of nature.
If so, that would explain some things. If that is what you personally experience when you make a decision, please step up to the microphone. I think we all suspect otherwise.
The decision making process is too complex to base any conclsuion on just out personal experience with it.