Questions of Divine Command Theory

[Relinquish]

Many theists love Divine Command Theory because they believe it makes them impervious to the problem of evil. Supposedly God couldn’t do evil because he is goodness by nature. I have a series of questions for those who ascribe to divine command theory;

If God is good, does not not necessitate that there is a standard of goodness external to God? If not then saying “God is good” is just saying “God is God”, which is vacuous.

Also, if you are able to find a way to meaningful say that the nature of a moral agent is goodness, can you explain what causes the nature of a moral agent to be goodness? Why is one moral agent’s nature goodness, and not anthers? What is the difference between God and myself, such that his nature is goodness where as mine isn’t? This seems incredibly arbitrary.

 

[carlysrose]

What is the difference between God and myself, such that his nature is goodness where as mine isn’t? This seems incredibly arbitrary.

God doesn’t get caught up in superfluousness things, whereas you do. Goodness/perfection is not wasting a single moment, which means there is no space for corruption/error.

 

[Relinquish]

God doesn’t get caught up in superfluousness things, whereas you do. Goodness/perfection is not wasting a single moment, which means there is no space for corruption/error.

The second question does not need to be answered if the first cannot be. The second question only arises once the theist is even able to answer the first.

Anyways, though, what do you mean by superfluousness and corruption or error? And why would these qualities distinguish between being a standard of goodness and not being a standard goodness? Why isn’t it good to be superfluous or corrupt or have error in what ever sense you meant these terms? (of course you have to define your terms like I asked, or your response will be meaningless.

 

[Iron_Donkey]

Saying that God is good does not require an external standard because we do not merely say that we have this adjective “good” lying around which happens to apply to God, but that goodness is actually part of what God is.

You could say that this makes good and evil arbitrary, but this would only be true if God’s essence were arbitrary, which would be hard to defend. It does mean that saying God is good is the same as saying that God is God, but I fail to see the problem with this since we do in fact know things about God. The sentence itself tells you nothing new, but most definitions do not (in the same way that saying 1+1=2 is technically meaningless, or at least tells you nothing you do not know, since +1 means successor of and the number 2 is defined to be the successor of 1 - nothing new here, but still useful to know).

It makes little sense to use your nature to judge God rather than the other way around because God is absolutely more fundamental than you. That is, He made you as He desired, your existence depends on His continued will that you exist, and everything you do you can do because He has decided that you will have the ability to do so. So if you were the fundamental standard of good, you’d (from our view, of reality, of course) have to admit that the fundamental standard of good relies on God for it’s structure (he made it), it’s continued existence, and it’s ability to apply itself to various situations. Which is something of a contradiction with the word “fundamental”.

 

[carlysrose]

The second question does not need to be answered if the first cannot be. The second question only arises once the theist is even able to answer the first.

Anyways, though, what do you mean by superfluousness and corruption or error? And why would these qualities distinguish between being a standard of goodness and not being a standard goodness? Why isn’t it good to be superfluous or corrupt or have error in what ever sense you meant these terms? (of course you have to define your terms like I asked, or your response will be meaningless.

su·per·flu·ous   [soo-pur-floo-uhs] Show IPA
adjective
1.
being more than is sufficient or required; excessive.
2.
unnecessary or needless.
3.
Obsolete . possessing or spending more than enough or necessary; extravagant.

cor·rup·tion   [kuh-ruhp-shuhn] Show IPA
noun
1.
the act of corrupting or state of being corrupt.
2.
moral perversion; depravity.
3.
perversion of integrity.
4.
corrupt or dishonest proceedings.

Do you believe you are free of these?

 

[carlysrose]

“Be perfect like your Father in Heaven.”

Clearly, it is possible.

Avoid the words I defined, and you are one step closer.

 

[Alberti_Devoveo]

I assume you mean “If God is good, does it not necessitate that there is a standard of goodness external to God?” A simple response is: no, it does not necessitate a standard of goodness external to God because God is that standard.

When one says, “God is good,” he is not defining God as good, but stating that all of goodness comes through God.

 

[Qoeleth]

Many theists love Divine Command Theory because they believe it makes them impervious to the problem of evil. Supposedly God couldn’t do evil because he is goodness by nature. I have a series of questions for those who ascribe to divine command theory;

If God is good, does not not necessitate that there is a standard of goodness external to God? If not then saying “God is good” is just saying “God is God”, which is vacuous.

