Problems with the Principle of Sufficient Reason

[NowAgnostic]

Every cosmological proof for God’s existence must assume some form of the principle of sufficient reason (PSR). For they must argue the existence of the universe cannot be simply a brute fact, without any cause or explanation.

Simplified, the PSR states that there is no contingent fact that is a brute fact; but that every contingent fact has an explanation. (A contingent fact is a fact about the world that could be otherwise, like me typing this right now; a necessary fact is one which exists in all possible worlds, like truths of mathematics.) A necessary fact can be said to be “self-explanatory” insofar as its denial would result in a logical contradiction, thus it must be. A contingent fact, however, needs its explanation from something else; its denial does not involve a contradiction.

For instance, the First Way of Aquinas (the argument from motion) assumes that nothing just moves for no reason or cause; it doesn’t just pop from potentiality to actuality, but it needs a sufficient reason, some other entity already in act moving it.

And the problem is that the PSR, stated this way, leads to a contradiction. Imagine a world with a set of contingent facts (which could in theory be an infinite set). Now, contrary to Hume, even an infinite set is not “explained” in the sense the term is meant by the PSR, because even though every member of the set has an explanation, a world without that set but with all other features the same would not involve a logical contradiction. For any set therefore, even an infinite set, an explanation must be sought outside the set. (There are also circular sets where A explains B and B explains A, of course.) But we’re always at the same problem, if all we have are contingent facts - the set is never explained. Thus it is argued, in every cosmological proof, that recourse must be had to something necessary. But what is logically entailed by a necessary fact is also itself necessary. Thus, the options are denial of the PSR (which would invalidate all cosmological proofs) or biting the bullet and denying contingency, saying that this world is the only possible one.

I’ve seen some Catholic metaphysicians with Ph.D.s attempt to grapple with this, not very successfully I might add. I’ve read things like “explanation does not mean entailment” pray tell then what does it mean? I’ve read an attempt to deny the above argument, claiming that a contingent set is “explained” when all its members are explained. It’s a serious issue for the Church has dogmatically declared BOTH that the existence of God can be known through created things AND that God created freely without any sort of compulsion or constraint.

 

[James_S_Saint]

…AND that God created freely without any sort of compulsion or constraint.

The CC declared this??

You are right. Cosmology is a fad to keep the pseudo-intellectuals busy and blind to politics.

The cause of the universe is the logical/mathematical resolve that having no universe is a logical impossibility.

There are no other “possible worlds”. It’s just a game.

 

[Areopagite]

Every cosmological proof for God’s existence must assume some form of the principle of sufficient reason (PSR). For they must argue the existence of the universe cannot be simply a brute fact, without any cause or explanation.

Simplified, the PSR states that there is no contingent fact that is a brute fact; but that every contingent fact has an explanation. (A contingent fact is a fact about the world that could be otherwise, like me typing this right now; a necessary fact is one which exists in all possible worlds, like truths of mathematics.) A necessary fact can be said to be “self-explanatory” insofar as its denial would result in a logical contradiction, thus it must be. A contingent fact, however, needs its explanation from something else; its denial does not involve a contradiction.

For instance, the First Way of Aquinas (the argument from motion) assumes that nothing just moves for no reason or cause; it doesn’t just pop from potentiality to actuality, but it needs a sufficient reason, some other entity already in act moving it.

And the problem is that the PSR, stated this way, leads to a contradiction. Imagine a world with a set of contingent facts (which could in theory be an infinite set). Now, contrary to Hume, even an infinite set is not “explained” in the sense the term is meant by the PSR, because even though every member of the set has an explanation, a world without that set but with all other features the same would not involve a logical contradiction. For any set therefore, even an infinite set, an explanation must be sought outside the set. (There are also circular sets where A explains B and B explains A, of course.) But we’re always at the same problem, if all we have are contingent facts - the set is never explained. Thus it is argued, in every cosmological proof, that recourse must be had to something necessary. But what is logically entailed by a necessary fact is also itself necessary. Thus, the options are denial of the PSR (which would invalidate all cosmological proofs) or biting the bullet and denying contingency, saying that this world is the only possible one.

