Sometime I will try to answer your post that was directed towards me–I haven’t had much time lately.Yes, that’s what I"m saying. A immutable being cannot create something that begins because the will to create something is (necessarily) a sufficient condition for the effect (or for the act of creation, which on its turn is sufficient to bring about the effect). Hence, since the wil does iot begin, the sufficient condition does not begin and whatever is created does not begin.
I think you are mainly right with regards to your whole post. I’m sorry that I’m only pointing out a negative but I am short on time.
- and 2. It’s convincing as far as it goes but it doesn’t mean anything. Who cares if the universe had an origin? (Thomas Aquinas was notoriously uninterested in that question and thought it was unanswerable this side of the grave).
The problem is that the will does not begin at allSometime I will try to answer your post that was directed towards me–I haven’t had much time lately.
The problem is that the will (in this case God’s will) does not begin by inability but by nature.
The problem is that the KCA requires an absolute beginning, and not a relativistic one.This coupled with a relativistic conception of time (and not absolutist) is sufficient to disarm the supposed contradiction.
I am absolutely sure that a being that cannot change cannot create at all, but that is NOT relevant to the argument I present here.And by the way, that you think a being that cannot change cannot create at all, is highly relevant to this apparent problem.
What Craig claims is not unclear. Whether his claims are mistaken or subject to contradiction is not the same issue at all. I mean, it makes it very difficult to have meaningful discussion with you about the implications of Kalam when you don’t know what Craig claims. Seriously.Maybe I’m wrong, or maybe the language Craig is using is too unclear to be of value.
He certainly means that the act of creation and the effect of creation are causally simultaneous. I don’t see on what grounds you would object to that. After all, as Craig points out, “[c]ontemporary philosophical discussions of causal directionality deal routinely with cases in which cause and effect are simultaneous . . . .” So the next question is: Can causally simultaneous events also be temporally simultaneous?He says time is created concomitantly with the first event. In what respect does he mean concomitantly? He seems to be saying the event of time’s creation has the same location in time as the first event ordered by it’s location in time. Does that make sense, though?
According to Craig, we already know that causally simultaneous events can also be temporally simultaneous. Now we have to apply this to a specific example of a causally simultaneous event - that being the act (cause) of creating the universe and the effect that the universe exists. So I take your question to be whether it makes sense to claim that the causally simultaneous event of the existence of the universe can also be a temporally simultaneous event.What would that mean for the event of times creation to have a location in time? I have no idea really.
Well, I believe I can, but that’s not to say I will. You know as well as I do the considerable time and effort necessary to frame another person’s argument in symbolic notation. I suspect that’s why I haven’t seen a similar effort made by you to demonstrate the impossibility or implausibility of the argument. That being said, I will see if I can put it in some short-hand notation that will elucidate Craig’s position. First though, I need to deal with a couple of your other comments.Maybe you could clear this up using set theory notation to describe the sequence we’re dealing with?
Correct, but these examples do have to do with space. That red proceeds blue in a rainbow is a declaration about a spatial property. The same can be said of the relationship between ordered integers. I can have a written integer line from left to right beginning with the integer 1 and concluding with 10. It can be abstracted such that we can speak of “1 coming before 10,” but ultimately it is based on a spatial ordering. But I don’t see how it makes sense to claim that a cause and effect have spatial properties. Even assuming that they do, I take it you aren’t using the term “causal past” to reflect spatial relationships.You’re right, precede means to come before but it does not necessarily have to mean temporally. 1 precedes 2 in a sequence of integers, red precedes blue in a rainbow, and one event may precede another in a causal chain. None of these examples have anything to do with time.
Well, that certainly wasn’t my intent. The point was to define “time” so we are both talking about the same thing. Time is a measure of the duration of physical reality. No physical reality, no time. So while philosophers (including you) say things like if “God created time,” it is equivalent to saying, “God created physical reality (the universe) which has time as its measure of duration.” As long as we are clear on that, then no problems.This is incredibly vague. Obscuring the creation of time only makes the argument weaker, not stronger.
Here we go:I’m not trying to argue that there was some lag between the cause of creation and the effect of creation. I’m saying that it doesn’t make sense for the event of time’s creation to have a location in time.
