Questions about the Cosmological Argument

[Shike]

How is an eternal pre-universe incoherent?

It’s not philosophically incoherent. But JohnAlexander is correct.

Now something self-caused… that is philosophically incoherent. Nothing comes from nothing (any attempt to sidestep this necessarily involves one in a contradiction).

 

[Samuel_Monosov]

It’s not philosophically incoherent. But JohnAlexander is correct.

JohnAlexander’s comment does not address the idea of an eternal pre-universe.

Now something self-caused… that is philosophically incoherent. Nothing comes from nothing (any attempt to sidestep this necessarily involves one in a contradiction).

It’s not from nothing. It’s from itself.

Where is the contradiction?

Where is the contradiction from something starting from nothing, with no causal explanation?

I’m not a philosopher. Please explain.

 

[razredge]

Where is the contradiction from something starting from nothing, with no causal explanation?

I’m not a philosopher. Please explain.

Lol, the basic principle of metaphysics and any (kind of attempt to to empirical science really) is ex nihilo nihil fit, something coming from nothing is no better than magic.

 

[Samuel_Monosov]

Lol, the basic principle of metaphysics and any (kind of attempt to to empirical science really) is ex nihilo nihil fit, something coming from nothing is no better than magic.

It’s nice words, but I don’t see the contradiction. What if there are strange things in our universe that violate this rule? What if the rules are different than this basic principle of metaphysics? What do you think the consequences would be? And how do you reach your conclusions about these consequences?

 

[belorg]

This simple argument for God’s existence, sometimes called the Kalam argument, goes something like:

1. Anything that has a beginning has a cause.
2. The universe has a beginning
3. Therefore the universe has a cause.
   …various arguments…
   X. This cause is God.

Here go my questions:

1. Do you find this argument convincing?

No

1. If not, why not?

Because the Kalam Cosmological argument disproves God

1. Finally, what arguments do you use to go from (3) to (X), and how do you eliminate alternative causes, such as some eternal pre-universe, etc?

It is impossible to go from 3 to X because the onkly logical conlusion fro m 3 is actually
“This cause most certainly isn’t God”.
The Kalam cosmological argument is a really co,vincing argument aagainst theism.

The reason why this is so is quite simple.
If we agree with premsie 1-3 then, unless we take into account an infinte regress of time, we end up with an a-temporal cause of the universe.
Even conceding for the sake of the argument that the concept of a timeless person is coherent (and I actually see no reason to think it is), the problem is that a timeless person cannot create anything that begins. So, if, as the KCA claims, the universe really did begin, it cannot possibly have been created by a timeless person.

 

[Shike]

JohnAlexander’s comment does not address the idea of an eternal pre-universe.

Correct. But JohnAlexander was still correct.

It’s not from nothing. It’s from itself.

Sure, we are looking at something causing itself; you are right. My comment about ‘nothing comes from nothing’ was to help illustrate the principle of non-contradiction.

The manifest contradiction with something causing its own existence is that it would have to both exist and not exist in the same respect (and if in time, then at the same time).

And the reason one should reject the “open-minded” attitude that the laws of logic may not apply everywhere, is that the laws of logic are at the foundation of coherent thought… It’s not coherent to say that the laws of logic do not apply everywhere. A suitable translation is that ‘the laws of logic asdfas dfaskf dsafsadfasd red blue tigers scissors run’. The possibility cannot be thought. Commenting on the possibility of nonsense is still nonsense.

The laws of logic are inescapable.

Good questions.

 

[Shike]

Even conceding for the sake of the argument that the concept of a timeless person is coherent (and I actually see no reason to think it is), the problem is that a timeless person cannot create anything that begins. So, if, as the KCA claims, the universe really did begin, it cannot possibly have been created by a timeless person.

I’m not a fan of the Kalaam, I don’t think it works.

That said, you are on to something. The way an unchanging being creates would be very different than the way any finite being would. I don’t see a contradiction however.

In Aristotelian terms change would be the interaction of two principles, that of potentiality reducing to actuality. A being that did not undergo this interaction of principles must be Pure Actuality. And the way Pure Actuality creates would be very different than anything else because it would not undergo change. Such a Being would not have to create from pre-existing matter but could call-forth, so-to-speak, existing things instantaneously.

 

[belorg]

I’m not a fan of the Kalaam, I don’t think it works.

That said, you are on to something. The way an unchanging being creates would be very different than the way any finite being would. I don’t see a contradiction however.

The difference is that an unchanging being cannot create a beginning universe.
And it’s eazsy to see why.
An unchanging being cannot go from ‘not creating’ to ‘creating’ because that would be a change. So the only way for an unchanging being to create is by always being creating. but that means that the effect of this eternal creation is also eternal. Hence, if the universe really did begin, this eternal unchanging being cannot possibly be the creator of the universe.

In Aristotelian terms change would be the interaction of two principles, that of potentiality reducing to actuality. A being that did not undergo this interaction of principles must be Pure Actuality. And the way Pure Actuality creates would be very different than anything else because it would not undergo change.

Just like I said.

Such a Being would not have to create from pre-existing matter but could call-forth, so-to-speak, existing things instantaneously.

I think Aristotelean-Thomistic cosmology is self-defeating, buit that goes beyond the scope of this thread.

 

[tonyrey]

The difference is that an unchanging being cannot create a beginning universe.

An unchanging being cannot go from ‘not creating’ to ‘creating’ because that would be a change. So the only way for an unchanging being to create is by always being creating. but that means that the effect of this eternal creation is also eternal. Hence, if the universe really did begin, this eternal unchanging being cannot possibly be the creator of the universe.

