Property Dualism compatible with Catholicism?

[awatkins69]

Many modern philosophers consider property dualism and emergentism to be the best explanation for mental entities such as ourselves and person-hood. Is it compatible with Catholicism? I’d like to hear your opinion.

 

[CDNowak]

Many modern philosophers consider property dualism and emergentism to be the best explanation for mental entities such as ourselves and person-hood. Is it compatible with Catholicism? I’d like to hear your opinion.

I’ll have to ask if the wiki articles are representative of the philosophies you mention.

If they are then they are not compatible with Christianity because they deny the spiritual including both God and the soul.

 

[awatkins69]

I’m not sure that they *must *be atheistic or *must *be in opposition to all spiritual. To be quite honest, I don’t already have an opinion, and I’d like to hear what others say.

 

[JohnDamian]

There is no reason to deny the underlying idea of Property Dualism. It is entirely sensible to believe that a substance can contain more than one form of Property.

That said; the general premise therein is that the Spiritual is merely a property of the substantially physical. However; this premise does not necessarily follow from the admission that a single substance can inhere more than one type of property.

Although; it seems implicit that there is only one substance; and also implicit that there is a distinction (arbitrary) between operating properties functioning in a singularity.

It is not (per se) wholly incompatible; but is (in function) wholly incompatible.

 

[awatkins69]

There is no reason to deny the underlying idea of Property Dualism. It is entirely sensible to believe that a substance can contain more than one form of Property.

How so? Doesn’t interaction amongst the physical by physical means produce physical properties? No violation of “ex nihilo nihil fit”?

That said; the general premise therein is that the Spiritual is merely a property of the substantially physical. However; this premise does not necessarily follow from the admission that a single substance can inhere more than one type of property.

What are the arguments against it? And what are the rebuttals to those arguments? It does seem pretty much consistent with everything else in naturalistic view.

Although; it seems implicit that there is only one substance; and also implicit that there is a distinction (arbitrary) between operating properties functioning in a singularity.

It is not (per se) wholly incompatible; but is (in function) wholly incompatible.

What are the rational alternatives? How do they fit in with the Catholic teaching? I have to admit I haven’t done a lot of reading on this dualist problem. Any good papers I can read?

 

[JohnDamian]

How so? Doesn’t interaction amongst the physical by physical means produce physical properties? No violation of “ex nihilo nihil fit”?

So long as an act or existence does not violate the law of noncontradiction really or formally it is entirely positable; even if it violates all of observed reality.

The premise underlying the idea that two properties can inhere in one is understandable. We can say this man is both “Red” and “Rational”; because the individual “man” can be predicated by genras which are distinct. However; to this can be replied that as the Man and his Mind are substantially and really distinct; such predication would be only to an in toto composite.

It follows from this then; that it seems contrary to observed reality that two substantially different properties can be inhered in a singular; however such contrarity is not a necessarily inherant contrarity; but an observed one. This is clearly distinct; thus; it is positable that a singularity that has a real unity is both predicated by properties of these seperate genera. However; it does not follow from this that there is a necessity for such to inhere in a specific substance.

So; as it is not logically contrary necessarily that two properties inhere in one; a singularity may be brought about functioning in this way. Despite the fact that no such operation has been observed (I am unable to even sensibly conceive an example) it does follow that this is possible within the Theology of the Church defined by The Doctor of the Church St. Peter Damian in De divina omnipotentia, which sets the precedent that anything which is not evil or impossible can be brought about by God; even things which are very strange and difficult to imagine. Damian demonstrates that God can restore virginity to someone who has lost it; because this act; (as an example) is possible and not evil.

Likewise; it is possible for God to inhere two properties in a single substance; as this does not entail a contradiction; nor is it evil - thus it can be done. That said; it is not by necessity that this act must occur within a physical substance; nor does it in any way teach that mental properties are properties applicable to physical substances in General.

To put it simply; Property Dualism is incorrect; but ONE of it’s ideas; the idea that two properties can inhere within one substance; does not violate the law of noncontradiction and is thus possible in accordance with the teachings of the Church.