Principle of Sufficient Reason

[blase6]

I was reading this article and I found an explanation of why something existing without a sufficient reason is a contradiction:

A being lacking sufficient reason has no explanation for existence either within or outside itself, which means nothing differentiates it from non-being. Yet, the actual act of existence of every being does differentiate it from non-being. Since such self-contradiction is impossible, every being must have a reason for being.

It does not seem to me that a being which lacks a sufficient reason for existing would have nothing to differentiate itself from non-being. The fact that it exists seems to differentiate it from non-being, so I do not see a contradiction.

An argument for the Principle of Sufficient Reason would be that something cannot come from nothing (ex nihilo nihil fit). However, that seems to me like an unprovable assumption.

Is there any real way to prove or demonstrate that the fact that something cannot come from nothing, and the Principle of Sufficient Reason are true apart from appealing to common sense?

 

[Vera_Ljuba]

An argument for the Principle of Sufficient Reason would be that something cannot come from nothing (ex nihilo nihil fit). However, that seems to me like an unprovable assumption.

Is there any real way to prove or demonstrate that the fact that something cannot come from nothing, and the Principle of Sufficient Reason are true apart from appealing to common sense?

The principle of “ex nihilo nihil fit” is true and irrelevant, because “nothing” is simply a concept, not an ontological entity. In other words: “nothing” as an entity does not and cannot exist. If it did, it would be “something”.

However that does not make the PSR correct. If everything “needs” an external explanation, that would lead to an infinite regress (like “it is turtles all the way down”) and that is another nonsense. The solution is simple: there are brute facts, which do not have, cannot have and do not need external explanation. Examples are the axioms in any deductive system. Or any new idea. Or any artistic creation (book, music, etc…).

Believers consider God as the ultimate brute fact, one that does not have nor can have external explanation. Non-believers simply accept the universe as the ontological foundation of existence. The questions, sometimes presented by the believers, like “what was BEFORE the universe”, or “where does the universe come from” are meaningless questions, just like “what exists of the reverse side of the Mobius strip” or “what exists to the north from the North Pole”. Not all syntactically correct questions (or propositions) are “legitimate”.

 

[IWantGod]

I was reading this article and I found an explanation of why something existing without a sufficient reason is a contradiction:

It does not seem to me that a being which lacks a sufficient reason for existing would have nothing to differentiate itself from non-being. The fact that it exists seems to differentiate it from non-being, so I do not see a contradiction.

An argument for the Principle of Sufficient Reason would be that something cannot come from nothing (ex nihilo nihil fit). However, that seems to me like an unprovable assumption.

Is there any real way to prove or demonstrate that the fact that something cannot come from nothing, and the Principle of Sufficient Reason are true apart from appealing to common sense?

Can something that does not exist cause something to exist? Of course not. This is the principle of sufficient reason.

A thing either has the explanation of its existence in its own nature or it derives its existence from something other than its own nature. In other-words you cannot have a brute fact. A thing cannot just exist for no reason; which is the same thing as getting something from nothing. There is no such thing as arbitrary existence. Such an idea is contrary to reason in much the same way something being a product of that which does not exist is contrary to reason. Reason itself collapses as soon as you think brute facts are possible.

strangenotions.com/5-reasons-why-the-universe-cant-be-merely-a-brute-fact/

*“No Arguments Allowed
The last argument I’ll offer for consideration comes from philosopher Edward Feser in his book Scholastic Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction. Feser argues the denial of the principle of sufficient reason is at the same time a denial of rational argumentation, including any argument for brute facts. Consider how when we accept the conclusion “Socrates is mortal,” we do so based on the premises “All men are mortal” and “Socrates is a man.” In other words, we recognize the conclusion as rational because the premises are true and the argument is logically valid.
But if brute facts are possible, and the principle of sufficient reason is false, then it follows that our conclusion “Socrates is mortal” might have nothing to do with the truth of the premises and their logical structure. It might also be possible our cognitive faculties themselves had no role to play in explaining why we came to that conclusion.
The bottom line is, if brute facts are possible, there might be no reason whatsoever we believe what we do, even the belief that we believe on rational grounds. This applies to any conclusion we might draw, even the conclusion “Things can exist without a reason for their existence.” But if the conclusion “Things, like the universe, can exist without a reason for their existence” might itself be a brute fact—namely, it has no connection to truth or logic—then we would have no reason to accept it as true. So to deny the principle of sufficient reason undercuts any ground one might have for doubting the principle. It’s self-refuting and thus unreasonable.”
*

