No, Prop 8 does not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, and no, of course I don’t deny that the purpose of Prop 8 was to overturn the gay marriage rulings (i.e., the redefinition of marriage) in CA and prevent gay marriage (i.e., the redefinition of marriage).
In the words of Justice Fitzgerald’s ruling for the Texas Court of Appeals dated August 31, 2010, overruling a District Court’s ruling that Texas marriage laws, in limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples, violate the infamous Equal Protection Clause and are thus unconstitutional:
See Loving v. Virginia (1, 388 U.S. I 12 (1967) (describing marriage as a “fundamental freedom” that may “not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations”); accord Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 719 (citing Loving as establishing fundamental right to marry); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rd. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535,541 (I 942)(”Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”). But Loving involved a marriage between a man and woman. The Loving opinion’s discussion of the
right to marry does not embrace the broad formulation proposed by appellee. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1301 (Cob. 1993) (Erickson, J., dissenting) (“[R]ather than expressing a willingness to extrapolate new fundamental rights based on selective language from prior Supreme Court decisions, we should exercise caution in identifying and embracing previously unrecognized fundamental rights.”). Many courts in other jurisdictions have confronted similar challenges to the federal DOMA and similar state laws, and they have generally concluded that the right being claimed should be defined and analyzed precisely as the right to marry a person of the same sex, not as the right to marry whomever one chooses. See. e.g., Smelt, 374 F. Supp. 2d at 877-79; In re Kandu, 315 B.R. at 138—41; Conawav, 932 .2d at 616—24; I-fernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 9—10;
Andersen v. King c’ntv., 138 P.3d 963, 976—79 (Wash. 2006) (plurality op.).
The Conaway court’s thorough discussion of the question demonstrates that the Supreme Court’s right-to-marry jurisprudence has always involved opposite-sex couples and that the Court has always justified the fundamental nature of the right to marry. at least in part, by reference to procreation. Conawav. 932 A.2d at 619—21. We agree with that analysis and conclude that the precise rights claimed by appellee are the right to marry a person of the same sex and the concomitant right to divorce.
“The limitation of marriage to one man and one woman preserves both its structure and its historic purposes.” Goodridge V. Dept of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 992 n.l3 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J., dissenting).
Accurately identifying and analyzing appellee’s claimed right----the purported “right to marry a person of the same sex”-—exposes the serious consequences such a position portends: the redefinition of the fundamental institution of marriage. And, of course, only by asserting that marriage includes the union of two persons of the same sex can appellee advance his claim of discrimination. A fatal flaw in this position is that it assumes the truth of the proposition to be proved.
dallasvoice.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/Gay.Divorce.pdf
In other words, those who claim discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation are
begging the question, just as I and others have pointed out repeatedly on this thread.