Quaestiones de mente- Questions about the mind

[Qoeleth]

Videatur ut mens definiatur sic ‘cogitans agens’. Autem, quum quicumque dormit (vel aliter cessat cogitare), non est cogitans agens. Ergo, mens cessat esse?

Si cogitatio coepit rursum, est eamdam mens sic anterior, aut nova? Si eadum, ubi erat quando cogitatio cessavit?

Sumne mens mea? Qui est relatio mentis ‘meae’ cum me? Magister aut servus mei?

It seems that the mind may be defined as the ‘thinking agent’. Now, when one sleeps (or otherwise ceases thinking), there is no thinking agent. So, does the mind then cease to exist?

If the thinking start again, is it the same mind as before, or a new one? If it is the same one, where did it go when the thinking stopped?

Am I my mind? What is the relationship of ‘my’ mind with me? Is it my master, or my servant?

 

[SentinelofTruth]

Qoeleth:

It seems that the mind may be defined as the ‘thinking agent’. Now, when one sleeps (or otherwise ceases thinking), there is no thinking agent. So, does the mind then cease to exist?

When a warrior loses his sword, he cannot use his strength to swing it, but this doesn’t mean that the warrior has lost his strength. Sleep works similarly: just because you can’t think doesn’t mean you don’t have a mind.

Qoeleth:

If the thinking start again, is it the same mind as before, or a new one? If it is the same one, where did it go when the thinking stopped?

It doesn’t need to “go somewhere” to stop thinking. When a computer is turned off, it stops computing, but it still exists. And when it is turned back on, it’s still the same computer.

 

[Qoeleth]

When a warrior loses his sword, he cannot use his strength to swing it, but this doesn’t mean that the warrior has lost his strength. Sleep works similarly: just because you can’t think doesn’t mean you don’t have a mind.

It doesn’t need to “go somewhere” to stop thinking. When a computer is turned off, it stops computing, but it still exists. And when it is turned back on, it’s still the same computer.

Etiam, sed mens non est brainus. Videatur ut brainus est similiter computore. Etiam, quum dormimus, habemus brainus. Sed mens est cogitans agens, non machinatio qua cogitatio facitur, qui est brainus, non, inquam, mens. Putesne mens et brainus sunt unum et eumdam?

Quomodo cogitans agens (sive, melior, actio cogitandi) sit sine cogitans, nam essentia suum est nonnisi cogitans?

Indeed, but the mind is not the brain. It seems that the brain is like the computer. Indeed, when we sleep, we still have a brain. But the mind is the ‘thinking agent’, not the machine whereby thinking is done, which is the brain, not, I suggest, the mind. Do you think the mind and the brain are one and the same?

How can the thinking agent (or, better, the act of thinking) be without thinking, since its essence is not other than thinking?

 

[SentinelofTruth]

Qoeleth:

Indeed, but the mind is not the brain.

This is extremely correct.

Qoeleth:

It seems that the brain is like the computer.

The brain is certainly more like a computer than the mind is, I was only comparing the mind to a computer because it seemed like a good analogy. I was not suggesting that the mind is actually like a computer.

Qoeleth:

But the mind is the ‘thinking agent’, not the machine whereby thinking is done, which is the brain, not, I suggest, the mind.

The brain is not the machine whereby thinking is done, it is the machine whereby action is done.

Qoeleth:

How can the thinking agent (or, better, the act of thinking) be without thinking, since its essence is not other than thinking?

Just because the mind thinks doesn’t mean its essence is thinking. The mind, being part of the soul, has inherent existence, unlike physical things. It exists inherently, it doesn’t need to be doing something to exist (besides, who says you don’t just spend all of your sleeping time dreaming and simply forget the majority of you dreams?).

Lastly, it seems I forgot to answer this question before:

Qoeleth:

Am I my mind? What is the relationship of ‘my’ mind with me? Is it my master, or my servant?

You are your soul. In my terminology, soul = mind + spirit. spirit = choosing agent (free will, personality, virtues, vices, etc). The mind consists of six cardinal faculties: thought, emotion, memory, belief, desire, and instinct. The first five being self-explanatory, instinct is interesting because it is subconscious. It’s the only one you don’t infallibly perceive through introspection. The body is, at best, an appendage. The physical universe being not inherently existent, but rather only a system by which our actions are allowed to result in sensory experiences for ourselves and for others. Your soul is the part of you is really “you”. Your mind is part of your soul.
Sorry if this was a little cryptic. I hope I have answered your question.

 

[Bagheera]

It seems that the mind may be defined as the ‘thinking agent’.

One can define things in multiple ways, but that does not make “all” definitions correct.

1. We know that we have a brain.
2. We know that the brain is active, it is composed of neurons, which are interconnected and exchange information by electrochemical action.
3. This activity is called the mind.

