C
Contarini
Guest
Obviously the argument doesn’t apply to incidental features of being human. But when you take one feature of being human and argue that it’s so ontological central to the human identity of Christ that those who don’t possess it can’t act in persona Christi, then I think you do seem to be running afoul of Nazianzus’ principle.Hmm… but, the principle speaks to the human person, that is, to human nature. Your application, however, takes one facet of human persons – that is, gender – and applies the same rationale. This is a logical error. If Nazianzus were appealing to physical qualities, he would have to make the statement that salvation depends on Jesus being male and female, Jew and Gentile, free and slave, blond and brunette and red-haired and black-haired, and possessing all physical characteristics in his physical body – or else, logically, no women, Gentiles, slaves, blonds or red-heads would have been able to be saved! Clearly, he does no such thing. So, why is it reasonable to suggest that Nazianzus’ claims about salvation and the human mind apply equally validly to Church roles and human biology?
The principle is that Jesus saves us by assuming our nature in its fullness. If Jesus didn’t assume–in its fullness–the human nature possessed by women, then they can’t be saved. If He did, then how can it be true that they can’t act “in persona Christi”?
Again, I’m willing to accept that there’s something I’m not seeing here. But I’m frustrated that no one seems even to see the difficulty.
If we all share the same nature with Jesus, then we can act “in persona Christi.”It does no such thing! Rather, we are saved inasmuch as we share the same nature of Christ – formed in the image and likeness of God – not through the question of which gender we possess!
No. You’ve asserted. You want it both ways. You want us to share the same human nature when it comes to salvation but not when it comes to acting “in persona Christi.”As I’ve demonstrated, the argument does no such thing:
No. I’m not.Really? You’re not making the argument that there are no distinctions?
No. Not necessarily. This argument doesn’t address that point. Granted, I’m very happy that the Catholic Church clearly does not ask me to hold to Aquinas’ view that women are defective males, and that so venerable a figure as Pope Benedict said (in what is arguably an exercise of the ordinary magisterium, though certainly not one covered by infallibility) that Paul’s words about women keeping silence had to be considered “relative.” But the Aristotelian argument and the argument from the literal sense of St. Paul’s words are not affected by the argument I’m making here. It’s a specific argument about what it means to act “in persona Christi.” If women are ontologically incapable of acting in persona Christi, not because their poorly formed bodies impose an obstacle to the full expression of their humanity (as St. Thomas taught) or because they are incapable of exercising any position of authority, but because they possess a separate nature from men but one of equal dignity with that of men–then, and only then, it seems that women couldn’t be saved. Which is absurd. Hence, either there is something I’m not seeing or this is a bad argument explaining why women can’t be ordained.You’re explicitly claiming that there are no distinctions with respect to ministry and gender, are you not?
I think one way around it is to drop the language of ontology altogether and to use iconic language instead. I’m still mulling over whether that makes a difference and how these two kinds of language are related.
I’m confused. What am I claiming? That there are no distinctions in ministry? Of course not. You persist in thinking that I must be making the stereotypical argument that exists in your head, no matter how many times I say that I’m not making any such argument.How is the fact that Paul explicitly claims that there are distinctions in ministry amount to a straw man argument, since this is what you’re claiming?![]()
Edwin