I’ve seen some Catholic metaphysicians with Ph.D.s attempt to grapple with this, not very successfully I might add. I’ve read things like “explanation does not mean entailment” pray tell then what does it mean? I’ve read an attempt to deny the above argument, claiming that a contingent set is “explained” when all its members are explained. It’s a serious issue for the Church has dogmatically declared BOTH that the existence of God can be known through created things AND that God created freely without any sort of compulsion or constraint.

Absolutely ingenious question. I am genuinely impressed by the calibre of this question. Very well put. I am really inexperienced with this topic, but I think I may have a solution. I’m going to state my perhaps deficient argument in various ways until it makes sense (to me, at least).

Even though the cosmological proofs are stating that God must necessarily exist for there to be a contingent universe in existence, it is not stating that God must have necessarily brought the universe into existence. You see the difference?

In other words, given that the universe exists and is contingent, God must necessarily exist to bring it into existence. But this does not equate to God being required to bringing the universe into existence.

The only thing that is stated as being necessary is “if the contingent universe exists, then God, who necessarily exists, was the one to bring it into existence” … and it is not specifically stating “if a particular universe could exist, then God necessarily had to bring it into existence in its particular way.” You see the difference? Does that make any sense?

You seem to be narrowing the usage of the word “necessary” in the cosmological argument. We’re not saying that God necessarily had to bring the universe into existence, but that since we see the universe existing and not non-existing, the conclusion must necessarily be that God did decide to bring it into existence. There is no other reason for it to exist.

Also, it could have existed in different ways because the idea that God must have necessarily created the universe based on the fact that the universe is existing and not non-existing does not imply that it had to exist in one specific kind of way.

Let me give an example (perhaps a very stupid one). Let’s say humans are the only ones that are able to make cars. It’s a contingent thing, though. They don’t have to make cars. But they are able to. Now, upon some observation, it turns out that cars exist. We would say …

"Humans have necessarily made cars."

But there are two interpretations of that phrase …

1. It is necessary for humans to make cars (which denies that humans can choose not to make cars)
2. Given that cars exist, it must necessarily be the case that humans have made those cars (and thus, humans, their creators, exist) … and this does not deny that they were free to choose to make the cars differently if they had so chosen

Obviously, the first one is false and the second one is true. But your objection to the cosmological argument seems to consist of you thinking that it is stating something like the first item here (but it is not … it is saying something like the second one).

I may very well be light-years off your topic, and for that I apologize.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

It’s a serious issue for the Church has dogmatically declared BOTH that the existence of God can be known through created things AND that God created freely without any sort of compulsion or constraint.

I fail to see how this is a serious issue. It may invalidate the cosmological proof, but the cosmological proof is not a way God is known through created things. It is just a proof.

From the fact that God cannot be proven, it does not follow that God does not exist.

From the fact that God cannot be proven, it does not follow that God cannot be known.

Am I missing something?

 

[NowAgnostic]

Absolutely ingenious question. I am genuinely impressed by the calibre of this question. Very well put. I am really inexperienced with this topic, but I think I may have a solution. I’m going to state my perhaps deficient argument in various ways until it makes sense (to me, at least).

Even though the cosmological proofs are stating that God must necessarily exist for there to be a contingent universe in existence, it is not stating that God must have necessarily brought the universe into existence. You see the difference?

Yes, I see the difference, but to do that the cosmological proofs must abandon the PSR at some point. That God created this universe rather than that would be an unexplained brute fact. Thus, appeal to a necessary being leads nowhere in terms of explanations. (There is another big problem here regarding divine simplicity but that would be a bit off-topic.) But anyway why posit a necessary being with a contingent act? Why cannot the creator of the world be a contingent being?

But once the PSR is denied and it is admitted that there can be eternally existent yet contingent (not logically necessary) entities (in this case God’s action) it becomes impossible to get to a necessary fact (the existence of God, as defined philosophically) because it will always be possible to find an explanation in other eternally contingent entities. For instance, I can posit a multitude of First Movers, each a mixture of potency in act, but in act from eternity. Their existence is a matter of brute fact, but the motion is explained (e.g. nothing just pops from potentiality to act).

No matter how you slice it, you have an unexplained, uncaused eternally existent ontological entity. It’s just impossible to argue from the contingent to the necessary, if my objection to the PSR is correct.