 

[IWantGod]

The principle of “ex nihilo nihil fit” is true and irrelevant, because “nothing” is simply a concept, not an ontological entity. In other words: “nothing” as an entity does not and cannot exist. If it did, it would be “something”.

However that does not make the PSR correct. If everything “needs” an external explanation, that would lead to an infinite regress (like “it is turtles all the way down”) and that is another nonsense. The solution is simple: there are brute facts, which do not have, cannot have and do not need external explanation. Examples are the axioms in any deductive system. Or any new idea. Or any artistic creation (book, music, etc…).

Believers consider God as the ultimate brute fact, one that does not have nor can have external explanation. Non-believers simply accept the universe as the ontological foundation of existence. The questions, sometimes presented by the believers, like “what was BEFORE the universe”, or “where does the universe come from” are meaningless questions, just like “what exists of the reverse side of the Mobius strip” or “what exists to the north from the North Pole”. Not all syntactically correct questions (or propositions) are “legitimate”.

So once you explain everything in the universe you ultimately come to a point that has no explanation at all - its existence. So what justification did one have to rationally explain anything in the universe at all in the first place? You can’t just use the principle of sufficient reason for things in the universe and then throw it out when it comes to explaining the existence of the universe as a whole. That’s called having it both ways.

So in order to justify metaphysical naturalism you have to believe that reality is fundamentally irrational. That’s justification enough for me to stay as far away from Atheism as possible.

 

[Rhubarb]

The arguments in the article take a lot for granted and even seemed to beg some questions. But it’s really late for me. I’ll have another pass at it tomorrow and edit my thoughts on it.

 

[Wesrock]

A being lacking sufficient reason has no explanation for existence either within or outside itself, which means nothing differentiates it from non-being. Yet, the actual act of existence of every being does differentiate it from non-being. Since such self-contradiction is impossible, every being must have a reason for being.

The author of the article really just throws that in there out of left field. I’ve encountered the statement before in Dr. Scott M. Sullivan’s book, Saint Thomas Aquinas and the Principle of Sufficient Reason, but Dr. Sullivan is far more systematic in reaching that point, during which he spends a good deal of time discussing the PSR, reasons for it, whether it can be known, whether it’s necessary, whether it’s exhaustive, different ways the PSR can be phrased from weak to strong, what a “reason” is and how this differs from a “cause”, whether the PSR begs the question, answering common objections to the PSR, etc… And he also spends a good amount of time establishing Saint Thomas Aquinas’ concept of esse (act of existence) as being that which distinguishes a being from nothing, and then gives this “Thomist” version of the PSR. (It should be noted that the PSR as we know it was formally given by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, but Dr. Sullivan believes that the principle underlies the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas and others as well.)

 

[Wesrock]

I don’t have time to recap the entire book (see post# 6 for context), not do I have time to recap an entire chapter of the book, but esse is presented as that which distinguishes a being from nothing (or also that which distinguishes a being from mere possibility). Some select excerpts may be helpful, though of course, incomplete.

