Questions on intrinsic evil

[Verbum_Caro]

My question about a court of law was indeed to ask about a “not guilty” plea, but I was trying to stick with the parameters of a “yes or no” question.

Context refers to the circumstances, which cannot change the moral object.

And yet

The only way that the same question and the same answer could be first a lie, and then the truth is if the second questioner understands the question in a different manner.

because

in such a case the meaning of the same words is different.

Isn’t the context, in which the second questioner understanding the question in a different manner, an example where the moral object is “changed”?

To be clear – when I ask if the moral object is “changed” I am not asking if something extrinsic to an already determined moral object has changed the moral object, I am asking whether or not in this context the moral object is different form the moral object in the first context even though everything else is the same?

VC

 

[Ron_Conte]

My question about a court of law was indeed to ask about a “not guilty” plea, but I was trying to stick with the parameters of a “yes or no” question.

A ‘not guilty’ plea is not a statement of fact, but a legal device enabling a person to be judged by a court. If a defendent refuses to enter a plea, a judge may enter the plea of ‘not guilty’ for him. Is the judge asserting to the court that the defendent, who has not yet had his trial, is not guilty? No, that is not the meaning of the term.

Isn’t the context, in which the second questioner understanding the question in a different manner, an example where the moral object is “changed”?

To be clear – when I ask if the moral object is “changed” I am not asking if something extrinsic to an already determined moral object has changed the moral object, I am asking whether or not in this context the moral object is different form the moral object in the first context even though everything else is the same?

You are using the term ‘context’ so that it includes things pertaining to the second font and the third font. Whereas context or circumstances (such as in that quote above from the CCC) is used to refer only to the third font. When you use context in that way, so that it includes two fonts, then you can’t distinguish between the nature of the act itself and the circumstances.

The nature of the act is determined by the end toward which the act (in this case, a verbal statement) is ordered. If I deliberately assert that what I know is false is actually true, then I am lying, regardless of context. If I do not realize that the assertion is false, because I mistakenly think that it is true, then I have not lied. Lying is intrinsically evil, so it is always deliberately chosen.

If my words have a certain meaning (e.g. as in mental reservation) such that I am still asserting a truth, not a falsehood, then I am not lying. But this is not context; it pertains to the nature of the act.

So the second font considers three things:

a. the act (uttering a falsehood)
b. the moral nature (species) of the act, which is its inherent moral meaning
c. the moral object, which is the end in terms of morality toward which the act is inherently ordered

The moral object determines the species (what kind of act it is, in terms of morality).

1. A man kills an attacker in self-defense. The moral object is defense of an innocent person. The act appears to be similar to murder:
2. A man kills another man as an act of murder. The moral object is the killing of an innocent person. These two acts appear similar, but the meaning is different because the person killed in #1 is an attacker, and in #2 is an innocent person.

This is not the context of the act, but rather its moral object and moral species.

1. A man must kill an innocent person in order to save the lives of himself and 99 other persons. Is this murder or self-defense? In this case, the intended end is defending the innocent, but the moral object is killing an innocent. The circumstance that 100 persons’ lives will be saved does not pertain to the species of the act and its moral object. The good intention to save 100 lives also does not pertain.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

this is not context; it pertains to the nature of the act.

I will consider this the touchstone to many of the controversies that we have seen here.

In my opinion, this is the thing to focus on.

VC

 

[elts1956]

[ron conte;6623383]so it is relatively easy to answer these questions in the hypothetical. What happens is that, in a particular case, there is a tendency for people to not want to call an act intrinsically evil if they realize that some great difficulty will result. This happens with questions on sexuality, on lying, etc.

For example, most catholics will state (correctly) that lying is intrinsically evil and therefore always immoral. But what if the person has a good intention, and the circumstances are dire? Some will try to claim that the moral object has changed, that the act is somehow no longer lying and no longer intrinsically evil. But the same statement of a falsehood made without those circumstances, everyone admits is a lie.

One test that can be used to tell if an act is intrinsically evil is to consider the act apart from the intention and the circumstances. If an act is intrinsically evil in another circumstance, or with a different intention, then it is intrinsically evil in any circumstance, with any intention.

I think that many catholics have been influenced by secular society to give an excessively high value to sex within marriage. And the result is that, in the area of sexuality, the teaching of the church on the basic principles of morality (e.g. Three fonts, intrinsic evil, the end does not justify the means, etc.) is entirely abandoned, in favor of various odd rationalizations so that no circumstance can arise that would required married persons to refrain from sexual relations or to avoid certain types of sexual acts.