 

[James_S_Saint]

Am I missing something?

I think he is just pointing out a deficiency in the use of PSR (Probably Sufficient Rationalization) in deducing a necessary entity.

To speak of future “possible worlds” can be a rational discussion by admitting a degree of ignorance of this world. But any discussion of past possible worlds is also an admission of ignorance but irrational if the deduction doesn’t lead eventually to this actual world.

Through possible world scenarios, you can basically invent your way out of any commitment to a necessary anything. But how I see that is, “if I am ignorant enough, I can deny anything.”

 

[JDaniel]

Every cosmological proof for God’s existence must assume some form of the principle of sufficient reason (PSR). For they must argue the existence of the universe cannot be simply a brute fact, without any cause or explanation.

Simplified, the PSR states that there is no contingent fact that is a brute fact; but that every contingent fact has an explanation. (A contingent fact is a fact about the world that could be otherwise, like me typing this right now; a necessary fact is one which exists in all possible worlds, like truths of mathematics.) A necessary fact can be said to be “self-explanatory” insofar as its denial would result in a logical contradiction, thus it must be. A contingent fact, however, needs its explanation from something else; its denial does not involve a contradiction.

For instance, the First Way of Aquinas (the argument from motion) assumes that nothing just moves for no reason or cause; it doesn’t just pop from potentiality to actuality, but it needs a sufficient reason, some other entity already in act moving it.

Not only not so, but also, absurd.

And the problem is that the PSR, stated this way, leads to a contradiction. Imagine a world with a set of contingent facts (which could in theory be an infinite set). Now, contrary to Hume, even an infinite set is not “explained” in the sense the term is meant by the PSR, because even though every member of the set has an explanation, a world without that set but with all other features the same would not involve a logical contradiction. For any set therefore, even an infinite set, an explanation must be sought outside the set. (There are also circular sets where A explains B and B explains A, of course.) But we’re always at the same problem, if all we have are contingent facts - the set is never explained. Thus it is argued, in every cosmological proof, that recourse must be had to something necessary. But what is logically entailed by a necessary fact is also itself necessary. Thus, the options are denial of the PSR (which would invalidate all cosmological proofs) or biting the bullet and denying contingency, saying that this world is the only possible one.

I’ve seen some Catholic metaphysicians with Ph.D.s attempt to grapple with this, not very successfully I might add. I’ve read things like “explanation does not mean entailment” pray tell then what does it mean? I’ve read an attempt to deny the above argument, claiming that a contingent set is “explained” when all its members are explained. It’s a serious issue for the Church has dogmatically declared BOTH that the existence of God can be known through created things AND that God created freely without any sort of compulsion or constraint.

jd

 

[JDaniel]

And the problem is that the PSR, stated this way, leads to a contradiction. Imagine a world with a set of contingent facts (which could in theory be an infinite set). Now, contrary to Hume, even an infinite set is not “explained” in the sense the term is meant by the PSR, because even though every member of the set has an explanation, a world without that set but with all other features the same would not involve a logical contradiction. For any set therefore, even an infinite set, an explanation must be sought outside the set. (There are also circular sets where A explains B and B explains A, of course.) But we’re always at the same problem, if all we have are contingent facts - the set is never explained. Thus it is argued, in every cosmological proof, that recourse must be had to something necessary. But what is logically entailed by a necessary fact is also itself necessary. Thus, the options are denial of the PSR (which would invalidate all cosmological proofs) or biting the bullet and denying contingency, saying that this world is the only possible one.

More absurd and strawman reasoning.

I’ve seen some Catholic metaphysicians with Ph.D.s attempt to grapple with this, not very successfully I might add.

When and where - and, what was said? Document or retract.

I’ve read things like “explanation does not mean entailment” pray tell then what does it mean?

When and where - and, what was said? Document or retract.

It’s a serious issue for the Church has dogmatically declared BOTH that the existence of God can be known through created things AND that God created freely without any sort of compulsion or constraint.

And? How is that a serious issue? Are you suggesting that that is contradictory? How?

