Proof of nonexistence of free will

[glowingembers]

Evidently the intellect gives us many things to will about, hence it’s temporal priority in general. However it is by it’s overall logical priority that it the will is essentially determinate of the act; and not intellect. By logical priority here it is that the will is the first and foremost entity in the determination of an act of volition or nolition.

Whilst it is true that the intellect provides us things to will about; it does not determine nessecarily the acts of the will, as this is contrary to judgements and experiences.

Ok, so basically you say that will acts based on intellect but not solely based on intellect. I say that, to the extent that will does not act based on intellect (desires, intentions), the will is blind/unintentional, and so is the action that is determined by it. So our actions are determined by a combination of a basically blind, unintentional will and our intellect (desires, intentions). They are in general determined partly unintentionally and partly intentionally. But does this describe what we imagine as free will? The unintentional part hardly so, and the intentional part leads us to the causal influence of our desires and intentions, which are ultimately determined by something we neither desired nor intended.

 

[JohnDamian]

Ok, so basically you say that will acts based on intellect but not solely based on intellect. I say that, to the extent that will does not act based on intellect (desires, intentions), the will is blind/unintentional, and so is the action that is determined by it. So our actions are determined by a combination of a basically blind, unintentional will and our intellect (desires, intentions). They are in general determined partly unintentionally and partly intentionally. But does this describe what we imagine as free will? The unintentional part hardly so, and the intentional part leads us to the causal influence of our desires and intentions, which are ultimately determined by something we neither desired nor intended.

You are presuming that the will is blind because it does not act in nessecarily with the intellects choices. This is not the case.

Every elicited act of the will is free in the sense of its being an act of self-determination elicited contingently and not deterministically. The prior liberty of the will frees it from the need to seek self-perfection as a primary goal; it consists in the free wills congenital inclination towards the good in accord with its intrinsic worth or value rather than in terms of how it may perfect self or nature. This pursuit is certainly not blind.

For the purposes of this I am referring to the affectio iustitiae of St Anselm.

 

[JM3]

1. If X is my free choice, it must be determined by my desire (intention) Y.
   NOTE: this is a necessary condition for a free choice, because if my choice is not determined by my desire (intention) then it happens without my desire (intention) and so is unintentional.

Your basic premise is incorrect. Free choice, or will, is not determined solely by desire. Nor does desire equal, or mean, intention. Thus, your conclusion, based on an incorrect premise, is false. While desire is a variable, it is not the only variable. Intellect and reason are also variables and must be included into the equation.

 

[glowingembers]

You are presuming that the will is blind because it does not act in nessecarily with the intellects choices. This is not the case.

If the will acts independently of the intellect it means it acts without desires and intentions. How is that not blind?

The prior liberty of the will frees it from the need to seek self-perfection as a primary goal; it consists in the free wills congenital inclination towards the good in accord with its intrinsic worth or value rather than in terms of how it may perfect self or nature. This pursuit is certainly not blind.

Inclinations, preferences and values are motives that direct you toward an action - they are parts of desires or intentions, which I thought you associated with intellect rather than will. But whether you associate some desires/intentions with “will” and others with “intellect”, what matters is that a choice that is not determined by desires/intentions is blind, and a choice that is determined by desires/intentions is ultimately determined by something we never desired/intended.

 

[JohnDamian]

Inclinations, preferences and values are motives that direct you toward an action - they are parts of desires or intentions, which I thought you associated with intellect rather than will. But whether you associate some desires/intentions with “will” and others with “intellect”, what matters is that a choice that is not determined by desires/intentions is blind, and a choice that is determined by desires/intentions is ultimately determined by something we never desired/intended.

Not so; our congenital inclinations are essentially ourselves, and are not really distinct from our soul. To try and say they are distinct is to deny that we have a rational soul. This rational soul is ourselves; and thus our wills are not dictated by anything external to us, nor is it blind.

 

[glowingembers]

Your basic premise is incorrect. Free choice, or will, is not determined solely by desire. Nor does desire equal, or mean, intention. Thus, your conclusion, based on an incorrect premise, is false. While desire is a variable, it is not the only variable. Intellect and reason are also variables and must be included into the equation.

Intellect and reason are part of the equation but if they are to have an influence on your free choice they must translate into your desires or intentions, which then influence the choice. I don’t think there is a significant difference between desire and intention because both are motives that influence your choice.
Then of course there may be other variables, besides desires and intentions, that determine your choice but they don’t make the choice any more free - they are the unintentional contribution to your choice.

 

[glowingembers]

Not so; our congenital inclinations are essentially ourselves, and are not really distinct from our soul. To try and say they are distinct is to deny that we have a rational soul. This rational soul is ourselves; and thus our wills are not dictated by anything external to us, nor is it blind.

I didn’t mean to say anything about a “self” or “soul” and I don’t think it’s relevant for free will. The fact that congenital inclinations are ourselves/our soul just means that we have desires we didn’t freely choose.

 

[fhansen]

Not so; our congenital inclinations are essentially ourselves, and are not really distinct from our soul. To try and say they are distinct is to deny that we have a rational soul. This rational soul is ourselves; and thus our wills are not dictated by anything external to us, nor is it blind.

I guess it sort of depends on how you define who “we” are. Certainly from a Catholic perspective, there exists a natural law that determines our natures. And by acting from that nature our wills should be perfectly directed. But, with this line of thought, the possession of a *free will *means that our wills can also be misdirected-by something. In any case, who’s in charge? Do our desires, reasoning, impulses, intellection, have nothing to do with who we are, are they necessarily “distinct from the soul”?

Or where do we draw the line? For every act, whether or not others may consider it objectively evil, the actor will generally have a justification for it. He’ll maintain that the act is right-that he is right-that the act was in accord with his nature or did not come from an inclination distinct from the soul.

