Question about double effect

[witsend]

I have a question about the fourth and last qualifyer of double effect. The good being done from the act must be at least equal to the unwanted bad effect of the act. Correct? Well, is that the same thing as performing the act so that something bad doesn’t happen? Like, it’s still morally good act or at least morally neutral, the bad effect is not desired, the good effect is not brought about by the bad effect, and NOT doing the act will bring about worse consequences than what could possibly happen if you DO do the act. In other words, the Good being done might not be much, but the evil being avoided is still proportionate or greater than the possible evil that will be brought about by doing it.

Is doing something that meets all other areas of DE, done to avoid a great evil, the same as doing the same act to bring about a great good?

 

[Ron_Conte]

I have a question about the fourth and last qualifyer of double effect. The good being done from the act must be at least equal to the unwanted bad effect of the act. Correct? Well, is that the same thing as performing the act so that something bad doesn’t happen? Like, it’s still morally good act or at least morally neutral, the bad effect is not desired, the good effect is not brought about by the bad effect, and NOT doing the act will bring about worse consequences than what could possibly happen if you DO do the act. In other words, the Good being done might not be much, but the evil being avoided is still proportionate or greater than the possible evil that will be brought about by doing it.

Is doing something that meets all other areas of DE, done to avoid a great evil, the same as doing the same act to bring about a great good?

I think it is more helpful to think of the principle of double effect in terms of the three fonts of morality, than as a checklist of criteria to be met.

1. intention - the act cannot be done with any bad intention. This includes, but is not limited to, intending any bad effects as an intended end.
2. moral object - the act cannot be intrinsically evil. The principle of double effect never justifies the deliberate choice of an intrinsically evil act, nor can that principle change an intrinsically evil act into a moral act.
3. circumstances - the reasonably anticipated good effects must morally outweigh, or at least equal, the reasonably anticipated bad effects. The good effects may include avoiding an evil (a type of harm) as well as accomplishing a good. The bad effects may include any evil or harm that is done, as well as any good that is lost. The sin of scandal also falls under circumstances.

 

[Gorgias]

I think it is more helpful to think of the principle of double effect in terms of the three fonts of morality, than as a checklist of criteria to be met.

1. intention - the act cannot be done with any bad intention. This includes, but is not limited to, intending any bad effects as an intended end.

We’re using the word itself in its own definition. How do we define ‘intent’ in this context? Is it simply that we do not desire the bad effect? Even though we desire the good effect and are willing to ‘tolerate’ the bad effect?

1. circumstances - the reasonably anticipated good effects must morally outweigh, or at least equal, the reasonably anticipated bad effects. The good effects may include avoiding an evil (a type of harm) as well as accomplishing a good. The bad effects may include any evil or harm that is done, as well as any good that is lost.

Is this a quantitative analysis? Are we really ‘weighing’ – in a quantitative fashion – how much good comes of one outcome against how much bad comes of the other?

The sin of scandal also falls under circumstances.

Only strictly speaking, right? We aren’t saying that, if a person doesn’t know the circumstances of your situation, and therefore, is scandalized, we need to change our perception of how to handle your situation, right?

 

[witsend]

I think it is more helpful to think of the principle of double effect in terms of the three fonts of morality, than as a checklist of criteria to be met.

1. intention - the act cannot be done with any bad intention. This includes, but is not limited to, intending any bad effects as an intended end.
2. moral object - the act cannot be intrinsically evil. The principle of double effect never justifies the deliberate choice of an intrinsically evil act, nor can that principle change an intrinsically evil act into a moral act.
3. circumstances - the reasonably anticipated good effects must morally outweigh, or at least equal, the reasonably anticipated bad effects. The good effects may include avoiding an evil (a type of harm) as well as accomplishing a good. The bad effects may include any evil or harm that is done, as well as any good that is lost. The sin of scandal also falls under circumstances.

Can you explain more about how scandal and double effect corelate?

 

[Ron_Conte]

Here’s a nice summary of the principle of double effect over at Ascension Health.

Whenever an act has substantial bad effects, the possibility of scandal must be considered. Will some persons be led into sin by seeing a faithful Catholic commit an act that has substantial bad effects? So scandal itself also weighs in the consequences (the circumstances) of the act.

For example, a legislator might vote for a law that restricts abortion further (relative to current law), but does not outlaw all direct abortion. Laws often have both substantial good effects and substantial bad effects, so the Catholic legislator should be careful to make his position clear, that he opposes all direct abortion as a grave intrinsic evil, but that he is voting for a problematic bill because it will do more good than harm.

