Proportional Reasons

[LeafByNiggle]

The question comes up about what “proportional reasons” there might be to vote for a candidate who is tolerant of abortion over a more pro-life candidate. The term “proportional reasons” was used by Cardinal Ratzinger in his often-quoted letter of 2004. Some argue that despite Cardinal Ratzinger having made the point to include this exception in his letter, there essentially are no such proportional reasons. They say that even if our vote does extremely little for the pro-life cause in a particular instance, and even if we must disregard other issues at stake, we are required to vote pro-life anyway. If you think of your vote as electoral capital, this interpretation requires that we spend every last bit of that capital to further the pro-life cause.

For example, in a general election, there might be a dozen different races in which a person can vote, such as State Legislator, Governor, Senator, Congressman, President, etc. Suppose such a person votes for the pro-life candidate in every one of these races except for one. In that one race, the person thinks, “I have already done a lot for the pro-life cause by voting for all those other pro-life candidates. But in this particular race, I really don’t like the pro-life candidate’s position on another issue. So I will vote against him for this one office.” Those who deny proportional reasons will say that it does not matter how much other good the voter might have done in other contests. He is obliged to spend his electoral capitol on the pro-life side in this race too.

While I might agree that it is praiseworthy to so spend your last electoral dime, so to speak, on the pro-life cause, I wonder if it could really be required and be sinful to do otherwise?

To shed some light on this question, I would like to consider an analogous situation. Suppose this voter is approached by a pro-life advocate who is soliciting funds to put up a series of high-profile pro-life billboards just before an important election. The voter decides it is a good thing and gives $400 toward this effort. A few days later, the advocate returns and says that the billboards will be put up, but now this group wants to run some radio ads as well. The voter decides he has given enough to the cause, and wants to take his family on a vacation. Any more money he donates will jeopardize the vacation. So he declines. Is he sinning by doing that? I would think not. That’s because he has proportional reasons to decline the donation. Even though his failure to donate for radio ads may make the difference between the pro-life proposition passing and failing, he may still decline to make that effort.

Applying that same thinking to the voting situation, we would conclude that declining to vote for each and every pro-life candidate can sometimes be allowed.

 

[St_Francis]

While I don’t think your analogy works, I do think it can be used as an example of proportionality. The man has a bunch of money, he uses it for different things. So, maybe he had some money set aside for charity, and he spent it on the first request. But for the second request, he didn’t have money set aside for charity, he only had money set aside for something for his family. Well, his first duty is to his family, so he has no obligation or duty to use that money for another purpose. It would be disproportionate for the man to divert a substantial amount of money set aside for his family, even for a good cause.

Now, the reason I think your analogy *doesn’t *work is that each vote is discrete and non-fungible. Each vote is unrelated to that other; the fact that you voted for 17 pro-life people doesn’t mean you’ve used enough of your voting for pro-life causes, just as each time you toss a coin you have an equal chance for heads or tails, even if you have gotten heads several times already.

The votes are also non-fungible because you can’t use it for another purpose. The man above could use hos money for the pro-life cause *or *for a family vacation. Your vote for one of the set of candidates can’t be used for some other purpose, only for voting for one of that set of people.

The proportionality of the vote comes in like this: say you are voting for dogcatcher. Joe is pro-abortion bit he would make an excellent dogcatcher. Charlie is pro-life, but he’s a lousy driver, terrible at paperwork, is allergic to dogs and cats, and can’t see very well. Given that The position of dogcatcher doesn’t involve pro-life issues, and the disparity in ability between the two men, it might be proportionately ok to vote for Joe.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

The votes are also non-fungible because you can’t use it for another purpose. The man above could use hos money for the pro-life cause *or *for a family vacation. Your vote for one of the set of candidates can’t be used for some other purpose, only for voting for one of that set of people.

I can indeed use my vote for some other purpose. I can either vote for a pro-life candidate, or I can vote for a candidate who supports increased funding for autism research. If I have a kid with autism (hypothetically) and my first duty is to my family, as you said earlier, I could reason that I have one vote set aside for promoting autism research. If I am obligated to spend that last vote in a way that is contrary to the interests of my family, that seems a lot like the donor being compelled to spend his vacation money on a pro-life cause.

 

[Zoltan_Cobalt]

I have a very dear old friend. He is and avid NRA member and a hard core gun rights supporter.

He supports ONLY candidates who are positively pro gun rights. I discussed this with him and told him that he was being a “single issue voter”. I encouraged him to be open to ALL issues and vote accordingly.

