Questions on Double Effect

[fakename]

(1) What is the difference between intending a bad effect and merely knowing that the bad effect will occur if one does something? For instance, in self-sacrifice, one knows that you will get killed and this is the intention of the agent. Also in self-defense one knows that you will kill your opponent, and you intend to do this inorder to protect yourself.

(2) What is the common measure that makes us say that one effect is better or proportional to another effect?

(3) Essentially, what makes double-effect so different from consequentialism? For it seems that the distinction between intention and permitted bad effects is useless, since one can also intend to permit bad effects and this is to intend a bad thing as an acceptable cause (even in the sense that a privation) of your end. So since the two are not logically different, double-effect becomes a mere variation of consequentialism.

 

[Bookcat]

catholicreference.net/index.cfm?id=33215

cuf.org/faithfacts/details_view.asp?ffID=56

 

[fakename]

catholicreference.net/index.cfm?id=33215

cuf.org/faithfacts/details_view.asp?ffID=56

I understand that but I was asking to what extent something forseen is unintended?

After all, in self-defense, one could ask oneself, “how do I intend to defeat my enemy?” and the answer would be “by killing him”. So you forsee the death of the enemy not just as a side-effect but as a means to defending yourself. If that is true, then when someone says “double-effect must require that the bad is not the cause of the result” then self defense would be wrong which is impossible.

Also, the same applies to ectopic pregnancies since the doctor can always ask “how do I intend to save my patient”. The answer would be “by removing the fallopian tubes” and then “how does removing the fallopian tubes save the patient?” and the final answer would be “by killing the baby”. The result being that one intends to kill a baby by intending to remove the fallopian tubes. Unless of course, one could say that the life of the baby is not the per se cause of the woman’s death but rather his spatial presence. Then again does this latter option merely take the chain of reasonings one step further?

I’m also saying that double-effect seems like simple “rationalization” and self-deception in order to avoid drawing the common-sense conclusion that one is killing a baby to save a person.

How does one avoid this conclusion?

Is it okay to say that one intends to kill the baby only inasmuch as the his/her death is an accident of the procedure?

 

[Fone_Bone_2001]

(1) What is the difference between intending a bad effect and merely knowing that the bad effect will occur if one does something?

If the bad effect is neither your goal nor a cause of your goal, you aren’t willing it, you’re merely foreseeing it.

For instance, in self-sacrifice, one knows that you will get killed and this is the intention of the agent.

No, it’s not your intention. At least, not if your death is not the means to the good end.

I can’t really say anything more unless you provide a specific scenario of self-sacrifice in which to apply the principle…

Also in self-defense one knows that you will kill your opponent, and you intend to do this inorder to protect yourself.

You got me there. From the first moment I learned the three or four points of the principle of double effect and how they apply, I never did understand how it justifies killing in self-defense. Hopefully others can enlighten us.

(2) What is the common measure that makes us say that one effect is better or proportional to another effect?

I don’t think there is one. This is the part of double effect where prudence, wisdom, and the judgments of a rightly-ordered conscience come into play. This is the subjective component. Only with prayer and honesty can one weigh the proportionate consequences in an accurate and morally sensitive manner.

(3) Essentially, what makes double-effect so different from consequentialism?

This one’s easy.

In consequentialism, the circumstances/outcomes entirely dictate the act’s moral nature.

The first principle of double effect, by contrast, is that an act’s object must be morally good or neutral, or it’s always wrong to commit. If it doesn’t pass that first requirement, the intentions and circumstances don’t matter.

In consequentialism, you don’t have to look at the object of the act at all; it’s morally inconsequential.

For instance: a brilliant terrorist with an untraceable bomb tells you that you must skewer and barbecue a live baby on a grill… or he’ll blow up Chicago, thereby torching to cinders its every living inhabitant.

Consequentialism, as a system, would say, “Barbecue that baby.”

Double effect, as a system, would say, “If you can’t stop that terrorist any other way, you have to let all of Chicago’s inhabitants get blown to smithereens. The alternative is intrinsically immoral, ethically unacceptable, because the object of the act is evil.”

For it seems that the distinction between intention and permitted bad effects is useless, since one can also intend to permit bad effects and this is to intend a bad thing as an acceptable cause (even in the sense that a privation) of your end.

If you “intend a bad thing as [the] cause” of your good end, double effect says the act is immoral and you shouldn’t do it. Simple enough.

