Proving the Existence of God

[belorg]

I’m not sure about the bolded sentence. As I said before, “There was no time at which he was not acting because the only times are those which He created; there happen to be a finite interval of times which He created.” I do not think God would have had to be not acting prior to the beginning of the world in order to have acted on it. It seems to make sense to speak of the beginning of the universe given the nature of time (that time moves forward from our perspective, that there are no times prior to the big bang, etc.), but such of a beginning of the universe seems perfectly compatible with God willing the existence of the totality of time eternally and there being no time at which God shifts from not willing the universe to willing the universe.

Yes, but that would not be a true beginning. it might be a beginning from our perspective, but that is becasue our perspective is limited.

 

[belorg]

I should add that “create” in the traditional understanding is not just to bring something into existence. It includes the sustaining of existence (so God is “creating” right now). So something like the Second Way, though it does not show the universe began in time, shows that God is Creator, in showing that each contingent thing depends on God for its existence at any given moment.

But that makes sense, given that God’s act of creation is one act of His one will. Eternally He has willed the existence of our universe, at every moment at which it exists. There is a first moment at which it exists, if creation in time is true, as Catholics hold it to be. But it is still the same act of the will that held that first moment in existence.

Which entails a B-theory of time.

 

[Peter_Plato]

Yes, but that would not be a true beginning. it might be a beginning from our perspective, but that is becasue our perspective is limited.

Why are you distinguishing between “beginning” and “true beginning?”

A claim that the universe “has a beginning” that corresponds to an A-Theory concept of time that could be true within the universe does not require a further stipulation that A-Theory time must therefore apply to all reality and God, as well. Why should that need to be so?

Using the book analogy, my claim was that A-Theory time could hold to be true inside the book (beginning, middle and ending akin to the space-time continuum of the universe) but that would not necessitate A-Theory time to hold true outside of the book.

If God simply holds the universe in existence, i.e., creates it, within B-Theory time of some kind, there is no “before” in which the universe did not exist as far as God is concerned, but the beginning of the universe ( like the beginning of the plot narrative of a story inside a book) would be the “in the beginning” regarding the “creation” of the universe.

The fact that we exist “in the story” so to speak, does not give us the privilege of holding God (the author) accountable to the time signature that constrains us. What we don’t have is access to what “time” is like for God at all, if, indeed, the idea applies to him at all. Our rather deficient conception of B-Theory time may provide a glimpse, but a glimpse is not sufficient to set logical limits on God.

 

[belorg]

Why are you distinguishing between “beginning” and “true beginning?”

A beginning is a beginning in the sense of the B-theory. A true beginning is a beginning in the sense of the A-theory

A claim that the universe “has a beginning” that corresponds to an A-Theory concept of time that could be true within the universe does not require a further stipulation that A-Theory time must therefore apply to all reality and God, as well. Why should that need to be so?

Let me try to explain. On a B-theory of time, the universe and time can be compared to a block with different points (A, B, C etc). Each point on this block is eternal, just the way God is (supposed to be)
If God creates some ‘baby universe’ that corresponds to the A-theory , then this baby universe starts from one point, let’s say point C. So, this baby universe includes point C, which is eternal. So, this baby universe did not begin. Moreover, if this baby universe corresponds to the A-theory of time, then God cannot sustain it, because on the A-theory there is real change and God is immutable. And immutable means the same as ‘stuck in B-time’

Using the book analogy, my claim was that A-Theory time could hold to be true inside the book (beginning, middle and ending akin to the space-time continuum of the universe) but that would not necessitate A-Theory time to hold true outside of the book.

I’ve explained why that is not true.

If God simply holds the universe in existence, i.e., creates it, within B-Theory time of some kind, there is no “before” in which the universe did not exist as far as God is concerned, but the beginning of the universe ( like the beginning of the plot narrative of a story inside a book) would be the “in the beginning” regarding the “creation” of the universe.

So, either this beginning regarding the creation is an illusion (or a maater of perspective), or we are stuck with an eternal universe that began. But the latter is a logical contradiction.

The fact that we exist “in the story” so to speak, does not give us the privilege of holding God (the author) accountable to the time signature that constrains us. What we don’t have is access to what “time” is like for God at all, if, indeed, the idea applies to him at all. Our rather deficient conception of B-Theory time may provide a glimpse, but a glimpse is not sufficient to set logical limits on God.

We do have access to what time is like for God, at least we do know what time would be like for an immutable being. It would be something like B-time.

