Dokimas claimed that life was so “awesome” that it necessitated a creator. AFAIK, every Christian I’ve ever met has considered God to be the most awesome thing in existence.
I’m sorry, I just don’t know how to quantify awesome, or whether you’re trying to make an argument with it. I don’t have a response right now. I’m not saying I don’t believe you that Dokimas said that; I’m just not certain how to deal with the statement. I’ll hope that you’ll appreciate that honesty, instead of expecting me to make potentially faulty assumptions about the meaning of the statement and go off on some diatribe about it.
But to be fair to Dawkins, he’s responding to Fred Hoyle’s “747 in a junkyard” argument, which doesn’t define complexity either.
That’s my point. The complexity “problem” as applied to designer vs. design has never been defined in a way that makes an comparison of probabilities meaningful.
I’m really not sure what position you’re arguing now. AFAICT, whatever position you take on the issue of complexity, it still speaks as equally to God as it does to life, the universe, or everything.
Well, I’m not presenting an argument for or against design. I’m merely attacking the sophomoric argument presented by Dawkins and parroted here.
However, I’m also not sure what you mean by complexity speaking equally to God and the universe. It does matter how you define complexity, because as shown, if you define complexity by the amount of information, the argument that God must be infinitely complex and therefore more improbable than his creation doesn’t hold water.
The original argument was that some level of complexity implies design. As we agreed, highly complex things can arise from relatively simple things. Whatever threshhold we pick for design complexity, we can probably find a way that it resulted from a simple thing below that threshhold, contradicting the original premise.
Yes, I do agree that highly complex things can arise from relatively simple things, if we define complexity by the amount of information contained in the object, and we have some sort of definable way of measuring the information equally in both. It has not been demonstrated that the complexity (or lack thereof) of God can be measured in terms of information, so using the argument against the existence of God is not useful.
OTOH, it seems to me that you’re now arguing that all things, even very simple things, require a creator. Well, if that’s the case, then invoking a “non-complex” God (however “complexity” is defined) doesn’t exclude God from needing a creator himself.
No, I wasn’t arguing that. In fact I specifically said that I didn’t mean to lead you down that road. Again, only attacking the comparative complexity “problem” which is sometimes expressed in terms of skyhook and crane. It’s quite boorish.
But since you asked, I am perfectly willing to admit the possibility that if God is capable of always existing, then so is the universe–potentially. So I see it as possible that the universe would not require a creator
to simply exist. The problem is, the universe, with its laws, etc. has
not always existed. There was an event that caused it to be. Events like the Big Bang, events like the introduction of phyla, do require a cause. God does not need a cause, if he has always been–there was no event giving rise to him. I would argue that the event of the emergence of the universe from non-existence does require such a cause. There was a before and an after.
So, I don’t say that all things, regardless of complexity, require a creator. That would mean that God would require a creator, or an exception that swallows the rule. I prefer to say that all events require causes. It would be a lot easier for atheists if the universe always existed…
When you suggest a “non-complex” God, you’re effectively saying that complex things can arise from simple things. Once you allow for this, you can no longer assert (as you have to in the original argument) that some level of complexity can only be the result of an outside influence.
Here’s where you’re doing some false equivalence. The whole point behind the need for an ascertainable definition of complexity is that “complexity” has not been defined in a way that makes it possible to compare the “complexity” or “simplicity” of God to that of any created thing. There are ways of defining the “complexity” or “simplicity” of God that do not involve there being more or less information. And then there are ways of defining the “complexity” or “simplicity” of God that do involve there being more or less information, and it is the usage of the latter argument as a proof of the impossibility of the existence of God that I have attacked, nothing more.