Property vs. Accident

[Areopagite]

Kind of a complicated Metaphysical question that I’ve not been able to get a straight answer for in quite some time …

Aristotle and Aquinas distinguish “property” vs. “accident” … the former being an essential attribute of a substance, and the latter being an inessential attribute of a substance.

Now, in the 10 Categories of Being, the 1st Category is said to be “Substance” and the 9 others are often said to be “accidents.” However, where do properties fit in? Would it be more fitting perhaps to call the nine categories “attributes” or “accidents and properties”? Or can properties be considered “accidents” in a broad sense (usually, I don’t see that … in fact, accidents are sometimes said to be a kind of property).

So, I’ve not been able to get a straight answer on this question for awhile. It’s kind of driving me crazy.

Thanks, God Bless.

 

[runningdude]

There are three (types of) “substances”; material, spiritual, and divine.

God is of divine substance.
The Angels are of spiritual substance.

The Earth, its plants and foods and animals and objects are of material substance.
Humans are of both material and spiritual substance.

When the Eucharist is celebrated, the Holy Spirit, acting through the spirit of the priest, transubstantiates the bread and wine from a material substance to divine substance. The appearance, taste and chemical properties no longer define what type of material the substance is, as the substance is now God Himself.

 

[Areopagite]

There are three (types of) “substances”; material, spiritual, and divine.

God is of divine substance.
The Angels are of spiritual substance.

The Earth, its plants and foods and animals and objects are of material substance.
Humans are of both material and spiritual substance.

When the Eucharist is celebrated, the Holy Spirit, acting through the spirit of the priest, transubstantiates the bread and wine from a material substance to divine substance. The appearance, taste and chemical properties no longer define what type of material the substance is, as the substance is now God Himself.

Thank you. I agree with all that. However, this unfortunately does not answer my question. I’m just looking for whether the last nine categories of Aristotle’s 10 Categories of Being are properly called “accidental” or something more general since “Properties” (which are commonly said to be distinguished from “accidents”) seem to be included in them as well.

My question is a very general metaphysical question … it doesn’t particularly pertain to transubstantiation.

 

[runningdude]

Thank you. I agree with all that. However, this unfortunately does not answer my question. I’m just looking for whether the last nine categories of Aristotle’s 10 Categories of Being are properly called “accidental” or something more general since “Properties” (which are commonly said to be distinguished from “accidents”) seem to be included in them as well.

“Properties” distinguish one form of physical matter from another. Since the Eucharist is no longer matter, it no longer has any physical properties. Its physical properties are “accidents”, incidental to the new substance, but not integrally describing the substance.

Really, there isn’t much application for this line of metaphysics, except to describe the Eucharist, or the consubstantial nature nature of the Trinity. This language is based on the observations of the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle, who was concerned with the spiritual and material, and adapted by Saint August and others describing the Eucharist. This metaphysics inaccurately describes the physical world, and has been largely abandoned for this purpose.

Within the realm of the physical sciences, this language is obsolete and has largely been displaced by more useful language. The physical sciences can only describe material substances, and so speaking of incidental properties (“accidents”) has no meaning, as the physical properties are integral to material substances. The modern and appropriate use of this language is in describing the relationship of non-material substances (the spiritual and divine); trying apply it to the physical sciences is the source of your confusion.

 

[1AugustSon7]

Kind of a complicated Metaphysical question that I’ve not been able to get a straight answer for in quite some time …

Aristotle and Aquinas distinguish “property” vs. “accident” … the former being an essential attribute of a substance, and the latter being an inessential attribute of a substance.

Now, in the 10 Categories of Being, the 1st Category is said to be “Substance” and the 9 others are often said to be “accidents.” However, where do properties fit in? Would it be more fitting perhaps to call the nine categories “attributes” or “accidents and properties”? Or can properties be considered “accidents” in a broad sense (usually, I don’t see that … in fact, accidents are sometimes said to be a kind of property).

So, I’ve not been able to get a straight answer on this question for awhile. It’s kind of driving me crazy.

Thanks, God Bless.

Yes it bends my mind sometimes too.

Aristotle was deeply interested in how things relate to each other logically. For the other categories notice that they also beg the question “What is ___?” In fact people think this is so necessary they find it annoying when “the what” -in the case of accidents- isn’t identified or stated; on the other hand, though, with substances we tend rather to ask “what about it?” For example, if I were to come up to you and say “two meters high” the question you would ask is, “What is two meters high?” Or is it -you might wonder- just the concept or idea of “two meters high” that fascinates me - that is, granting me the benefit of a doubt that I am not a quack. In that case, then, we might ask “what about it [two meters high]” but only and strictly as an idea or concept: i.e. in the abstract.

