Question on Knowledge as JTB

[Qoeleth]

Following another thread on epistemology, I would like to raise the following question about the definition as justified, true belief.

Imagine a person has a mathematical problem. He work out the problem, in what he believes to be the write way, and feels he has got the answer. He is perhaps 70% sure he is right.

Now, his answer actually is right.

Is it correct to describe him as ‘knowing’ the answer, given that he would seem to have JTB, although he is only 70% convinced of his own answer?

Is relative certainty of a JTB necessary for it to be knowledge?

 

[ASimon]

Following another thread on epistemology, I would like to raise the following question about the definition as justified, true belief.

Imagine a person has a mathematical problem. He work out the problem, in what he believes to be the write way, and feels he has got the answer. He is perhaps 70% sure he is right.

Now, his answer actually is right.

Is it correct to describe him as ‘knowing’ the answer, given that he would seem to have JTB, although he is only 70% convinced of his own answer?

Is relative certainty of a JTB necessary for it to be knowledge?

I would say that no, it’s not enough. If you’re a math student working at the chalkboard, on a problem that I (the math teacher) have set out for you, and you solve the problem with an answer that you’re 70% confident is correct, then all you can claim is that you think you know the answer. I, the math teacher, however, do know the answer, and I know that I know the answer. But until I confirm your answer is correct (or you discover its accuracy through other means), you can only say you think you know.

 

[Qoeleth]

I would say that no, it’s not enough. If you’re a math student working at the chalkboard, on a problem that I (the math teacher) have set out for you, and you solve the problem with an answer that you’re 70% confident is correct, then all you can claim is that you think you know the answer. I, the math teacher, however, do know the answer, and I know that I know the answer. But until I confirm your answer is correct (or you discover its accuracy through other means), you can only say you think you know.

So, knowledge may be better defined as justified, true, certain belief?

 

[ASimon]

So, knowledge may be better defined as justified, true, certain belief?

Yes.

 

[MarkThompson]

Following another thread on epistemology, I would like to raise the following question about the definition as justified, true belief.

Imagine a person has a mathematical problem. He work out the problem, in what he believes to be the write way, and feels he has got the answer. He is perhaps 70% sure he is right.

Now, his answer actually is right.

Is it correct to describe him as ‘knowing’ the answer, given that he would seem to have JTB, although he is only 70% convinced of his own answer?

Is relative certainty of a JTB necessary for it to be knowledge?

I think most people would not describe things that they suspected to be true, with 70% confidence, to be things that they “knew.” People do not typically say, “I know it, but there’s a pretty large chance I’m wrong about it.” At any rate, this “certainty” aspect is already captured in what is typically proposed as the “belief” requirement. That is to say, the subject must believe that the proposition in question is true, not that is probably true.

(Of course, though, one can hold beliefs with certainty about topics which are known only to a degree of probability. If a machine correctly identifies a chemical sample 70% of the time, a person might say, “Based on the readout, I strongly suspect that this sample is benzite, and in fact I know that there’s a 70% chance that it is.”)

 

[Qoeleth]

I think most people would not describe things that they suspected to be true, with 70% confidence, to be things that they “knew.” People do not typically say, “I know it, but there’s a pretty large chance I’m wrong about it.” At any rate, this “certainty” aspect is already captured in what is typically proposed as the “belief” requirement. That is to say, the subject must believe that the proposition in question is true, not that is probably true.

If one says “I believe God exists”- that it implies (I suggest) a degree of uncertainty. But, it would still seem to qualify as ‘belief’.