If the use of abortifacient contraception is intrinsically evil in one circumstance, or with one intention, then it is intrinsically evil in any circumstance, and with any intention. But this insight would cause difficulty in some cases, and so some persons will try to find a rationalization to claim that its use is somehow moral, despite the deaths of innocent prenatals and the deprivation of the procreative meaning. Does this make their judgement correct. I don’t understand your argument if it is that, or are you using the forum as a sounding board? Which is ok, I just don’t see the point.
I suggest you make sure you know the difference between Intrinsic evil which is ALWAYS evil and those evils which one may judge using Prudential judgement.

A TRUTH IS ALWAYS A TRUTH EVEN IF NO ONE BELIEVES IT
A LIE IS ALWAYS A LIE EVEN IF EVERYONE BELIEVES IT

 

[Ron_Conte]

Does this make their judgement correct. I don’t understand your argument if it is that, or are you using the forum as a sounding board? Which is ok, I just don’t see the point.
I suggest you make sure you know the difference between Intrinsic evil which is ALWAYS evil and those evils which one may judge using Prudential judgement.

A TRUTH IS ALWAYS A TRUTH EVEN IF NO ONE BELIEVES IT
A LIE IS ALWAYS A LIE EVEN IF EVERYONE BELIEVES IT

No, it does not make their judgment correct.

Intrinsically evil acts are always immoral. Lying is intrinsically evil.

Evils that one may judge using prudential judgment? What?

All moral evil is sin. An act is morally evil if it has either:

1. a bad intention
2. an evil moral object
3. if the bad consequences can be reasonably anticipated to outweigh the good consequences (this requires prudential judgment).

 

[Ron_Conte]

Here is a new article I’ve written on Intrinsic Evil and the Moral Object
catechism.cc/articles/moral-object.htm

I wrote it because most of my fellow Catholics have no idea what a moral object is, or how to determine if an act is intrinsically evil.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

this is not context; it pertains to the nature of the act.

St. Thomas seems to call these things “principle conditions”:

A circumstance, so long as it is but a circumstance, does not specify an action, since thus it is a mere accident: but when it becomes a principle condition of the object, then it does specify the action.

*See ST Ia IIae q. 18 a.10.

But, since terminology is not doctrine and the Church does not have one set of terms used in theology, there seem to be various terms used to describe the same fundamental concept that circumstances which are principle condition of the object – when they pertain to the nature of the act – specify the action and are actually part of the object chosen.

VC

 

[Ron_Conte]

St. Thomas seems to call these things “principle conditions”:

See ST Ia IIae q. 18 a.10.

But, since terminology is not doctrine and the Church does not have one set of terms used in theology, there seem to be various terms used to describe the same fundamental concept that circumstances which are principle condition of the object – when they pertain to the nature of the act – specify the action and are actually part of the object chosen.

VC

St. Thomas was writing before the concept and terminology of the three fonts was fully developed. If you read Veritatis Splendor (which is Latin for ‘the encyclical that every one ignores’), circumstances is used to refer only to the third font. St. Thomas has the three fonts implicit in his work, but not yet fully and explicitly described and separated.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

St. Thomas was writing before the concept and terminology of the three fonts was fully developed. If you read Veritatis Splendor (which is Latin for ‘the encyclical that every one ignores’), circumstances is used to refer only to the third font. St. Thomas has the three fonts implicit in his work, but not yet fully and explicitly described and separated.

This is good to remember, since St. Thomas doesn’t use the exact same terminology as later used in Veritatis splendor, and also that terminology is not doctrine. We might not find the term “principle condition” used consistently, but the concept of “accidental circumstances” distinguished from what “pertains to the nature of the act” is always part and parcel of the three fonts of morality as developed by the Church.

VC

 

[elts1956]

No, it does not make their judgment correct.

Intrinsically evil acts are always immoral. Lying is intrinsically evil.

Evils that one may judge using prudential judgment? What?

All moral evil is sin. An act is morally evil if it has either:

1. a bad intention
2. an evil moral object
3. if the bad consequences can be reasonably anticipated to outweigh the good consequences (this requires prudential judgment).

Have you checked out what the Catechism says regarding the difference between Venial and Mortal sin?

 

[elts1956]

No, it does not make their judgment correct.

Intrinsically evil acts are always immoral. Lying is intrinsically evil.

Evils that one may judge using prudential judgment? What?

All moral evil is sin. An act is morally evil if it has either:

1. a bad intention
2. an evil moral object
3. if the bad consequences can be reasonably anticipated to outweigh the good consequences (this requires prudential judgment).

