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Trevor_Stamm
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Expound on this. You say He has no freedom of choice to create yet eternally willed to create, seems like a contradiction.
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belorg
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He cannot will something else, can he?
The ‘will’ in God’s will does not entail any sort of volition. The will of God is an idea that is unchangeable by definition and has been residing in God’s mind forever. And, as I said, since God is necssary, He necessarily has that idea in His mind.
Which, in turn, means that God’s will is identical in every possible world. Which means that in every possible world, everything happens according to God’s unchangeable will, so everything that happens, happens by necessity. I do not choose to be an atheist, because in every possible world God wills me to be an atheist. Hitler, in every possible world is a mass-murdere by God’s will.
Hence, nobody is in fact free in the libertarian sense, which leaves only one option: compatibilism, as in Calvinism.
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MindOverMatter2
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There was never a “time” or a “before” when the universe did not exist, since physical change is intrinsic to the universe. God, being pure love, cannot possibly be without that which he gives in love. Gods intrinsic existence is simultaneous with the “first event” and all events.
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Trevor_Stamm
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If we observe His nature as giving, or how I originally put “agape love”, then it is not a question if He can will something else, but His will and his perfect nature are one. Choosing always one choice does not entail that this choice is the only choice or a passive act if we also observe that not choosing is also a choice. God eternal will to create does not reduce Him in freedom but rather emphasizes his nature of giving.
I don’t have a wife or children but my brothers do. They are good men in every sense. They always do what’s best for their children and their spouse before thinking of themselves. They do not even think, let alone act, of choices that would lessen their families in any way. It is as if they have no freedom of choice at all, always choosing what’s best for their families and never anything else. One could narrowly conclude these men are not acting of choice. As we observe other husbands and fathers that do not always choose what’s best for their families, or even go as far as to hurt them, we as society, in general, observe these men as lesser then good. Almost applying a sort of hierarchy to fathership, that those that do most they can for their families are categorized as good and those that don’t do the most for their family are not seen as good and those that hurt their family are, without hesitation, seen the least good. It seems on this imaginary hierarchy the more good you are, the less choices you subject yourself too and the least good you are the more choices open and even choices that would not even be a thought to the good fathers. God being the highest degree of good, is not subtracted in volition because He eternally wills to create, but because He eternally wills to create is why God is the highest degree of good.
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belorg
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Which makes it an automatic reaction and not ‘volition’.
Not choosing isn’t a choice for God.
It means that his ‘giving’ is an automatic reflex and has nothing to do with volition.The nature of the Being is that it is creating. That’s it. ‘Loving’ or ‘Chossing’ have nothing to do with it.
I am prepared to believe that they do not act of those choices, but I very much doubt they do not even think about them, or haven’t ever thought about them, but have decided their love for their family is more valuable than other ‘pleasures’ or something. That’s a real choice. God’s choice, under your God concept, isn’t.
You can know they haven’t chosen to do anything else, but you cannot know they have never considered anything else.
Sure
No, that does n ot follow at all. The more good you are, the more you make the best choices. If you have no choices you subject yourself to, you are , in fact, a robot without any real free will, just like God is.
The two options here are not mutually exclusive. It depends on how you define ‘good’. God’s eternal will to create is good for the ones that are created, but do not entail any sort of volition on God’s part.
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danserr
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I’ve been following the conversation and have a couple brief thoughts before the week starts getting nuts.
Calvinism is not compatibilist. Compatibilism claims that free will is compatible with determinism. Calvinism simply denies the existence of free will altogether.
It may not necessarily be true that if God is necessary, then all his effects must be. Alexander Pruss has an article on the Leibnizian Cosmological Argument where he argues that; it’s a long article, but good to be aware of. (recently publish in the blackwell companion to natural theology, but also last I checked, available online).
In every possible world God’s will may be identical, but it does not follow that one is not free. God does will that you be a Christian, but he also wills that you be free. Thus far you have chosen not to be a Christian, God’s will has not changed. He wills that you freely chose Christianity. He has eternally willed this.
One question seems to be why do people choose? We asess how likely our decision is to turn out a certain way, the facts that surround our decision and are evidence for or against it, the moral factors. God is similar and different. He does not lack the power to act, is omniscient, and morally perfect. As such, he has no need to deliberate possible choices, but eternally wills.
