P
punkforchrist
Guest
Okay, so the title is a bit of an exaggeration, but I have a great fascination with cosmological arguments in general, no matter the flavor. I was reading through some of the comments on the modal ontological argument here on this forum, and I felt inspired to take another look at a number of modal cosmological arguments (see Pruss and Gale, Maydole, etc.).
Peter van Inwagen has developed an intriguing objection to the principle of sufficient reason (PSR). What he states is something like this: “If X is the set of all contingent states of affairs, then X cannot be explained by something necessary. For, what is necessary will necessarily entail its explicandum, which means that X is actually necessary. This is a contradiction; therefore, the PSR is false.”
I’d like to assume for the sake of argument that he is correct. Can a sound modal cosmological argument (MCA) still be developed? Here’s my attempt:
“[The PSR] merely requires any existing thing to have an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in some external cause. This premise is compatible with there being brute facts or states of affairs about the world. What it precludes is that there could exist things - substances exemplifying properties - which just exist inexplicably.” [1]
Hence, I don’t believe there is any contradiction in the notion of a necessary being. The other possible objection for the skeptic is to deny the S5 axiom on which (2) is dependent. The S5 axiom basically states that, “if p is possibly necessary, then p is necessary,” or, “◊□p → □p.”
However, this axiom is fairly easy to defend. Its contrapositive is this: “~□p → ~◊□p.” In other words, if something is not necessary, then it’s not possibly necessary. Davis puts it this way: “if p is not necessarily true, then it is not possible that p be necessarily true.” [2]
Given the equivalence of “~□p → ~◊□p” with “◊□p → □p,” and the obvious truth of the former, it follows logically and inescapably that the latter is also true. As a result, there is seemingly no tenable objection to the S5 axiom.
Now, since (3) follows from (2), and the real world is contained in the class of all possible worlds, it follows that (4) is correct and that a necessary being exists.
Moving on, there are certain attributes that can be analytically inferred about this necessary being. Given that it explains the universe, it must transcend the universe. Hence, it must be timeless, changeless, and immaterial. It must also be enormously powerful; and finally, it must also be personal. The reason why is that explanations are either personal or scientific. Yet, scientific explanations are part of the explicandum, meaning this necessary being is explaining what is scientifically explicable. On this basis, science is contained within the set of things being explained, and cannot therefore exist outside of this set. Ergo, the necessary being that explains the universe must be personal. This necessary and personal being we call God.
One final objection the skeptic might raise is that the necessary being is the universe itself, which would negate the above paragraph. However, our modal intuitions strongly suggest that the universe, as it is, is not logically necessary. For instance, it is logically possible for the universe to contain more particles of matter than it does. It could also be any number of alternate universes. So, the objector would have to give us a really good reason to believe the universe exists by necessity, and such a reason does not appear forthcoming.
Thoughts?
Works Cited
[1] William Lane Craig, “The Cosmological Argument,” in The Rationality of Theism, edited by Paul Copan and Paul K. Moser, Routledge Press, 2003, p. 115.
[2] Stephen T. Davis, “The Ontological Argument,” ibid., p. 107.
Peter van Inwagen has developed an intriguing objection to the principle of sufficient reason (PSR). What he states is something like this: “If X is the set of all contingent states of affairs, then X cannot be explained by something necessary. For, what is necessary will necessarily entail its explicandum, which means that X is actually necessary. This is a contradiction; therefore, the PSR is false.”
I’d like to assume for the sake of argument that he is correct. Can a sound modal cosmological argument (MCA) still be developed? Here’s my attempt:
- It is possible that a necessary being explains the universe.
- If something is possibly necessary, then it exists in all possible worlds.
- Whatever exists in all possible worlds exists in the real world.
- Therefore, a necessary being exists in the real world.
“[The PSR] merely requires any existing thing to have an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in some external cause. This premise is compatible with there being brute facts or states of affairs about the world. What it precludes is that there could exist things - substances exemplifying properties - which just exist inexplicably.” [1]
Hence, I don’t believe there is any contradiction in the notion of a necessary being. The other possible objection for the skeptic is to deny the S5 axiom on which (2) is dependent. The S5 axiom basically states that, “if p is possibly necessary, then p is necessary,” or, “◊□p → □p.”
However, this axiom is fairly easy to defend. Its contrapositive is this: “~□p → ~◊□p.” In other words, if something is not necessary, then it’s not possibly necessary. Davis puts it this way: “if p is not necessarily true, then it is not possible that p be necessarily true.” [2]
Given the equivalence of “~□p → ~◊□p” with “◊□p → □p,” and the obvious truth of the former, it follows logically and inescapably that the latter is also true. As a result, there is seemingly no tenable objection to the S5 axiom.
Now, since (3) follows from (2), and the real world is contained in the class of all possible worlds, it follows that (4) is correct and that a necessary being exists.
Moving on, there are certain attributes that can be analytically inferred about this necessary being. Given that it explains the universe, it must transcend the universe. Hence, it must be timeless, changeless, and immaterial. It must also be enormously powerful; and finally, it must also be personal. The reason why is that explanations are either personal or scientific. Yet, scientific explanations are part of the explicandum, meaning this necessary being is explaining what is scientifically explicable. On this basis, science is contained within the set of things being explained, and cannot therefore exist outside of this set. Ergo, the necessary being that explains the universe must be personal. This necessary and personal being we call God.
One final objection the skeptic might raise is that the necessary being is the universe itself, which would negate the above paragraph. However, our modal intuitions strongly suggest that the universe, as it is, is not logically necessary. For instance, it is logically possible for the universe to contain more particles of matter than it does. It could also be any number of alternate universes. So, the objector would have to give us a really good reason to believe the universe exists by necessity, and such a reason does not appear forthcoming.
Thoughts?
Works Cited
[1] William Lane Craig, “The Cosmological Argument,” in The Rationality of Theism, edited by Paul Copan and Paul K. Moser, Routledge Press, 2003, p. 115.
[2] Stephen T. Davis, “The Ontological Argument,” ibid., p. 107.