After all, in self-defense, one could ask oneself, “how do I intend to defeat my enemy?” and the answer would be “by killing him”. So you forsee the death of the enemy not just as a side-effect but as a means to defending yourself. If that is true, then when someone says “double-effect must require that the bad is not the cause of the result” then self defense would be wrong which is impossible.

I also don’t understand how double effect justifies violent self-defense, even though I’m always told that it does. Hopefully someone more knowledgeable than I can come along and help us understand this.

Your other example, though, does not have this difficulty:

Also, the same applies to ectopic pregnancies since the doctor can always ask “how do I intend to save my patient”. The answer would be “by removing the fallopian tubes” and then “how does removing the fallopian tubes save the patient?” and the final answer would be “by killing the baby”.

No, removing the fallopian tubes does not save the pregnant woman because it kills her baby. That surgical act saves her by preserving her insides from lethal rupture. The death of her unborn child is not a cause of her life continuing; rather, the death of her unborn child and her life continuing are both effects of the removal of her fallopian tubes.

See the difference? It’s NOT this:

Removal of fallopian tubes —> death of her child —> the mother’s survival

But rather it’s THIS:

Removal of fallopian tubes -----> the mother’s survival
Removal of fallopian tubes -----> death of her child

See?

Or think of it this way: imagine the baby miraculously survives. Or better yet, imagine a doctor has secretly developed the technology to keep human embryos/fetuses that young alive, but no one knows about it in advance. He manages to save the child after the removal of the fallopian tubes.

Does that mean the mother then dies? No, of course not. She lives, and she gets the best surprise of her life: her child has survived! That proves that her child’s death is not a means to the end of her survival. If it were, the negation of that means - i.e. the child surviving - would lead to the negation of that end - her survival.

The result being that one intends to kill a baby by intending to remove the fallopian tubes.

No, the death of the child is not intended. It’s neither the goal, nor - as I established above - the actual means of reaching the end of saving the mother’s life. That is the difference between “intended” and “foreseen” - a result is an intention only if it is the ultimate motive (end) or a necessary means of achieving that motive. Otherwise it is merely foreseen.

Unless of course, one could say that the life of the baby is not the per se cause of the woman’s death but rather his spatial presence. Then again does this latter option merely take the chain of reasonings one step further?

No, it does more than just “take the chain of reasonings one step further.” It takes the baby’s death out of the necessary causes altogether. As I said above: if the baby somehow lives because this doctor is an awesome scientist with groundbreaking new technology that no one knows about yet, the mother still lives. That shows beyond a shadow of a doubt that the baby’s death is not at all any part of the causes of the mother’s survival.

I’m also saying that double-effect seems like simple “rationalization” and self-deception in order to avoid drawing the common-sense conclusion that one is killing a baby to save a person.

Hardly, especially since double effect can fail to justify the acts we want to justify. For instance, my ticking time-bomb scenario above.

Or how about this one: shooting a man in the head who’s burning to death slowly and painfully? That fails double effect, since in this case his death is a means to the end. You can test this with a similar thought experiment: if he doesn’t die for some reason - say, you only perforate his lung with your bullet - do you still accomplish your end, which is to eliminate his suffering? No, you don’t. That means the bad effect in this case is a means to the good end.

So double effect isn’t mere rationalization, because there are plenty of things it doesn’t let us rationalize.

I hope my responses have helped.

 

[fakename]

If the bad effect is neither your goal nor a cause of your goal, you aren’t willing it, you’re merely foreseeing it.

No, it’s not your intention. At least, not if your death is not the means to the good end.

I can’t really say anything more unless you provide a specific scenario of self-sacrifice in which to apply the principle…

You got me there. From the first moment I learned the three or four points of the principle of double effect and how they apply, I never did understand how it justifies killing in self-defense. Hopefully others can enlighten us.

I don’t think there is one. This is the part of double effect where prudence, wisdom, and the judgments of a rightly-ordered conscience come into play. This is the subjective component. Only with prayer and honesty can one weigh the proportionate consequences in an accurate and morally sensitive manner.

This one’s easy.

In consequentialism, the circumstances/outcomes entirely dictate the act’s moral nature.

The first principle of double effect, by contrast, is that an act’s object must be morally good or neutral, or it’s always wrong to commit. If it doesn’t pass that first requirement, the intentions and circumstances don’t matter.

In consequentialism, you don’t have to look at the object of the act at all; it’s morally inconsequential.