Again, if I were to just blurt out “man” you would probably ask “what about man?” and presumably not “what ‘is man’?” Substance to accidents in this sense is a logical necessity and piority: the accident always inheres in some actual thing.

I think the substance-accident distinction is perhaps better understood within the larger context of Plato’s Idealism. Perhaps it is somewhat ironic that in Aristotle’s attempt to ground things in actual reality - his empiricism - he sometimes almost sounds like an Idealist himself; I mean, since when -even in Aristotle’s own sytem- is something like dimensionality only “accidental” to being an actual man? Or an actual body? Surely that would be absurd. I can see how logically the accidents themselves can be said to presuppose something actual and substantial; that is, in reality the accidents themselves never exist independently of something else in which they inhere so that substance is more primary and has a logical priority. But still it would be strange to imagine that certain substances could ever exist without certain “accidents”.

But perhaps I am mistaken in my interpretation of Aristotle here and someone more expert can clarify.

 

[Areopagite]

Really, there isn’t much application for this line of metaphysics, except to describe the Eucharist, or the consubstantial nature nature of the Trinity. This language is based on the observations of the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle, who was concerned with the spiritual and material, and adapted by Saint August and others describing the Eucharist. This metaphysics inaccurately describes the physical world, and has been largely abandoned for this purpose.

Within the realm of the physical sciences, this language is obsolete and has largely been displaced by more useful language. The physical sciences can only describe material substances, and so speaking of incidental properties (“accidents”) has no meaning, as the physical properties are integral to material substances. The modern and appropriate use of this language is in describing the relationship of non-material substances (the spiritual and divine); trying apply it to the physical sciences is the source of your confusion.

Well, that’s all very debatable. I believe that if the language is truly obsolete, then it shouldn’t be used to explain transubstantiation. People have long argued that the common sense terminology of Aristotle has been “disproved” by modern science, but they have never actually provided clear demonstration of it.

In any case, I’m not asking whether Aristotle is right or not. I’m asking whether he (and other like-minded Aristotelians like Aquinas) would believe the last nine Categories of being include so-called “properties” or merely accidents (and if the former, is it a misnomer to call them “accidental” categories).

I think the substance-accident distinction is perhaps better understood within the larger context of Plato’s Idealism. Perhaps it is somewhat ironic that in Aristotle’s attempt to ground things in actual reality - his empiricism - he sometimes almost sounds like an Idealist himself; I mean, since when -even in Aristotle’s own sytem- is something like dimensionality only “accidental” to being an actual man? Or an actual body? Surely that would be absurd. I can see how logically the accidents themselves can be said to presuppose something actual and substantial; that is, in reality the accidents themselves never exist independently of something else in which they inhere so that substance is more primary and has a logical priority. But still it would be strange to imagine that certain substances could ever exist without certain “accidents”.

But perhaps I am mistaken in my interpretation of Aristotle here and someone more expert can clarify.

I’m not sure if that relates to my question, though you bring up some interesting points.

 

[1AugustSon7]

I’m not sure if that relates to my question, though you bring up some interesting points.

I’m not sure that substance is “an essential attribute of a substance”. Substance just is - if I understand Aristotle rightly - the substance: it is itself the underlying and ultimate subject. I think that might be the issue here: substance is not ‘an attribute’ - essential or otherwise - of substance: being man is not ‘an essential attribute of’ being man: being man just is being-man. In such a system where substance is predicated of something else, though, man becomes accidental or secondary or incidental to being-man. Substance, however, is - for Aristotle I think at least - the ultimate subject; but the way you seem to be thinking of it, you seem to be asking what the subject of the subject is or, in other words, what the substance of the substance is. In your system there is substance which is then divded between two broad sub-categories: the essential and the inessential. There would, then, in such a system be the subject, which is then divided between essential and non-essential attributes. But for Aristotle there was just substance and then the other (nine) categories; and not

I. ‘Underlying subject’ (e.g. man), then
i) Its ‘essential attribute(s)’ and
ii) Its ‘inessential attributes’.

Or in other words, if even what is essential is ‘attributed’ to a substance -rather than just being the substance- then we want to know what the underlying thing is that it is all being predicated of. The way you are speaking of substance, there must be some other underlying substance in which the essential is being “attributed of”. If it is not substance, then it is something else; but for Aristotle, substance just is what everything else is predicated of.

Remember, substance is the category that the other categories are always predicated of: but the substance itself is predicated of nothing. I think that is key for Aristotle’s thinking.

But again I may be wrong here