Also, if you are able to find a way to meaningful say that the nature of a moral agent is goodness, can you explain what causes the nature of a moral agent to be goodness? Why is one moral agent’s nature goodness, and not anthers? What is the difference between God and myself, such that his nature is goodness where as mine isn’t? This seems incredibly arbitrary.

People have a bit of the “Divine Spark” in them. It is called the soul. Now, the soul (the conscience) senses what is good. God’s goodness is the same type as human goodness (cf. Eckhart), but different in degree.

Aquinas and Scotus had the debate about whether predicates to God are applied univocally (meaning that “goodness” is the same “goodness”, different in degree, whether in you or God), or analogically. Of course, Scotus was right- they are univocal.

 

[Relinquish]

su·per·flu·ous   [soo-pur-floo-uhs] Show IPA
adjective
1.
being more than is sufficient or required; excessive.
2.
unnecessary or needless.
3.
Obsolete . possessing or spending more than enough or necessary; extravagant.

cor·rup·tion   [kuh-ruhp-shuhn] Show IPA
noun
1.
the act of corrupting or state of being corrupt.
2.
moral perversion; depravity.
3.
perversion of integrity.
4.
corrupt or dishonest proceedings.

Do you believe you are free of these?

No. Do you believe an entity which does possess these qualities exists? If so I’d like to see the proof. Futhermore, if such an entity existed, why would these qualities in of themselves cause the entity which possessed them to be the good?

 

[Relinquish]

Saying that God is good does not require an external standard because we do not merely say that we have this adjective “good” lying around which happens to apply to God, but that goodness is actually part of what God is.

So when calling someone good, you’re really saying they behave in a way that is similar to God. Why would it be morally praise worthy that God do good things? After all, God behaving in a good way is merely to say that God is behaving as God behaves.

Furthermore it’s perfectly logically possible for God to do things that we would consider evil. It’s possible for God to rape, to murder, torture babies and such. This means that on your metaethical view, it’s possible for rape, murder, and torturing babies to be good. What is the difference between God doing good and doing evil? There isn’t one. Morality seems to completely break down if we try to take up the divine command theory position.

You could say that this makes good and evil arbitrary, but this would only be true if God’s essence were arbitrary, which would be hard to defend. It does mean that saying God is good is the same as saying that God is God, but I fail to see the problem with this since we do in fact know things about God. The sentence itself tells you nothing new, but most definitions do not (in the same way that saying 1+1=2 is technically meaningless, or at least tells you nothing you do not know, since +1 means successor of and the number 2 is defined to be the successor of 1 - nothing new here, but still useful to know).

Good and evil are not arbitrary, per say, but the fact that they are reflected in God’s nature is. Why would you deem God’s nature the standard of goodness apposed to another persons nature? If God’s nature is the standard by which we measure goodness, then how can God’s nature measure himself? A meter stick is a meter long. That’s only because of how we’ve defined what a meter stick is. In the same way God is only good because of how you’ve defined his nature–not because of any morally virtuous achievement. What is morally praiseworthy about an entity that is good merely by definition?

It makes little sense to use your nature to judge God rather than the other way around because God is absolutely more fundamental than you. That is, He made you as He desired, your existence depends on His continued will that you exist, and everything you do you can do because He has decided that you will have the ability to do so. So if you were the fundamental standard of good, you’d (from our view, of reality, of course) have to admit that the fundamental standard of good relies on God for it’s structure (he made it), it’s continued existence, and it’s ability to apply itself to various situations. Which is something of a contradiction with the word “fundamental”.

I believe the facts of morality are external to any moral agent, so I am not judging God by my nature, but by objective moral facts.
Also why would an entity being “fundamental” in any way be a sufficient and necessary condition for being the good?

If Moloch was the creator and demanded we burn our infants alive to show our worship to him, would he not be an evil person? By your view you would have to call Moloch perfectly good every single time he raped or murdered an innocent. And, in fact, you would have to call actions that were reflective of his nature good as well. Can you really say this is intuitive?

You seem to be saying that might makes right, but this is quite obviously false. And if it is true, the atheist could easily have a metaethical position superior to yours by saying God does not exist and he* is the most powerful one. In that case you’ve got to do everything the atheist dictator makes you do.*

 

[Relinquish]

I assume you mean “If God is good, does it not necessitate that there is a standard of goodness external to God?” A simple response is: no, it does not necessitate a standard of goodness external to God because God is that standard.