For instance: a brilliant terrorist with an untraceable bomb tells you that you must skewer and barbecue a live baby on a grill… or he’ll blow up Chicago, thereby torching to cinders its every living inhabitant.

Consequentialism, as a system, would say, “Barbecue that baby.”

Double effect, as a system, would say, “If you can’t stop that terrorist any other way, you have to let all of Chicago’s inhabitants get blown to smithereens. The alternative is intrinsically immoral, ethically unacceptable, because the object of the act is evil.”

If you “intend a bad thing as [the] cause” of your good end, double effect says the act is immoral and you shouldn’t do it. Simple enough.

I also don’t understand how double effect justifies violent self-defense, even though I’m always told that it does. Hopefully someone more knowledgeable than I can come along and help us understand this.

Your other example, though, does not have this difficulty:

No, removing the fallopian tubes does not save the pregnant woman because it kills her baby. That surgical act saves her by preserving her insides from lethal rupture. The death of her unborn child is not a cause of her life continuing; rather, the death of her unborn child and her life continuing are both effects of the removal of her fallopian tubes.

See the difference? It’s NOT this:

Removal of fallopian tubes —> death of her child —> the mother’s survival

But rather it’s THIS:

Removal of fallopian tubes -----> the mother’s survival
Removal of fallopian tubes -----> death of her child

See?

Or think of it this way: imagine the baby miraculously survives. Or better yet, imagine a doctor has secretly developed the technology to keep human embryos/fetuses that young alive, but no one knows about it in advance. He manages to save the child after the removal of the fallopian tubes.

Does that mean the mother then dies? No, of course not. She lives, and she gets the best surprise of her life: her child has survived! That proves that her child’s death is not a means to the end of her survival. If it were, the negation of that means - i.e. the child surviving - would lead to the negation of that end - her survival.

No, the death of the child is not intended. It’s neither the goal, nor - as I established above - the actual means of reaching the end of saving the mother’s life. That is the difference between “intended” and “foreseen” - a result is an intention only if it is the ultimate motive (end) or a necessary means of achieving that motive. Otherwise it is merely foreseen.

No, it does more than just “take the chain of reasonings one step further.” It takes the baby’s death out of the necessary causes altogether. As I said above: if the baby somehow lives because this doctor is an awesome scientist with groundbreaking new technology that no one knows about yet, the mother still lives. That shows beyond a shadow of a doubt that the baby’s death is not at all any part of the causes of the mother’s survival.

Hardly, especially since double effect can fail to justify the acts we want to justify. For instance, my ticking time-bomb scenario above.

Or how about this one: shooting a man in the head who’s burning to death slowly and painfully? That fails double effect, since in this case his death is a means to the end. You can test this with a similar thought experiment: if he doesn’t die for some reason - say, you only perforate his lung with your bullet - do you still accomplish your end, which is to eliminate his suffering? No, you don’t. That means the bad effect in this case is a means to the good end.

So double effect isn’t mere rationalization, because there are plenty of things it doesn’t let us rationalize.

I hope my responses have helped.

That was a pretty helpful response.

But I think we would agree then, that the baby is the per accidens cause of the mother’s survival so that one could intend the accidental cause w/o sin (as opposed to the per se cause)?

 

[capoly]

fakename:

I’m also saying that double-effect seems like simple “rationalization” and self-deception in order to avoid drawing the common-sense conclusion that one is killing a baby to save a person.

How does one avoid this conclusion?

If one is intellectually honest, there is no way to avoid this conclusion. The principle of double effect is just a cop-out, or an ineffective explanation-away in order to avoid looking into the mirror, and saying: “yes, I did what was necessary and here is my justification”. It is the method of keeping the nonsensical “intrinsically evil” idea alive, instead of taking all the circumstances into consideration, and make a judgment call about the action.

Yes, if one takes a gun and simply shoots another person for “fun” it is not the same as shooting the other person in self-defense. The two actions are the same: “grab a gun, point it, and pull the trigger”. Why this desperate struggle to own up what one does and attempt to hide behind some “double effect”?

 

[JerBear_Meaux]

i think the idea is to take responsibility for your own actions and making the morally just decision, knowing something bad could happen stemming from a response of yours should allow you to reason and put it into proportion with your other options, sometimes its hard to reason and to understand the consequences of your decisions though. That is when you whould ask an elder maybe from your family or a close friend or a member of your church the ability to make a decision regarding your actions involves prudence
and the ability to determine if your cause is righteous involves justice, If you were determined to defend yourself through a form of self defense is taking the other mans life necessary and just, and if your not able to determine whether it is necessary to take the other mans life perhaps it would be necessary to avoid all cases where self defense would be neccesary.

