Questions about the Cosmological Argument

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tonyrey -

What belorg is trying to say about a being changing when it acts does not assume that that being ceases to be the being that it was entirely, just that it has changed. The very notion of something ‘changing’ in fact necessitates that something remain in which this change takes place. For example, If I were to take a class on woodworking, I would have changed from a person that doesn’t know how to make tables, into a person that does. The fact that I call this a change shows that the ‘I’ that existed before the class still exists afterwords, but some aspect of me has changed. It is clear that I am not entirely the same after the class as before the class as I am now capable of things that I previously was not capable of. If there was no difference in me, then I could not be capable of anything new.
An aspect of you is not you! You are** fundamentally the same person. Nothing affects your individuality, responsibility or eternal destiny. You and you alone are a unique, irreplaceable individual who cannot pass the buck to anyone else. Even if we choose to reject God and go to hell we are the same persons He created and loves whatever we do. Similarly God does not change even though He causes change - and we are made in His image… “Love does not alter when it alteration finds” because it knows a person’s choices and decisions cannot change that person’s identity**.
 
Also like I said, even if it’s true that the cosmological evidence supports a finite temporal past it does not support a finite causal past. The theist is committed to accepting that our temporal past and our causal past are not identical, so the fact that the cosmological evidence supports a finite temporal past is irrelevant.
Several problems here. First, not all variations of the Cosmological Argument demand a prior cause, including Kalam. All that is necessary is a concurrent or simultaneous cause. In other words, there is no time that elapses between cause and effect; between the creative act and the existence of the universe. You are incorrect then when you declare that the theist is required to accept that our temporal past and causal past are not identical.

Second, even if you were correct, the non-theist would need to set forth a metaphysic to explain how a “prior cause” can exist without time and - more to the point - how an infinite number of “prior causes” outside of time could exist.

Finally, it is very relevant that the cosmological evidence supports a temporal past. It means that the universe began to exist, and that means there is some true account of the cause of its existence. That is the starting point of philosophical inquiry into the matter. While non-theists have little to nothing to offer in the way of explanation, theists do.
 
Of course this state of affairs requires the concurrence of time. And because your definition of God makes this impossible, your God (and Craig’s and Aqionas’) is incompatible with a beginning universe.
Belorg:

You have not answered, Why? with any degree of succinctness and coherence yet. But, maybe it’s forthcoming. I’ll wait.
That’s exactly what I am claiming: that God crates from all eternity.
No question about that. However, there are lots and lots of things God can create. The multitude of angels, for one thing.
You seem to suggest that the universe can have a beginning if God created a chain of causes from eternity that resulted in the universe. But that runs into very serious problems and moreover, depends on your definition of ‘universe’
OK. Now I see your reasoning. Remember, the universe is not the last thing that God has created (here I am using words that are anthropomorphic, as I have no alternative). The last soul, no, the last soul, no, the last soul… - if you see what I mean. It really does not depend on my definition of universe. It may help me to understand it if I can properly discern what an “infinity” is. That may portend, in fact, a multiverse, i.e., a multiverse of finite things that (all) have had beginnings - plus a myriad more things to come. I see no problem with that, logically.
That’s a nice assertion, but I do not see any argument for that, especially since you seem to presuppose a ‘way’ along which God can create. A ‘way’ in this sense is temporal. So a a-tempral being cannot have a ‘way’ along which to create.
Why?
Well, since you haven’t really offered a third answer, I can remain human for the time being.
I’m trying right now to imagine someone that’s “all ears.” Try it, it’s not easy!