When one says, “God is good,” he is not defining God as good, but stating that all of goodness comes through God.

So when you say “God is good” you’re not saying anything meaningful about God but that he is as he is. We could say the exact same thing about any god no matter what their behavior was. A god that raped people would be good–and thus the action of rape would be morally obligatory.

Is this not incredibly unintuitive?

And I’m not sure what you mean by “goodness comes through God”.

 

[Relinquish]

People have a bit of the “Divine Spark” in them. It is called the soul. Now, the soul (the conscience) senses what is good. God’s goodness is the same type as human goodness (cf. Eckhart), but different in degree.

Why is it then that people observe God’s commands and sense that it is evil? For example God commanding death for homosexuals, or many of the other atrocities in the Bible? And so you do believe that there is a standard of goodness external to all moral agents, and God conforms to this standard perfectly thus he is perfectly good? In that case you are not a divine command theorist.

Aquinas and Scotus had the debate about whether predicates to God are applied univocally (meaning that “goodness” is the same “goodness”, different in degree, whether in you or God), or analogically. Of course, Scotus was right- they are univocal.

Yes of course goodness has to mean the same thing when it’s a human or a deity which possesses the quality. If there are no qualities which both humans and deities possess, then you’re going to have many many theological problems–and it’s going to be nearly impossible to even talk about God

 

[Gorgias]

So when calling someone good, you’re really saying they behave in a way that is similar to God. Why would it be morally praise worthy that God do good things? After all, God behaving in a good way is merely to say that God is behaving as God behaves.

Well, I don’t buy into the argument of Scotus that we can predicate univocally: when we say “God is good”, we are simply making a statement about the standard – which is God himself. That being said, I’m not sure I understand your hangup about “morally praiseworthiness” wrt God…?

Incidentally, by requiring an “external standard of goodness”, you create an untenable situation. Your requirement sets up an infinite regress: if God is not the standard for goodness, and there’s an external standard, what’s the standard that explicates the “external standard”? Once you establish that one, what’s the standard that explicates it? Et cetera, et cetera, et cetera…

Furthermore it’s perfectly logically possible for God to do things that we would consider evil. It’s possible for God to rape, to murder, torture babies and such.

Hmm… I’m not sure I would put it that way. First off, I would say that it’s not possible for God to do evil – God’s the standard for goodness, by definition, and so these things are not possible. (Don’t go claiming that I’m messing with the notion of “omnipotence”, now, either – that’s an old canard: it’s illogical to assert that God contradicts his own nature, and that does not impinge on God’s omnipotence. (It’s the tired old “Can God create a rock so big that He can’t lift it” game, of course…)

This means that on your metaethical view, it’s possible for rape, murder, and torturing babies to be good.

Once you redefine the standard as you wish, you can equivocate in this way. However, you don’t get to redefine the standard: it already exists – it’s God, and God is the standard for goodness.

Morality seems to completely break down if we try to take up the divine command theory position.

So, if you reach a contradiction, that’s a good indication that the premise is faulty – divine command theory, as stated (well, to be honest, you didn’t really state your conception of “divine command theory”, per se), doesn’t work.

If God’s nature is the standard by which we measure goodness, then how can God’s nature measure himself? A meter stick is a meter long. That’s only because of how we’ve defined what a meter stick is. In the same way God is only good because of how you’ve defined his nature–not because of any morally virtuous achievement. What is morally praiseworthy about an entity that is good merely by definition?

Is this your hangup with “moral virtue”? Must all standards pass this “moral virtue” test? If so, what’s the moral virtue in a “meter”?

If Moloch was the creator and demanded we burn our infants alive to show our worship to him, would he not be an evil person? By your view you would have to call Moloch perfectly good every single time he raped or murdered an innocent. And, in fact, you would have to call actions that were reflective of his nature good as well. Can you really say this is intuitive?

Well, if you want to go down this route, then you’re going to have to define “evil”. Not give examples, mind you, but provide an objective over-arching definition of evil.

 

[Alberti_Devoveo]

So when you say “God is good” you’re not saying anything meaningful about God but that he is as he is. We could say the exact same thing about any god no matter what their behavior was. A god that raped people would be good–and thus the action of rape would be morally obligatory.