 

[Fone_Bone_2001]

That was a pretty helpful response.

Good; I’m glad.

But I think we would agree then, that the baby is the per accidens cause of the mother’s survival so that one could intend the accidental cause w/o sin (as opposed to the per se cause)?

Sorry, I’m not familiar with the terms “per accidens” vs. “per se.” Do they just mean that one is the cause by itself and the other the cause by accident?

If so, I still disagree. In no sense is the baby’s death the cause of the mother’s survival. As I said above, the mother’s survival and the baby’s death are both effects of the removal of the fallopian tubes. The mother’s survival and the baby’s death have the same cause, but they are not causally connected at all. In fact, as I emphasized above, if the baby somehow lives because the doctor has some crazy awesome new technology, the mother still survives. That shows that the baby’s death is not in any sense a cause of her mother’s survival. Rather, it is - in reality - an unavoidable side effect.

If one is intellectually honest, there is no way to avoid this conclusion. The principle of double effect is just a cop-out, or an ineffective explanation-away in order to avoid looking into the mirror, and saying: “yes, I did what was necessary and here is my justification”. It is the method of keeping the nonsensical “intrinsically evil” idea alive, instead of taking all the circumstances into consideration, and make a judgment call about the action.

What you’ve said is false, through and through.

Please address my examples. I cited several hypothetical scenarios in which double effect does not allow us to rationalize the decisions we’d like to make, because they honestly and truly fail to meet its criteria:

(1) “Barbecue this live baby, or in ten minutes I’ll blow up a city, toasting its every living inhabitant to cinders.” If you can’t stop that terrorist any other way, capoly, then according to double effect you have to let him blow up that city.

(2) “That man is running around on fire, suffering a horrific death. Quick, take this gun and shoot him dead so save him from suffering.” Double effect also would say you can’t do this.

So, capoly, how exactly does double effect allow us to rationalize the choices we’d like to make but which seem immoral? If that’s it’s objective, it stinks at it.

What it actually does is point out that permitting a foreseen evil to occur can be morally defensible, and it gives us a way to determine if doing so is right in any given situation.

 

[capoly]

Fone Bone 2001:

Please address my examples. I cited several hypothetical scenarios in which double effect does not allow us to rationalize the decisions we’d like to make, because they honestly and truly fail to meet its criteria:

(1) “Barbecue this live baby, or in ten minutes I’ll blow up a city, toasting its every living inhabitant to cinders.” If you can’t stop that terrorist any other way, capoly, then according to double effect you have to let him blow up that city.

But I would NOT do that. All things need to be considered. If you are stuck between a rock and a hard place (both outcomes are wrong), then the only sensible choice is to minimize the harms of the outcome. The act of barbecuing that baby is not a palatable choice, but it is still better than have everyone die. I suspect that you might argue that it is the terrorist (and not “YOU”) who will do the act, you merely “played Pilate” washing your hands. There is this misbegotten concept floating around that there is a significant difference between “doing something with your own hands” and simply “allowing it to happen, even if you could prevent it”.

You might have chosen a less emotionally charged example and say that your choice is either “murder” the terrorist or allow him to do his act. After all “murder” is also viewed as a “mortal sin”… If you can rationalize that you simply wish to stop the terrorist, but there is no “better” way to do it, then you can rationalize your action, by stating that the killing of the terrorist (or the death of that baby) is simply a foreseen but UNintended outcome of stopping the terrorist. In othere words, it is hypocrisy through and through. You know that pulling that trigger will kill the terrorist, but refuse to come clean about it. The honest person does what needs to be done, admits it, and lives with the consequences.

quote=Fone Bone 2001 “That man is running around on fire, suffering a horrific death. Quick, take this gun and shoot him dead so save him from suffering.” Double effect also would say you can’t do this.
[/quote]

This is not a good example either Again, a less emotional example would be a patient, who asks for a deadly dose of morphine. The doctor can rationalize that he gives the dose, which is efficient for the purposes of alleviating pain, and he merely foresees, but does not intend to kill the patient.
Fone Bone 2001:

So, capoly, how exactly does double effect allow us to rationalize the choices we’d like to make but which seem immoral? If that’s it’s objective, it stinks at it.

