Questions on intrinsic evil

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Given that act ‘A’ is intrinsically evil:
  1. is ‘A’ moral when done with a good intention?
  2. if ‘A’ is chosen for a good purpose, could ‘A’ possibly cease to be intrinsically evil?
  3. when the only way to avoid gravely harmful consequences is to do ‘A’, is ‘A’ moral?
  4. if ‘A’ is done in conjunction with good acts ‘B’, ‘C’, and ‘D’, could ‘A’ possibly be moral?
  5. is there any context or circumstance in which the deliberate choice to commit act ‘A’ could possibly be moral?
  6. can a set of knowingly chosen acts merge, so that act ‘A’ becomes moral as part of a set of acts?
  7. can intention or circumstances transform act ‘A’ into an act that is moral or justifiable?
 
An intrinsic evil is always, everywhere, in every circumstance or situation contary to the moral law.

Killing is not intrinsically evil as sometimes it is justified, as in the case of war, or in self-defense (where the death of the aggressor was not intended).

Abortion is always the murder of an innocent child, no matter how the child was conceived or the effect the pregnancy has or will have on the mother. It is intrinsically evil. No circumstance can change the evilness of the act.
 
Ron_Conte said:
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Instead seek out sources such as the Catechism of the Catholic Church and books for sale from Catholic Answers.
 
The question is often, however, whether or not “A” is indeed intrinsically evil. Often, things that are not intrinsically evil are labeled as such because of misinterpretation and misapplication of magisterial statements.
 
Ron_Conte said:
Given that act ‘A’ is intrinsically evil:
  1. is ‘A’ moral when done with a good intention?
    No.
  2. if ‘A’ is chosen for a good purpose, could ‘A’ possibly cease to be intrinsically evil?
    No.
  3. when the only way to avoid gravely harmful consequences is to do ‘A’, is ‘A’ moral?
    No, but extreme circumstances, and a careful consideration of harm done by your act vs. harm done by inaction, can render you less culpable. E.g. rob a bank to keep your mother from being murdered. However, this situation is called ‘lesser of two evils,’ not 'lesser of two oh okay.'
  4. if ‘A’ is done in conjunction with good acts ‘B’, ‘C’, and ‘D’, could ‘A’ possibly be moral?
    No.
  5. is there any context or circumstance in which the deliberate choice to commit act ‘A’ could possibly be moral?
    No.
  6. can a set of knowingly chosen acts merge, so that act ‘A’ becomes moral as part of a set of acts?
    No.
  7. can intention or circumstances transform act ‘A’ into an act that is moral or justifiable?
    Moral, no. Justifiable, perhaps. Again, lesser of two evils.
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These can all be resolved by an understanding of what “intrinsic” means. Evil is a very part of the nature of some acts, no matter what.

Sam, the Neon Orange Knight
 
stuart12, good answers. I like your blog.

Neon, the idea of permitting the lesser of two evils still does not allow a person to commit an intrinsically evil act without sin.

For example, in Humanae Vitae, n. 14.

“Neither is it valid to argue, as a justification for sexual intercourse which is deliberately contraceptive, that a lesser evil is to be preferred to a greater one, or that such intercourse would merge with procreative acts of past and future to form a single entity, and so be qualified by exactly the same moral goodness as these. Though it is true that sometimes it is lawful **to tolerate a lesser moral evil in order to avoid a greater evil **or in order to promote a greater good,” it is never lawful, even for the gravest reasons, to do evil that good may come of it"

Allowing a lesser evil (in the consequences of your act, or in the acts of other persons) is different from committing moral evil.
 
The answer to all of the questions is ‘no’. An intrinsically evil act is inherently immoral because it is inherently ordered toward an evil moral object. Intention, circumstances, and other acts cannot change the moral object from evil to good.

Examples:

Direct abortion is intrinsically evil and always gravely immoral.
  1. A woman has a surgical abortion as an end, because she does not want the child. This abortion is direct and intrinsically evil.
  2. A woman has a surgical abortion as a means, because she is chronically ill and the pregnancy would present a severe danger to her life. Her intention is to save her own life, and perhaps the situation is that the child is unlikely to survive. But the abortion is nevertheless direct and intrinsically evil.
  3. A woman is pregnant and has cancer. The prenatal is too early in development to deliver, and too early to wait for viability. She is treated with chemotherapy, which kills the prenatal. The act is not direct abortion because it is an act inherently directed at the health of the mother. The death of the prenatal is an unintended consequence.
The difference between #2 and #3 above is found in the inherent ordering of the act toward its moral object, not in the intention.
 
