Proof of nonexistence of free will

[glowingembers]

1. If X is my free choice, it must be determined by my desire (intention) Y.
   NOTE: this is a necessary condition for a free choice, because if my choice is not determined by my desire (intention) then it happens without my desire (intention) and so is unintentional.
2. If I don’t choose my desire Y freely, then my choice X is determined by something I didn’t choose freely and hence X is not my free choice.
3. If I choose my desire Y freely, then it must be determined by my desire Y2 (according to point no. 1).
4. If I don’t choose my desire Y2 freely, then my choice Y and consequently X is determined by something I didn’t choose freely and hence X is not my free choice.
5. If I choose my desire Y2 freely, then it must be determined by my desire Y3 (according to point no. 1). And so on. It’s an infinite regress or there is a first desire that is not determined by another desire and is therefore not freely chosen. Hence, my choice X is never free.

 

[JohnDamian]

This is not correct.

The will’s act is posterior only temporally to the act of intellection; in terms of logical supremacy the will is prior.

1. If X is my free choice, it must be determined by my desire (intention) Y.

The intellection (Y) only serves to form object formation and organisation in your mind; it does not serve to compel the act; as the wills act is logically (and experientially) prior. In that, X is not determined per se, it is merely presented by the intellect.

this is a necessary condition for a free choice, because if my choice is not determined by my desire (intention) then it happens without my desire (intention) and so is unintentional.

It is not nessecary, for the volition of the will can occur prior to intellection; it is true that the intellect and the will are only formally distinct; as they have a less than real distinction between them. However, as the intellect presents a choice the will can ignore such presentation; and as the will can act prior to intellection (although rarely) it is in no sense contingent or determined by desire.

1. If I don’t choose my desire Y freely, then my choice X is determined by something I didn’t choose freely and hence X is not my free choice.

If you desire a thing, but your will solicits an act to the contrary it is true that your abstracted “choice” in terms of intellection was not so determinate of your act; but nonetheless, the acts of the will are free - in that they are distinct from compulsions or determinations (albeit only formally).

It appears that you are mistaking the (posterior) contemplations and choices of the intellect for those of the will. In essence, for a will to be free it must also be independant of intellection, which it (experientially) is.

 

[glowingembers]

The intellection (Y) only serves to form object formation and organisation in your mind; it does not serve to compel the act; as the wills act is logically (and experientially) prior.

Do you mean to say that the will acts even before it knows why it acts? Doesn’t that make will blind, irrational?

 

[LilyM]

Do you mean to say that the will acts even before it knows why it acts? Doesn’t that make will blind, irrational?

But desire is never the sole determiner of how we act. Many times we will desire but not act on that desire. For example, we’ll form the intention of waking up early and going for a run, but then when the alarm goes off hit the snooze button and go back to sleep. Or the converse - form the intention of sleeping in and taking it easy, until we wake up and see how good the weather is.

As St Paul says ‘I fail to do the good that I want to do, and do the evil that I do not wish to do’.

So being that we can and do often act contrary to our desires, its a false premise to say that they determine how we will act such that our will is not free.

 

[JohnDamian]

Do you mean to say that the will acts even before it knows why it acts? Doesn’t that make will blind, irrational?

That is why in general the will is temporally posterior to intellection.

However, it is only posterior in time, and not in logical priority.

So even though in general we think before we act - what we think does not compel how we act. I could desire this or that particular; but not will it. I could also will this or that particular without desiring it.

 

[sbsand]

1. If X is my free choice, it must be determined by my desire (intention) Y.
   NOTE: this is a necessary condition for a free choice, because if my choice is not determined by my desire (intention) then it happens without my desire (intention) and so is unintentional.

I agree that you cannot will something that you don’t desire, but it doesn’t follow that choice is determined by desire.
We have at least three types of desire: short-term satisfaction (pleasure), long-term satisfaction and the ultimate good.
A free choice involves seeking to satisfy one of these desires at the cost of another.
You could argue that choice is then just determined by the strongest desire.
But these three types of desires are qualitatively different. They cannot be compared quantitatively, so there is no ‘strongest.’