If [a] thing really exists and is distinct from nothingness or mere possibility, there must be some actuality in the being itself to make it so. Otherwise, in reality and prior to any mental consideration, it would be identical to that merely possible state. If the thing does not have – truly have – some actuality which makes it distinct from nothing, then it is not, in reality, distinct from nothing. Hence, it seems necessary to admit that the Thomistic point that this act of distinction from nothing or being must be a real principle possessed by things . . . By using distinction from nothing or mere possibility as our primary means of explaining the principle part of the [PSR], it should be easy to see how this proposition should be taken as a necessary proposition. To ask why a thing exists is the same as to question what distinguishes this from nothing. To lack distinction from nothing is to be identical to nothing, and thus, not a being at all. Therefore, there must be something that makes beings distinct from nothing - a reason or fundamentum distinctionis and that reason cannot itself be “nothing,” for then there would be no distinction! To hold two things as distinct with absolutely no difference between them is a nonsensical position. In short, if nothing distinguishes a being from nothing, then it is not distinguished from nothing.

…

Some might wonder if we are justified in calling this act of distinction from nothing a “reason.” In response we can certainly say that there is no incompatibility or inconsistency in doing so. In fact, given what we said above when we clarified what a “reason” is, vix., that which accounts for the being of a thing, Wesrock’s note: At the outset Dr. Sullivan is clear that this book is an inquiry into reasons for existence, not so much essence] clearly if this esse is anything at all, it is this! This is precisely what Aquinas and the later Thomists have said about the act of being. Esse is that in virtue of which something exists. Possessing an act of being is certainly an answer to the question of why this being exists, and thus can certainly be said to be the reason why a thing exists. We could also mention the fact that the Thomistic notion of esse is equally as broad as our notion of reason. Just as Aquinas says, it is impossible for something to exist without esse, and thus every being must have it, so too we can, and will argue later, that all beings must possess a reason for existence. Like the act of being, a reason for existence is also universal to all beings. Just as one might say nihil est sine ratione, one might also just as well say nihil est sine esse. The scope and meaning of the terms are the same.

For this reason then we can put to rest any fears that we are in error when we call the act of being a “reason” for existence. Hence, “reason” and “act of being,” as I am using the terms here, are interchangeable. This means we could now, if we were so inclined, give this principle part of the [PSR] a more Thomistic formulation. Cast in Thomistic terms, the principle would state “*Whatever exists must have an act of being (esse)”. . . *

So this is the principle part of the [PSR]. It can be phrased in various ways, like, “Whatever exists must have a reason for existence,” “Whatever exists must have that in virtue of which it is distinguished from nothing,” . . . “Whatever exists must have esse.” All of these formulations, I claim, are equivalent . . . For the sake of clarity however, it seems to me that the formulation [that] explicitly says what a reason is will be the most useful for our purposes, namely, “Whatever exists must have that in virtue of which it is distinguished from nothing.” Presumably this is the clearest and least controversial way of stating the principle part of the [PSR], and so throughout the rest of this work it will be the most common way I formulate it.

. . .

To put the point syllogistically, “That which accounts for a thing’s being is a reason for existence, esse accounts for a thing’s being, therefore esse is a reason for existence.”

. . .

Whatever is not distinct from nothing, is nothing.

A PSR defiant being is not distinct from nothing.

Therefore, a PSR defiant being is nothing.

Excerpts from Dr. Scott M. Sullivan’s * Saint Thomas Aquinas and the Principle of Sufficient Reason, * Chapter III: The Principle Stated and Its Meaning and Chapter IV: The Reductio Ad Absurdum Argument for the Principle of Sufficient Reason.

 

[Wesrock]

However that does not make the PSR correct. If everything “needs” an external explanation, that would lead to an infinite regress (like “it is turtles all the way down”) and that is another nonsense. The solution is simple: there are brute facts, which do not have, cannot have and do not need external explanation. Examples are the axioms in any deductive system. Or any new idea. Or any artistic creation (book, music, etc…).

The PSR is not “everything needs an external explanation/external reason,” so that does that.

 

[blase6]

To ask why a thing exists is the same as to question what distinguishes this from nothing.

