T
Touchstone
Guest
I think that’s true, but we’re equivocating on our terms, or more specifically, equivocating on our epistemology. A “non-scientific truth” is not the same as a “scientific truth”, epistemically, in the same way an objective proposition is not the same as a subjective proposition. They are both propositions, but are fundamentally different.Touchstone,
I would agree with your reply for the most part except for the following:-
I think you might have misidentified the cause of the problem. The problem is not in doubting reality but wanting everything to be inductively proven true.
There are truths which are Scientific and truths that are not.
A non-scientific proposition like “God is love”, for example, may be “true”, but only if we construe “true” in a much different (and conflicting) sense than we use it if we say “mass exerts gravitational pull on mass”. The former is not only problematic just in terms of its formal qualification, but is also only “true” in a more casual sense, if it is true at all; it’s non-intersubjective, epistemically, and it’s not subject to falsification. Indeed, many of the “non-scientific truths”, like our example here (“God is love”) are declarative, not descriptive, as a scientific truth would be. Tautologies, rather than empirical principles, in other words.
You can call that “equally true”, or “more profoundly true”, if you like. That’s a subjective classification. What’s objectively true about such a non-scientific truth is that its “truth” does not have the qualities that are valued in scientific truths – intersubjectivity, predictive power, explanatory scope and economy, falsifiability, etc. A scientific truth can “show its math” and “demonstrate itself”, where a religious proposition cannot – by definition: if it could show its math in some intersubjective way, we’d consider it science not religion!
I hear this all the time – “therre are more truths and other kinds of truth” – and perhaps they are. But they do not have the qualities and properties that scientific truths do, or they would be scientific truths. The value of intersubjectivity and falsifiability is a subjective matter, I guess, so I’ll leave it to each to value the kinds of truth that pass the epistemic rigors of science.
That’s right. But really, that’s like saying that science deals in the “truthy” forms of truth, or the “solid” or the “serious” forms of truth. Lack of falsifiability is a debilitating feature; It eviscerates the “true” part in “true”, epistemically. Part of what we mean when we say “true”, I suggest, is “not false”. That is, the semantics of “true” entail “not false”. Of necessity. By affirming the a proposition as non-falsifiable, even in principle, you’ve rendered the “true” part impotent, by virtue of removing the possibility of its negation. What can’t be false isn’t true as a statement about the real world. It’s a trivial truth, a tautology. That’s a major bug, not the feature many religious folk suppose their non-falsifiability aspects of their propositions might be.I think this claim is way off. Science is not anti-religion at all. Science deals with a different class of truths that are falsifiable.
It has no say on the matter of ‘non-scientific truths’ or on whether ‘Only scientific truths are valuable’.
Or are you trying to say it does?
See above. Subjective values are a crucial, and foundational part of the human experience. Nothing wrong with that. The trouble here is just the equivocation between “true as an intersubjective, falsifiable” proposition, built on epistemology that demands those things (among others), and “true as subjective, non-falsifiable propositions”.God Bless![]()
Both have utility and place in human thinking and action. But they are not interchangeable. And if where we do value some sense of “true” that applies and obtains beyond our fancies, our parochial minds and its whims and preferences, then scientific truth is king. It’s not necessary to value truth that way, and one may value “personal truth” and “truth as preference” more than something grounded in skeptical objective analysis.
But if one does value the “kind of truth” that intersubjectivity and falsifiability enable, then “truths” (if they are truths, even on their own terms) like “God is love” just can’t compete, and cannot rise to that kind of valuation.
-TS
Edited to Add: If it’s not clear, the above is why I referred to the scientific approach as “anti-religion”. The scientific epistemology reviles the very thing that religious credulity celebrates and calls “higher”; it is precise what produces that kind of affirmation that science understands to be the cardinal source of error, the corrosive element of anti-knowledge that cannot be tolerated or indulged if science is to maintain its own epistemic integrity.