 

[prodigalson2011]

A beginning is a beginning in the sense of the B-theory. A true beginning is a beginning in the sense of the A-theory

Let me try to explain. On a B-theory of time, the universe and time can be compared to a block with different points (A, B, C etc). Each point on this block is eternal, just the way God is (supposed to be)
If God creates some ‘baby universe’ that corresponds to the A-theory , then this baby universe starts from one point, let’s say point C. So, this baby universe includes point C, which is eternal. So, this baby universe did not begin. Moreover, if this baby universe corresponds to the A-theory of time, then God cannot sustain it, because on the A-theory there is real change and God is immutable. And immutable means the same as ‘stuck in B-time’

I’ve explained why that is not true.

So, either this beginning regarding the creation is an illusion (or a maater of perspective), or we are stuck with an eternal universe that began. But the latter is a logical contradiction.

We do have access to what time is like for God, at least we do know what time would be like for an immutable being. It would be something like B-time.

This whole argument hinges on an erroneous understanding of what is meant by the Catholic/Thomistic understanding of the changelessness of God:

That God is changeless follows upon his infinity and his absolute actuality. What is changeable is, to that extent, perfectible, and God is absolutely perfect. What is changeable is finite, for change means loss or gain, increase or diminishment, and God is infinite. What is changeable is in the state of potentiality (the state of “can be”) and in God there is no potentiality at all; God is not in the state of “can be”; God is. Therefore God is immutable or changeless. This does not mean that God is in a kind of frozen fixity. Changelessness in God is sheer perfection. It means that God is without any lack which a change could fill up, and that God is pure actuality which can suffer no loss by change. (catholictheology.info/summa-theologica/summa-part1.php?q=27)

God’s changelessness does not entail an inability to cause change in other things. It is not being “frozen in time.” It rather has to do with His will and existence. His will does not change because it is His very nature, nor does His existence begin or cease because it is His very nature to exist. This does not necessitate that His will or the effects of His will obtain eternally. His eternal will could be for things to unfold or begin in time. Such entails no contradiction.

 

[Bahman]

I’ll take your word for that. But how is that related to the O.P. which you are responding to?

Linus2nd.

In response to second paragraph which says that the there is no proof for beginning of universe.

 

[Bahman]

This whole argument hinges on an erroneous understanding of what is meant by the Catholic/Thomistic understanding of the changelessness of God:

That God is changeless follows upon his infinity and his absolute actuality. What is changeable is, to that extent, perfectible, and God is absolutely perfect. What is changeable is finite, for change means loss or gain, increase or diminishment, and God is infinite. What is changeable is in the state of potentiality (the state of “can be”) and in God there is no potentiality at all; God is not in the state of “can be”; God is. Therefore God is immutable or changeless. This does not mean that God is in a kind of frozen fixity. Changelessness in God is sheer perfection. It means that God is without any lack which a change could fill up, and that God is pure actuality which can suffer no loss by change. (catholictheology.info/summa-theologica/summa-part1.php?q=27)

God’s changelessness does not entail an inability to cause change in other things. It is not being “frozen in time.” It rather has to do with His will and existence. His will does not change because it is His very nature, nor does His existence begin or cease because it is His very nature to exist. This does not necessitate that His will or the effects of His will obtain eternally. His eternal will could be for things to unfold or begin in time. Such entails no contradiction.

God cannot be changeless, good and creative when we know that there is “evil problem”. To understand how these attributes contradict when the problem of evil exist we have to focus on the point of creation. Here is a important question: Does God know the fate of being with free will before or after creation? The answer is yes if we accept the changeless attribute. But if God knows the fate of a being before creation then God is responsible for evil creation if the being turns to devil hence God created evil which contradict with “good” attribute. The problem of evil can be resolved only if we accept that God knows the fate of being after creation which this raise to another problem since God knowledge differs before and after creation hence God cannot be changeless.

 

[inocente]

This whole argument hinges on an erroneous understanding of what is meant by the Catholic/Thomistic understanding of the changelessness of God:

That God is changeless follows upon his infinity and his absolute actuality. What is changeable is, to that extent, perfectible, and God is absolutely perfect. What is changeable is finite, for change means loss or gain, increase or diminishment, and God is infinite. What is changeable is in the state of potentiality (the state of “can be”) and in God there is no potentiality at all; God is not in the state of “can be”; God is. Therefore God is immutable or changeless. This does not mean that God is in a kind of frozen fixity. Changelessness in God is sheer perfection. It means that God is without any lack which a change could fill up, and that God is pure actuality which can suffer no loss by change. (catholictheology.info/summa-theologica/summa-part1.php?q=27)

God’s changelessness does not entail an inability to cause change in other things. It is not being “frozen in time.” It rather has to do with His will and existence. His will does not change because it is His very nature, nor does His existence begin or cease because it is His very nature to exist. This does not necessitate that His will or the effects of His will obtain eternally. His eternal will could be for things to unfold or begin in time. Such entails no contradiction.