(Sorry to sound inhospitable, but, that was the tone of your text and I didn’t want to seem subservient to something immaterial.)

jd

 

[JDaniel]

Absolutely ingenious question. I am genuinely impressed by the calibre of this question. Very well put. I am really inexperienced with this topic, but I think I may have a solution. I’m going to state my perhaps deficient argument in various ways until it makes sense (to me, at least).

Even though the cosmological proofs are stating that God must necessarily exist for there to be a contingent universe in existence, it is not stating that God must have necessarily brought the universe into existence. You see the difference?

In other words, given that the universe exists and is contingent, God must necessarily exist to bring it into existence. But this does not equate to God being required to bringing the universe into existence.

The only thing that is stated as being necessary is “if the contingent universe exists, then God, who necessarily exists, was the one to bring it into existence” … and it is not specifically stating “if a particular universe could exist, then God necessarily had to bring it into existence in its particular way.” You see the difference? Does that make any sense?

You seem to be narrowing the usage of the word “necessary” in the cosmological argument. We’re not saying that God necessarily had to bring the universe into existence, but that since we see the universe existing and not non-existing, the conclusion must necessarily be that God did decide to bring it into existence. There is no other reason for it to exist.

Also, it could have existed in different ways because the idea that God must have necessarily created the universe based on the fact that the universe is existing and not non-existing does not imply that it had to exist in one specific kind of way.

Let me give an example (perhaps a very stupid one). Let’s say humans are the only ones that are able to make cars. It’s a contingent thing, though. They don’t have to make cars. But they are able to. Now, upon some observation, it turns out that cars exist. We would say …

"Humans have necessarily made cars."

But there are two interpretations of that phrase …

1. It is necessary for humans to make cars (which denies that humans can choose not to make cars)
2. Given that cars exist, it must necessarily be the case that humans have made those cars (and thus, humans, their creators, exist) … and this does not deny that they were free to choose to make the cars differently if they had so chosen

Obviously, the first one is false and the second one is true. But your objection to the cosmological argument seems to consist of you thinking that it is stating something like the first item here (but it is not … it is saying something like the second one).

I may very well be light-years off your topic, and for that I apologize.

Actually, that was very good.

jd

 

[JDaniel]

Yes, I see the difference, but to do that the cosmological proofs must abandon the PSR at some point. That God created this universe rather than that would be an unexplained brute fact. Thus, appeal to a necessary being leads nowhere in terms of explanations. (There is another big problem here regarding divine simplicity but that would be a bit off-topic.) But anyway why posit a necessary being with a contingent act? Why cannot the creator of the world be a contingent being?

Ask yourself that question: How many contingent beings would we have to regress through before the creation of the universe made any sense whatsoever? If the “series” was infinite, it would never occur and we wouldn’t be here discussing it. (Of course, perhaps we’re not here.)

But once the PSR is denied and it is admitted that there can be eternally existent yet contingent (not logically necessary) entities (in this case God’s action) it becomes impossible to get to a necessary fact (the existence of God, as defined philosophically) because it will always be possible to find an explanation in other eternally contingent entities.

Then you simply do not understand what it is to be actually infinite.

For instance, I can posit a multitude of First Movers, each a mixture of potency in act, but in act from eternity.

Kind of like the billions of human beings on the planet? And, you don’t understand “motion”, “efficient cause”, “necessary cause”, “final cause”, and, “gradations of being”.

Their existence is a matter of brute fact, but the motion is explained (e.g. nothing just pops from potentiality to act).

Cute confusion of the logic of Aquinas.

No matter how you slice it, you have an unexplained, uncaused eternally existent ontological entity. It’s just impossible to argue from the contingent to the necessary, if my objection to the PSR is correct.

Once again, I will state that your argument springs from the straw of a strawman, from whence one can easily be deluded as to the exquisite validity of one’s own exquisite arguments.

jd

 

[Areopagite]

Yes, I see the difference, but to do that the cosmological proofs must abandon the PSR at some point. That God created this universe rather than that would be an unexplained brute fact. Thus, appeal to a necessary being leads nowhere in terms of explanations. (There is another big problem here regarding divine simplicity but that would be a bit off-topic.)