 

[glowingembers]

But desire is never the sole determiner of how we act. Many times we will desire but not act on that desire. For example, we’ll form the intention of waking up early and going for a run, but then when the alarm goes off hit the snooze button and go back to sleep. Or the converse - form the intention of sleeping in and taking it easy, until we wake up and see how good the weather is.

And the decision to go back to sleep is not determined by our desire to go back to sleep? It must be, unless we go back to sleep unintentionally (without a conscious desire to go back to sleep). So it holds that our choice is determined by our desire or it is not determined by our desire (in which case the choice is unintentional). Either way, it is not free.

As St Paul says ‘I fail to do the good that I want to do, and do the evil that I do not wish to do’.

Then his doing evil is determined by his desire, or it is not determined by his desire (in which case it is unintentional). Even though we say that we do not wish to do something evil we often do have a desire for that evil thing and that’s why we do it. In that case we have two conflicting desires: a desire not to do the evil thing and a desire to do the evil thing, and our action will be determined by both desires, but the stronger desire will prevail (unless causes other than our desires make us do otherwise).

 

[Earnest_Bunbury]

From the Summa 1. q.83. a1:

On the contrary, It is written (Sirach 15:14):** “God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel”; and the gloss adds: “That is of his free-will.”**

I answer that, Man has free-will: otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain. In order to make this evident, we must observe that some things act without judgment; as a stone moves downwards; and in like manner all things which lack knowledge. And some act from judgment, but not a free judgment; as brute animals. For the sheep, seeing the wolf, judges it a thing to be shunned, from a natural and not a free judgment, because it judges, not from reason, but from natural instinct. And the same thing is to be said of any judgment of brute animals. But man acts from judgment, because by his apprehensive power he judges that something should be avoided or sought. But because this judgment, in the case of some particular act, is not from a natural instinct, but from some act of comparison in the reason, therefore he acts from free judgment and retains the power of being inclined to various things. For reason in contingent matters may follow opposite courses, as we see in dialectic syllogisms and rhetorical arguments. Now particular operations are contingent, and therefore in such matters the judgment of reason may follow opposite courses, and is not determinate to one. And forasmuch as man is rational is it necessary that man have a free-will.

newadvent.org/summa/1083.htm#article1

One has reason until one clouds this in desire: Summa 1-2. q.77. a1

A passion of the sensitive appetite cannot draw or move the will directly; but it can do so indirectly, and this in two ways. First, by a kind of distraction: because, since all the soul’s powers are rooted in the one essence of the soul, it follows of necessity that, when one power is intent in its act, another power becomes remiss…Secondly, this may happen on the part of the will’s object, which is good apprehended by reason. Because the judgment and apprehension of reason is impeded on account of a vehement and inordinate apprehension of the imagination and judgment of the estimative power, as appears in those who are out of their mind.

newadvent.org/summa/2077.htm#article1

 

[glowingembers]

That is why in general the will is temporally posterior to intellection.

However, it is only posterior in time, and not in logical priority.

So you’re saying that will is temporally posterior to intellection but logically prior to intellection. Then what does “logically prior” mean?

 

[abucs]

glowingembers - good logical post. Very thought provoking.

My quick (ill thought out) questions/hypothesis -

1. What if our will is attached to (but distinct from) our creation in the physical world?
2. And that physical creation has as it’s formed starting point the presence of a multitude of basic physical and emotional desires. Then our will chooses between these desires.
3. So there are pre-existing desires (many of them) as the initial starting point in the nature of man (not chosen) and it is the will that then chooses between them in which path we go down in subsequent circumstances - like whether to take the fruit in the garden or not.
4. As we choose to favour certain pre-existing desires over others then we form the type of being we are.

Would this not get over the problem of all desires having to be originally chosen from other desires etc and without also invalidating the definition of free will ???

P.S. (As an aside - The free will which chooses to be more like God might bring us into closer connection with God (the ultimate reality) while our free will choices that are opposite to God might take us further away from that connection).

 

[grannymh]

Do you mean to say that the will acts even before it knows why it acts? Doesn’t that make will blind, irrational?

Our will is naturally directed (different than action) to the greatest good. However, we can choose actions which are less good and often bad.