 

[JohnDamian]

I didn’t mean to say anything about a “self” or “soul” and I don’t think it’s relevant for free will. The fact that congenital inclinations are ourselves/our soul just means that we have desires we didn’t freely choose.

These inclinations are not really distinct from ourselves. They are only formally distinct.

 

[JohnDamian]

Or where do we draw the line? For every act, whether or not others may consider it objectively evil, the actor will generally have a justification for it. He’ll maintain that the act is right-that he is right-that the act was in accord with his nature or did not come from an inclination distinct from the soul.

Particular claims from agents or entities do not pervert the objective truth; not that it is sensible to claim that any human agent knows what this truth is. It is only with the predication of omniscience that a being can comprehend if an act is performed in accord with that entities nature or not.

 

[fhansen]

I didn’t mean to say anything about a “self” or “soul” and I don’t think it’s relevant for free will. The fact that congenital inclinations are ourselves/our soul just means that we have desires we didn’t freely choose.

I think our wills are free insofar as they can choose between options. But the options are limited to, perhaps, various natural inclinations which may conflict with not necessarily natural ones, along with physical limitations ( I can’t fly like a bird whether or not I will to).

 

[glowingembers]

These inclinations are not really distinct from ourselves. They are only formally distinct.

Ok, so we didn’t freely choose who we are, or at least this part of ourselves.

 

[fhansen]

Particular claims from agents or entities do not pervert the objective truth; not that it is sensible to claim that any human agent knows what this truth is. It is only with the predication of omniscience that a being can comprehend if an act is performed in accord with that entities nature or not.

So, as a Catholic, we “know” that its possible-and in which ways it might be possible- to act outside of our natures only due to revelation? And we discern this truth by faith-meaning by the enlightening power of the intellect by grace?

 

[JohnDamian]

Ok, so we didn’t freely choose who we are, or at least this part of ourselves.

Of course we didn’t choose who we are, if we chose who we are we would have had to already exist before we chose etc. ad infinitum.



We were created; and of course elements of ourselves are constrained - but in the same way as I am physically free I am wilfully free. Yes; I cannot physically fly, but I am physically free; likewise I cannot will a contradiction or will that I stop willing; but some restrictions do not mean that the will is not free; merely that it is not unconstrained.

I don’t think anyone is arguing that the will is completely unbounded; but I am certainly arguing that the decisions of the will are not nessecarily caused or determined by intellection or any other factor.

 

[glowingembers]

I think our wills are free insofar as they can choose between options.

Every choice is determined by our desires or is not determined by our desires. The first case leads to determination by something we never desired (as I showed in OP) and the second case lacks intentionality. Neither case seems to support belief in free will.

 

[glowingembers]

I don’t think anyone is arguing that the will is completely unbounded; but I am certainly arguing that the decisions of the will are not nessecarily caused or determined by intellection or any other factor.

But if they are not caused by intellection, which we didn’t freely choose, then they are caused only by the “congenital inclinations of the will”, which we didn’t freely choose either.

 

[JohnDamian]

But if they are not caused by intellection, which we didn’t freely choose, then they are caused only by the “congenital inclinations of the will”, which we didn’t freely choose either.

The congenital inclinations of the will are really identical to who we are. Our choices are chosen by ourselves. - This is what is meant by free will, that we choose our choices.

The only choice all of us did not choose is to be created; as we did not exist before we were conceived; and so were somewhat unable to give our consent.

 

[fhansen]

The congenital inclinations of the will are really identical to who we are. Our choices are chosen by ourselves. - This is what is meant by free will, that we choose our choices.

The only choice all of us did not choose is to be created; as we did not exist before we were conceived; and so were somewhat unable to give our consent.

IOW, Gods will and ours should be the same, for each of us, but, of course, things didn’t necessarily go that way from Genesis? Sorry, I know I’m getting a little off track.

 

[glowingembers]

The congenital inclinations of the will are really identical to who we are. Our choices are chosen by ourselves. - This is what is meant by free will, that we choose our choices.

I don’t think it enables free will that our choices are chosen by ourselves. Involuntary ticks and hemorrhages are chosen by ourselves too and we don’t regard them as acts of free will. When we do something unconsciously it is again chosen by ourselves and we don’t regard that as an act of free will. What we do regard as an act of free will is an act that is determined by our desire or intention, but even then it is ultimately determined by something we neither desired nor intended.

 

[JohnDamian]

I don’t think it enables free will that our choices are chosen by ourselves. Involuntary ticks and hemorrhages are chosen by ourselves too and we don’t regard them as acts of free will. When we do something unconsciously it is again chosen by ourselves and we don’t regard that as an act of free will. What we do regard as an act of free will is an act that is determined by our desire or intention, but even then it is ultimately determined by something we neither desired nor intended.

I am afraid that ticks and hemorrahages are not caused by ourselves inasmuch as they are caused by external influences, or internal failures symptomatic of some bodily imbalance or affliction. The consequences for our body (which is formally distinct from our soul) may include those that are burdensome or damaging; likewise determinations of the will may lead to burdensome or damaging effects.

Nonetheless; the will is clearly different from ticks; in that the will conforms to a natural inclination; wheras ticks are the product of a natural failure.

I am more than the materials of my body; although they are me; likewise, I am more than my intellect; although it is me. The individuator in humans is the rational soul; which is distinct formally from our mind or body; and in truth what our haecceity is - what we are per se; and as an element of our rational soul is the disposition to inclinations that composite the will we are thus.

Now; this is distinct from external influences and externally implanted desires of the intellect; as the dispositions of the rational soul are internal and are essentially what we are. Therein our will is free inasmuch as it determines itself; we are free in as much as we determine our own actions; freedom entails self-determination, and as the will is self-determining it is, and we are free.