Can God will something else? In one sense no, but that is no limit on God. It simply means God has no need to deliberate what to do. His freedom is different from human freedom. God’s freedom consists in that he is compelled by no force outside himself
I have a question here. You seem to be saying that if his brothers really never considered doing anything not best for their families, then they would not be free. Similarly, if God never considered or contemplated say, raping and torturing a little girl to death, he is not really free. Or at least this is what your position seems to entail. But freedom in the sense that you mean it, really does seem like a defect or a liability. A human might consider doing something morally imperfect, but that is because he is hindered by sin, a defect in his goodness and nature. A human is not more free because of that defect, but less free. His realization of his own nature is hindered by another force (sin). God, however, has no such defect. Freedom isn’t just mere choice, but the ability to realize one’s own nature and flourish as the sort of being one is unhindered by external encumbrance.
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belorg
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Well, at least some Calvinists are compatibilists. But for every Chrsitian who thinks one thing, there is another one that thinks exactly the opposite, so it’s hard to speak of ‘Calvinism’, since there are so many dofferent types, as it is hard to speak of ‘Chrsitianity’, since this concept is made up of hundreds of loosely related ideas.
Yes, i have read it, but I don’t agree with Pruss. I don’t think he’s consistent in his thinking in this respcet.
This will take us too far, danserr, but the only type of freedom that is possible under Trovor’s scenario is compatibilist free will and not libertarian free will, for the simple reason that if God and God’s wiull are unchangeable and eternal, then so is God’s knowledge, and if God knowns what I will do, He has always knwon it, which means that what I will do is determined beforehand, so there are no possible counterfactuals.
So He makes no chocies and cannot make any choices.
I am not saying this is a limit on God, I am saying that God cannot make any sort of choice; not because He has no need to, but because He simply cannot do it.
Which is the standard definition of compatibilist free will.
No, II am saying that if his brothers never considered doing anything not best, they did not make a choice. They may be free in the sens of not compelled by anything outside themselves, but their free will would be compatibilist free will and not liberetarian free will.
If God could have never contemplated anything else than what He really willed, then His will is not an expression of libertarian free will and it is hard to see how it is even a matter of personality at all. His will seems much more like an automatic sort of reflex.
Be careful not to pour your whole theology down the drain, danserr. You are on very dangerous territory here.
It’s time to become a Calvinsit, danserr.
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Trevor_Stamm
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Something tells me we’re going to have a lot of these friendly back and forths in quite a few discussions for awhile 
To be good belongs pre-eminently to God. For a thing is good according to its desirableness. Now everything seeks after its own perfection; and the perfection and form of an effect consist in a certain likeness to the agent, since every agent makes its like; and hence the agent itself is desirable and has the nature of good. For the very thing which is desirable in it is the participation of its likeness. Therefore, since God is the first effective cause of all things, it is manifest that the aspect of good and of desirableness belong to Him; and hence Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) attributes good to God as to the first efficient cause, saying that, God is called good “as by Whom all things subsist.”
In other words, your simply saying creation was passive. . . coming full swing back to the Pure Act doctrine. My observations of God’s freedom is defensible from there but before reigniting that fire (for the sake of charity, lol) do we want to open up that can again or just leave it here?
Think Aquinas answers this perfectly
To be good belongs pre-eminently to God. For a thing is good according to its desirableness. Now everything seeks after its own perfection; and the perfection and form of an effect consist in a certain likeness to the agent, since every agent makes its like; and hence the agent itself is desirable and has the nature of good. For the very thing which is desirable in it is the participation of its likeness. Therefore, since God is the first effective cause of all things, it is manifest that the aspect of good and of desirableness belong to Him; and hence Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) attributes good to God as to the first efficient cause, saying that, God is called good “as by Whom all things subsist.”
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belorg
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MaybeSomething tells me we’re going to have a lot of these friendly back and forths in quite a few discussions for awhile
If you insist on using the distinction between active and passive, which I think in this context is meaningless, then yes: creation was passive, in that, neither from an athiestic viewpoint, nor from a Thomistic viewpoint, the term 'agrnt volition ’ or ‘agent causation’ seems to have any meaning at all.
God’s ‘freedon’ is indeed defensible from a Thomistic POV, but it is a passive sort of freedom, so I do not see how we could call it ‘free"don’ in any meaningful sense.
This defines ‘good’ as ‘resembling God’ or somethingh like that. Which is fine, but rellay mean anything, does it?
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danserr
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I’m not sure you fully understand Calvinism. Or at least, if you do, then I don’t. No Calvinist would accept that portrait of God that I have given. They would typically go so far as to say that God is so free that he really does have unlimited possibilities, even to do stuff we currently call evil. Second, Calvinists typically deny any sort of free will to man at all.
Now you seem to think that my view of God’s freedom is somehow compatiblistic. But this doesn’t seem right. Compatibilism is the attempt to reconcile determinism with free will. Determinism holds that our actions are determined by causal factors outside of ourselves; hence compatibilism’s attempt to reconcile this with free will.