What it actually does is point out that permitting a foreseen evil to occur can be morally defensible, and it gives us a way to determine if doing so is right in any given situation.

So, neither of those were not good examples of the double effect.

 

[Fone_Bone_2001]

So, neither of those were not good examples of the double effect.

Any situation with a moral dilemma is a good example with which to apply double effect.

You seem to be saying - correct me if I’m wrong - that it’s “not a good example” of double effect unless double effect claims to justify permitting the foreseen evil in that particular scenario.

But an application of double effect to a scenario can come to either conclusion: if the situation meets its four criteria, then one can permit the foreseen evil; if the situation fails one of its four criteria, then it claims one should not permit the foreseen evil. But either way, you have applied double effect to the situation.

See? You seemed to be saying that my examples were not “good examples of double effect” merely because they were examples in which double effect says you can’t permit the foreseen evil. But it’s still an application of double effect; you just get a different answer than you would in a situation in which it allows the moral agent to permit the foreseen evil.

But I would NOT do that. All things need to be considered. If you are stuck between a rock and a hard place (both outcomes are wrong), then the only sensible choice is to minimize the harms of the outcome. The act of barbecuing that baby is not a palatable choice, but it is still better than have everyone die. I suspect that you might argue that it is the terrorist (and not “YOU”) who will do the act, you merely “played Pilate” washing your hands. There is this misbegotten concept floating around that there is a significant difference between “doing something with your own hands” and simply “allowing it to happen, even if you could prevent it”.

That’s my point, capoly. Who wouldn’t consider it unthinkable to let all those people die? But you agreed that double effect is essentially nothing more than a sophistic tool to justify hard moral choices while still rejecting consequentialism. To correct that statement, I offered an example of precisely where double effect refuses to let us make the decision we naturally want to. In other words:

(1) If double effect were just a tool to help us rationalize choices that seem necessary but immoral, its standards would justify such choices.
(2) There are choices that seem necessary and immoral that double effect rejects as a morally viable decision.
(3) Therefore, double effect is not a tool to help us rationalize choices that seem necessary but immoral.

That’s my point. Would you please address it?

If you can rationalize that you simply wish to stop the terrorist, but there is no “better” way to do it, then you can rationalize your action, by stating that the killing of the terrorist (or the death of that baby) is simply a foreseen but UNintended outcome of stopping the terrorist.

I think you misunderstand how double effect works. One of its very principles is that an act is **immoral **if the moral agent wills the evil effect as a means to the good effect.

In your example, whether double effect justifies killing that terrorist depends. If, for instance, that bomb is linked to his vitals, and is set to go off unless his heart stops, then killing him to prevent it from going off would, according to double effect, be the wrong choice.

Again, we see an example where double effect doesn’t let us rationalize the choice we want to make.

So as I said above: how exactly is double effect a smokescreen for rationalizing supposedly immoral actions when it often rejects as unacceptable the very choices we sometimes feel are necessary? Clearly it’s not a smokescreen for rationalizing supposedly immoral acts.

In other words, it is hypocrisy through and through. You know that pulling that trigger will kill the terrorist, but refuse to come clean about it.

On the contrary… double effect nowhere denies that the evil effect is foreseen. You know this; you yourself said that double effect deals with foreseen side effects. So how on earth does a person using it “refuse to come clean” about the result of their pulling that trigger?

Again, a less emotional example would be a patient, who asks for a deadly dose of morphine. The doctor can rationalize that he gives the dose, which is efficient for the purposes of alleviating pain, and he merely foresees, but does not intend to kill the patient.

So? What’s wrong with that? As we both admitted above, double effect in no way denies the fact that in such a case, the moral agent (the doctor, in this scenario) knows full well that his patient will die.

Where is the hypocrisy in this scenario?

The honest person does what needs to be done, admits it, and lives with the consequences.

No matter what? Yeesh, you sound like the Operative from the film Serenity… but then, he is a utilitarian and a consequentialist, so…

 

[fakename]

Good; I’m glad.

Sorry, I’m not familiar with the terms “per accidens” vs. “per se.” Do they just mean that one is the cause by itself and the other the cause by accident?

If so, I still disagree. In no sense is the baby’s death the cause of the mother’s survival. As I said above, the mother’s survival and the baby’s death are both effects of the removal of the fallopian tubes. The mother’s survival and the baby’s death have the same cause, but they are not causally connected at all. In fact, as I emphasized above, if the baby somehow lives because the doctor has some crazy awesome new technology, the mother still survives. That shows that the baby’s death is not in any sense a cause of her mother’s survival. Rather, it is - in reality - an unavoidable side effect.

