M
Michael1801
Guest
I’m still struggling to understand these things, but I’m gonna take a brief stab at what I think Aquinas is saying.
And I’m gonna return to the example of Ronald Reagan.
I think what he’s saying is that even though God is the ultimate cause of everything, and everyone–including Ronald Reagan and the world he lived in, his ethnicity, ancestry, and the country he was president of–there were a lot of secondary causes along the way that really contributed something in determining his first name, his second name, and his family surname (and the number of letters in each–not to mention our numbering system, with it’s ones column, it’s tens column, and it’s hundreds column.) One of these secondary causes would have been his mother (who chose the man she was gonna marry, and what she was gonna name her son.) Another one might have been William Shakespeare (and everyone along the way who helped make the English language what it was at the time he was born, and standardize the spelling of words and names.)
All these secondary causes would have been within God’s will, but he wouldn’t have willed all of them “per se” (in and of themselves.) And that means that some things can be said to happen by chance (or be coincidences), while other things are directly willed by God (“per se,” in and of themselves) for some purpose (or to send some message.)
An example might be freewill (which I think God wills “per se”–in and of itself), and sin, which follows as a consequence of a secondary cause (i.e. freewill.)
Anyway, I think that’s what he’s saying.
And I think it makes some sense.
But as I said, I’m still struggling to understand this (and Aquinas) myself.
And I’m gonna return to the example of Ronald Reagan.
I think what he’s saying is that even though God is the ultimate cause of everything, and everyone–including Ronald Reagan and the world he lived in, his ethnicity, ancestry, and the country he was president of–there were a lot of secondary causes along the way that really contributed something in determining his first name, his second name, and his family surname (and the number of letters in each–not to mention our numbering system, with it’s ones column, it’s tens column, and it’s hundreds column.) One of these secondary causes would have been his mother (who chose the man she was gonna marry, and what she was gonna name her son.) Another one might have been William Shakespeare (and everyone along the way who helped make the English language what it was at the time he was born, and standardize the spelling of words and names.)
All these secondary causes would have been within God’s will, but he wouldn’t have willed all of them “per se” (in and of themselves.) And that means that some things can be said to happen by chance (or be coincidences), while other things are directly willed by God (“per se,” in and of themselves) for some purpose (or to send some message.)
An example might be freewill (which I think God wills “per se”–in and of itself), and sin, which follows as a consequence of a secondary cause (i.e. freewill.)
Anyway, I think that’s what he’s saying.
And I think it makes some sense.
But as I said, I’m still struggling to understand this (and Aquinas) myself.
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