1. The unchanging Being is constantly Self-creating!
2. The power of self-creation implies the power to create other beings
3. The creation of other beings does not entail change:
4. “**In **Him we live, move and have our being”

 

[belorg]

1. The unchanging Being is constantly Self-creating!

That’s a contradiction, but it’s hardly relevant for this thread.

1. The power of self-creation implies the power to create other beings

Which means that these ‘other beings’ are constantly created and don’t ‘begin’.

1. The creation of other beings does not entail change:

Actually, it does, but, again, not really relevant here.

1. “**In **Him we live, move and have our being”

Which means that we have always had our being in Him and did not begin to have it.
My point is that if the secand premise f the KCA is true, then what you say here is false.

 

[Samuel_Monosov]

The manifest contradiction with something causing its own existence is that it would have to both exist and not exist in the same respect (and if in time, then at the same time).

Why is this? I can imagine a causal loop, say where a pool ball (P1) that starts moving at t0 causes another pool ball (P2) to move at t1, but P2 moves backwards in time and causes P1 to start moving at t0. There is no time during which P1 is both moving and not moving. At least, not that I see.

 

[razredge]

Why is this? I can imagine a causal loop, say where a pool ball (P1) that starts moving at t0 causes another pool ball (P2) to move at t1, but P2 moves backwards in time and causes P1 to start moving at t0. There is no time during which P1 is both moving and not moving. At least, not that I see.

That doesn’t make sense - P1 still had to start moving first, so the chain of causal relations began at P1, P2 can’t cause P1 since P1 has to exist before P2.

 

[tonyrey]

1. The unchanging Being is constantly Self-creating!

Are you a different person after you have created something?

2. The power of self-creation implies the power to create other beings

Which means that these ‘other beings’ are constantly created and don’t ‘begin’.

There is no reason why creatures need be identical with their Creator.

3. The creation of other beings does not entail change:

Actually, it does, but, again, not really relevant here.

Have you changed after you have changed something?

4. "**In **

Him we live, move and have our being" Which means that we have always had our being in Him and did not begin to have it.
My point is that if the secand premise f the KCA is true, then what you say here is false.

There is no obvious reason for “always”.

 

[Samuel_Monosov]

That doesn’t make sense - P1 still had to start moving first, so the chain of causal relations began at P1, P2 can’t cause P1 since P1 has to exist before P2.

I don’t understand this objection.

Why can’t it be that for t = t0, P2, while moving backwards in time, causes P1 to start moving? Why must there be a “first”?

 

[Perplexity]

I think an interesting question to ask is whether on the basis of our available evidence relevant to (1), is it irrational to suspend belief in (1)? If not, this can hardly constitute a good argument for theism.

 

[tdgesq]

I think an interesting question to ask is whether on the basis of our available evidence relevant to (1), is it irrational to suspend belief in (1)? If not, this can hardly constitute a good argument for theism.

(1) “Anything that has a beginning has a cause.”

If you deny this premise then please provide evidence, any evidence, that it is false.

 

[Perplexity]

(1) “Anything that has a beginning has a cause.”

If you deny this premise then please provide evidence, any evidence, that it is false.

Suspending belief in (1) is not the same as saying (1) is false. Although, as I stated earlier in this thread, (1) needs the a-theory of time, so b-theory could be used as the evidence you’re asking for.

However, I just want to know if I’m irrational in suspending belief in (1). For example, what if I said something like this: I’ll only believe (1) on the basis of extremely powerful evidence so that I can preserve myself from false beliefs as much as possible. Suppose (1) doesn’t have that kind of evidence. Am I irrational?

 

[tdgesq]

Suspending belief in (1) is not the same as saying (1) is false. Although, as I stated earlier in this thread, (1) needs the a-theory of time, so b-theory could be used as the evidence you’re asking for.

Suspending belief is equivalent to saying you have no belief. So be it. The b theory of time tells us nothing about (1), because there is no “beginning” under such a theory.

However, I just want to know if I’m irrational in suspending belief in (1). For example, what if I said something like this: I’ll only believe (1) on the basis of extremely powerful evidence so that I can preserve myself from false beliefs as much as possible. Suppose (1) doesn’t have that kind of evidence. Am I irrational?

Yes you are irrational, because the standard of proof you employ is (a) arbitrary and (b) it will keep you from truths that are more probable than not. Not that it matters in this case particularly: everything we have observed with a beginning has a cause.

 

[Perplexity]

Suspending belief is equivalent to saying you have no belief. So be it. The b theory of time tells us nothing about (1),** because there is no “beginning” under such a theor**y.

Precisely, which is why the b-theorist has to say (1) is false.

Yes you are irrational, because the standard of proof you employ is (a) arbitrary and (b) it will keep you from truths that are more probable than not. Not that it matters in this case particularly: everything we have observed with a beginning has a cause.

First, let me clarify, I used a phrase sloppily. If you think something is more probable than not, then you’ll believe it. But, this standard says not all of your beliefs are knowledge, which seems obvious. It places the rationality threshold higher than ‘more probable than not.’

Second, there’s no reason to accept (a). It seems self-evident that the stronger evidence we have for a position, the greater probability it is that the position is true.

With my clarification in hand, you would still believe things which are more probable than not, but you wouldn’t take yourself to know them simply by virtue of that.

As to your final comment, I’ll reproduce some of my thoughts from post 10:

Further, all of our experiential support confirms things which begin in time as having causes. None of it confirms things having a cause which begin to exist with time.

Since the universe is alleged to have began with time, none of our experience lends support to the universe having a cause because it began.

 

[razredge]

I don’t understand this objection.

Why can’t it be that for t = t0, P2, while moving backwards in time, causes P1 to start moving? Why must there be a “first”?

Because, say if we could somehow observe such an event occurring inside a self contained mini universe, we would see P1 occur first, then cause P2 which would move backwards in time to cause P1.