Now, in my view, God’s actions are determined solely by his own nature. His actions are not determined by causal factors outside himself. This contrasts to compatibilists who try to reconcile determinism (the view that human actions are determined by causal factors outside themselves) with free will.
sorry for the typos, I only had a moment.
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Trevor_Stamm
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Well, from the Thomistic POV God is Pure Act and what is more actual abounds in active power. Therefore, what is Pure Act abounds in infinite active power. If God eternally willed to create is thus part of His pure actuality, and actively created from His own will (more or less paraphrasing danserr).
But the question is free will of God. Simply stating humans seem to have a higher degree of freedom because of the inconsistency of the self or choosing things one wouldn’t have before I don’t think is valid grounds. My argument was showing that God being ever consistent in his choice and not changing does not mean He is not free, it simply shows that what He chose to do is what He eternally wills.
But it seem your main objection is: since what was eternally willed was intrinsic from an unchangeable nature of giving/love, thus seems to imply passive creation.
My reply to that is that we should remember creation was not out of necessity, and we are ultimately contingent. That said, we also need to remember before us was only Him in an atemporal POV. Creation of unnecessary beings does not add or subtract His nature, and not creating does not add or subtract His nature. I’ll direct you to Aquinas writing in Contra Gentiles, Book I Chapter 81 “That God does not will other things in a necessary way” 3rd paragraph:
Furthermore, since the understood good is the object of the will, the will can will anything conceived by the intellect in which the nature of the good is present. Hence, although the being of any given thing is as such a good and its non-being an evil, the non-being of something can fall under the will (though not by necessity) because of some adjoined good that is preserved; since it is a good that something be, even though something else does not exist. Therefore, according to its own nature, the will cannot not will that good whose non-existence causes the nature of the good entirely to be lost. But there is no such good apart from God. According to its nature, therefore, the will can will the non-existence of anything whatever apart from God. But in God will is present according to its whole range, since all things in Him are universally perfect. God, therefore, can will the non-existence of anything whatever apart from Himself. Hence, it is not of necessity that things other than Himself exist.
I also suggest Chapter 88
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belorg
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No, I don’t fully understand calvinism, but I have discussed these issues with calvinists, and at least some of them hold to compatibilist free will.
You don’t either, but that’s no problem: most calvinist dont understand calvinism either, just as most cahtloics don’t undertsand catholicism.
That’s true, and they are correct in this respect. If God is truly free then he has unlimited possibilities, even do stuff we currently call evil.
The reason is that God works in mysterious ways and that ‘stuff we call evil’ is in fact, done for good reasons, so, if God does it, it’s good, if we do it, it’s evil…
They deny libertarian free will. The calvinists I mentioned would say that, although God planned everything so that it is determined that I will eat chocolat ice-cream tomorrow, it’s still also me who chooses to eat chocolat ice-cream since I wasn’t coerced to do so by God. Now, if you ask my opnion, I don’t think this is free will in any meaningful sense, but calvinists claim it is.
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It is certainly not libertarian
I don’t think the distinction between causal factors inside or outside ourselves is meaningful.If all my atoms etc determine that I eat chocolat ice-cream, that’s an internal factor, still my eating chocolat is determined and my freedom is not counterfactual. That means I (the collection of my atoms) cannot choose to eat vanilla ice-cream instead.
Now, let’s say my actions are determiend by my ‘soul’. Then my ‘soul’ is the internal factor
determining what I wil choose, and there still is no counterfactual free will.
My definition of compatibilism is that free will is compatible with ful determinism, whether internal or external.
If they are determined by causal factors internal to Him (his nature) then He does not have counterfactual free will.
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belorg
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I now how Thomists define actuality, but asserting that it’s an active power does not make it so. If we look at it in more detail, it is, in fact a passive power.
What I am saying is that God’s free will is not counterfactual in any respect, hence, God’s free will is not libertarian. It’s not a matter of ‘choosing things one wouldn’t have before’, it’s a matter of choosing things period. God does not in any meaningful way choose things.
The question is : could he have eternallu willed something different?
Something like that, yes.
That’s the point we are discussing. I maintain, if Thomism is true, it IS out of necessity and we are NOT ultimately contingent .
Yes
I would like to see an argument for that. Could God have decided not to create anything? I think creating is eternally part of His nature.
No, Trevor, the will wills everything conceived by the intellect in which the nature of the good is present. Why is that: because God has an unchanging, unchangeable perfectly good nature. To refrain from creating something in which the nature of the good is present, means that God’s nature is not perfectly good.
Which means that God cannot possibly will the non-being of any anything in which the nature of good is present.