Both will and intellect are powers or faculties of the non-material spiritual soul in human nature.

Blessings,
granny

The human person is worthy of profound respect from the moment of conception.

 

[LilyM]

And the decision to go back to sleep is not determined by our desire to go back to sleep? It must be, unless we go back to sleep unintentionally (without a conscious desire to go back to sleep). So it holds that our choice is determined by our desire or it is not determined by our desire (in which case the choice is unintentional). Either way, it is not free.

You’re confusing desire with intention. They aren’t the same thing at all, of course. I can look at a chocolate iced donut and DESIRE to eat it, but yet not actively form the INTENTION to eat it. I can look at some brussels sprouts and NOT desire to eat them, and yet actively form the INTENTION to eat them.

Of course there are times when I will follow neither my desire nor my intention. Say my desire is to sleep but I force myself to get up. But my intention isn’t just to get up - it’s to get up AND go for a run, remember. Let’s say I get up but DON’T go for a run, and do something else instead. In that case I’ve acted contrary to BOTH my desire AND my intention (at least partly).

Then his doing evil is determined by his desire, or it is not determined by his desire (in which case it is unintentional). Even though we say that we do not wish to do something evil we often do have a desire for that evil thing and that’s why we do it.

Ah, but that doesn’t mean we have the INTENTION to do that evil. Again, do you mean desire or do you mean intention? If we eat the donut then our desire is stronger than our intention. If we eat that brussels sprout our intention is stronger than our desire. So is our act equivalent to our desire? No, not always. Is it equivalent to our intention? Again, not always.

I have yet to be convinced that either desire or intention is so completely tied in with questions of will. We do a lot of things completely without conscious thought, or with very little consciousness going into them.

In that case we have two conflicting desires: a desire not to do the evil thing and a desire to do the evil thing, and our action will be determined by both desires, but the stronger desire will prevail (unless causes other than our desires make us do otherwise).

That’s the nub of it. There are so many more factors at play in our actions than simple desire or intention to do them. So often I won’t have the donut, say, simply because I don’t have any money in my purse at that moment with which to pay for it. Or won’t go for a run for mixed motives - because the weather’s slightly bad more so than out of any desire for sleep. Or eat the brussels sprouts, not because I have any real desire to eat them, but simply because if I don’t they’ll go to waste and I hate to see food wasted - in other words out of an unrelated desire to the actual act.

But one reason my will is free is that the possibilities are always manifold, and I don’t usually just have the simple option of ‘yes’ or ‘no’, with no inbetween. I might buy the donut and only have one bite. I might, as I said earlier, get up but not run, or go to the gym instead, or something. That multiplicity of choices at any given time means my behaviour is much less predetermined than you seem to think.

Then too, both our desires and intentions are often vague, including but not limited to our actions. My desire and intention might simply be ‘to get some exercise’, without me particularly caring or forming an intention as to the particular type, which may be determined as much by chance circumstances of the moment as anything. For example my eyes lighting on my skipping rope before they fall on my treadmill, which influences me to skip rather than use the treadmill for my exercise.

 

[glowingembers]

I agree that you cannot will something that you don’t desire, but it doesn’t follow that choice is determined by desire.

A choice doesn’t have to be determined by a desire, but then it is unintentional.

We have at least three types of desire: short-term satisfaction (pleasure), long-term satisfaction and the ultimate good.
A free choice involves seeking to satisfy one of these desires at the cost of another.
You could argue that choice is then just determined by the strongest desire.
But these three types of desires are qualitatively different. They cannot be compared quantitatively, so there is no ‘strongest.’

Even though the desires may be qualitatively different they may affect you in the qualitatively same way: they may motivate you in certains directions in the same or related space and that’s when they can come into conflict (for example a desire to buy ice cream moves you to buy ice cream, while a desire not to buy ice cream moves you in the opposite direction - not to buy ice cream, in the same space of “ice cream-buying”). If the desires motivate you in different independent or compatible spaces, then they don’t come into conflict (for example a desire to buy ice cream moves you in the direction of buying ice cream while a desire to sing moves you in the direction of singing). So if you say that it is impossible to compare how different desires affect you with respect to a certain action, then they cannot be in conflict with each other with respect to that action - you can’t say which desire is “stronger” but it doesn’t matter.