He squinted from under his “Elmer Fudd hunting hat” and asked: “What other issues are there?” I said well…abortion, for one. He opened the candidate’s pamphlet and said…“look he’s totally against abortion.” How about smaller government, I asked. “Yep! he’s all for that too.” Hmmm, What about taxes? “He wants to reduce them and maybe even revise the tax code.” Wow…this candidate was a Conservative’s dream.

Since then I have looked closely at all interesting candidates. What I have found is that if they are anti-abortion and/or anti gun control they are everything else I hold dear.

To answer your question directly, You may or may not support a pro life candidate…but you should NEVER vote for a candidate who would support abortion.

 

[powerofk]

While I don’t think your analogy works, I do think it can be used as an example of proportionality. The man has a bunch of money, he uses it for different things. So, maybe he had some money set aside for charity, and he spent it on the first request. But for the second request, he didn’t have money set aside for charity, he only had money set aside for something for his family. Well, his first duty is to his family, so he has no obligation or duty to use that money for another purpose. It would be disproportionate for the man to divert a substantial amount of money set aside for his family, even for a good cause.

Now, the reason I think your analogy *doesn’t *work is that each vote is discrete and non-fungible. Each vote is unrelated to that other; the fact that you voted for 17 pro-life people doesn’t mean you’ve used enough of your voting for pro-life causes, just as each time you toss a coin you have an equal chance for heads or tails, even if you have gotten heads several times already.

The votes are also non-fungible because you can’t use it for another purpose. The man above could use hos money for the pro-life cause *or *for a family vacation. Your vote for one of the set of candidates can’t be used for some other purpose, only for voting for one of that set of people.

The proportionality of the vote comes in like this: say you are voting for dogcatcher. Joe is pro-abortion bit he would make an excellent dogcatcher. Charlie is pro-life, but he’s a lousy driver, terrible at paperwork, is allergic to dogs and cats, and can’t see very well. Given that The position of dogcatcher doesn’t involve pro-life issues, and the disparity in ability between the two men, it might be proportionately ok to vote for Joe.

That’s true - and it might also be best to focus on areas where the pro-life position will make the greatest impact. It turns out, that today, this is seen at the state level above all other levels. Municipalities don’t deal with life issues very much, and they can really only slap a small fine on law-breakers anyway.

 

[St_Francis]

I can indeed use my vote for some other purpose. I can either vote for a pro-life candidate, or I can vote for a candidate who supports increased funding for autism research. If I have a kid with autism (hypothetically) and my first duty is to my family, as you said earlier, I could reason that I have one vote set aside for promoting autism research. If I am obligated to spend that last vote in a way that is contrary to the interests of my family, that seems a lot like the donor being compelled to spend his vacation money on a pro-life cause.

Well, ideally one would vote for the politician one believes would do the best job for the juridiction s/he would represent and the larger jurisdiction as a whole (so a House Representatives would reflect their district’s concerns but in the context of what is good for the nation as a whole), so I try to vote with a wider picture in mind, which is what I have heard certain people call voting against my own best interests… bit I do realize that the rules are different and I didn’t make the rules, so in your hypothetical situation:

Again it would depend. Are we talking about a rabidly pro-abortion candidate who is in a position to have a large effect? In that case, I would lean against voting for that person even if they were into funding which would benefit my family.

But a person who was pro-abortion but not doing anything about it, not really affecting the issue, then it might be a proportionate reason depending on the state of funding and the likelihood of his or her being able to accomplish much in that area. In that situation I would probably discuss it with a good priest before voting.

That is not exactly what I meant by using my vote for some other purpose, but I see what you are saying.

 

[Ender]

The question comes up about what “proportional reasons” there might be to vote for a candidate who is tolerant of abortion over a more pro-life candidate.

This reminds me of earlier discussions I’ve had about torture. Specifically, finding that point between “this is” and “that isn’t”. There are valid observations to be made where it can reasonably be asserted that this is a proportional reason (and that isn’t torture) but it doesn’t seem productive to focus on that point where yes becomes no.

In both cases the significant issues can be condensed to particular, concrete instances that can be discussed without having to invent what-if examples. In the case of voting it isn’t all that hard to identify the most relevant situations: candidates for legislative and executive positions at the state and federal level. What is a proportional reason for supporting the pro-abortion candidate in such races? Questions about dog catchers and city treasurers may be interesting but they are not immediately significant.

Ender

 

[LeafByNiggle]

…In both cases the significant issues can be condensed to particular, concrete instances that can be discussed without having to invent what-if examples. In the case of voting it isn’t all that hard to identify the most relevant situations: candidates for legislative and executive positions at the state and federal level. What is a proportional reason for supporting the pro-abortion candidate in such races? Questions about dog catchers and city treasurers may be interesting but they are not immediately significant.