This also describes a law of nature - in fact the properties of a law of nature are that it is universal, simple, absolute, unchanging and omnipotent.

But of course a law of nature has no personality, it must always apply, it is blind. So where does intellect come in your description?

 

[tonyrey]

This also describes a law of nature - in fact the properties of a law of nature are that it is universal, simple, absolute, unchanging and omnipotent.

“omnipotent”?

 

[belorg]

This whole argument hinges on an erroneous understanding of what is meant by the Catholic/Thomistic understanding of the changelessness of God:

I do understand what is meant by the Thomistic understanding of the changelessness in God.

That God is changeless follows upon his infinity and his absolute actuality. What is changeable is, to that extent, perfectible, and God is absolutely perfect. What is changeable is finite, for change means loss or gain, increase or diminishment, and God is infinite. What is changeable is in the state of potentiality (the state of “can be”) and in God there is no potentiality at all; God is not in the state of “can be”; God is. Therefore God is immutable or changeless. This does not mean that God is in a kind of frozen fixity. Changelessness in God is sheer perfection. It means that God is without any lack which a change could fill up, and that God is pure actuality which can suffer no loss by change. (catholictheology.info/summa-theologica/summa-part1.php?q=27)

Indeed

God’s changelessness does not entail an inability to cause change in other things. It is not being “frozen in time.” It rather has to do with His will and existence. His will does not change because it is His very nature, nor does His existence begin or cease because it is His very nature to exist. This does not necessitate that His will or the effects of His will obtain eternally. His eternal will could be for things to unfold or begin in time. Such entails no contradiction.

“Begin in time” does not equal “begin”. Sure the universe could have begun “in time”, meaning there was a first time at which the universe began and no time before that. But that is not what i am talking about. What I am saying is that if this beginning is a **true **beginning, in that the universe had an absolute beginning, that is impossible under Thomistic immutability.

And I have never claimed that immutability is the same as '“frozen in time”, what I am saying is that immutability entails a (kind of ) B-theory of time.

 

[Peter_Plato]

“Begin in time” does not equal “begin”. Sure the universe could have begun “in time”, meaning there was a first time at which the universe began and no time before that. But that is not what i am talking about. What I am saying is that if this beginning is a **true **beginning, in that the universe had an absolute beginning, that is impossible under Thomistic immutability.

It appears that you keep trying to find a means by which to apply A-Theory time to God. The “beginning” of the universe refers to the time signature that applies to it, like, a book that God creates eternally with a beginning as an aspect integral to it, but that “beginning” does not apply to God’s act of creation which is eternal - it occurs eternally, not temporally, as if there was a time before God created the universe. That would mean God is also in A-Theory time. If God is atemporal (eternal) then categories of before and after do not apply to his activity, even though it boggles our minds to try to think of it.

I don’t accept your distinction. I understand what you are saying. You mean that God’s act of creation is like a piece of music that God “plays.” His act of playing it is coterminous with the beginning of the song, therefore, the beginning of the song marks the beginning of the act of playing as well. That, however, assumes the song as well as the player both exist in A-Theory time, which is what I deny with regard to God creating the universe. The time constraints are only found inside the universe and do not apply to God creating it. There is no before, during or after regarding God’s creative activity. Mind boggling, to be sure, but that is because we are limited minds, existing in time, attempting to understand timelessness which we cannot even imagine since “acts” for us must be sequential by their very nature because we function “in time.”

 

[belorg]

It appears that you keep trying to find a means by which to apply A-Theory time to God. The “beginning” of the universe refers to the time signature that applies to it, like, a book that God creates eternally with a beginning as an aspect integral to it, but that “beginning” does not apply to God’s act of creation which is eternal - it occurs eternally, not temporally, as if there was a time before God created the universe. That would mean God is also in A-Theory time. If God is atemporal (eternal) then categories of before and after do not apply to his activity, even though it boggles our minds to try to think of it.

I am not trying to find a means by which to apply the A-time to God. On the contrary, I apply the B-time to God.