God bless,
jd
 
An aspect of you is not you! You are** fundamentally the same person. Nothing affects your individuality, responsibility or eternal destiny. You and you alone are a unique, irreplaceable individual who cannot pass the buck to anyone else. Even if we choose to reject God and go to hell we are the same persons He created and loves whatever we do. Similarly God does not change even though He causes change - and we are made in His image… “Love does not alter when it alteration finds” because it knows a person’s choices and decisions cannot change that person’s identity**.
That was part of my point. I was trying to say exactly that while you change in some respect, it is not a change from one indidvidual to another. Of coure you remain the same person, with the same responsibility and eternal destiny, there has been no destruction of you, the person, which is precisely why you can say that it is you that is changing. You, the person exist both before and after the change. In other words, you, the person, are the subject in which the change takes place. I was trying to show how saying that a person changes does not mean that the person changes substantially from one individual into another rather, that the person has changed qualitatively. I think this is just a disagreement about words used. So far as I can tell I don’t think we disagree about the reality that occurs, its just that you don’t like talking about the person changing, and would rather say it is an aspect of the person changing. I entirely agree with saying it is an aspect of the person that changes, I just also see that in such a case the person is also changing. The problem lies in the fact that there are two ways to use the word ‘change’, it can eiher refer to a substantial or a qualitative change. A substantial change would be a change from one subject to another, from a person to dust, or something like that. A qualitative change is when a person learns a new skill, or goes suntanning, or becomes ill, it is still the person changing, but not into another subject, the person is changing in a certain respect rather than changing completely into something else. In this latter case, I almost think it is actually less correct to say that the person is changing precisely because the person, in this scenario, no longer exists. I hope this helps clarify the matter.
 
Several problems here. First, not all variations of the Cosmological Argument demand a prior cause, including Kalam. All that is necessary is a concurrent or simultaneous cause. In other words, there is no time that elapses between cause and effect; between the creative act and the existence of the universe. You are incorrect then when you declare that the theist is required to accept that our temporal past and causal past are not identical.
Well we’re talking about the Kalam Cosmological specifically, that’s what the OP was about and that’s what my original response was about.

Maybe I haven’t been clear enough in what I mean by causal and temporal past.
Our temporal past is the collection of all events ordered by their location in time.
Our causal past is the collection of all events ordered by their location in a causal chain, obviously with causes preceding effects.

Can the event of God creating time have a location in time? I’d think not. You can’t say that the cause and effect happened at the same time because the effect was time.

So yeah it seems the collection of events ordered by their position in time and the collection of events ordered by their position in a causal line would not be identical.
Second, even if you were correct, the non-theist would need to set forth a metaphysic to explain how a “prior cause” can exist without time and - more to the point - how an infinite number of “prior causes” outside of time could exist.
Well I would just assume what ever metaphysic the theist was using.
Finally, it is very relevant that the cosmological evidence supports a temporal past. It means that the universe began to exist, and that means there is some true account of the cause of its existence. That is the starting point of philosophical inquiry into the matter. While non-theists have little to nothing to offer in the way of explanation, theists do.
Began to exist in a temporal sense, which as I’ve shown does not imply a first cause. And the kalam cosmological isn’t an argument to the best explanation, but an argument to the necessity of a first cause.
 
So I guess I’m just not seeing it.
Could you spell out the contradiction in a single sentence in the form A & not-A?
God has willed frrometernity that the universe exist and god’s will is a suuficinet condition for the universe to existtherefore at each and every non-temporal point at which the nont-temporal God exists, so must the uniiverse.
Oh, no… God sure does know it is a beginning for us…
God knows that we have an incomplete experiience. to use an analogy: God knows that what we experience us a two-dimensional circle is really a sphere.
but He doesn’t experience a beginning because He doesn’t change.
Because there is no diiference newteen Him being ‘alone’ and Him being with the universe.
So you keep saying… but why is it a contradiction? It seems to me that the only way it could be a problem is if you select the wrong definition of the two possible definitions of eternity that your definition ambiguously includes.
No, because if I select the wrong definition, there is no contradiction.
When I keep running the conditional through my head, namely, that ‘if God is eternal and does not change then He cannot create something that isn’t and does’, I do find a contradiction…
Great
but upon further inspection I find that I am sneaking change into God through the back door and subjecting Him to time.
How are you sneaking change into God?
I’m not saying I can perfectly conceive of a categorically timeless being creating something subject to time… all I am saying is that there is no contradiction. If there appears to be then I am only losing sight of one of the premises.
Which premise are you losing sight of?
So the only possible way in which a temporal first member could occur is if God is the sufficient condition.
No, Shike, he only possible way in which a temporal first member could occur is if God is NOT the sufficient condition.
And I agree that He is… what I don’t agree is that a being categorically not subject to time is found to be in contradiction with something that is.
I am not even saying that it is. All I am saying is that ‘beginning’ or ‘coming into being’ contradicts an a-temporal state in which nothing changes;
What you propose is that an unchanging timeless God will X from etrenity but somehow also wills that this X only occurs at time t. But that means that God’s will is not a suffiicient condition for X