A being that does not change is not subject to time, therefore, there can be no time restriction that limits the being’s creative powers–if one accepts that a timless/changeless being can create at all (which you don’t).The problem is that the will does not begin at all
If this is ‘by nature’ does not change things. If anything iy makes matters worse because it is clear that, becasque of His nature, it is logically impossible for God to create a beginning universe.
I don’t see why. If time is a measure of change and change is relative, then it appears that time must be relative as well. And thus saying the universe has a beginning is not necessarily to make any pronouncement about the time-quality of God.The problem is that the KCA requires an absolute beginning, and not a relativistic one.
If a timeless being cannot create something that has a beginning, and a timeless being does not change, then a being that does not change cannot create something that has a beginning.I am absolutely sure that a being that cannot change cannot create at all, but that is NOT relevant to the argument I present here.
Question, what the heck is a non-temporal point? You make it sound like there are a bunch of them or something.God has willed frrometernity that the universe exist and god’s will is a suuficinet condition for the universe to existtherefore at each and every non-temporal point at which the nont-temporal God exists, so must the uniiverse.
If time is relative, then I don’t see how our experience is somehow incomplete (at least by nature). Your objection only works on an absolutist conception of time.God knows that we have an incomplete experiience. to use an analogy: God knows that what we experience us a two-dimensional circle is really a sphere.
There is a logical difference.Because there is no diiference newteen Him being ‘alone’ and Him being with the universe.
Actually there does seem to be by virtue of your initial argument. If God merely went backwards in time infinitely, then He would have already realized all possibilities, which means that a universe that had a beginning would have happened already–and this problem exists for however early you want to postulate our universe.No, because if I select the wrong definition, there is no contradiction.
Read my last few sentences as it answers this question. When I look at it I find that I have a contradiction only because I have accidentally used the wrong definition of eternity and have subscribed change to God.How are you sneaking change into God?
That God does not change.Which premise are you losing sight of?
So says you. I can’t see any contradiction yet… though it’s not like I haven’t tried.No, Shike, he only possible way in which a temporal first member could occur is if God is NOT the sufficient condition.
I agree. When you select the wrong definition of eternity, this is exactly what you get. But you still need to see the difference between the lack of something versus categorically not having something. As the latter is the key to seeing how what you argue here doesn’t apply to a being that doesn’t change by nature.I am not even saying that it is. All I am saying is that ‘beginning’ or ‘coming into being’ contradicts an a-temporal state in which nothing changes;
Then logically you have already given the ‘game’ away.NO, he could not. But keep in mind that for the sake of the discussion in this thread I am assuming He could.
I can only say that I accept the first three lines so far. I do not accept his philosophical argument for 2, however, which is why I see the first three lines not in the same light as a demonstration along the lines of, say, one of Aquinas’ Five Ways.Well, that much is certain. But I think it shows that there is something wring with Craig’s KCA too.
There is no time restriction that limits the being’s creative powers and that’s excatly why the things he creates do not have beginnings.A being that does not change is not subject to time, therefore, there can be no time restriction that limits the being’s creative powers.
But if God creates change then chnage is NOT relative either.I don’t see why. If time is a measure of change and change is relative, then it appears that time must be relative as well.
It is saying that God began to do something.And thus saying the universe has a beginning is not necessarily to make any pronouncement about the time-quality of God.
Of course.If a timeless being cannot create something that has a beginning, and a timeless being does not change, then a being that does not change cannot create something that has a beginning.
That’s obvious.And if a being that does not change cannot create at all, then such a being obviously could not create something that has a beginning either.
No it is not relevant to my argument, because, I am willing to accept for the sake of the argument that a changeless being can create something.It would be better to cut to the chase and just say this outright; in other words, this is highly relevant whether you realize it or not.
I don’t think there is such a thing as a non-temporal point. It’s just an analogy to describe the non-temporal eternity of God.Question, what the heck is a non-temporal point? You make it sound like there are a bunch of them or something.