I might be missing you again, but the cosmological proof is simply proving that God is the only one who could have brought this contingent universe into existence, but it is not proving/showing why He did. However, answering why He did is a separate question. It’s just like saying, “If cars exist, humans had to exist to be the ones to make them, whatever their reason was for making them.” In reasoning out that humans existed to make those cars, the question of why they made them is a totally unrelated question.

But for what it’s worth, I think you’re right that, from natural reason, you cannot figure out why God created the universe (I might be wrong). However, I think divine revelation sheds more light on that subject. I could go into that, but maybe it’s an unrelated topic.

But anyway why posit a necessary being with a contingent act? Why cannot the creator of the world be a contingent being?

But once the PSR is denied and it is admitted that there can be eternally existent yet contingent (not logically necessary) entities (in this case God’s action) it becomes impossible to get to a necessary fact (the existence of God, as defined philosophically) because it will always be possible to find an explanation in other eternally contingent entities. For instance, I can posit a multitude of First Movers, each a mixture of potency in act, but in act from eternity. Their existence is a matter of brute fact, but the motion is explained (e.g. nothing just pops from potentiality to act).

Because, if He was contingent, something had to create Him, and that Super-Creator had to be created by a Supreme-Super-Creator, and then we have the same problem. And infinite set of contingent things, since its just made up of contingencies, would itself be contingent … and have no reason to exist. Something necessary had to create them … Otherwise they would not be contingent, they would be necessary. Something like that.

No matter how you slice it, you have an unexplained, uncaused eternally existent ontological entity

The reason why God must necessarily exist is that existence is part of his nature. This is unlike any created thing, whose natures do not include existence, and are thus contingent. God, due to His divine simplicity, has no separations in Him. Thus, His essence equals His existence. That is why He is uncaused and eternally existent.

Something like that.

 

[NowAgnostic]

I might be missing you again, but the cosmological proof is simply proving that God is the only one who could have brought this contingent universe into existence, but it is not proving/showing why He did.

Correct, the universe is held to be the result of a contingent act by a necessary being, not a contingent, brute fact in itself. However, the universe still remains “unexplained”. The PSR is abandoned at this point.

However, answering why He did is a separate question.

One to which there cannot be answer if the universe is truly contingent, and one to which there must be an answer if the PSR holds.

Now why is it more of an “explanation” to say that God created this universe rather than that for no reason versus saying the universe is simply a brute unexplained fact?

BTW saying He did it for “His glory” is no explanation at all. Why did He not create a different universe which would give Him even more?

Because, if He was contingent, something had to create Him,

Why? (Bear in mind I am using “contingent” in the sense that logicians do today, meaning “not logically necessary” not “not existing for eternity”, and “necessary” in the same sense, meaning “logically necessary” not eternal, as explained in the OP.) I am making him an eternally existing yet logically contingent entity. Being eternally existent, he was not created, and yet he is contingent, not logically necessary.

Why must all eternally existent entities be logically necessary? And if they are, then God’s will, eternally existent and immutable, is also logically necessary.

…and that Super-Creator had to be created by a Supreme-Super-Creator, and then we have the same problem. And infinite set of contingent things, since its just made up of contingencies, would itself be contingent … and have no reason to exist. Something necessary had to create them … Otherwise they would not be contingent, they would be necessary. Something like that.

But they’re STILL contingent even if something necessary creates them, unless the act of creation was also necessary!

The reason why God must necessarily exist is that existence is part of his nature. This is unlike any created thing, whose natures do not include existence, and are thus contingent. God, due to His divine simplicity, has no separations in Him. Thus, His essence equals His existence. That is why He is uncaused and eternally existent.

Something like that.

That is, assuming God’s existence is logically possible, and if it is, we don’t need cosmological proofs anyway, since from modal logic if a necessary being is logically possible it exists.

But, since you brought up divine simplicity, His essence and existence are also identical to His actions, since there are no separations in Him, and if His essence is logically necessary, so are His actions, so therefore creation is logically necessary.

 

[NowAgnostic]

More absurd and strawman reasoning.

Do you even know what a “strawman” is? Can you document exactly how my argument is a “strawman”. What argument am I misrepresenting?