What you’ve said is false, through and through.

Please address my examples. I cited several hypothetical scenarios in which double effect does not allow us to rationalize the decisions we’d like to make, because they honestly and truly fail to meet its criteria:

(1) “Barbecue this live baby, or in ten minutes I’ll blow up a city, toasting its every living inhabitant to cinders.” If you can’t stop that terrorist any other way, capoly, then according to double effect you have to let him blow up that city.

(2) “That man is running around on fire, suffering a horrific death. Quick, take this gun and shoot him dead so save him from suffering.” Double effect also would say you can’t do this.

So, capoly, how exactly does double effect allow us to rationalize the choices we’d like to make but which seem immoral? If that’s it’s objective, it stinks at it.

What it actually does is point out that permitting a foreseen evil to occur can be morally defensible, and it gives us a way to determine if doing so is right in any given situation.

Disregarding this specific case of cause and effect, in general would you say that one can intend accidental causes?

After all the change of one thing or state of affairs into another seems to include accidental causes. After all, unmusical things change into musical things, not per musical or unmusical but per some accident of musical (like human training). I suppose accident would not be the right word here, since it denotes some metaphysical reality but rather incident is a better word. The incidental cause of a person’s survival can be considered to be the non-existence or destruction of the impediment to survival. IF that’s true, then do you think that such incidental causes can be intended?

 

[JerBear_Meaux]

why argue about this topic if youve already kinda made up your mind about what you believe regarding this subject?
It seems some people would take a more rational approach and decide that they could not “BBQ a baby” because that act would play on their consious, why not ask if its morally evil to commit an act knowing that your intention isnt in everyones best interest.
you could evacuate the residents of the city within ten minutes to save as many live as possible then you have commited no morally wrong act and have instead commited a willfully good act.

 

[Fone_Bone_2001]

Disregarding this specific case of cause and effect, in general would you say that one can intend accidental causes?

After all the change of one thing or state of affairs into another seems to include accidental causes. After all, unmusical things change into musical things, not per musical or unmusical but per some accident of musical (like human training). I suppose accident would not be the right word here, since it denotes some metaphysical reality but rather incident is a better word. The incidental cause of a person’s survival can be considered to be the non-existence or destruction of the impediment to survival. IF that’s true, then do you think that such incidental causes can be intended?

That’s a lot to ponder. I’m definitely not sure.

I suppose I would need examples to decide what I think - a hypothetical or two that purports to show me a person who intends what you’re calling an “incidental cause,” which I’m also not sure really qualifies as a cause in the context of double effect…

A lot to think about here.

 

[Fone_Bone_2001]

why argue about this topic if youve already kinda made up your mind about what you believe regarding this subject?

It depends on what you mean by “argue about this topic” even though one’s mind is made up.

If you mean trying to convince people to embrace double effect and subscribe to a view of morality that considers object, intention, and circumstances all important, then I agree with you. I don’t wish to try to convince someone about that; truth be told, I wouldn’t know how.

But if you mean merely answering objections to the internal consistency or logic inherent in double effect as a princple, whether one wishes to use it or not, then that is definitely worth it, because double effect is quite rational and makes sense. That aspect of the argument is not a matter of opinion.

It seems some people would take a more rational approach and decide that they could not “BBQ a baby” because that act would play on their consious,

Oh, I agree. In fact, I’d say that’s true of me, too. The real reason I wouldn’t be able to “barbecue a live baby,” even in that circumstance, is because I would be psychologically incapable of carrying out such a deed.

I appealed to such an extreme example - one which I didn’t make up, by the way, I got that from an ethics professor who also didn’t make it up himself - to make the situation as difficult as possible. For the sake of making the hypothetical dilemma stronger, in order to clarify how double effect works…

why not ask if its morally evil to commit an act knowing that your intention isnt in everyones best interest.

I agree, assuming I understand you correctly. That’s a good question, too.

you could evacuate the residents of the city within ten minutes to save as many live as possible then you have commited no morally wrong act and have instead commited a willfully good act.

True. Excellent thinking, my friend.

 

[JerBear_Meaux]

i wouldnt say necessarily that double effect is totally logical and rational.