I don’t understand why this is true. To ask why something exists is just to ask what brought that thing into existence. Isn’t the nature of something to have being distinct from any cause?

 

[Wesrock]

I don’t understand why this is true. To ask why something exists is just to ask what brought that thing into existence.

I would disagree with the “just” in that statement. Asking what brought the being into existence is part of the inquiry, but I wouldn’t say it’s the only manner of inquiry. [Part of the fault of the question as you stated it seems to be that it assumes an external reason, which might not be the case.] You could state, “the reason this being is distinguished from nothingness or mere possibility is that it has an act of being (esse).” Now, from where it got this distinguishing feature, whether it possessed it intrinsically or received it from another is a separate question. I suppose you could be more complete and further state, “the reason this being is distinguished from nothingness or mere possibility is that it has esse, which it has because _____” (perhaps it’s been received from something else).

It occurs to me that part of the issue might be the difficulty in distinguishing between reason and cause. The PSR is not about causation per se, it’s about reason. A cause is only a type of reason. If “cause” is a species, “reason” is a genus.

Isn’t the nature of something to have being distinct from any cause?

Could you please clarify?

 

[Vera_Ljuba]

So once you explain everything in the universe you ultimately come to a point that has no explanation at all - its existence. So what justification did one have to rationally explain anything in the universe at all in the first place? You can’t just use the principle of sufficient reason for things in the universe and then throw it out when it comes to explaining the existence of the universe as a whole. That’s called having it both ways.

Not at all. I differentiate between a collection (the universe) and the elements of the collection (“things”). Consider a library. It is a collection of books. Each book has an author, a publisher, a binding, etc. None of these “properties” are applicable to the library. You cannot expect the collection to have the same properties as the elements of the collection. THAT would be irrational.

So in order to justify metaphysical naturalism you have to believe that reality is fundamentally irrational. That’s justification enough for me to stay as far away from Atheism as possible.

The adjectives of “rational” or “irrational” are not applicable to the whole reality. Just like the “author” or “publisher” are inapplicable to the library. You are welcome to stay away from atheism (no need to capitalize the word). I would much rather have you in the “opposing” camp… bless your heart!

 

[Wesrock]

Not at all. I differentiate between a collection (the universe) and the elements of the collection (“things”). Consider a library. It is a collection of books. Each book has an author, a publisher, a binding, etc. None of these “properties” are applicable to the library. You cannot expect the collection to have the same properties as the elements of the collection. THAT would be irrational.

I am sympathetic to looking at the elements rather than the whole when it comes to the universe (though inquiry into what is an element is appropriate, and my sympathy more comes from the possibility that the “whole” is not really a thing in itself anyway, the way a library is actually a thing, meaning I don’t know if you’re analogy of the library to the universe-as-a-whole follows), and so I’m not certain I event want to start down this path, but the library certainly shares some properties to the books it contains. Both the library and the books have efficient causes. Both exist materially. Both, and this is most fundamental, exist. So while not all properties the books possess can be attributed to the library, the more fundamental properties can be.

And another way of looking at the elements and the whole is not to look as the whole as being some type of container in the way a library contains books, but to be the aggregate collection of the whole, in which case a better analogy might be a brick wall. If each element in the collection is a brick, and each brick is red, it follows that the wall will be made of brick and will be red.

 

[IWantGod]

Not at all. I differentiate between a collection (the universe) and the elements of the collection (“things”). Consider a library. It is a collection of books. Each book has an author, a publisher, a binding, etc. None of these “properties” are applicable to the library. You cannot expect the collection to have the same properties as the elements of the collection. THAT would be irrational.

So what the universe is made of is not applicable to the whole universe? What is the whole universe that it doesn’t require a reasoned response? I mean i get that a book case is not a book, I’m not an idiot. What i need to know is how that analogy fits with the actual universe as a whole and how that would legitimize the idea that it doesn’t need a reason for its existence. It seems highly suspect that you would stop reasoning at a point where an inference to something other than a physical cause would be required.