I
t’s like saying something which couldn’t fly by nature is in opposition to something which can. The analogy you are hoping for is something that could fly by nature but happens to not be able to versus something which can fly–but that doesn’t fly here in this case.
I do not understand this analogy.
Could God create anything if He could not change?
NO, he could not. But keep in mind that for the sake of the discussion in this thread I am assuming He could.
Meh, if anything I think you are helping show that there is something wrong with Craig’s conception of God.
Well, that much is certain. But I think it shows that there is something wring with Craig’s KCA too.
 
No question about that. However, there are lots and lots of things God can create. The multitude of angels, for one thing.
The question still is:was there a first angel and did that angel begin to exist? If God is timless, than there can be no beginning first angel.
OK. Now I see your reasoning. Remember, the universe is not the last thing that God has created (here I am using words that are anthropomorphic, as I have no alternative).
So God will create something else tomorrow? That’s impossible since God has from eternity willed whatever it is you think will occur tomorrow and therefore that which you think will occur tomorrow has in fact always existed.
The universe, JD, is the first and the last thing God has created. (first and last are actually meaningless in this context, but sometimes antropomorphism is the only ay to talk about something)
The last soul, no, the last soul, no, the last soul… - if you see what I mean. It really does not depend on my definition of universe. It may help me to understand it if I can properly discern what an “infinity” is. That may portend, in fact, a multiverse, i.e., a multiverse of finite things that (all) have had beginnings - plus a myriad more things to come. I see no problem with that, logically.
You are always going to be stuck with a ‘first’ member that is the cause of all others, and, according to the KCA requires no cause because it did not begin.
Becasue you are differentiating God’s will, and by doing that, you are sneaking time into the equantion.
I’m trying right now to imagine someone that’s “all ears.” Try it, it’s not easy!
Much easier than trying to imagine an non-beginning changeless being beginning to do something.
 
I’ve never seen Craig give an argument in a debate,(meaning that you have never seen any of his debates, otherwise you wouldn’t waste our time with something so patently false) though I’ve heard of arguments that he’s given in books.
( wait, you have HEARD about arguments he WROTE? that’s a nice way of saying that everything you know about Craig is from second and perhaps third hand accounts.)

(1) There is an infinite collection A of discrete objects
(2) Three objects are removed from A
(3) A contains infinity - 3 many members
(4) A contains infinity many members
(5) Contradiction between (3) and (4), therefore reject (1)

I’m not sure where he gives this argument, I’ve only heard it given by people who agree with him and claim this is an argument of his.

So an actual infinite of objects is impossible, what are you getting at? I think you forgot the punchline.

I’m claiming that Craig’s arguments that it’s necessarily true that the universe had a beginning are confused. Others who have made similar attempts such as “if the past is infinite, how could the present exist?” were also quite confused. I’ve never heard of a scientist give any such argument, though.

You’re changing what you said before and pretending no one will notice the switch. You said ANY argument to show the past is finite is confused, not merely this argument or that one.

(1) No it does not. P being true does not imply that P is a tautology.I agree, what I said was not a tautology, how’s that a problem for me?
Also like I said, even if it’s true that the cosmological evidence supports a finite temporal past it does not support a finite causal past. The theist is committed to accepting that our temporal past and our causal past are not identical, so the fact that the cosmological evidence supports a finite temporal past is irrelevant.Some of us are not very knowledgeable about physics/math so you will have to unpack what you’re saying here.

(2) I know.
 
That was part of my point. I was trying to say exactly that while you change in some respect, it is not a change from one indidvidual to another. Of coure you remain the same person, with the same responsibility and eternal destiny, there has been no destruction of you, the person, which is precisely why you can say that it is you that is changing. You, the person exist both before and after the change. In other words, you, the person, are the subject in which the change takes place. I was trying to show how saying that a person changes does not mean that the person changes substantially from one individual into another rather, that the person has changed qualitatively. I think this is just a disagreement about words used. So far as I can tell I don’t think we disagree about the reality that occurs, its just that you don’t like talking about the person changing, and would rather say it is an aspect of the person changing. I entirely agree with saying it is an aspect of the person that changes, I just also see that in such a case the person is also changing. The problem lies in the fact that there are two ways to use the word ‘change’, it can eiher refer to a substantial or a qualitative change. A substantial change would be a change from one subject to another, from a person to dust, or something like that. A qualitative change is when a person learns a new skill, or goes suntanning, or becomes ill, it is still the person changing, but not into another subject, the person is changing in a certain respect rather than changing completely into something else. In this latter case, I almost think it is actually less correct to say that the person is changing precisely because the person, in this scenario, no longer exists. I hope this helps clarify the matter.
It does indeed and I hope that we agree that** God** does not change either substantially or qualitatively… 🙂
 