Ender

Even if we set aside the borderline cases of dog catchers and city treasurers, there is still the matter of the comparison to other means by which a cause can be supported or not.

To answer one of the objections of St Francis to my earlier analogy, suppose the money that is requested for a campaign against abortion was not set aside for a family vacation. Suppose the man simply felt he had “done enough” by his earlier contribution. Maybe he would rather buy a motorcycle for himself. Of course it would be praiseworthy if he could find it in his heart to made an additional effort, but I think most people would recognize his decision not to contribute more to this campaign as a providential judgement, just like deciding when someone has given an appropriate amount to charity, and not a subject of an absolute demand of our faith.

 

[Ender]

Even if we set aside the borderline cases of dog catchers and city treasurers, there is still the matter of the comparison to other means by which a cause can be supported or not.

But why do you look for analogies when real examples are so prevalent? Why not deal with the actual situations every voter faces? There will be elections this fall and we will all get to vote for a congressman for the US House and almost surely for our state house as well. At least a third of us will vote on someone for the US Senate. There are also votes to be cast for state senators and state governors. Why not use these real examples?

Two people are contesting the position for US Representative, one (A) supports abortion (is pro-choice, whatever) and the other (X) opposes abortion and the question is: what are proportional reasons to support A instead of X?

Ender

 

[LeafByNiggle]

But why do you look for analogies when real examples are so prevalent? Why not deal with the actual situations every voter faces? There will be elections this fall and we will all get to vote for a congressman for the US House and almost surely for our state house as well. At least a third of us will vote on someone for the US Senate. There are also votes to be cast for state senators and state governors. Why not use these real examples?

Two people are contesting the position for US Representative, one (A) supports abortion (is pro-choice, whatever) and the other (X) opposes abortion and the question is: what are proportional reasons to support A instead of X?

Ender

I did offer a concrete example in voting. I said that if a person had already voted for a dozen other pro-life candidates, he might reasonably decide to vote for one candidate regardless of that candidate’s pro-choice views if that candidate also was an advocate for autism research, and he had an autistic child. He could conclude that his other 12 votes had done enough for the pro-life cause, and he could be allowed to spend his one remaining vote doing something to benefit his child, based on proportional reasons.

The argument that is usually made against this view is that autism research and other social goods that might be considered in voting can never be considered as important as combating abortion, since people can disagree about the best means to obtain such social goods.

This counter argument does not seem to depend on anything intrinsic in voting, and could just as well apply to other ways in which the pro-life cause is advanced. That’s where the analogy comes it. It presents a decision on spending one’s money as analogous to spending ones votes. If the analogy is applicable, it raises objections to that counter argument. So if you want to dismiss that analogy as inapplicable, it seems that you would have to show either

1. The argument that abortion issues supersede all other issues applies to voting but not to any other area in which these issues might be in competition (such as in spending money), or
2. The abortion issue does actually supersede all other issues in any area where they might be in competition - in voting or otherwise.

 

[powerofk]

I did offer a concrete example in voting. I said that if a person had already voted for a dozen other pro-life candidates, he might reasonably decide to vote for one candidate regardless of that candidate’s pro-choice views if that candidate also was an advocate for autism research, and he had an autistic child. He could conclude that his other 12 votes had done enough for the pro-life cause, and he could be allowed to spend his one remaining vote doing something to benefit his child, based on proportional reasons.

The argument that is usually made against this view is that autism research and other social goods that might be considered in voting can never be considered as important as combating abortion, since people can disagree about the best means to obtain such social goods.

This counter argument does not seem to depend on anything intrinsic in voting, and could just as well apply to other ways in which the pro-life cause is advanced. That’s where the analogy comes it. It presents a decision on spending one’s money as analogous to spending ones votes. If the analogy is applicable, it raises objections to that counter argument. So if you want to dismiss that analogy as inapplicable, it seems that you would have to show either

1. The argument that abortion issues supersede all other issues applies to voting but not to any other area in which these issues might be in competition (such as in spending money), or
2. The abortion issue does actually supersede all other issues in any area where they might be in competition - in voting or otherwise.

And see, I consider abortion to be a very important issue yet see neither party really trying to tackle the roots of the problem. The roots of the problem are plentiful, and the legality of abortion is just one facet of the problem. Yes, abortion needs to be made illegal once again, but at the same time, the basic humanity of every living person (whether in the womb or out of it; “able-bodied” or disabled; young or old; child, adult, or elderly; healthy or terminally ill; native-born or immigrant; male or female; white, black, Hispanic, Asian, First American; etc., etc., etc.) must also be recognized! And see, it’s a tangled web. Abortion, euthanasia, embryonic stem-cell research, and the like are both causes and effects of the plague of the dehumanizing of society.