The mind is not a physical object. It is the activity of the brain, which is a complex physical object. The level of action is different in the awake state, in the sleeping state, or when one is unconscious due to a trauma, or when is in the state of reversible clinical death. Yet, there is an activity. It ceases when at the time of irreversible death - by definition.

The brain is composed of a finite number of neurons, it is a biological computer. Due to its biological nature it cannot be turned off and back on - at will. There are cellular computers, with distributed processing “centers”, which are defined by their “transition functions”. Lots of info here, sorry… The brain’s “transition function” is constantly changing, there are new connections made all the time.

About the question of “me”. Many parts of our bodies are replaceable, either with artificial prosthesis or by performing an organ transplant. “We” are still the “same” - basically. However as soon as one starts to “tinker” with the brain’s activity, problems arise. Just sever the frontal lobe from the rest of the brain, and the “personality”, the “we” is gone.

On the other hand, if we were able to replace one neuron with an artificial equivalent, with identical functionality, “we” would still be the same. And since there is no known reason why more than one neuron cannot be replaced, therefore a “cyborg” would still carry the same information and the original biological entity did. And if would carry this process to the extreme, we would reach a “non-biological being” - which acts exactly as the original biological one did. Therefore we can safely say that “we” are our mind, the activity of the brain, no matter what material that brain is composed of.

 

[Qoeleth]

This is extremely correct.

Lastly, it seems I forgot to answer this question before:

You are your soul. In my terminology, soul = mind + spirit. spirit = choosing agent (free will, personality, virtues, vices, etc). The mind consists of six cardinal faculties: thought, emotion, memory, belief, desire, and instinct. The first five being self-explanatory, instinct is interesting because it is subconscious. It’s the only one you don’t infallibly perceive through introspection. The body is, at best, an appendage. The physical universe being not inherently existent, but rather only a system by which our actions are allowed to result in sensory experiences for ourselves and for others. Your soul is the part of you is really “you”. Your mind is part of your soul.
Sorry if this was a little cryptic. I hope I have answered your question.

It seems as if the mind depends upon the integrity of the physical mechanism. If half the brain was removed, the mind would be wrecked, or at least changed. Similarly, if my physical mechanism were changed (say, by injecting hormones), my instincts could also be changed. So, assuming when we die the brain is totally destroyed, it would seem that the mind must also cease. If an Alzheimer’s patient can lose memories while alive, presumably when we’re dead, all memories are gone?

But if the mind is part of the soul, you would say somehow it continues after death?

 

[Qoeleth]

One can define things in multiple ways, but that does not make “all” definitions correct.

1. We know that we have a brain.
2. We know that the brain is active, it is composed of neurons, which are interconnected and exchange information by electrochemical action.
3. This activity is called the mind.

The mind is not a physical object. It is the activity of the brain, which is a complex physical object. The level of action is different in the awake state, in the sleeping state, or when one is unconscious due to a trauma, or when is in the state of reversible clinical death. Yet, there is an activity. It ceases when at the time of irreversible death - by definition.

About the question of “me”. Many parts of our bodies are replaceable, either with artificial prosthesis or by performing an organ transplant. “We” are still the “same” - basically. However as soon as one starts to “tinker” with the brain’s activity, problems arise. Just sever the frontal lobe from the rest of the brain, and the “personality”, the “we” is gone.

On the other hand, if we were able to replace one neuron with an artificial equivalent, with identical functionality, “we” would still be the same. And since there is no known reason why more than one neuron cannot be replaced, therefore a “cyborg” would still carry the same information and the original biological entity did. And if would carry this process to the extreme, we would reach a “non-biological being” - which acts exactly as the original biological one did. Therefore we can safely say that “we” are our mind, the activity of the brain, no matter what material that brain is composed of.

So, if an identical copy was made of my brain and my body (which, theoretically, could be possible) what would happen to my identity?

If I had a brain transplant, would I still be ‘me’?

 

[Flimmy]

What mind do you mean.
?

 

[GEddie]

Your limbs are your body’s “movement agents”. But when you lie still, you still have your limbs.

Your nose is your “smelling agent”. But when you have a head cold and so cannot smell, you still have a nose.

Your eyes are your seeing agency. But blindfolded or in the dark, and so unseeing, you still have eyes.

Likewise, whether or not the “mind is the brain” (it actually resides therein) and even ignoring the fact that the sleeping mind is quite active generating your dreams; there is no reason to imagine that your mind ceases being when thinking stops.

ICXC NIKA.

 

[Bagheera]

So, if an identical copy was made of my brain and my body (which, theoretically, could be possible) what would happen to my identity?

For one “second” you would have an identical copy - and both copies would rightfully claim to be the “real McCoy”. From that moment onwards, the copies would cease to be identical (both being exposed to different stimuli), but there would be no way to decide which is the “real” continuation.