When and where - and, what was said? Document or retract.

www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/ap85/papers/ENNFtalk.html

"I think either horn of the dilemma can be embraced by the defender of the PSR. First, the necessity horn. The argument against this relies on the claim that if p explains q then p entails q. But we know this is not always so. "

The ridiculous errors in that essay are too numerous to count. But here’s a doozy:

Here is an ad hominem argument against the claim that if p explains q then p entails q. Here is an explanation of why a dog did not bark: None of the possible causes of the dog’s barking occurred. This is a perfectly good explanation. But unless a Causal Principle is necessarily true, and the opponent of the PSR is apt to deny this, that none of the possible causes of barking have occurred does not entail that the dog did not bark—it might have barked causelessly, after all.

The opponent of the PSR will simply say that a causal principle is not necessarily true, but it might be contingently true in some cases; it might be true in this world that a dog never barks without a cause, and in that case, in that case only, is the fact of none of the possible causes of the dog’s barking occurring an explanation for the dog’s not barking.

And? How is that a serious issue? Are you suggesting that that is contradictory? How?

Yes, I’m suggesting that God’s creation being logically necessary is contradictory to His creating freely.

(Sorry to sound inhospitable, but, that was the tone of your text and I didn’t want to seem subservient to something immaterial.)

There is nothing wrong with the tone of my text. It simply laid out the argument. The fact that you might not like it and can’t refute it is not my fault.

 

[NowAgnostic]

Ask yourself that question: How many contingent beings would we have to regress through before the creation of the universe made any sense whatsoever? If the “series” was infinite, it would never occur and we wouldn’t be here discussing it. (Of course, perhaps we’re not here.)

And just how does positing a necessary being make “sense” of things? What do you mean by “sense”? There is no ultimate explanation for the universe unless it is logically necessary. If the universe is contingent there must be a brute fact somewhere.

Then you simply do not understand what it is to be actually infinite.

Kind of like the billions of human beings on the planet? And, you don’t understand “motion”, “efficient cause”, “necessary cause”, “final cause”, and, “gradations of being”.

Cute confusion of the logic of Aquinas.

Once again, I will state that your argument springs from the straw of a strawman, from whence one can easily be deluded as to the exquisite validity of one’s own exquisite arguments.

jd

Lots of rhetoric, but nothing in the way of a substantive rebuttal…

It’s a cute rhetorical trick to claim your opponent “just doesn’t understand” when you can’t really refute him…

But yeah, kind of like the billions of humans, if one accepts libertarian free will, they are the first movers when they move something from potency to act, their own will doesn’t have a cause.

 

[James_S_Saint]

JDaniel,

I don’t see the hostility that you seem to think NowAgnostic is displaying. Most probably you are projecting.

NowAgnostic,

so far, I don’t error in your reasoning, although I’m wondering what you would conclude if your reasoning was accepted by everyone? What would be the result?

 

[warpspeedpetey]

Thus it is argued, in every cosmological proof, that recourse must be had to something necessary. But what is logically entailed by a necessary fact is also itself necessary.

so whats the problem with this and how does it force the following decision?

Thus, the options are denial of the PSR (which would invalidate all cosmological proofs)

it would also invalidate science. i have a feeling that the PSR isnt the one you would like to dump.

or biting the bullet and denying contingency, saying that this world is the only possible one.

why do i suspect that you would like to deny contingency?

as to this world being the only possible one. why? what evidence do you have that this is the only possible world? i suspect that you have none. at least ive never seen any, maybe you do, this should be interesting.

 

[punkforchrist]

Hi NowAgnostic,

Your question reminds me of the Rowe/van Inwagen objection to the S-PSR (strong version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason). The S-PSR states that every fact has an explanation of its existence. Thus, the conjunction of every contingent fact must itself be contingent. And given that every fact has an explanation, then the conjunction itself must be explained, which can only be a necessary explanation. Rowe and van Inwagen argue that this results in a contradiction, for if A is necessary, and A explains B, then A also entails B and B is necessary. So, the conjunction of all contingent facts would not be contingent after all, which is contradictory.

I think we can easily grant this for the sake of argument and it wouldn’t have any effect on the Cosmological Argument. We can, after all, weaken to S-PSR to the standard PSR, which states that every thing has an explanation of its existence. In this case, God (who exists necessarily) explains the contingent universe, but God’s existence doesn’t entail the universe’s existence. God’s choice to create the universe is logically contingent, since there are possible worlds in which He either creates a different world, or else, no physical universe at all.