From the perspective of eternity, the universe has no beginning. But the universe can have a beginning from rhe perspective of temporality. that’'s what relativistic means.I have no problem with looking at things from the perspective of eternity. But time is relative (perspective is essential) and therefore the universe can have a beginning while being caused by a timeless being.
Our experince is incomplete because from the perspective of eternity, time has no beginning at all. A complete experience would have to take into account all possible perspectives.If time is relative, then I don’t see how our experience is somehow incomplete (at least by nature). Your objection only works on an absolutist conception of time.
Tes, but a logical difference does not denote a beginning.There is a logical difference.
Maybe, but since I do not presuppose a temporal eternity, this is irrelevant.Actually there does seem to be by virtue of your initial argument. If God merely went backwards in time infinitely, then He would have already realized all possibilities, which means that a universe that had a beginning would have happened already–and this problem exists for however early you want to postulate our universe.
No, the contradiction arises just because God does NOT change.Read my last few sentences as it answers this question. When I look at it I find that I have a contradiction only because I have accidentally used the wrong definition of eternity and have subscribed change to God.
The problem is that from this perspective, God begins too, and if we believe the KCA, God must have a cause. From an eternal perspective, however, the first member you are talking about does not come into existence, because from an eternal point of view, nothing comes into existence.So says you. I can’t see any contradiction yet… though it’s not like I haven’t tried.
The porblem is that, to make his KCA work, Craig has to select this ‘wrong definition of eternity’ for the universe and the ‘right definition of eternity for God’.I agree. When you select the wrong definition of eternity, this is exactly what you get. But you still need to see the difference between the lack of something versus categorically not having something. As the latter is the key to seeing how what you argue here doesn’t apply to a being that doesn’t change by nature.
No, I am merely not conflating two arguments.Then logically you have already given the ‘game’ away.
Because his philosophical argument argues from an absolute and not a relative beginning.I can only say that I accept the first three lines so far. I do not accept his philosophical argument for 2,
They contradict Aquinas’ five ways.however, which is why I see the first three lines not in the same light as a demonstration along the lines of, say, one of Aquinas’ Five Ways.
I don’t think I can say much until you start naming what definition of eternity you are using at any given time: either atemporality or a series without a first member that stretches back infinitely into the past.From the perspective of eternity, the universe has no beginning. But the universe can have a beginning from rhe perspective of temporality. that’'s what relativistic means.
Please parse your definition of eternity. A temporal perspective does not apply to something that doesn’t change, and therefore it doesn’t apply to God.But God also has no beginning from the perspective of eternity, but He does have a beginning from a temporal perspective.
To risk repeating myself, I need you to parse your definition. That said, unless you are God I’d say that by nature you are grounded in time and that such an experience outside of time doesn’t make you any more human than you already are (actually it would make you less human as you wouldn’t be human at all; there is only one possible atemporal seat and it is taken already).Our experince is incomplete because from the perspective of eternity, time has no beginning at all. A complete experience would have to take into account all possible perspectives.
You got it… parse your definition. Atemporality doesn’t apply to things with a beginning so what you say is true although for a different reason. Subsequently you don’t get the conclusion you are after. We could try to say what it would be like for an atemporal Being to experience things with a beginning.From an eternal perspective, however, the first member you are talking about does not come into existence, because from an eternal point of view, nothing comes into existence.
I’m fairly certain that the first three lines do not (to be clear, I am not talking about supporting arguments for the first three lines).They contradict Aquinas’ five ways.
Depends what definition you are using to underlie “no time restriction”. If categorical atemporality is meant, then there is no contradiction with such a being creating something with a beginning. Of course we mean the words “creating” and “being” as having analogical functions, but it is still true to say.There is no time restriction that limits the being’s creative powers and that’s excatly why the things he creates do not have beginnings.
I am a using the first definition at al times in this argument: atemporality.I don’t think I can say much until you start naming what definition of eternity you are using at any given time: either atemporality or a series without a first member that stretches back infinitely into the past.
Temporal creatures perceive everything temporally. So, form the perspective of a temporal being, God has a beginning, and from the prespective of God, nothing has.Please parse your definition of eternity. A temporal perspective does not apply to something that doesn’t change, and therefore it doesn’t apply to God.