Another way how to formulate the solution to your dilemma of qualitatively different desires is that if you intentionally choose to satisfy one of those desires rather than another, then this choice itself must be determined by a desire (intention) - so we’re back to your choice being determined by a desire (unless it is unintentional).

 

[glowingembers]

Quote:
On the contrary, It is written (Sirach 15:14): “God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel”; and the gloss adds: “That is of his free-will.”

I answer that, Man has free-will: otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain.

When counsels, exhortations etc. are associated with a man’s desires, then they can motivate him through his desires. So this is just another case when a man is motivated by his desires.

 

[glowingembers]

1. What if our will is attached to (but distinct from) our creation in the physical world?
2. And that physical creation has as it’s formed starting point the presence of a multitude of basic physical and emotional desires. Then our will chooses between these desires.
3. So there are pre-existing desires (many of them) as the initial starting point in the nature of man (not chosen) and it is the will that then chooses between them in which path we go down in subsequent circumstances - like whether to take the fruit in the garden or not.
4. As we choose to favour certain pre-existing desires over others then we form the type of being we are.

But why would we choose to favor certain desires over others? Again, because of a desire (then our choice follows from this desire) or not because of a desire (then our choice is unintentional).

 

[fhansen]

If you desire a thing, but your will solicits an act to the contrary it is true that your abstracted “choice” in terms of intellection was not so determinate of your act; but nonetheless, the acts of the will are free - in that they are distinct from compulsions or determinations (albeit only formally).

It appears that you are mistaking the (posterior) contemplations and choices of the intellect for those of the will. In essence, for a will to be free it must also be independant of intellection, which it (experientially) is.

But if a will is free from *our *intellection, whose will is it? Is it really free? It seems to me that various impulses, reasonings, conflicting interests, external forces, etc, can all be at play-in fact must be at play-in order for there to exist something to desire, to “will about”.

It seems that, if an animal wants to do something, it simply does it-there is no separation between will and desire. But for us, where various desires compete and we can reflect on them, the outcome would not be as predictable.

1. If I don’t choose my desire Y freely, then my choice X is determined by something I didn’t choose freely and hence X is not my free choice.
2. If I choose my desire Y freely, then it must be determined by my desire Y2 (according to point no. 1).
   ]

In the end, I don’t know that we choose our desires at all. They may come from within, i.e. from our natures-or from without, from various influences.

 

[JohnDamian]

But if a will is free from *our *intellection, whose will is it? Is it really free? It seems to me that various impulses, reasonings, conflicting interests, external forces, etc, can all be at play-in fact must be at play-in order for there to exist something to desire, to “will about”.

It seems that, if an animal wants to do something, it simply does it-there is no separation between the will and desire. But for us, where various desires compete and we can reflect on them, the outcome would not be as predictable.

In the end, I don’t know that we choose our desires at all. They may come from within, i.e. from our natures-or from without, from various influences.

The will is not really distinct from intellection, yet only formally so.

Evidently the intellect gives us many things to will about, hence it’s temporal priority in general. However it is by it’s overall logical priority that it the will is essentially determinate of the act; and not intellect. By logical priority here it is that the will is the first and foremost entity in the determination of an act of volition or nolition.

Whilst it is true that the intellect provides us things to will about; it does not determine nessecarily the acts of the will, as this is contrary to judgements and experiences.

Likewise, desires are merely formulations that are not compelling in the act. It is certain that in general desires can influence our acts; but they do not do so in a compelling way; except in instances where one wills to not exersise their freedom over the act; this is usually where there is congruency in both the desire and the will; for example if I put my hand in a pot of hot water; there is no incongruency in my desire to be free from pain; and my will. However; were I to exercise my will and hurt myself I would be able to create an incongruency between my desires and my will. And, as the will is logically prior - it’s determination stands.

 

[glowingembers]

You’re confusing desire with intention. They aren’t the same thing at all, of course. I can look at a chocolate iced donut and DESIRE to eat it, but yet not actively form the INTENTION to eat it. I can look at some brussels sprouts and NOT desire to eat them, and yet actively form the INTENTION to eat them.