 

[djames99]

No different from shunning in scripture. For example, a man who gives all to society, is a good man in every other respect, but finishes his day to spend it away from his wife but with his girlfriend or “partner” is to be shunned. This is because he is prepared to covenant with evil on a specific point to have his way. Heaven cannot accept people who can turn against God and are not solidly reliable.

What is behooving on the person is to first set his temple(himself) in order to make him presentable to good, a voluntary sanctification. Only then when properly disposed can he set examples and do the tasks of society. Then the electorate can see nothing wrong in the man, as God resides in him.

The immediate fears of consequences that the electorate may feel by choosing to do the right thing, and having that “bottom dropped out from under me” feeling, is from the evil one. What occurs after the voter’s choice is a set of events the Holy Spirit will initiate, but could only do so when the person trusts do do the right thing. Here is when we stand back and watch the awesome display of works he will award us by doing so.

 

[Ender]

I said that if a person had already voted for a dozen other pro-life candidates, he might reasonably decide to vote for one candidate regardless of that candidate’s pro-choice views if that candidate also was an advocate for autism research, and he had an autistic child. He could conclude that his other 12 votes had done enough for the pro-life cause, and he could be allowed to spend his one remaining vote doing something to benefit his child, based on proportional reasons.

It is clear there are any number of ways people can rationalize their actions. If there weren’t we probably wouldn’t have had half of all Catholics voting for our current president, and I recognize that the inclination to justify doing what one wants becomes stronger as the stakes get higher. Doing something to benefit one of our children would certainly be near the top of the list. That said, the vote is still an exchange: trading help for your child at the price of keeping abortion legal.

The argument that is usually made against this view is that autism research and other social goods that might be considered in voting can never be considered as important as combating abortion, since people can disagree about the best means to obtain such social goods.

The issue is not whether people agree on prudential matters but whether they may legitimately support things which are not prudential but are intrinsically evil. Differences on autism research are valid, differences on abortion are not.

That’s where the analogy comes it. It presents a decision on spending one’s money as analogous to spending ones votes. If the analogy is applicable, it raises objections to that counter argument. So if you want to dismiss that analogy as inapplicable, it seems that you would have to show either…

I think the analogy fails for a different reason than you suggested. In voting I am choosing between two competing options: I will help one and hurt the other. When I donate to one charity there is no harm done to the others. A better question would be whether we should donate to a charity that helps in one area even as it supports abortion. The Susan G. Korman charity is an example of this. They do good work in raising funds for breast cancer research, but they also contribute to Planned Parenthood.

We are told we may not do evil that good may come of it. How then can we overlook the evil the Korman foundation does even though they do good as well? In like manner, how can we overlook the evil contained in a vote for someone who supports abortion in exchange for a good we expect to receive?

Ender

 

[LeafByNiggle]

The issue is not whether people agree on prudential matters but whether they may legitimately support things which are not prudential but are intrinsically evil. Differences on autism research are valid, differences on abortion are not.

Agreed. I am not disputing the undebatable intrinsic evil of abortion.

I think the analogy fails for a different reason than you suggested. In voting I am choosing between two competing options: I will help one and hurt the other. When I donate to one charity there is no harm done to the others.

But that was not the question in the analogy. I was not asking if it it would be proper to donate to one charity vs another. My latest revision of my analogy (post #7) was asking if it might be acceptable for me to buy myself a motorcycle that I use for recreation instead of donate more to an anti-abortion campaign, given the fact that I had already donated a considerable sum to that campaign before. By my refusing to make that last donation, I certainly would be hurting the anti-abortion cause - perhaps more than if I just cast one vote for the pro-choice candidate.

We are told we may not do evil that good may come of it. How then can we overlook the evil the Korman foundation does even though they do good as well? In like manner, how can we overlook the evil contained in a vote for someone who supports abortion in exchange for a good we expect to receive?

But isn’t it overlooking that evil just as much if I declined to contribute to a campaign to expose the evil activities of the Korman foundation? And yet that decision is generally regarded as prudential.

 

[pnewton]

I think it important to understand the difference between proportional reasons and proportional issues. As we have no direct vote on abortion, there are more reasons than just what the issue is. One can also weigh, for example, electability, if one does not believe in using a vote on a better third party candidate. One can also weigh the influence of the office, if the office is unlikely to have much effect on a serious issue.