Of course only an atemporal being can have a truly atemporal experiience and only temporal beings can have temporal experiences.That said, unless you are God I’d say that by nature you are grounded in time and that such an experience outside of time doesn’t make you any more human than you already are (actually it would make you less human as you wouldn’t be human at all; there is only one possible atemporal seat and it is taken already).
Atempoorality does not apply to things with a beginning and beginnin does not apply to atempral things.You got it… parse your definition. Atemporality doesn’t apply to things with a beginning so what you say is true although for a different reason. Subsequently you don’t get the conclusion you are after.
An atemporal being cannot precieve things with a beginning.We could try to say what it would be like for an atemporal Being to experience things with a beginning.
The second premise: the universe has a beginning, contradicts at least one of Aquinas’ ways, since Aquinas holds that the creator/sustainer of the universe is unchanging and immutable and therfore cannot begin to do something, hence creation (the universe)cannot begin to exist.I’m fairly certain that the first three lines do not (to be clear, I am not talking about supporting arguments for the first three lines).
Yes, there is, because a categorically atemporal being cannot begin to do something, otherwise it would leave its category.Depends what definition you are using to underlie “no time restriction”. If categorical atemporality is meant, then there is no contradiction with such a being creating something with a beginning.
This doesn’t make sense to me. Sure, in one sense a temporal creature perceives everything temporally because the creature has to be in time to perceive anything at all. But it isn’t clear to me that everything a creature perceives must be temporal, especially if perception in general extends beyond the five senses–which it must. If such was not the case, then we couldn’t come to any knowledge of the existence of God in the first place. But we can based on arguments such as Aquinas’ Five Ways, ergo…Temporal creatures perceive everything temporally. So, form the perspective of a temporal being, God has a beginning, and from the prespective of God, nothing has.
You are treating the relative as imaginary. The relative nature of time and change is a real objective fact. Again, there is no contradiction between an atemporal being ‘creating from all eternity’ something that has a beginning.But the point is: if the creator is atemporal, then the ‘first’ thing He creates cannot have a beginning either, because that would entail that the creature began doing something.
So, howvere we as temporal creaturs perceive creation, it did not really begin.
An atemporal being cannot perceive things the same way that a creature with a beginning perceives things, but nonetheless, (somewhat depending on one’s definition of perception) such a being can perceive things that have a beginning.An atemporal being cannot precieve things with a beginning.
That’s close. But for Aquinas God creates from atemporality (or all eternity). And, as I pointed out above, just because the experience of a beginning is relative doesn’t make it any less of an objective fact that some things have beginnings–God still experiences creatures that have a beginning.The second premise: the universe has a beginning, contradicts at least one of Aquinas’ ways, since Aquinas holds that the creator/sustainer of the universe is unchanging and immutable and therfore cannot begin to do something, hence creation (the universe)cannot begin to exist.
You are correct. But it’s not necessary for an atemporal being to begin to do something which it can do from all eternity–and, again, such an action doesn’t preclude the creation of beings with beginnings. I’m not saying I fully comprehend how such a thing is possible, only that there is no contradiction with what I do comprehend.Yes, there is, because a categorically atemporal being cannot begin to do something, otherwise it would leave its category.
I myself am not too concerned with the KCA as with your position that A) an atemporal, unchanging being cannot create anything at all, and B) an atemporal, unchanging being cannot create anything that has a beginning. I grant that the experience of Creator and creature will be different, but it wouldn’t change the objective state of affairs or merit that such a beginning would somehow be “unreal”.Now, Shike, unless you have something new to add I think we’ve arived at an impasse.
To clarify my position for the last time: I do not object to an atempral being creating something that we perceive as having a beginning, but that does not save the KCA.
The KCA states that the universe began to exist, it does not state that the universe is perceived as having a beginning.
You are welcome. And it is always a breath of fresh air around here to get someone who doesn’t use the philosophy forum as a pretext to throw around stereotypes and avoid philosophy.Thank you for the interesting discussion. I am glad that at least some people here have the courtesy to actually addrees my arguments instead of just mocking them out of sheer ignorance.