But if the word will is taken to mean not the faculty but the decision taken by the will (the will willed, not the will willing), then it is true that the two wills always acted in harmony: there were two wills willing and two acts, but one object, one will willed; in the phrase of St. Maximus, there were duo thelemata though mia gnome. The word will is also used to mean not a decision of the will, but a mere velleity or wish, voluntas ut natura (thelesis) as opposed to voluntas ut ratio (boulesis). These are but two movements of the same faculty; both exist in Christ without any imperfection, and the natural movement of His human will is perfectly subject to its rational or free movement. Lastly, the sensitive appetite is also sometimes entitled will. It is an integral part of human nature, and therefore exists in the perfect human nature of Jesus Christ, but without any of the imperfection induced by original or actual sin: He can have no passions (in that sense of the word which implies a revolt against the reason), no concupiscence, no “will of the flesh”. Therefore this “lower will” is to be denied in Christ, in so far as it is called a will, because it resists the rational will (it was in this sense that Honorius was said by John IV to have denied that Christ had a lower will); but it is to be asserted in Him so far as it is called will, because it obeys the rational will, and so is voluntas per participationem: in fact in this latter sense the sensual appetite is less improperly called will in Christ than in us, for quo perfectior est volens, eo magis sensualitas in eo de voluntate habet. But the strict Sense of the word will (votuntas, thelema) is always the rational will, the free will. It is therefore correct to say that in Christ there are but two wills: the Divine will, which is the Divine nature, and the human rational will, which always acts in harmony with and in free subjection to the Divine will. The denial of more than one will in Christ by the heretics necessarily involved the incompleteness of His human nature. They confounded the will as faculty with the decision of the faculty. They argued that two wills must mean contrary wills, which shows that they could not conceive of two distinct faculties having the same object. Further, they saw rightly that the Divine will is the ultimate governing principle, to hegemonikon, but a free human will acting under its leadership seemed to them to be otiose. Yet this omission prevents our Lord’s actions from being free, from being human actions, from being meritorious, indeed makes His human nature nothing but an irrational, irresponsible instrument of the Divinity — a machine, of which the Divinity is the motive power. To Severus our Lord’s knowledge was similarly of one kind — He had only Divine knowledge and no human cognitive faculty. Such thoroughgoing conclusions were not contemplated by the inventors of Monothelitism, **and Sergius merely denied two wills in order to assert that there was no repugnance in Christ’s human nature to the promptings of the Divine, and he certainly did not see the consequences of his own disastrous teaching. **