 

[guanophore]

But I would NOT do that. All things need to be considered. If you are stuck between a rock and a hard place (both outcomes are wrong), then the only sensible choice is to minimize the harms of the outcome. The act of barbecuing that baby is not a palatable choice, but it is still better than have everyone die.

In general it is a good principle to take the lesser of two evils. However, there are certain “non-negotionables” for the people of God. In this case, the end does NOT justify the means. The taking of innocent life is always and everywhere wrong. Characterizing this act of wanton ego centeredness as “not a palatable choice” is another reflection of the consceince searing that is caused by the culture of death. As a society, we have become hardened against the horror of the taking of innocent life by the worldy perspective that this grievious sin is for the “greater good”. It is not. When we compromise basic principles in this way, we are just passing through the Gates of Hell.

I agree with you that “all things need to be considered”. Most importantly, God’s point of view needs to be considered in first place. We are not given the license to slay the innocent to preserve ourselves, or even the “majority”.

After all “murder” is also viewed as a “mortal sin”… If you can rationalize that you simply wish to stop the terrorist, but there is no “better” way to do it, then you can rationalize your action, by stating that the killing of the terrorist (or the death of that baby) is simply a foreseen but UNintended outcome of stopping the terrorist. In othere words,

You are not just mixing apples and oranges here, but apples and cockroaches. The terrorist has chosen, and willfully participates in a sin agianst life. The baby is innocent, and has not chosen. If a terrorist dies in an effort to carry out the taking of life, he suffers only one of the consequences of his choice. The baby suffers murder, and is the victim of one taking an innocent life.

The honest person does what needs to be done, admits it, and lives with the consequences.

Is this how abortion is rationalized?

I agree, the honest person does admit what one has done wrong. Better than living with the consequences, though, repent and be saved by grace, then live a life worthy of the Gospel.

 

[capoly]

Fone Bone 2001:

You seem to be saying - correct me if I’m wrong - that it’s “not a good example” of double effect unless double effect claims to justify permitting the foreseen evil in that particular scenario.

Exactly. In your examples you chose the morally unacceptable solution (minimize the harm, if some harm is unavoidable). You did not even try to explain your choice, just said that the other choice would have been “intrinsically evil”.
Fone Bone 2001:

On the contrary… double effect nowhere denies that the evil effect is foreseen. You know this; you yourself said that double effect deals with foreseen side effects. So how on earth does a person using it “refuse to come clean” about the result of their pulling that trigger?

The point is that the person refuses to admit that he intended to do what he did. The phrase: “foreseen, but not intended” is nonsense. If you foresee an outcome, and do not intend it, then don’t do it. If you do it, you cannot say: “I did not intend the outcome, which was inevitable”.

Of course everyone in such a scenario would “wish” that the cards were dealt differently, and the dilemma would not be that harsh. That is just human. But the “cards” were dealt as they were, and you must “play” the game as is. You have the choice to do something that would not be your choice if there would be another solution. But there is none. So you do what needs to be done. Let’s drop that barbecued baby, because it is just cheap emotionalism. Let’s substitute it with another “intrinsically evil mortal sin” - namely “masturbation”. The church teaches that no evil can be performed so that something good will come out of it. So here is your dilemma: “The terrorist demands that you perform masturbation, or he will blow up Chicago”. By your ethical system you must refuse. What kind of “ethical” person would you be if you refused?
Fone Bone 2001:

So? What’s wrong with that? As we both admitted above, double effect in no way denies the fact that in such a case, the moral agent (the doctor, in this scenario) knows full well that his patient will die.

Where is the hypocrisy in this scenario?

Obvious. If the doctor asserts that he did not intend the unavoidable outcome.
Fone Bone 2001:

No matter what?

After taking ALL the known circumstances into consideration, and opting for the best possible outcome.
Fone Bone 2001:

Yeesh, you sound like the Operative from the film Serenity… but then, he is a utilitarian and a consequentialist, so…

But of course. There is no other acceptable ethical system. Consider everything you can and go for the best outcome. To clarify: the consequences themselves are not the only things to consider. Everything needs to be considered, the intent, the means and the end (the consequences).
Fone Bone 2001:

I agree with you that “all things need to be considered”. Most importantly, God’s point of view needs to be considered in first place.

Except that God’s point of view is unknown. Don’t try to mix God into the problem. The dilemma is completely secular, and the two “horns” of the dilemma are the church advocated “non-negotiable, intrinsically evil mortal sins” (like non-procreative sex and masturbation) and the secular, “let’s aim for the minimum harm, if causing some harm is unavoidable”. No need to deviate from it.