meaning that you have never seen any of his debates, otherwise you wouldn’t waste our time with something so patently false
Why don’t you start a thread in honor of my ignorance, and give the philosophical arguments that Craig would give against the possibility of an infinite past?
wait, you have HEARD about arguments he WROTE? that’s a nice way of saying that everything you know about Craig is from second and perhaps third hand accounts.
It is true, though I’ve watched/listened to many of his debates, I have not read any of his books. Maybe you could educate me in this thread you’re going to start, and post some of these dastardly philosophical arguments against an infinite past that wont come out in his debates?
(1) There is an infinite collection A of discrete objects
(2) Three objects are removed from A
(3) A contains infinity - 3 many members
(4) A contains infinity many members
(5) Contradiction between (3) and (4), therefore reject (1)
I’m not sure where he gives this argument, I’ve only heard it given by people who agree with him and claim this is an argument of his.
So an actual infinite of objects is impossible, what are you getting at? I think you forgot the punchline.
Not seeing the problem in that argument is making me lose faith in you.
You’re changing what you said before and pretending no one will notice the switch. You said ANY argument to show the past is finite is confused, not merely this argument or that one.
Obviously I meant any philosophical arguments, not cosmological as that was the context in which I was saying it. I had already admitted that the cosmological evidence points towards a finite past so it’s rather uncharitable for you to assume I was claiming that cosmologists don’t know what they’re talking about. I have come across many people trying to also prove that the past must be finite, and all their arguments were weak as well. Sure maybe there’s some good proof out there that can demonstrate this, but I have yet to find it.

I’m starting to think you’re just interested in making me look bad, than actually defending William Craig’s arguments. If you’ve got so much faith in him why don’t you post the grand entirety of them which would prove that the past must be finite?
Some of us are not very knowledgeable about physics/math so you will have to unpack what you’re saying here.
Our temporal past is the collection of all events ordered by their location in time.
Our causal past is the collection of all events ordered by their location in a causal chain, obviously with causes preceding effects.

Can the event of God creating time have a location in time? I’d think not. You can’t say that the cause and effect happened at the same time because the effect was time.

So it seems the collection of events ordered by their position in time and the collection of events ordered by their position in a causal line would not be identical.
 
Why don’t you start a thread in honor of my ignorance, and give the philosophical arguments that Craig would give against the possibility of an infinite past?

It seems somebody is anxious to change the focus from what he said to something else.😉 I will not start a thread in “honor” of your ignorance since that is not the issue here. You claim to have seen many of Craig’s debates and then go say that he makes no arguments to defend his position.

That is not called ignorance; it is called dishonesty or sloppy thinking on your part

Not seeing the problem in that argument is making me lose faith in you.
relinquish, i already told you: an actual infinite or an essentially ordered series is impossible.I suggest you to get familiar with the notion of essentially ordered series and an accidentally ordered series before you go on.

Obviously I meant any philosophical arguments, not cosmological as that was the context in which I was saying it. I had already admitted that the cosmological evidence points towards a finite past so it’s rather uncharitable(you hate lack of charity? and this from the guy that says craig does not give arguments in debates, how cute) for you to assume I was claiming that cosmologists don’t know what they’re talking about. I have come across many people trying to also prove that the past must be finite, and all their arguments were weak as well. Sure maybe there’s some good proof out there that can demonstrate this, but I have yet to find it.

you explicitly said that evidence for a the finite past is IRRELEVANT for establishing the truth of a finite past. that means all scientists that think otherwise are confused or mistaken, so how did I misrepresent you?:rolleyes:

I’m starting to think you’re just interested in making me look bad, than actually defending William Craig’s arguments. If you’ve got so much faith in him why don’t you post the grand entirety of them which would prove that the past must be finite?