In any case, the PSR is only required in Leibnizian Cosmological Argument (LCA). In any Thomistic (TCA) or Kalam (KCA) version, the PSR is not assumed to be true. The only first principle we need in order for the TCA to work, for example, is that out of nothing comes nothing.

 

[Areopagite]

Correct, the universe is held to be the result of a contingent act by a necessary being, not a contingent, brute fact in itself. However, the universe still remains “unexplained”. The PSR is abandoned at this point.

“Unexplained” in what sense? The cosmological proof does indeed explain something, namely, how can a contingent universe exist? Answer: a necessary being brought it into existence. That, my friend, is called an explanation, and one that pertains to the existence of the universe. Thus, you could say:* The universe is explained* (specifically regarding the question of what brought it into existence).

Now, even though that is an explanation regarding the existence of the universe, there are different questions that ask for different explanations about different things. Namely, what would be a reason why God would create the universe? That would be a different explanation about something different regarding the universe. You are being, I think, a bit vague about what exactly is not being explained about the universe.

Once again, the car example: if a car exists, humans must exist because they are the ones who make cars. But why did the humans make cars? Oh no! I don’t know! The cars are unexplained! Thus, humans don’t exist! Right? What? Wait a minute, that doesn’t make any sense. This is what your argument looks like to me. Is this a fair representation?

Now why is it more of an “explanation” to say that God created this universe rather than that for no reason versus saying the universe is simply a brute unexplained fact?

It might be just me, but this is worded a little confusing. I’m not sure I made sense of it.

But, giving it a stab, what is an “explanation”? Well, an explanation is showing the reason for something. Saying that the universe exists because God created it, is more of an explanation than the universe exists for no reason, because the former gives a reason whereas the latter does not.

BTW saying He did it for “His glory” is no explanation at all.

Um … why?

Why did He not create a different universe which would give Him even more?

Maybe He could have. Did He have to? Was He under some moral obligation to? Also, are you implying that there is some possible universe in which God’s glory could be maximized? And would there just be one possible universe of this kind? Or could there be many possible universes that could equally show forth God’s glory to its maximum extent? Or could there always be a possible universe that could show forth His glory more? And, are you assuming He perhaps did not create other universes? In fact, could he have created all possible universes? And, once again, did He have to do this? These are all very good questions, but I’m not quite sure where you’re question is getting at and what the point of it is. I have a few guesses on what you could mean, but instead of exploring each of the possible avenues (which would be fun), I’m going to request you make yourself just a tad more clear.

Why? (Bear in mind I am using “contingent” in the sense that logicians do today, meaning “not logically necessary” not “not existing for eternity”, and “necessary” in the same sense, meaning “logically necessary” not eternal, as explained in the OP.) I am making him an eternally existing yet logically contingent entity. Being eternally existent, he was not created, and yet he is contingent, not logically necessary.

First of all, are you familiar with Aquinas’ idea that God could have created an eternal universe (a world without a temporal beginning or a temporal end)? However, in that case, the universe is entirely made up of contingent things, and thus you could say the universe itself, eternal or not, is contingent. If the eternal universe is contingent then it needs to be created, otherwise it would be necessary, but it isn’t because it’s entirely made up of contingencies. Saying that it exists for no reason, is by definition no explanation, whereas saying that it exists because God created it is by definition an explanation because it gives a reason (and, I would also hold, a reason that works).

Now, if you say that God is eternal but logically contingent (and I’m not sure what you mean here by that), then God is like this eternal universe that still requires an explanation. However, if His essence is His existence, so thus He is necessary absolutely, without any possible condition.

I hope that kind of makes sense.

Why must all eternally existent entities be logically necessary? And if they are, then God’s will, eternally existent and immutable, is also logically necessary.

It was never said that eternally existent entities must necessarily exist absolutely. Thomas never said that either. In fact, he said the opposite. Therefore, I’m afraid, your conclusion does not follow.

But, since you brought up divine simplicity, His essence and existence are also identical to His actions, since there are no separations in Him, and if His essence is logically necessary, so are His actions, so therefore creation is logically necessary.

