Question on Aquinas

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ttabor33

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Hello,

I am studying Aquinas on my own and I have a couple of questions I how you can help me or enlighten me on.

“considered absolutely, being itself is infinite. for it can be participated in infinite ways by an infinite number of things. If, then the being of something is finite, that being must be limited by something else which is its cause in some way. but there can be no cause of the divine being, since God is necessary in himself. Therefore, God’s being and God himself are infinite” (SCG 1.43:363)

Questions.

How would Aquinas define being?

Being itself is Infinite - How do we know this? where do we get our knowledge of this fact?

Participated in infinite ways by an infinite number of things - Please give examples of this - elaborate on it.
 
ttabor33 said:
Being itself is Infinite - How do we know this? where do we get our knowledge of this fact?

Participated in infinite ways by an infinite number of things - Please give examples of this - elaborate on it.
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There are no inherent limitations on how many things can be. E.g. your existence as such in no way prejudices mine.
 
ttabor33 said:
Hello,

I am studying Aquinas on my own and I have a couple of questions I how you can help me or enlighten me on.

“considered absolutely, being itself is infinite. for it can be participated in infinite ways by an infinite number of things. If, then the being of something is finite, that being must be limited by something else which is its cause in some way. but there can be no cause of the divine being, since God is necessary in himself. Therefore, God’s being and God himself are infinite” (SCG 1.43:363)

Questions.

How would Aquinas define being?

Being itself is Infinite - How do we know this? where do we get our knowledge of this fact?

Participated in infinite ways by an infinite number of things - Please give examples of this - elaborate on it.
Click to expand...
Modern Catholic Dictionary – “Whatever in any way is, whether it exists or is possible, whether in the mind, in the imagination, or in a statement. Philosophically being is the real, and corresponds to essence or thing. Its opposite is the unreal and finally that which implies an inner contradiction.”
 
SO if we say Truth or Wisdom not received in anything is Pure Act then could we say it is unlimited and mean by that there is no end to the Truth or Wisdom or Love of God? If Potency limits Act and God is Pure Act without any Potency there is no end to his Be-ing Correct?
 
Vico said:
Whatever in any way is, whether it exists or is possible, whether in the mind, in the imagination, or in a statement. Philosophically being is the real, and corresponds to essence or thing. Its opposite is the unreal and finally that which implies an inner contradiction.
Click to expand...
Wow, I really can’t say a single positive thing about that definition. Clearly not written by a philosopher!

“Its opposite is the unreal”? Is that supposed to imply that unreal things exist?
 
Yes, I’m more than aware of that. But both concrete and abstract objects are, by definition, real. Otherwise they wouldn’t be objects.
Question: is evil a “thing”?
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If it exists, it is surely a thing. Of course, Augustine denies its existence, and that’s another question entirely.
 
That is Augustine’s view, though various Catholic theologians differ on the matter.
 
And mind you, a distortion of a good would surely be a thing.
 
The implication of the inner contradiction is the essence of declination. This statement is not only philosophy it is moved from the pre- to the Renaissance mind.
The post-modern has always attempted to deconstruct what is true but fails on what is the definition of is. To quote that great post-modernist, Forrest, stupid is what stupid does, that is the definition of is.
Levity may also raise the mood of philosophy, at times.
 
I guess my point is that “real” is nothing more than a synonym for “existent”. Such a definition is utterly uninformative.
 
Prodigal_Son said:
I guess my point is that “real” is nothing more than a synonym for “existent”. Such a definition is utterly uninformative.
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Try here: Aquinas: Metaphysics | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Primarily, for Aquinas, a thing cannot be unless it possesses an act of being, and the thing that possesses an act of being is thereby rendered an essence/existence composite. If an essence has an act of being, the act of being is limited by that essence whose act it is.
 
OK, but this response cannot address my concern with the MCD definition, since it does not mention the word “real”. For Aquinas, I expect, all “things” were necessarily real, since one cannot speak of something that doesn’t exist. Thus “this thing is not real” is an impossible statement.