Isn’t that more a product of your dogmatic atheism than actual reason?

The adjectives of “rational” or “irrational” are not applicable to the whole reality. Just like the “author” or “publisher” are inapplicable to the library. You are welcome to stay away from atheism (no need to capitalize the word). I would much rather have you in the “opposing” camp… bless your heart!

More of these comparisons which you assert as being equivalent to the question of why a thing exists as opposed to not existing

So far all you have demonstrated is that reason is only applicable to existence when you want it to be. If you want to believe that things can just exist for no rational reason then please continue as you are. Just know i can’t join you because reason does not allow me to; i cannot excuse myself from reason like you do.

 

[Lucretius]

Is there any real way to prove or demonstrate that the fact that something cannot come from nothing

Principles are not demonstrable: they are self-evidently true. They are the material from which the demonstrable are demonstrated from.

Once one understands what nothing actually is, it is by definition true that nothing comes from nothing, just as when someone understands what two and four are, that by definition 2 + 2 = 4.

Christi pax.

 

[STT]

Principles are not demonstrable: they are self-evidently true. They are the material from which the demonstrable are demonstrated from.

Once one understands what nothing actually is, it is by definition true that nothing comes from nothing, just as when someone understands what two and four are, that by definition 2 + 2 = 4.

Christi pax.

 

[Lucretius]

 

[blase6]

I would disagree with the “just” in that statement. Asking what brought the being into existence is part of the inquiry, but I wouldn’t say it’s the only manner of inquiry. [Part of the fault of the question as you stated it seems to be that it assumes an external reason, which might not be the case.] You could state, “the reason this being is distinguished from nothingness or mere possibility is that it has an act of being (esse).” Now, from where it got this distinguishing feature, whether it possessed it intrinsically or received it from another is a separate question. I suppose you could be more complete and further state, “the reason this being is distinguished from nothingness or mere possibility is that it has esse, which it has because _____” (perhaps it’s been received from something else).

It occurs to me that part of the issue might be the difficulty in distinguishing between reason and cause. The PSR is not about causation per se, it’s about reason. A cause is only a type of reason. If “cause” is a species, “reason” is a genus.

I can understand the difference between a reason and a cause, but I still don’t understand why asking why a thing exists is the same as asking what distinguishes that thing from nothing. When I ask why something exists, all I care about is what reason it has to exist. It is already obvious to me that it is distinct from nothing. Because of my intuitive belief in the PSR, I assume that there must be at least some reason why it exists. But even if I cannot conceive of any reason why a particular thing exists, it exists. That thing is distinguished from nothing by the fact that it exists!

Could you please clarify?

For example:

1. The computer exists.
2. Someone made the computer.

It seems that 1 and 2 are distinct ideas. I can know 1 without knowing 2, even if I intuitively believe that 2 is a necessary condition for 1. An immature child without a grasp of cause and effect may believe 1 without believing 2.

 

[Vera_Ljuba]

So what the universe is made of is not applicable to the whole universe?

Of course not. Take a floor comprised of tiles. Every tile is white and square. From this fact it follows that the whole floor is white, but it does NOT follow that the whole floor is square (it could be an oblong). Isn’t that obvious? The collection might or might not have the same properties as its elements. You cannot willy-nilly generalize the properties of the elements and apply it to the collection. You need to demonstrate the properties of the elements are inherited by the collection. Sometimes it does, other times it does not.

What is the whole universe that it doesn’t require a reasoned response? I mean i get that a book case is not a book, I’m not an idiot. What i need to know is how that analogy fits with the actual universe as a whole and how that would legitimize the idea that it doesn’t need a reason for its existence. It seems highly suspect that you would stop reasoning at a point where an inference to something other than a physical cause would be required.