  1. A woman is pregnant and has cancer. The prenatal is too early in development to deliver, and too early to wait for viability. She is treated with chemotherapy, which kills the prenatal. The act is not direct abortion because it is an act inherently directed at the health of the mother. The death of the prenatal is an unintended consequence.
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The difference between #2 and #3 above is found in the inherent ordering of the act toward its moral object,** not in the intention**.
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(and in #2 the death of the prenatal is intended.)

Could we use a clarification?

VC
 
Verbum_Caro said:
(and in #2 the death of the prenatal is intended.)

Could we use a clarification?

VC
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Verbum Caro,

There are three fonts of morality. Intention and moral object are separate fonts.

So in example #2, the intention of the woman is to save her own life, which is the same good intention as in example #3. The difference is that the moral object in #2 is evil, and in #3 is good.
 
I will clarify my query:
  1. A woman is pregnant and has cancer. The prenatal is too early in development to deliver, and too early to wait for viability. She is treated with chemotherapy, which kills the prenatal. The act is not direct abortion because it is an act inherently directed at the health of the mother. The death of the prenatal is an unintended consequence.
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This last line seems to distinguish #3 from #'s 1 and 2. Presumably then, in 1 and 2 the death of the prenatal is intended?

There seems to be a personal and* additional* intention in each case (1 - because she doesn’t want the baby, 2 – to save her own life, 3 – to save her own life) above and beyond the intention to kill the baby (1 and 2) or not kill the baby (3)?

VC
 
In case 3, the death of the prenatal must be unintended so that the first font of morality is good. This death is a bad consequence in the third font, but it is outweigh by saving the life of the mother, not because the mother’s life is worth more, but because the prenatal’s life could not be saved. So the first and third fonts are good. Then the second font of moral object is good, because the act is not direct abortion.

In case 2, the moral object is evil, so the intention and consequences cannot cause the act to be moral.

Intention and moral object are separate fonts.
 
Ron_Conte said:
Neon, the idea of permitting the lesser of two evils still does not allow a person to commit an intrinsically evil act without sin.
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Right, and I said as much. But there are mitigating factors that can render one less culpable, such as grave threats, which can remove the “with full consent” factor from the mortal sin requirements.

And, I never said that dismembering children was a “lesser” evil. In fact, if you’ll note, my example held murder as the greater evil.

Sam, the Neon Orange Knight
 
Ne_OrangeKnight said:
Right, and I said as much. But there are mitigating factors that can render one less culpable, such as grave threats, which can remove the “with full consent” factor from the mortal sin requirements.

And, I never said that dismembering children was a “lesser” evil. In fact, if you’ll note, my example held murder as the greater evil.

Sam, the Neon Orange Knight
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Yes, there are varying degrees of culpability, depending on an evaulation of all three fonts of morality.
 
Ron_Conte said:
Given that act ‘A’ is intrinsically evil:
  1. is ‘A’ moral when done with a good intention?
  2. if ‘A’ is chosen for a good purpose, could ‘A’ possibly cease to be intrinsically evil?
  3. when the only way to avoid gravely harmful consequences is to do ‘A’, is ‘A’ moral?
  4. if ‘A’ is done in conjunction with good acts ‘B’, ‘C’, and ‘D’, could ‘A’ possibly be moral?
  5. is there any context or circumstance in which the deliberate choice to commit act ‘A’ could possibly be moral?
  6. can a set of knowingly chosen acts merge, so that act ‘A’ becomes moral as part of a set of acts?
  7. can intention or circumstances transform act ‘A’ into an act that is moral or justifiable?
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One may never intentionally use evil to promote a good. Yes, there are levels of culpability, but all are sinful.
 
So it is relatively easy to answer these questions in the hypothetical. What happens is that, in a particular case, there is a tendency for people to not want to call an act intrinsically evil if they realize that some great difficulty will result. This happens with questions on sexuality, on lying, etc.