I don’t accept your distinction. I understand what you are saying. You mean that God’s act of creation is like a piece of music that God “plays.” His act of playing it is coterminous with the beginning of the song, therefore, the beginning of the song marks the beginning of the act of playing as well. That, however, assumes the song as well as the player both exist in A-Theory time, which is what I deny with regard to God creating the universe. The time constraints are only found inside the universe and do not apply to God creating it. There is no before, during or after regarding God’s creative activity. Mind boggling, to be sure, but that is because we are limited minds, existing in time, attempting to understand timelessness which we cannot even imagine since “acts” for us must be sequential by their very nature because we function “in time.”

What is mind-boggling is that you apparently completely agree with me without realizing it.

 

[prodigalson2011]

“Begin in time” does not equal “begin”… And I have never claimed that immutability is the same as '“frozen in time”, what I am saying is that immutability entails a (kind of ) B-theory of time.

This really seems like nothing more than semantics, based again on a misunderstanding; this time, of what is meant by “time” and “eternity”. If we can say that, in fact, there is a point prior to which no time or space exists, then we can say that that is an absolute beginning of time and space. It is senseless to speak of a “theory of time” beyond the beginning of time, because there is no such thing as time beyond that point. Time is a measure of change, and there is no change prior to the beginning of time. What makes it a true beginning is that it is the singular point from which all time flows, which itself flows from God. It is senseless to speak of the universe (the total composite of space and time) existing eternally in this sense, because eternity presupposes the absence of time. The fact of the creator’s eternity does not imply that the creation must also be eternal. Indeed, if that creation is to include time, it must NOT be eternal.

*Article 4. Whether eternity differs from time?

Objection 1. It seems that eternity does not differ from time. For two measures of duration cannot exist together, unless one is part of the other; for instance two days or two hours cannot be together; nevertheless, we may say that a day or an hour are together, considering hour as part of a day. But eternity and time occur together, each of which imports a certain measure of duration. Since therefore eternity is not a part of time, forasmuch as eternity exceeds time, and includes it, it seems that time is a part of eternity, and is not a different thing from eternity.

Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv), the “now” of time remains the same in the whole of time. But the nature of eternity seems to be that it is the same indivisible thing in the whole space of time. Therefore eternity is the “now” of time. But the “now” of time is not substantially different from time. Therefore eternity is not substantially different from time.

Objection 3. Further, as the measure of the first movement is the measure of every movement, as said in Phys. iv, it thus appears that the measure of the first being is that of every being. But eternity is the measure of the first being–that is, of the divine being. Therefore eternity is the measure of every being. But the being of things corruptible is measured by time. Time therefore is either eternity or is a part of eternity.

On the contrary, Eternity is simultaneously whole. But time has a “before” and an “after.” Therefore time and eternity are not the same thing.

I answer that, It is manifest that time and eternity are not the same. Some have founded this difference on the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor an end; whereas time has a beginning and an end. This, however, makes a merely accidental, and not an absolute difference because, granted that time always was and always will be, according to the idea of those who think the movement of the heavens goes on for ever, there would yet remain a difference between eternity and time, as Boethius says (De Consol. v), arising from the fact that eternity is simultaneously whole; which cannot be applied to time: for eternity is the measure of a permanent being; while time is a measure of movement. Supposing, however, that the aforesaid difference be considered on the part of the things measured, and not as regards the measures, then there is some reason for it, inasmuch as that alone is measured by time which has beginning and end in time. Hence, if the movement of the heavens lasted always, time would not be of its measure as regards the whole of its duration, since the infinite is not measurable; but it would be the measure of that part of its revolution which has beginning and end in time.

Another reason for the same can be taken from these measures in themselves, if we consider the end and the beginning as potentialities; because, granted also that time always goes on, yet it is possible to note in time both the beginning and the end, by considering its parts: thus we speak of the beginning and the end of a day or of a year; which cannot be applied to eternity. Still these differences follow upon the essential and primary differences, that eternity is simultaneously whole, but that time is not so.

Reply to Objection 1. Such a reason would be a valid one if time and eternity were the same kind of measure; but this is seen not to be the case when we consider those things of which the respective measures are time and eternity.

Reply to Objection 2. The “now” of time is the same as regards its subject in the whole course of time, but it differs in aspect; for inasmuch as time corresponds to movement, its “now” corresponds to what is movable; and the thing movable has the same one subject in all time, but differs in aspect a being here and there; and such alteration is movement. Likewise the flow of the “now” as alternating in aspect is time. But eternity remains the same according to both subject and aspect; and hence eternity is not the same as the “now” of time.

