This is why I think you are wrong. Lawrence -v- Texas was a 2003 United States Supreme Court case that struck down, on due process grounds, a Texas statute making sodomy illegal. Justice O’Connor concurred in the result, but said she would strike it down on the basis of equal protection, reasoning that the statute was directed toward a group rather than an act. (The defendants had argued that the Texas law prohibited only homosexual sodomy.) Justice Scalia noted in his dissent that if Justice O’Connor’s reasoning was applied, then it would be doubtful that laws prohibiting gay marriages would be able to pass rational basis scrutiny. Justice O’Connor, for her part, wrote that a law limiting marriage to heterosexual couples would pass rational basis scrutiny provided that the law was directed to protect traditional marriage rather than being based on the state’s dislike of homosexual persons.
The majority in Lawrence -v- Texas did not strike down the sodomy law in question on equal protection grounds. If they had, as Justice Scalia noted, an equal protection argument for gay marriage would have more legs than it has now. But, even if the majority had adopted Justice O’Connor’s view, it is to be noted that Justice O’Connor herself wrote that the protection of traditional marriage would have provided the necessary rational basis.
Therefore, it is for you to first explain how we even get to the need for a rational basis evaluation before the rational basis is provided. This cannot be done by begging the question by assuming what needs to be proven, i.e., that homosexuals are being denied equal protection by Proposition 8.
Your move.
I’ll take your last point first. Your claim that I’ve begged the question by assuming that homosexuals are being denied equal protection is false – no where in my argument
for this conclusion have I assumed it. If you look at the structure of my argument (see op), you’ll notice that it is logically valid, and thus the only way to resist the conclusion is to reject one of its premises. Nothing you wrote does that.
Second, I don’t know why
Lawrence is relevant here; as you noted, the majority struck down the statute on due process grounds, but in this thread, I’m only concerned with equal protection. One can challenge a statute solely on equal protection grounds, solely on due process grounds, or both. You seem to be under the impression that I need to show how Prop 8
first violates due process before I can show how it violates equal protection, but this is simply mistaken.
Third, the burden falls on prop 8 proponents to show that, at the very least, there is a rational basis for the restriction. Why? Because I’ve already shown how prop 8
does discriminate (in the neutral sense) on the basis of sexual orientation and sex (see other thread). Hence we are left with the question: is the discrimination justified or not? If there is no rational basis for the discrimination, then it follows that prop 8 violates equal protection. In other words,one cannot hold that prop 8 doesn’t violate equal protection even though the discrimination can’t survive rational basis scrutiny. The following are mutually exclusive:
- Prop 8 discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation and sex but doesn’t violate equal protection.
- Prop 8 can’t survive rational basis scrutiny.
- and 2) are not compatible. The only way that 1) can be true is if the discrimination does, at the very least, survive rational basis scrutiny.
Fourth, O’ Conner’s comments on same-sex marriage are 1) ambiguous, and 2) mere dicta. They’re ambiguous because her whole statement depends on what does it mean to “protect traditional marriage.” If traditional marriage will not be threatened in the relevant sense, then laws restricting same-sex marriage cannot survive rational basis (per Conner’s view).