I have no “faith” in Craig or what have you.:rolleyes:
1-Craig is superficial philosopher. (though, he sometimes he makes some astute remarks, like his widely misunderstood position on the Canaanite genocide.)

2-A potential infinite or an accidental series of infinite length is possible.

3-The evidence for a beginning in time and the fact that presentism is far more defensible than eternalism makes the Kalam argument persuasive. (read: not a strict proof.)

Our temporal past is the collection of all events ordered by their location in time.
Our causal past is the collection of all events ordered by their location in a causal chain, obviously with causes preceding effects.

Can the event of God creating time have a location in time? I’d think not. You can’t say that the cause and effect happened at the same time because the effect was time.

cause and effect happens simultaneously. How is it even possible for cause and effect to be loose and separate from each other?And that applies to the relationship between god and the universe, Catholics believe god is causing the universe to exist right now. Besides you do not need time to be the cause of some effect; there can be things that are logically prior to others, for example.

So it seems the collection of events ordered by their position in time and the collection of events ordered by their position in a causal line would not be identical.
 
The question still is:was there a first angel and did that angel begin to exist? If God is timless, than there can be no beginning first angel.

So God will create something else tomorrow? That’s impossible since God has from eternity willed whatever it is you think will occur tomorrow and therefore that which you think will occur tomorrow has in fact always existed.
The universe, JD, is the first and the last thing God has created. (first and last are actually meaningless in this context, but sometimes antropomorphism is the only ay to talk about something)

You are always going to be stuck with a ‘first’ member that is the cause of all others, and, according to the KCA requires no cause because it did not begin.

Becasue you are differentiating God’s will, and by doing that, you are sneaking time into the equantion.

Much easier than trying to imagine an non-beginning changeless being beginning to do something.
1-Belorg, there are Catholics that believe God is everlasting rather than timeless.

2-I don’t understand why you think god creating timelessly is impossible . A timeless god creates things in a logical sequence rather than through a temporal way. :confused:
Can you make your argument more explicit?
3-so god will create something different tomorrow? well, the potential for a different tomorrow is still there even if God has decided to actualize one specific tomorrow.
 
1-Belorg, there are Catholics that believe God is everlasting rather than timeless.
Yes, there are several types of catholics. But keep in mind, William, that in this thread all I am disputing is that the God of Craig and the God of Thomas of Aquino are compatible with a beginning universe. I am not disputing that some kind of God that some kind of catholic believes in can be compatible with a beginning universe.
2-I don’t understand why you think god creating timelessly is impossible . A timeless god creates things in a logical sequence rather than through a temporal way. :confused:
I am not disputing that timeless creation is impossible, but, as you npoint out: A timless god creates things in a logical sequence and ‘beginning’ is not a logical sequence, it is a temporal one. And that’s the problem.
3-so god will create something different tomorrow?
An unchanging God cannot create anything different tomorrow, for the simple reaosn that for a timeless God there is no ‘tomorrow’.
well, the potential for a different tomorrow is still there even if God has decided to actualize one specific tomorrow.
But this potential will never be actualized because God has decided to actualize one specific tomorrow.
 
I am not disputing that timeless creation is impossible, but, as you npoint out: A timless god creates things in a logical sequence and ‘beginning’ is not a logical sequence, it is a temporal one. And that’s the problem.

.
Sorry, you’re not telling us exactly what the problem is…are you saying that God’s immutability is threatened if the universe began and that we must reject the notion of a beginning because of that?
 