 

[Ron_Conte]

We’re using the word itself in its own definition. How do we define ‘intent’ in this context? Is it simply that we do not desire the bad effect? Even though we desire the good effect and are willing to ‘tolerate’ the bad effect?

The font of intention is the intended end, in other words, the purpose or reason for choosing the act. Intended the bad effect would be immoral. But any other bad intention would also make the act immoral. Tolerating bad consequences is not a bad intention.

Is this a quantitative analysis? Are we really ‘weighing’ – in a quantitative fashion – how much good comes of one outcome against how much bad comes of the other?

The font called circumstances is evaluated based on “the totality of the foreseeable consequences of that act for all persons concerned.” (Veritatis Splendor, n. 79). The consequences (effects) are evaluated based on the love of God above all else, and the love of neighbor as self. So it is the moral weight of the consequences that matters.

Only strictly speaking, right? We aren’t saying that, if a person doesn’t know the circumstances of your situation, and therefore, is scandalized, we need to change our perception of how to handle your situation, right?

We are saying that. A person might commit a good act with only good intentions, but if he reasonably anticipates that other persons might misunderstand, and think that a grave sin is occurring, that bad effect might make the act immoral. So we do need to take into account the mistaken perceptions of others.

For example, a boyfriend and girlfriend move in together, but they are not having sexual relations. The sin of scandal still applies because people will suppose that they are living in sin, and they will be scandalized by that bad example. So the couple cannot move in together, even if they intend to sleep separately.

 

[Actaeon]

I have a question about the fourth and last qualifyer of double effect. The good being done from the act must be at least equal to the unwanted bad effect of the act. Correct? Well, is that the same thing as performing the act so that something bad doesn’t happen? Like, it’s still morally good act or at least morally neutral, the bad effect is not desired, the good effect is not brought about by the bad effect, and NOT doing the act will bring about worse consequences than what could possibly happen if you DO do the act. In other words, the Good being done might not be much, but the evil being avoided is still proportionate or greater than the possible evil that will be brought about by doing it.

Is doing something that meets all other areas of DE, done to avoid a great evil, the same as doing the same act to bring about a great good?

Yes. Example, A cargo train with two people on it is headed down a track-switch. On the current track, a bus with 50 children is stuck, and they won’t be able to get out of the way before the train gets there. If the train is not switched, all 50 children, the bus driver, and the teacher will be killed. On the other track there is construction, if the trian is switched, then the conductor and the engineer will die.

Applying the principle of double effect:

1. Switching the tracks is, itself, a morally neutral act
2. Switching the tracks would not be done with the desired outcome of killing the conductor and engineer… rather, this is a sad side-effect of not-killing the children.
3. The good effect is brought about by switching the track, not by the killing of the conductor and the engineer.
4. Not killing 50 children and their teachers is proportionally better than not killing two train workers (or, reformulated positively, saving the lives of 50 children and their teachers is proportionally greater than the loss of two lives caused by switching the track)

So you see, we can formulate that last item either negatively or positively, but the end result is the same: the effects are at least proportional, if not greater “good” caused by taking the action.

so in this example, we should switch the tracks.

 

[yellow8yellowM]

Yes. Example, A cargo train with two people on it is headed down a track-switch. On the current track, a bus with 50 children is stuck, and they won’t be able to get out of the way before the train gets there. If the train is not switched, all 50 children, the bus driver, and the teacher will be killed. On the other track there is construction, if the trian is switched, then the conductor and the engineer will die.

Applying the principle of double effect:

1. Switching the tracks is, itself, a morally neutral act
2. Switching the tracks would not be done with the desired outcome of killing the conductor and engineer… rather, this is a sad side-effect of not-killing the children.
3. The good effect is brought about by switching the track, not by the killing of the conductor and the engineer.
4. Not killing 50 children and their teachers is proportionally better than not killing two train workers (or, reformulated positively, saving the lives of 50 children and their teachers is proportionally greater than the loss of two lives caused by switching the track)

So you see, we can formulate that last item either negatively or positively, but the end result is the same: the effects are at least proportional, if not greater “good” caused by taking the action.

so in this example, we should switch the tracks.

I agree with you, but would like to parse this out further. I could make the argument that switching the tracks knowing that the track will end is not a morally neutral act. This act will bring about the deaths of the conductor and engineer the same as pulling a trigger will bring about the deaths of the person you are pointing your gun at. Pulling a trigger in and of itself is morally neutral, but doing it when there is somebody in front of it is not.