Words “desire” and “intention” may have different connotations in some situations but both a desire and an intention direct you toward an action. You seem to give the word “desire” the connotation of pleasantness or pleasure from food and contrast it with an “intention” that is directed opposite this pleasure from food. However, if you have an intention not to eat a pleasant donut we can just as well say you have a desire not to eat the donut. On the one hand, you have a desire to eat the donut presumably because of its pleasant taste (that’s what you called DESIRE) and on the other hand you have a desire not to eat the donut presumably because of some other reason, maybe health concerns, body shape, lack of money coupled with unwillingness to steal or get indebted etc. (that’s what you called INTENTION). Both DESIRE and INTENTION are a motive that moves you toward an action, and that’s why I don’t think there is a significant difference between them for my argument.

Of course there are times when I will follow neither my desire nor my intention. Say my desire is to sleep but I force myself to get up. But my intention isn’t just to get up - it’s to get up AND go for a run, remember. Let’s say I get up but DON’T go for a run, and do something else instead. In that case I’ve acted contrary to BOTH my desire AND my intention (at least partly).

Why, then, would you act contrary to your desire and intention? Either because of some other desire or intention, or not because of some other desire or intention. In the first case your action is determined by a desire or an intention (and the rest of my argument follows); in the second case your action is undesired or unintended.

Ah, but that doesn’t mean we have the INTENTION to do that evil. Again, do you mean desire or do you mean intention? If we eat the donut then our desire is stronger than our intention. If we eat that brussels sprout our intention is stronger than our desire. So is our act equivalent to our desire? No, not always. Is it equivalent to our intention? Again, not always.

It doesn’t matter if you call the motive “desire” or “intention”. If you claim that your choice is free, then it must be determined by your desire or intention (whichever sounds better to you) and then you find that it is ultimately determined by something you neither desired nor intended.

I have yet to be convinced that either desire or intention is so completely tied in with questions of will. We do a lot of things completely without conscious thought, or with very little consciousness going into them.

I don’t deny that we can do something unconsciously but these acts are usually not regarded as free will acts.

That’s the nub of it. There are so many more factors at play in our actions than simple desire or intention to do them.

Of course there may be various other factors, besides our desires or intentions, that determine our choices. I just say that if our choice is free, then it must be determined by our desires or intentions. If our choice is not determined by our desires or intentions then it is not free no matter what it is determined by.

So often I won’t have the donut, say, simply because I don’t have any money in my purse at that moment with which to pay for it. Or won’t go for a run for mixed motives - because the weather’s slightly bad more so than out of any desire for sleep. Or eat the brussels sprouts, not because I have any real desire to eat them, but simply because if I don’t they’ll go to waste and I hate to see food wasted - in other words out of an unrelated desire to the actual act.

Again, all these are desires or intentions.

But one reason my will is free is that the possibilities are always manifold, and I don’t usually just have the simple option of ‘yes’ or ‘no’, with no inbetween. I might buy the donut and only have one bite. I might, as I said earlier, get up but not run, or go to the gym instead, or something. That multiplicity of choices at any given time means my behaviour is much less predetermined than you seem to think.

If your desire to eat a donut is stronger than, say, your health concerns (which motivate you in the opposite direction), then you will eat the donut but not as much as you would eat if you had no health concerns - both your desires (good taste, good health) determine your action but the stronger desire prevails. The multiplicity of desires and choices can facilitate the illusion of free will but it doesn’t mean you have free will.

 

[fhansen]

However; were I to exercise my will and hurt myself I would be able to create an incongruency between my desires and my will. And, as the will is logically prior - it’s determination stands.

Interesting. But wouldn’t the will to hurt yourself also come from a desire to hurt yourself-for whatever reason, albeit a conflicting one with the desire to be free from pain?

 

[JohnDamian]

Interesting. But wouldn’t the will to hurt yourself also come from a desire to hurt yourself-for whatever reason, albeit a conflicting one with the desire to be free from pain?

A desire is an object of the intellect, whilst it is entirely possible the desire to hurt oneself could emerge in the brain it is not nessecarily the case; one could easily act without any thought on the matter; thereby acting without a desire.