Well we’re talking about the Kalam Cosmological specifically, that’s what the OP was about and that’s what my original response was about.
Lol. I know, which is why I stated that many variations of the Cosmological Argument, including Kalam do not assert a prior cause. From the conclusion of Craig’s God and the Beginning of Time: “[T]ake the state of God’s existing changelessly sans creation as timeless, time springing into being concomitantly with the first event. God’s act of creating the world may be taken to be simultaneous with the world’s coming into being.” Please concede that you misrepresented the Kalam argument.
Our causal past is the collection of all events ordered by their location in a causal chain, obviously with causes preceding effects.
The moment you claim that all causes “preced[e]” effects, you invoke the temporal past. To precede means to come before. I thought the whole point of defining causal past was to demonstrate it as distinct from the temporal past.
Can the event of God creating time have a location in time? I’d think not.
It was the physical universe that came into existence. Time is a measure of the duration of physical and material reality. Once the physical universe exists, time exists. The effect of God’s timeless (eternal) act is the physical universe and time. But notice, there is no time that elapses between cause and effect.
You can’t say that the cause and effect happened at the same time because the effect was time.
Well, it may seem strange (as do many other things at the boundary of time), but yes I can say that. There is no time between the cause of the universe and the effect of the universe. It necessarily follows that there is no difference in time between the act of creation and the effect of creation. That is why Craig calls the cause and effect concomitant and simultaneous.
So yeah it seems the collection of events ordered by their position in time and the collection of events ordered by their position in a causal line would not be identical.
Then you would be wrong. They are identical under the Kalam Argument. The causal act of the universe is identical temporally to the effect of that act, the universe.
Well I would just assume what ever metaphysic the theist was using.
O.k. Then you would accept that the cause of the universe is immaterial. You would also accept that the cause of the universe is timelessly eternal. Thank you.
 
“[T]ake the state of God’s existing changelessly sans creation as timeless, time springing into being concomitantly with the first event. God’s act of creating the world may be taken to be simultaneous with the world’s coming into being.” Please concede that you misrepresented the Kalam argument.
Maybe I’m wrong, or maybe the language Craig is using is too unclear to be of value. He says time is created concomitantly with the first event. In what respect does he mean concomitantly? He seems to be saying the event of time’s creation has the same location in time as the first event ordered by it’s location in time. Does that make sense, though?

What would that mean for the event of times creation to have a location in time? I have no idea really. Maybe you could clear this up using set theory notation to describe the sequence we’re dealing with?
The moment you claim that all causes “preced[e]” effects, you invoke the temporal past. To precede means to come before. I thought the whole point of defining causal past was to demonstrate it as distinct from the temporal past.
You’re right, precede means to come before but it does not necessarily have to mean temporally. 1 precedes 2 in a sequence of integers, red precedes blue in a rainbow, and one event may precede another in a causal chain. None of these examples have anything to do with time.
It was the physical universe that came into existence. Time is a measure of the duration of physical and material reality. Once the physical universe exists, time exists. The effect of God’s timeless (eternal) act is the physical universe and time. But notice, there is no time that elapses between cause and effect.
This is incredibly vague. Obscuring the creation of time only makes the argument weaker, not stronger.
Well, it may seem strange (as do many other things at the boundary of time), but yes I can say that. There is no time between the cause of the universe and the effect of the universe. It necessarily follows that there is no difference in time between the act of creation and the effect of creation. That is why Craig calls the cause and effect concomitant and simultaneous.
I’m not trying to argue that there was some lag between the cause of creation and the effect of creation. I’m saying that it doesn’t make sense for the event of time’s creation to have a location in time.
O.k. Then you would accept that the cause of the universe is immaterial. You would also accept that the cause of the universe is timelessly eternal. Thank you.
I do think a timeless immaterial object caused the big bang, as do many atheists.
 