Is this not incredibly unintuitive?

And I’m not sure what you mean by “goodness comes through God”.

This is not unintuitive at all, but it can be if you (a) do not understand the argument or (b) force a misconception in the understanding. “God is good” is similar to “God is love” or “God is forgiveness;” those attributes, and others, are perfected in God.

As for your misunderstanding my last sentence: what is good is because God deemed it so. Thus, somethings “goodness” comes because God said so, it comes through Him.

 

[sw85]

Many theists love Divine Command Theory because they believe it makes them impervious to the problem of evil. Supposedly God couldn’t do evil because he is goodness by nature. I have a series of questions for those who ascribe to divine command theory;

If God is good, does not not necessitate that there is a standard of goodness external to God? If not then saying “God is good” is just saying “God is God”, which is vacuous.

No, it necessitates no such thing. And yes, saying “God is good” is in a sense self-referential, but only in a sense. Goodness is a particular aspect of God, as is justice, mercy, love, etc. God is each of these things and all of them, but none of them is God.

Also, if you are able to find a way to meaningful say that the nature of a moral agent is goodness, can you explain what causes the nature of a moral agent to be goodness? Why is one moral agent’s nature goodness, and not anthers? What is the difference between God and myself, such that his nature is goodness where as mine isn’t? This seems incredibly arbitrary.

There is a distinction between essence and existence in everything but God. Thus, while I can be said to be good, God alone can be said to be goodness, because His essence just is existence, and so whatever can be said to be true of Him, He actually, literally is. This isn’t an arbitrary distinction but one necessitated by the simple fact that God alone is and must be actus purus.

If it seems arbitrary, perhaps it’s because you’re not up to speed on the relevant issues. I recommend Edward Feser’s Aquinas, or The Last Superstition for a more polemical and less dry/academic treatment of the same issues.

 

[theblindlead]

this probably isn’t helpful because it really does not address your question but Catholics do not ascribe to divine command theory. the ascribe to Natural Law theory.

and if you are worried about the problem of evil i would suggest reading plantinga. here is a link to an article that summarizes it very well but plantinga did such a good job refuting the problem of evil that nearly every atheist accepts what he says as true and they had to rephrase their problem of evil argument to make it around plantinga’s argument

www.hughlafollette.com/papers/Plantinga_on_the_Free_Will_Defense.pdf

 

[Relinquish]

No, it necessitates no such thing.

How so?

And yes, saying “God is good” is in a sense self-referential, but only in a sense. Goodness is a particular aspect of God, as is justice, mercy, love, etc. God is each of these things and all of them, but none of them is God.

If goodness is a particular aspect of God, and not the totality of his nature, that means that there exists a quality (being good or goodness) that is not identical to God’s nature but which God’s nature possesses. This means that goodness or the good is external to God’s nature. I’m sorry but you’ve got to be careful with your metaphysics

There is a distinction between essence and existence in everything but God. Thus, while I can be said to be good, God alone can be said to be goodness, because His essence just is existence, and so whatever can be said to be true of Him, He actually, literally is. This isn’t an arbitrary distinction but one necessitated by the simple fact that God alone is and must be actus purus.

You’re making some very bad metaphysical claims that I just cant get on board with.

If it seems arbitrary, perhaps it’s because you’re not up to speed on the relevant issues. I recommend Edward Feser’s Aquinas, or The Last Superstition for a more polemical and less dry/academic treatment of the same issues.

I will consider adding them to my reading list. From your previous statement, though, I don’t have very high hopes for your particular brand of metaphysics and probably wont read these books if that’s where you’ve gotten these ideas.

 

[Gorgias]

sw85:

There is a distinction between essence and existence in everything but God. Thus, while I can be said to be good, God alone can be said to be goodness, because His essence just is existence, and so whatever can be said to be true of Him, He actually, literally is. This isn’t an arbitrary distinction but one necessitated by the simple fact that God alone is and must be actus purus.

You’re making some very bad metaphysical claims that I just cant get on board with.

Can you be a little more specific?

 

[Relinquish]

Well, I don’t buy into the argument of Scotus that we can predicate univocally: when we say “God is good”, we are simply making a statement about the standard – which is God himself. That being said, I’m not sure I understand your hangup about “morally praiseworthiness” wrt God…?