Show me any example of a non-physical causation, and then we can continue. There is nothing logically impossible to posit a non-physical causative agent. But you need to demonstrate that such an agent actually exists, AND it can influence the physical reality. The “let there be light, and there was light” is simply magic. You need much more than that. The ball is in your court, present a non-physical causative agent, and explain how a non-physical agent can influence the physical reality. There are a couple of charlatans (like Uri Geller) who assert some paranormal powers and say that they can utilize these powers to influence reality. Guess what? Any time such a “demonstration” is attempted, a trained stage-magician shows that the demonstration is simple cheating. No wonder that these charlatans refuse to perform when stage-magicians are present.

Isn’t that more a product of your dogmatic atheism than actual reason?

What is “dogmatic” atheism? Atheism has no dogmas. All you have to do is demonstrate an active non-physical entity, and I will fold my cards and concede defeat. Non-physical entities are dime a dozen; all the concepts, ideas, attributes, relationships, actions belong to this collection. But none of them exist independently from the physical framework, and none of them can influence the physical reality.

More of these comparisons which you assert as being equivalent to the question of why a thing exists as opposed to not existing

Non-existence is just a concept, not an ontologically existing “something”.

So far all you have demonstrated is that reason is only applicable to existence when you want it to be. If you want to believe that things can just exist for no rational reason then please continue as you are. Just know i can’t join you because reason does not allow me to; i cannot excuse myself from reason like you do.

As I said, you are in the driver seat. Show us the non-physical causative agent, and demonstrate how it influences the physical reality.

---

And another way of looking at the elements and the whole is not to look as the whole as being some type of container in the way a library contains books, but to be the aggregate collection of the whole, in which case a better analogy might be a brick wall. If each element in the collection is a brick, and each brick is red, it follows that the wall will be made of brick and will be red.

Very true. But the inheritance is NOT automatic. Every brick can be of the shape of a cube, but from this fact it does not follow that the whole wall is also a “cube”.

 

[STT]

What is the reason for existence of God?

 

[Wesrock]

What is the reason for existence of God?

The book I quoted from previously gives three forms of the PSR:

Weak: Whatever begins to exist has a cause for its existence.

**Mild: **Whatever exists contingently has a cause for its existence.

Strong: Whatever exists has a reason for its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in the casual efficacy of some other being.

Only the strong form of the PSR presented here would include God in its scope, and we are not at this time thinking of the “God of Abraham”, but of the Prime Mover and First Cause, that is, that which has been logically deduced to be necessary in itself; the terminus of any essentially ordered series of movers and causes, in whom there is no composition, not even of essence and “act of being.” God would therefore fall into the part of the PSR in which the being has the reason intrinsically, or “God’s reason for existence is in the necessity of His own nature.” God doesn’t just have an “act of being,” He *is *the “act of being.” Since what He is is the same as that He is, He requires no cause to explain a composition of an essence with an “act of being”, there is no composition, He simply is it and so possesses it intrinsically.

You might object with “why can’t this teapot just be said to have an act of being intrinsically,” and I think that would imply that attributing to God an intrinsically necessary “act of being” is simply an arbitrary choice on the theist’s part, but the point is that the teapot example is clearly false, as would anything else that is a composite of parts, substance and accident, form [Aristotlean] and matter, essence and esse.

The cosmological arguments don’t so much explain why God has the act of being intrinsically, it’s (1) that anything that has properties X, Y, and Z cannot be the Prime Mover or First Cause, (2) that there must be a Prime Mover and First cause (which we will denote as God; #2 is not being demonstrated here, that’s the point of the cosmological arguments which I’m not recapping), and (3) if 1 and 2 are true this God must be divinely simple, actus purus, a being who simply is His own act of being. The cosmological arguments propose that there must be a being who is his own act of being by intrinsic necessity, and this is what we call God. To see it as something simply being arbitrarily attributed would be to miss what is established by the arguments. It’s not explaining “why” exactly so much as saying “there must be something that has it intrinsically if the PSR is true,” because if there isn’t, everything is ultimately rendered a PSR-defiant being."