I understand what you are trying to say, but it does not add up. If the non-being of something falls under God’s will because by not creating it, some other adjoined good is preserved, then of course God does not create said thing out of necessity becuase creating it would be against God’s perfectly good nature.
He cannot not will this Which means: it’s necessary that he wills it.
But since the non-existence of things other than Himself is better than the existence of things other than Himself (since things other than Hismelf are NOT universally perfect), God, being perfectly good, can only will the non-existence of anything apart from Himself, wich means that the non-existence of anything apart from Himself is necessary.
Which gives me a perfect argument against God
1 If God exists the non-existence of anything apart from Himself is necessary
2 Theer are things that exist apart from God
3 Therefore: God does not exist.
I also suggest Chapter 88
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Luke_K
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belorg
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The ‘problem’ with that is that God has no free will at all. But maybe that’s not a problem at all, after all is free will essential for God?
Another ‘problem with that’ is that God does not need to be personal in any way, 'automatic refelxes 'will do. But maybe that’s ot a problem at all, aftyer all, why is God necessarily a personal being.
Couldn’t we just call an impersonal unfree being ‘God’ if we wanted to? Sure we could. But then, in that case, we could also call ourselves atheists…
The point is that the overal picture with creation is not univesrally perfect, while God sand creation is universally perfect. A universally prefect being wants everyhting to be universally perfect. If this cannot be doen by creating things beyond itself, then a universally perfect being does not create anything.
I see you started a thread that’s related to this problem, let’s wait and see what other peopole have to say there, because I feel this thread is bleeding to death.
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David_Castlen
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Trevor_Stamm
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Agreed. Was simply stating our being or non-being does not reduce or increase His being.
For the following, remember I was a quoting from the Contra Gentiles. Just seems by your responses, you thought those were my words.
Not seeing how this is different from what was said, you say “everything conceived” and Aquinas said “anything conceived”.
Right. As I stated in the other thread, Aquinas taught being is convertible with good.
What is being is good and what is non-being is neither. If I was not conceived, it is not that my non-being is evil but is simply just non-being. If this seems irrelevant, maybe I am misinterpreting your retort.
I think this is a misuse of the word, necessary. Necessary is that which is required. We require the necessary being to exist but the necessary being is required to act on His nature? The necessary being acted on His nature by desire. So I think your statement should read, it’s eternally desired that he wills it.
And maybe this is why in Catholicism it is the belief that the only reason of being is to partake in His perfect nature by choice. Hence the Eurcharist in the corporeal world and the eternal communion in Heaven. And Hell being a state of eternal non-communion and those within are there by choice, since being is convertible with good whatever is being is good and cannot be willed to not exist but cannot partake in perfect goodness if the will of these agents do not wish to. This is what happens when you throw free will into being, it is not just about God creating things to all be universally perfect but the receptive agents must be willing to partake in that universal perfect goodness.
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belorg
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NO, I know those are Aquinas’ words. But Aquinas does not post here too often, so I respond to you instead.
Aquinas would not agree with the last part of what I said.
"To refrain from creating something in which the nature of the good is present, means that God’s nature is not perfectly good. " Aquinas would deny this.
Not axxording to The Angelic Doctor, Trevor
Not only are you misinterpreting my retort, you are misinterpreting Aquinas.
I am using ‘necessary’ in the sense it is generally used in philosophy: “existing in every possible world”, or “impossible not to be”
He isn’t required to act on His nature, He cannot not act on His nature. There is no possible world in which He does not act on His nature.
No, the statement should not be read that way. If that’s true, we are lucky tha God had this desire, because He could just as well not have had it.
That may all be true, but it is completely irrelevant to my argument.
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Trevor_Stamm
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And you know the things that are not created have the nature of good present in them? How?
I can argue that all things that have a nature of good present in them have been, are, and will be created.
Before I answer, are you stating that God wills things apart from Himself is absolutely necessary or necessary by supposition?
I know, just was pointing out you see no point for God to create things that are not part of Himself. I was stating that things created apart from Himself are directed to Him, but only by will.
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belorg
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I was replying to something you said, Trevor, you said
“What is being is good and what is non-being is neither.”
But Thomas of Aquino said:
"the being of any given thing is as such a good and its non-being an evil, "
So, what is non-being, according to Thomas, is evil and according to you is neutral.
That’s what Aquinas would argue, yes, but that would mean that everything that has been, is, or will be created, has been, is and willbe created out of necessity.
I say that if God wills things apart from Himself (which I think would contradict His perfectly Good nature) then this is done out of absolute necessity.
I know tha Aquinas claims it is necessary by supposition, but I think that is false.
God creating things that are not part of Himself is, IMO, a contradiction.
They are either apart from God or not.
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