Clever. But I think that since his actions are contingent (at least the actions that proceed out of Him, unlike the ones that do not, like the Trinitarian processions), they are extrinsic to His nature. You see, there are no separations in what is in Him, but you can actually and really distinguish the actions that are not in Him, but proceed out of Him (like Creation). Thus, creation, which is an action that proceeded out of Him and not in Him, is not an intrinsic and inseparable part of God. Now, of course, pantheists would disagree.

Now, I’m kind of a beginner with all this, so I may be wrong in everything I say. (I hope not though)

By the way, I don’t think you are being disrespectful, NowAgnostic (contrary to what others might think … and I apologize on behalf of them). You are being admirably well-mannered and professional in your arguments.

 

[punkforchrist]

Here’s an example of a TCA that doesn’t rely on the PSR:

1. Every existing being is either corruptible or necessary.
2. Something has always existed.
3. Every corruptible being potentially fails to exist.
4. Given infinite time, every real potentiality will be actualized.
5. Hence, there is some time in the infinite past in which every corruptible being collectively fails to exist.
6. Therefore, a necessary being exists. (From 1, 2, and 5).

The PSR deals with what is logically contingent and logically necessary. The TCA, on the other hand, deals strictly with what is temporally contingent (i.e. corruptible) and temporally necessary. A thing that exists can either potentially fail to exist (it is corruptible), or it cannot not-be (it is necessary). There’s no third option available here, as there may be with a denial of the PSR (brute facts).

If we agree that out of nothing comes nothing, then it must be the case that something has always existed if, in fact, something exists right now. But, via premises (3), (4) and (5), we know that there must have been a state in which no corruptible being existed. Now, since something must have existed during that state, the only thing that possibly could have existed was a necessary being. As a result, (6) follows necessarily.

Of course, this doesn’t prove that the necessary being is God. Additional arguments need to be raised in order to demonstrate that. However, this conclusion does lead us in the God-direction.

 

[JDaniel]

Originally Posted by NowAgnostic:

***Every cosmological proof ***for God’s existence must assume some form of the principle of sufficient reason (PSR). For they must argue the existence of the universe cannot be simply a brute fact, without any cause or explanation.

Simplified, the PSR states that there is no contingent fact that is a brute fact; but that every contingent fact has an explanation. (A contingent fact is a fact about the world that could be otherwise, like me typing this right now; a necessary fact is one which exists in all possible worlds, like truths of mathematics.) A necessary fact can be said to be “self-explanatory” insofar as its denial would result in a logical contradiction, thus it must be. A contingent fact, however, needs its explanation from something else; its denial does not involve a contradiction.

For instance, the First Way of Aquinas (the argument from motion) assumes that nothing just moves for no reason or cause; it doesn’t just pop from potentiality to actuality, but it needs a sufficient reason, some other entity already in act moving it.

Not only not so, but also, absurd.

Assertion # 1 (IN BOLD PRINT) is NOT SO:

1. Typology of Cosmological Arguments

Craig distinguishes three types of cosmological arguments. The first, advocated by Aquinas, is based on the impossiblity of an essentially ordered infinite regress. The second, which Craig terms the kalām argument, holds that an infinite temporal regress is impossible because an actual infinite is impossible. The third, espoused by Leibniz and Clarke, is overtly founded on the Principle of Sufficient Reason (Craig 1980, 282). Another way of distinguishing between versions of the argument is in terms of the relevance of time. In Aquinas’s version, consideration of the essential ordering of the causes or reasons proceeds independent of temporal concerns. The relationship between cause and effect is treated as real but not temporal, so that the first cause is not a first cause in time but a sustaining cause. In the kalām version, however, the temporal ordering of the causal sequence is central. The distinction between these types of argument is important because the objections raised against one version may not be relevant to the other versions. So, for example, a critique of the principle of sufficient reason, which one finds developed by William Rowe or Richard Gale, might not be telling against the Thomistic or kalām versions of the argument.- STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, found at: plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmological-argument/

The very first statement of your argument makes an unfounded assertion. If you are going to begin your proof-reasoning with an error, one can only guess at how big it will be by its end.

jd