 

[Ender]

But that was not the question in the analogy. I was not asking if it it would be proper to donate to one charity vs another. My latest revision of my analogy (post #7) was asking if it might be acceptable for me to buy myself a motorcycle that I use for recreation instead of donate more to an anti-abortion campaign, given the fact that I had already donated a considerable sum to that campaign before. By my refusing to make that last donation, I certainly would be hurting the anti-abortion cause - perhaps more than if I just cast one vote for the pro-choice candidate.

Not helping is quite different that harming. The former is the absence of a good while the latter is the presence of an evil. We have positive precepts: heal the sick, feed the hungry, as well as negative precepts: thou shalt not kill, etc., but while both precepts are universally binding “Only the negative commandments oblige always and under all circumstances.” (Veritatis Splendor #52) Failing to do good is in a different category than doing evil.

But isn’t it overlooking that evil just as much if I declined to contribute to a campaign to expose the evil activities of the Korman foundation? And yet that decision is generally regarded as prudential.

No. See above.

Ender

 

[LeafByNiggle]

We are told we may not do evil that good may come of it. How then can we overlook the evil the Korman foundation does even though they do good as well? In like manner, how can we overlook the evil contained in a vote for someone who supports abortion in exchange for a good we expect to receive?

The principle that we may not do evil that good may come of it means attempting to bring about good by means of that evil. That principle does not apply when the evil which might be caused is an unintended side-effect of the act, and not the very means by which the good is achieved. This is the situation in the voting scenario. The candidate’s pro-choice views are not the intended means of bringing about some unrelated good. Of course such a decision could be wrong for other reasons. That is where proportional reasons come in.

Not helping is quite different that harming. The former is the absence of a good while the latter is the presence of an evil. We have positive precepts: heal the sick, feed the hungry, as well as negative precepts: thou shalt not kill, etc., but while both precepts are universally binding “Only the negative commandments oblige always and under all circumstances.” (Veritatis Splendor #52) Failing to do good is in a different category than doing evil.

In some cases this can be a distinction without a difference. Suppose in my motorcycle vs. donation scenario, the money was set aside for the extra donation - perhaps as a decision between me and my wife. Then, without consulting her, I decide at the last minute to withdraw that money from the bank and buy myself a motorcycle. Now I have changed the passive act of declining to make a contribution to an active one of making an impulsive purchase that directly harms the pro-life campaign that we had decided to help. Is there a negative commandment not to do that? Is it binding always and under all circumstances?

 

[Ender]

The principle that we may not do evil that good may come of it means attempting to bring about good by means of that evil. That principle does not apply when the evil which might be caused is an unintended side-effect of the act, and not the very means by which the good is achieved. This is the situation in the voting scenario. The candidate’s pro-choice views are not the intended means of bringing about some unrelated good. Of course such a decision could be wrong for other reasons. That is where proportional reasons come in.

OK, then it falls under the principle of double effect. The relevant requirement here is that the good effect be as equally important as the evil effect. Clearly the other issues do not carry the same moral import as abortion, but one could still argue that the likelihood of having any effect on abortion is slim therefore one is justified in voting for someone who supports it. I don’t think much of that argument because we can see what it has led to: politicians support abortion with impunity, at least as far as Catholics are concerned.

In some cases this can be a distinction without a difference.

It is the church’s distinction and it seems the distinction is a significant one.

Suppose in my motorcycle vs. donation scenario, the money was set aside for the extra donation - perhaps as a decision between me and my wife. Then, without consulting her, I decide at the last minute to withdraw that money from the bank and buy myself a motorcycle. Now I have changed the passive act of declining to make a contribution to an active one of making an impulsive purchase that directly harms the pro-life campaign that we had decided to help. Is there a negative commandment not to do that? Is it binding always and under all circumstances?

I can only repeat what the church teaches:* “the negative commandments oblige always and under all circumstances.”* and I would contest your assertion that you have directly harmed anyone other than your own family. Again, not contributing is not in the same category as stealing.

I will point out that you are having to be extremely inventive in imagining a circumstance that justifies supporting pro-abortion politicians. The church has already said that such proportional reasons can exist, but the point is that they do not commonly exist, and they certainly exist far less often than most people imagine, and they do not extend to normal policy preferences.

Ender

 

[estesbob]

What is a ‘proportionate’ reason when it comes to the abortion issue? It’s the kind of reason we will be able to explain, with a clean heart, to the victims of abortion when we meet them face to face in the next life–which we most certainly will. If we’re confident that these victims will accept our motives as something more than an alibi, then we can proceed.” Archbishop Charles Chaput.