It seems somebody is anxious to change the focus from what he said to something else. I will not start a thread in “honor” of your ignorance since that is not the issue here. You claim to have seen many of Craig’s debates and then go say that he makes no arguments to defend his position.
That is not called ignorance; it is called dishonesty or sloppy thinking on your part
I stand by it. For all the many debates I’ve watched in which Craig gives the Kalam Cosmological, I have never seen him propose a philosophical argument against the possibility of an infinite causal past. Like I said before, if you really do believe me to be wrong why don’t you demonstrate it? It shouldn’t be difficult to come up with one debate in which Craig did give such an argument.
relinquish, i already told you: an actual infinite or an essentially ordered series is impossible.
Yeah Craig thinks the same thing, but neither of you have proven it as of yet. Again, why don’t you start a thread and we can argue specifically over this? I’m interested to see what arguments you might provide against the possibility of an actual infinite.
you hate lack of charity? and this from the guy that says craig does not give arguments in debates, how cute
Prove my dishonesty if you can, show the world that I’m wrong.
you explicitly said that evidence for a the finite past is IRRELEVANT for establishing the truth of a finite past. that means all scientists that think otherwise are confused or mistaken, so how did I misrepresent you?
I said the evidence for a finite temporal past is irrelevant for establishing a finite causal past. Our causal past may very well extend infinitely farther than our temporal past does. I’m sorry if I was not clear enough, I hope now that I’ve explained myself better you can focus on rebutting my actual claims instead of picking at them.
2-A potential infinite or an accidental series of infinite length is possible.
Please define a potential infinite clearly, using set theory notation if possible.
3-The evidence for a beginning in time and the fact that presentism is far more defensible than eternalism makes the Kalam argument persuasive. (read: not a strict proof.)
The Kalam Cosmological argument as given by William Craig is a deductive argument. It’s either sound or unsound, it cannot bring one merely to a degree of certainty. There’s a problem with your rational faculties if an unsound deductive argument persuades you.
cause and effect happens simultaneously. How is it even possible for cause and effect to be loose and separate from each other?And that applies to the relationship between god and the universe, Catholics believe god is causing the universe to exist right now. Besides you do not need time to be the cause of some effect; there can be things that are logically prior to others, for example.
I’m not sure how this is relevant. And that’s a very strange metaphysic. And though I’m not sure if I would agree that time is not necessary for causation, I wouldn’t reject it either.
And I’m also not sure where logical priority comes into this.

Also it would be helpful if you responded using the quote option.
 
Sorry, you’re not telling us exactly what the problem is…are you saying that God’s immutability is threatened if the universe began and that we must reject the notion of a beginning because of that?
Yes, that’s what I"m saying. A immutable being cannot create something that begins because the will to create something is (necessarily) a sufficient condition for the effect (or for the act of creation, which on its turn is sufficient to bring about the effect). Hence, since the wil does iot begin, the sufficient condition does not begin and whatever is created does not begin.
 
This simple argument for God’s existence, sometimes called the Kalam argument, goes something like:
  1. Anything that has a beginning has a cause.
  2. The universe has a beginning
  3. Therefore the universe has a cause.
    …various arguments…
    X. This cause is God.
Here go my questions:
  1. Do you find this argument convincing?
  2. If not, why not?
  3. If you do find this argument convincing, how do you answer the objection that things may be self-caused?
  4. What about the objection that something that has a beginning may not be caused?
  5. Finally, what arguments do you use to go from (3) to (X), and how do you eliminate alternative causes, such as some eternal pre-universe, etc?
  1. and 2. It’s convincing as far as it goes but it doesn’t mean anything. Who cares if the universe had an origin? (Thomas Aquinas was notoriously uninterested in that question and thought it was unanswerable this side of the grave). What matters is where being itself comes from, which is what apologistic arguments ought to explain: why there is something rather than nothing.
  2. The notion of something causing itself is obviously ludicrous. A thing must be actual to have causal power; but if it is already actual than it cannot have caused itself.
  3. We know things do not enter existence causelessly because the universe behaves in orderly and deterministic ways, which it would not if things simply popped into existence all the time.
I heard a quantum mechanics-lover once say that of course things can pop into existence without a cause, it’s just that the probability of that happening is very very low. This argument carries no weight. For every particle with a .000(+a billion zeroes)1 chance of popping into existence, I can imagine a particle with all the same properties but a .9999 chance of popping into existence. They’re both equally nonexistent, after all, there’s no reason to advantage one over the other. But if you say “the probability of a thing’s popping into existence is conditioned by something outside itself,” then you’ve given the game away – you have acknowledged that, in fact, nothing comes into being unaided.
  1. I don’t want to say to that. I think the argument as presently phrased misses the point entirely; it doesn’t matter why there is a universe, it matters why there is a universe filled with stuff – matter, living matter, and rational living matter (i.e., man). For that you need to go to Aquinas’ arguments.
Hi. If we define God to be this first cause, does that just not raise the question what caused God? And put us back to square one? Thank you.
A better way to phrase the argument is “Everything which begins to exist must have a cause; nothing can cause itself; there cannot be an infinite regress of causes; therefore there must be a first cause which was not itself caused and which has the power to cause everything else.” i.e., there must be an infinite, omnipotent being.

So no, there can be no question of what caused God. If God was caused He would not be God.
 
Bump. Still waiting for those proofs that actual infinite’s are impossible.
 
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