S
SalamKhan
Guest
Three questions:
In Islam, it is said that Allah has an entity or essence, for all things that exist have an essence. However, it is not said that Allah has a substance, as substances and accidents are created. Why is it said in Christianity that God has a substance (ousia)?
Secondly, in the Middle Ages, Peter Lombard defined characteristics of the Divine Essence, but his definition was rejected by Joachim of Fiore, claiming that such a definition introduces a quarternity to the Trinity. The Church sided with Peter Lombard, but did any theologian actually answer Joachim of Fiore’s objection?
Third, since the Church affirms Divine Simplicity, how is this compatible with the Trinity? Even if the three persons are not considered parts of God, what kind of distinction is there between the three persons of the Trinity? Can there be a virtual distinction without falling into a heretical view of the Trinity, such as modalism? Or can there be formal or real distinction without contradicting Divine Simplicity?
In Islam, it is said that Allah has an entity or essence, for all things that exist have an essence. However, it is not said that Allah has a substance, as substances and accidents are created. Why is it said in Christianity that God has a substance (ousia)?
Secondly, in the Middle Ages, Peter Lombard defined characteristics of the Divine Essence, but his definition was rejected by Joachim of Fiore, claiming that such a definition introduces a quarternity to the Trinity. The Church sided with Peter Lombard, but did any theologian actually answer Joachim of Fiore’s objection?
Third, since the Church affirms Divine Simplicity, how is this compatible with the Trinity? Even if the three persons are not considered parts of God, what kind of distinction is there between the three persons of the Trinity? Can there be a virtual distinction without falling into a heretical view of the Trinity, such as modalism? Or can there be formal or real distinction without contradicting Divine Simplicity?