 

[Fone_Bone_2001]

i wouldnt say necessarily that double effect is totally logical and rational.

Well, if you read, for instance, wikipedia’s section on criticism of double effect, notice that the objections to it that come from professional philosophers basically all boil down to, “In this situation, double effect may approve of the action, whereas in this minor variation, it does not. That doesn’t seem realistic or right.”

So, again, people dissent from it when they don’t agree with its conclusions, which I suppose is fair enough. Its internal logical consistency, however, is above reproach… but that doesn’t mean anyone has to think it’s a good set of rules (though I do).

The point is that the person refuses to admit that he intended to do what he did.

The moral agent does not refuse to admit that he intended to do what he did.

Rather, the moral agent refuses to admit that he intended one of the effects of what he did.

The latter is perfectly sensible and logically legitimate.

The phrase: “foreseen, but not intended” is nonsense. If you foresee an outcome, and do not intend it, then don’t do it.

Okay, let me fill in the pronouns you used with their antecedents to make clear what you just said:

“If you foresee an outcome, and do not intend that outcome, don’t do it.”

But an “outcome” isn’t something you “do” or “don’t do.” What the moral agent does, he intends, and double effect doesn’t deny that he intends what he does. That doesn’t mean he desires every effect of his action to happen.

Do you understand?

Let’s drop that barbecued baby, because it is just cheap emotionalism.

Okay, sure, but I do find it puzzling and a little amusing that you are so incapable of seeing the intellectual value of that particular hypothetical: by pitting two horrific outcomes against each other and mandating one of them, you make the dilemma as hard as possible for the ethical philosopher to solve.

But sure, we can drop that example.

Let’s substitute it with another “intrinsically evil mortal sin” - namely “masturbation”. The church teaches that no evil can be performed so that something good will come out of it. So here is your dilemma: “The terrorist demands that you perform masturbation, or he will blow up Chicago”. By your ethical system you must refuse. What kind of “ethical” person would you be if you refused?

So… are you admitting that double effect is not a cheap method for rationalizing what would otherwise be considered morally dubious actions?

If you are admitting that, great.

If you’re not, then let me ask you this: What kind of convoluted philosophical justification for getting around the Church’s moral positions could possibly stink so much at the very rationalization it’s supposed to enable that it can’t even justify one act of masturbation to save hundreds of thousands of people?

I do wish you would answer that question…

If the doctor asserts that he did not intend the unavoidable outcome.

But he didn’t. In what way did he intend it?

Except that God’s point of view is unknown. Don’t try to mix God into the problem.

You got the quotes mixed up; I’m not the one who said we need to consider God’s point of view.

I agree with you that in devising a universally accessible set of ethical standards, we can’t appeal to the will of any deity. The divine command theory of ethics isn’t a good one, anyway; Plato made mincemeat of it in the Euthyphro.

The dilemma is completely secular, and the two “horns” of the dilemma are the church advocated “non-negotiable, intrinsically evil mortal sins” (like non-procreative sex and masturbation) and the secular, “let’s aim for the minimum harm, if causing some harm is unavoidable”. No need to deviate from it.

The position you’re identifying as “the Church-advocated” one isn’t necessarily a religious position. Utilitarianism is rejected not just by the Catholic Church, but even by secular philosophers such as Immanuel Kant (yes, I know Kant personally had some religious views, but he certainly didn’t mix them up in his philosophy or base his philosophy on them in the slightest).

 

[JerBear_Meaux]

I wouldnt worry about the philosophers and their opinions about double effect you should try and understand what is meant by what they are saying. perhaps their side of the arguement is not as clear as you think,perhaps they also have another way of looking at double effect which they have not told you learning to reason on your own would probably be better suited for the philosophy field anyways part of philosophy is descerning an aspect of nature you may not be aware of.

 

[Fone_Bone_2001]

I wouldnt worry about the philosophers and their opinions about double effect you should try and understand what is meant by what they are saying. perhaps their side of the arguement is not as clear as you think,perhaps they also have another way of looking at double effect which they have not told you learning to reason on your own would probably be better suited for the philosophy field anyways part of philosophy is descerning an aspect of nature you may not be aware of.

Of course. I don’t uncritically accept things. At the same time, though, I have more to learn from than to teach those who study these sorts of things professionally.