Reply to Objection 3. As eternity is the proper measure of permanent being, so time is the proper measure of movement; and hence, according as any being recedes from permanence of being, and is subject to change, it recedes from eternity, and is subject to time. Therefore the being of things corruptible, because it is changeable, is not measured by eternity, but by time; for time measures not only things actually changed, but also things changeable; hence it not only measures movement but it also measures repose, which belongs to whatever is naturally movable, but is not actually in motion.*

 

[belorg]

This really seems like nothing more than semantics, based again on a misunderstanding; this time, of what is meant by “time” and “eternity”. If we can say that, in fact, there is a point prior to which no time or space exists, then we can say that that is an absolute beginning of time and space.

But, on a Thomistic account of creation, there cannot be a point prior to which no time or space exists.

It is senseless to speak of a “theory of time” beyond the beginning of time, because there is no such thing as time beyond that point. Time is a measure of change, and there is no change prior to the beginning of time. What makes it a true beginning is that it is the singular point from which all time flows, which itself flows from God. It is senseless to speak of the universe (the total composite of space and time) existing eternally in this sense, because eternity presupposes the absence of time.

On a Thomistic account, the universe cannot be the total composite of space and time, since the universe is necessarily eternal, that is, without beginning.

 

[prodigalson2011]

But, on a Thomistic account of creation, there cannot be a point prior to which no time or space exists.

Yes, there can.

On a Thomistic account, the universe cannot be the total composite of space and time, since the universe is necessarily eternal, that is, without beginning.

No, it is not. Precisely because it includes time, it has a beginning. Beginning is implicit in the notion of time.

That time (and therefore a beginning) is a product of eternity may be a counterintuitive or mysterious notion, but it entails no contradiction.

 

[belorg]

Yes, there can.

Prior denotes time, prodigalson, so, no there can’t.

No, it is not. Precisely because it includes time, it has a beginning. Beginning is implicit in the notion of time.

That time (and therefore a beginning) is a product of eternity may be a counterintuitive or mysterious notion, but it entails no contradiction.

The first point is the beginning in time of the universe, but since the first point itself did not begin, it is obviously no beginning.

 

[polytropos]

This also describes a law of nature - in fact the properties of a law of nature are that it is universal, simple, absolute, unchanging and omnipotent.

But of course a law of nature has no personality, it must always apply, it is blind. So where does intellect come in your description?

Actually, I believe many scientists regard laws of nature as contingent. “Simple” is a technical theological term, so I’m not sure what it would mean for a law of nature to be “simple” (it would have to be a concrete ontological entity, to start).

The term “laws” of nature are kind of a holdover from Newton, who thought that the laws of nature were decreed by God.

 

[Peter_Plato]

Prior denotes time, prodigalson, so, no there can’t.

The first point is the beginning in time of the universe, but since the first point itself did not begin, it is obviously no beginning.

There are two senses of “beginning” at play here.
The initial event that is the beginning of time in the universe is its beginning in terms of originating the sequence of space-time events in the universe. That “beginning” need not correspond to when the universe as an entirety came into existence.

The first word or first event in the first chapter of a novel is the “beginning” of the story in the same sense that the Big Bang is the “beginning” of the universe. But the “beginning” that initiates the plot sequence in the story need not be identical to the instant when the author “began” to write or create the story. In fact, the author may have gone back after completing the entire story and undertook to rewrite the beginning to improve it. The author is not inside and constrained to the time sequence in the story because the story “beginning” is relative only to the rest of the story, and has little or nothing to do with when the author as its creator “began” to write the story.

Imagine an eternally existing story narrative, encased in a book that exists eternally. The narrative would conceivably have a “beginning” even though the story itself (the book that “carries” it) simply exists eternally.

 

[belorg]

There are two senses of “beginning” at play here.
The initial event that is the beginning of time in the universe is its beginning in terms of originating the sequence of space-time events in the universe. That “beginning” need not correspond to when the universe as an entirety came into existence.

The first word or first event in the first chapter of a novel is the “beginning” of the story in the same sense that the Big Bang is the “beginning” of the universe. But the “beginning” that initiates the plot sequence in the story need not be identical to the instant when the author “began” to write or create the story. In fact, the author may have gone back after completing the entire story and undertook to rewrite the beginning to improve it. The author is not inside and constrained to the time sequence in the story because the story “beginning” is relative only to the rest of the story, and has little or nothing to do with when the author as its creator “began” to write the story.

Imagine an eternally existing story narrative, encased in a book that exists eternally. The narrative would conceivably have a “beginning” even though the story itself (the book that “carries” it) simply exists eternally.

Exactly my point.

 

[inocente]

“omnipotent”?

Yes. Everything must comply with a law of nature, there cannot be even one exception. So for instance the law of gravity applies to all matter, nothing can escape its clutches.