If one could make an atom-to-atom copy of the Mona Lisa (for example), then only one of them would be the one which was touched by the hand of Leonardo. The trouble is that there would be no way to find out which one. The question of “which is the original” ceases to be relevant, if there is no way to decide. Not to mention that one can make the copy process by selectively choosing every “even” atom and transpose it (also replacing the original one with an identical one ) and then you would have two copies, both having half of the atoms of the “original”.

There is a science-fiction concept of “teleportation”, where all the information of the person is copied, and transmitted to a far-away receiver. Since the atoms of our bodies are irrelevant (and get replaced about every 7 years), the copy would properly claim to have been teleported. However, there is no reason why the transmission could only happen only once. If two copies are made, then again the question of “which is the ‘real’ continuation” becomes unanswerable.

The conclusion: “with the development of technology, new problems arise, and not all of them can be answered in an objective manner”. Of course, this is nothing new. When the particle-wave dichotomy was first proposed, it seemed to be a “valid” question. It turned out that it is not a valid one. Reality has this “nasty” () aspect that it does not care about our categories. It is what it is.

Stanislaw Lem (the greatest thinker of our time in my opinion) wrote a wonderful book: “Summa Technologiae” (the title in not a coincidence) in which he explored this and similar questions. Only parts have been translated into English, more is the pity. But it is still an awesome read.

If I had a brain transplant, would I still be ‘me’?

Yes.

 

[GEddie]

So, if an identical copy was made of my brain and my body (which, theoretically, could be possible) what would happen to my identity?

If I had a brain transplant, would I still be ‘me’?

Re the first part, I concur with the statement that the two beings would be “identical” only until the two bodies began to register disparate stimuli. After that, there would be only an unusual set of adult twins.

For the second, it’s a wee bit sticky.

There are three aspects of making you “you”.

The first is your body; and this is what the general society uses to identify somebody.. Physical markers such as fingerprints, retinae and DNA can be matched to someone’s identity. To the general society, you are your body, even if your mind completely changes.

The second is your consciousness. As long as thoughts and perceptions run through your mind, you are you. This one is usable only by you.

The third is your memory. Should you become unconscious, when you (your body) comes out of it, the memories in your mind will tell you who you are.

So if brain transplant were possible, the mind would be transferred. The society would say the person was the same (same DNA, fingerprints, etc).

The subject would probably say no, since they would have none of the memories of the body’s original owner, and a new set of their own memories.

Which one is true? I’d go with the second. As a cognitive-science professor once said, " Your cerebral cortex is where you live life."

ICXC NIKA

 

[tonyrey]

Videatur ut mens definiatur sic ‘cogitans agens’. Autem, quum quicumque dormit (vel aliter cessat cogitare), non est cogitans agens. Ergo, mens cessat esse?

Si cogitatio coepit rursum, est eamdam mens sic anterior, aut nova? Si eadum, ubi erat quando cogitatio cessavit?

Sumne mens mea? Qui est relatio mentis ‘meae’ cum me? Magister aut servus mei?

It seems that the mind may be defined as the ‘thinking agent’. Now, when one sleeps (or otherwise ceases thinking), there is no thinking agent. So, does the mind then cease to exist?

If the thinking start again, is it the same mind as before, or a new one? If it is the same one, where did it go when the thinking stopped?

Am I my mind? What is the relationship of ‘my’ mind with me? Is it my master, or my servant?

Our primary data are our thoughts, feelings, sense data, choices and decisions. We infer the existence of physical objects including our brain - from our perceptions. There is no evidence whatsoever that the contents of our skull are aware of themselves or what they are doing. The reality of our intangible mind is our sole certainty.

 

[SentinelofTruth]

tonrey:

There is no evidence whatsoever that the contents of our skull are aware of themselves or what they are doing.

Wow. I don’t think I’ve ever seen anyone agree with me on this.
The rest of y’all, however, are missing the above point. The mind is not contained within the brain. Consider the following argument:
Imagine a computer. Are you imagining it? Okay, good. Now, would you think it more accurate to say that you are picturing a computer or that you are picturing what your visual field would look like if you were seeing a computer? If you think the first statement is more accurate, then modify your mental image so that you are imagining what your visual field would look like if you were seeing the computer. You didn’t have to change it at all, did you? Therefore what you are actually imagining here is not the computer itself, but a perception of the computer. Now, try imaging the computer itself, as distinct from imaging a perception of it. It’s impossible, isn’t it? The only way to imagine a physical thing is to imagine a perception of it. From this I infer that physical things do not exist inherently, only insofar as they are perceived. Our mind, however, as we can see through our (infallible) introspection, clearly has inherent existence. Thus, no part of the mind can be reduced to anything physical (because then it would lack inherent reality, a fundamental property of the mind).