For example, most Catholics will state (correctly) that lying is intrinsically evil and therefore always immoral. But what if the person has a good intention, and the circumstances are dire? Some will try to claim that the moral object has changed, that the act is somehow no longer lying and no longer intrinsically evil. But the same statement of a falsehood made without those circumstances, everyone admits is a lie.

One test that can be used to tell if an act is intrinsically evil is to consider the act apart from the intention and the circumstances. If an act is intrinsically evil in another circumstance, or with a different intention, then it is intrinsically evil in any circumstance, with any intention.

I think that many Catholics have been influenced by secular society to give an excessively high value to sex within marriage. And the result is that, in the area of sexuality, the teaching of the Church on the basic principles of morality (e.g. three fonts, intrinsic evil, the end does not justify the means, etc.) is entirely abandoned, in favor of various odd rationalizations so that no circumstance can arise that would required married persons to refrain from sexual relations or to avoid certain types of sexual acts.

If the use of abortifacient contraception is intrinsically evil in one circumstance, or with one intention, then it is intrinsically evil in any circumstance, and with any intention. But this insight would cause difficulty in some cases, and so some persons will try to find a rationalization to claim that its use is somehow moral, despite the deaths of innocent prenatals and the deprivation of the procreative meaning.
 
For example, most Catholics will state (correctly) that lying is intrinsically evil and therefore always immoral. But what if the person has a good intention, and the circumstances are dire? Some will try to claim that the moral object has changed, that the act is somehow no longer lying and no longer intrinsically evil. But the same statement of a falsehood made without those circumstances, everyone admits is a lie.
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What does “the same statement of falsehood” mean?

VC
 
Verbum_Caro said:
What does “the same statement of falsehood” mean?

VC
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The same lie. The same false statement.

Question 1, a yes or no question.
Answer 1, ‘Yes’ – yes, is a lie.

Same question in dire circumstances.
The same answer is still a lie.
 
Question 1, a yes or no question.
Answer 1, ‘Yes’ – yes, is a lie.
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Same question in dire circumstances.
The same answer is still a lie.
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Does it work in this case?:

Question 1: Did you steal this?
Answer 1: No. (No is a lie).

same question in dire circumstances:
Question 2: Did you steal this?
Answer 2: No. (No is a lie).

same question in a court of law:
Question 3: Did you steal this?
Answer 3: No. (Lie?)

Are there **any **contexts in which the same question and same answer based on the same event don’t equal the same moral object?

Is the answer that in the third case the “No” isn’t the “same false statement”? Is this because the moral object isn’t just the physical action In example 3 it isn’t a lie because a lie is a direct and voluntary deprivation of truth from an assertion, and “No.” doesn’t amount to the same assertion in this context?

**VC
 
Verbum_Caro said:
same question in a court of law:
Question 3: Did you steal this?
Answer 3: No. (Lie?)

Are there any contexts in which the same question and same answer based on the same event don’t equal the same moral object?

Is the answer that in the third case the “No” isn’t the “same false statement”? Is this because the moral object isn’t just the physical action In example 3 it isn’t a lie because a lie is a direct and voluntary deprivation of truth from an assertion, and “No.” doesn’t amount to the same assertion in this context?
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The same lie told under oath has two evil moral objects, the deprivation of truth from an assertion and the breaking of an oath, so it is a more sinful act. I don’t see why a false assertion in a court of law would somehow not be a lie. You can plead ‘not guilty’ which is not an assertion of fact.

Context refers to the circumstances, which cannot change the moral object.

The Catechism of the Catholic Church: “It is therefore an error to judge the morality of human acts by considering only the intention that inspires them or the circumstances (environment, social pressure, duress or emergency, etc.) which supply their context. There are acts which, in and of themselves, independently of circumstances and intentions, are always gravely illicit by reason of their object; such as blasphemy and perjury, murder and adultery. One may not do evil so that good may result from it.” (CCC, n. 1756.)

The only way that the same question and the same answer could be first a lie, and then the truth is if the second questioner understands the question in a different manner. So for example, expropriation is morally not stealing, but legally it is stealing. So if the context indicated that the question was moral in one case, and legal in another case, then the answer would differ. Yes, I stole in the legal sense of the word, but no, I did not steal in the moral sense of the word.

But in such a case the meaning of the same words is different.
 
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