What is praiseworthy in doing what you do? Moral agents preform morally praiseworthy actions when they conform to a standard of goodness in a non-tautological way. In other words, it’s logically possible for me and you to do evil, so when we do good it’s meaningful. God, on the other hand, cannot do evil actions if you define his nature as the good and so his actions are not morally praiseworthy.

Incidentally, by requiring an “external standard of goodness”, you create an untenable situation. Your requirement sets up an infinite regress: if God is not the standard for goodness, and there’s an external standard, what’s the standard that explicates the “external standard”? Once you establish that one, what’s the standard that explicates it? Et cetera, et cetera, et cetera…

Not at all! If the standard of goodness was not a moral agent then the goodness could not be itself good. This is a much more intuitive solution that does not dig up any paradox’s like Divine Command Theory does. Now you could always claim that God is not a moral agent himself, and then your divine command theory would make sense, but at the sacrifice of God’s actions no longer being morally significant or praiseworthy.

Hmm… I’m not sure I would put it that way. First off, I would say that it’s not possible for God to do evil – God’s the standard for goodness, by definition, and so these things are not possible. (Don’t go claiming that I’m messing with the notion of “omnipotence”, now, either – that’s an old canard: it’s illogical to assert that God contradicts his own nature, and that does not impinge on God’s omnipotence. (It’s the tired old “Can God create a rock so big that He can’t lift it” game, of course…)

I never said it was possible for God to do evil. I recognize that you’ve defined goodness in such a way that any action God preforms is good. What I said is that it’s logically possible for God to do things that we all believe are evil such as rape and murder for no reason more than the fun of it—which would imply that these possibly are morally sufficient reasons to rape and murder.

Another point to make; if you can’t trust your intuitions that, say, homosexuals shouldn’t be killed just for being gay despite what God commands, then how can you trust any of your moral intuitions or even God for that matter as he gave you those intuitions? Now maybe your intuitions are perfectly in line with Christian doctrine. Mine are not and I think most people would say theirs are not either, and accepting divine command theory would throw me into such a deep global skeptism that I would have trouble accepting it even if there were persuasive arguments to support it. Just like how we’re all dubious of other areas of global skeptism, like the problem of other minds or the possibility of being a brain in a vat.

Once you redefine the standard as you wish, you can equivocate in this way. However, you don’t get to redefine the standard: it already exists – it’s God, and God is the standard for goodness.

You have accused me of equivocation. Please demonstrate where I have commuted this offense. And I realize that you believe God is the standard of goodness, you nor has anyone proven it as of yet, though.

So, if you reach a contradiction, that’s a good indication that the premise is faulty – divine command theory, as stated (well, to be honest, you didn’t really state your conception of “divine command theory”, per se), doesn’t work.

I never spoke of a contradiction. I just gave my reasons of being dubious of it.

Well, if you want to go down this route, then you’re going to have to define “evil”. Not give examples, mind you, but provide an objective over-arching definition of evil.

It does not matter what I conceive of evil to be, I am asking you according to YOUR conception of good and evil, would the creator Moloch be good to rape and torture and burn babies alive for the fun of it? This is how I’m trying to judge if YOUR conception of good and evil are meaningful. What I believe the identity of evil to be is irrelevant, please do not try to shift the burden of proof again or we will not get anywhere.

 

[Qoeleth]

Why is it then that people observe God’s commands and sense that it is evil? For example God commanding death for homosexuals, or many of the other atrocities in the Bible? And so you do believe that there is a standard of goodness external to all moral agents, and God conforms to this standard perfectly thus he is perfectly good? In that case you are not a divine command theorist.

Yes of course goodness has to mean the same thing when it’s a human or a deity which possesses the quality. If there are no qualities which both humans and deities possess, then you’re going to have many many theological problems–and it’s going to be nearly impossible to even talk about God

Maybe people get God’s commands wrong- and His commands are always filtered through social conditions. Divine command theory is very unpopular among Christians. William of Ockham is the only prominent example I can think of. Few Christians follow the Old Testament commands literally.

Let me put it this way- Christians define God in terms of goodness, and nothing else. “Power” and “omniscience” are just secondary, metaphoric attributes, used in some particular literary discourses, but not essential. That is why Jesus, who was perfectly good, is God.