But whatever – my intention was never to derail this thread. I just have a pet peeve about imprecise definitions.
 
Prodigal_Son said:
OK, but this response cannot address my concern with the MCD definition, since it does not mention the word “real”. For Aquinas, I expect, all “things” were necessarily real, since one cannot speak of something that doesn’t exist. Thus “this thing is not real” is an impossible statement.

But whatever – my intention was never to derail this thread. I just have a pet peeve about imprecise definitions.
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And another: http://www.aquinasonline.com/Topics/essencex.html

That a thing is or has existence, is a principle really distinct from its quiddity. In no case (except for God) does the essence of a thing indicate anything about whether that thing really is. The essence of a horse that exists, and the essence of a horse that doesn’t are absolutely the same, namely horse-ness; a horse’s existing is totally different from what kind of a thing it is. Therefore, there must be something about really existing things that accounts for this very existing, and it is not their essence; it is their existence. Existence then is that which makes essences to be, to exercise the act of existing. St. Thomas indicated the activity of being, existence, with the Latin of “to be”, esse.
 
Vico said:
That a thing is or has existence, is a principle really distinct from its quiddity. In no case (except for God) does the essence of a thing indicate anything about whether that thing really is. The essence of a horse that exists, and the essence of a horse that doesn’t are absolutely the same, namely horse-ness; a horse’s existing is totally different from what kind of a thing it is. Therefore, there must be something about really existing things that accounts for this very existing, and it is not their essence; it is their existence. Existence then is that which makes essences to be, to exercise the act of existing. St. Thomas indicated the activity of being, existence, with the Latin of “to be”, esse.
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OK, this is much more helpful. In my understanding, this is saying that there “are” essences – which is to say that essences are real – quite independent from the question of whether there is a thing that possesses that essence. In other words, we’re talking about something like universals as existing over and above the existence of particulars that instantiate these universals.

I would still think that it would be a mistake to say, however, that unicorns “exist”, but are not “real”. Using the schema above, we would rather say either that (a) the type “unicorn” is real, but there just aren’t any unicorns, or (b) there is no type “unicorn”, since there is no quiddity for a type of thing that does not (and has not, and will not) exist. I would lean toward option A if I were a Thomist.

I’m guessing that Aquinas was working in a language (Latin) that lacked a word for “real”. That is all to the good. The word doesn’t make anything clearer, in my estimation. Nevertheless, I do now appreciate the point you’re trying to make. 🙂
 
Prodigal_Son said:
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Vico:
That a thing is or has existence, is a principle really distinct from its quiddity. In no case (except for God) does the essence of a thing indicate anything about whether that thing really is. The essence of a horse that exists, and the essence of a horse that doesn’t are absolutely the same, namely horse-ness; a horse’s existing is totally different from what kind of a thing it is. Therefore, there must be something about really existing things that accounts for this very existing, and it is not their essence; it is their existence. Existence then is that which makes essences to be, to exercise the act of existing. St. Thomas indicated the activity of being, existence, with the Latin of “to be”, esse.
Click to expand...
OK, this is much more helpful. In my understanding, this is saying that there “are” essences – which is to say that essences are real – quite independent from the question of whether there is a thing that possesses that essence. In other words, we’re talking about something like universals as existing over and above the existence of particulars that instantiate these universals.

I would still think that it would be a mistake to say, however, that unicorns “exist”, but are not “real”. Using the schema above, we would rather say either that (a) the type “unicorn” is real, but there just aren’t any unicorns, or (b) there is no type “unicorn”, since there is no quiddity for a type of thing that does not (and has not, and will not) exist. I would lean toward option A if I were a Thomist.

I’m guessing that Aquinas was working in a language (Latin) that lacked a word for “real”. That is all to the good. The word doesn’t make anything clearer, in my estimation. Nevertheless, I do now appreciate the point you’re trying to make. 🙂
Click to expand...
Everything has two principles that explains its being: essence and existence. Essence is the “what” (quiddity) of a thing. Existence is the act of being (esse) exercised by beings.

See: http://www.aquinasonline.com/Topics/deente4.html
 
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