Okay, I am getting confusider and confusider. All “sin” is evil, is it not? All sin speaks to a lack of morality, not so? There are hierarchies of evil, just as there are hirerarchies of good, is this not so? I hate the act of lying although I have been weak and not upheld what is good many times. But I have never thought of all lying as being Intrinsically evil. Wouldn’t the level of culpability depend on what the lie is about? Someone lying about the outcome of the use of an Atomic bomb as compared as to whether “I forgot” to get something at the grocery store cannot have the same depth of immorality.

Do you consider “just” War to be an Intrinsic Evil, the Economy, or care of the Environment? These are evils which can be judged by using Prudential Judgement. They are not Intrinsic evils. We can agree to disagree on solutions of issues such as these.

I am going to go back and read all the posts. I seem to be missing a point being made here?

 

[elts1956]

I will clarify my query:

This last line seems to distinguish #3 from #'s 1 and 2. Presumably then, in 1 and 2 the death of the prenatal is intended?

There seems to be a personal and* additional* intention in each case (1 - because she doesn’t want the baby, 2 – to save her own life, 3 – to save her own life) above and beyond the intention to kill the baby (1 and 2) or not kill the baby (3)?

VC

In all probability, the intentions in 1 and 2 can be construed as purely selfish, in 1, the baby is not wanted, period, in 2 the abortion is intentional to save her own life, in 3, presumably the the abortion is a side effect of the chemotherapy. I “think” there may be a very fine line between 2 and 3? Confusing.

These are the same split hairs in tubal pregnancies. The tube may split if the pregnancy is furthered, killing both mother and child. Therefore, the tube is cut above and below the baby, ridding the woman’s body of a “diseased” tube. The intention is not to kill the baby, but to save the Mother. As, I say, confusing.

 

[elts1956]

An intrinsic evil is always, everywhere, in every circumstance or situation contary to the moral law.

Killing is not intrinsically evil as sometimes it is justified, as in the case of war, or in self-defense (where the death of the aggressor was not intended).

Abortion is always the murder of an innocent child, no matter how the child was conceived or the effect the pregnancy has or will have on the mother. It is intrinsically evil. No circumstance can change the evilness of the act.

In Evangelium Vitae, Pope John Paul II says culpability may be lessened, or strengthened depending on circumstances. But as you say, the ACT itself is Intrinsically Evil.

 

[elts1956]

An intrinsic evil is always, everywhere, in every circumstance or situation contary to the moral law.

Killing is not intrinsically evil as sometimes it is justified, as in the case of war, or in self-defense (where the death of the aggressor was not intended).

Abortion is always the murder of an innocent child, no matter how the child was conceived or the effect the pregnancy has or will have on the mother. It is intrinsically evil. No circumstance can change the evilness of the act.

Why is killing in war justified? I’m curious about the Catholic Church’s position on this.

It must be a JUST war, not one of agression. The intention must be one of defense, not offense. Killing in itself is evil, levels of culpablity are allowed in the defense of oneself and one’s country. I would say, it would be the rare person, who is not greatly effected by killing someone in a War. Look at the shattered psyches of some of our Service men and women who return home after being in the horrendous circumstances of a war. God knew what he was forbidding when He said, “Thou shall not kill.”

 

[Ron_Conte]

There are three fonts (sources) of morality:

1. intention
2. moral object
3. circumstances

When the moral object is evil, the act is intrinsically evil. Such an act is always immoral, but not always gravely immoral. Some intrinsically evil acts are venial sin, and others are mortal sin.

Prudential judgment considers the moral weight of the reasonably anticipated good and bad consequences, in order to determine the morality of the font called circumstances. For the font to be good, the bad consequences must not outweigh the good consequences.

 

[elts1956]

There are three fonts (sources) of morality:

1. intention
2. moral object
3. circumstances

When the moral object is evil, the act is intrinsically evil. Such an act is always immoral, but not always gravely immoral. Some intrinsically evil acts are venial sin, and others are mortal sin.

Prudential judgment considers the moral weight of the reasonably anticipated good and bad consequences, in order to determine the morality of the font called circumstances. For the font to be good, the bad consequences must not outweigh the good consequences.

Committing an Intrinsic evil act is always a mortal sin. It is never, never allowed under any circumstances, abortion, euthanasia, homosexual marriage, etc. I agree with your definition of Prudential Judgement.

 

[Ron_Conte]

Committing an Intrinsic evil act is always a mortal sin. It is never, never allowed under any circumstances, abortion, euthanasia, homosexual marriage, etc. I agree with your definition of Prudential Judgement.

Intrinsically evil acts are sometimes venial sins. Lying is generally a venial sin, and theft is a venial sin if the amount stolen and the harm done is small.

Other intrinsically evil acts are mortal sins.

When the moral object is gravely disordered, as in abortion or contraception or euthanasia, then the act is always objectively a mortal sin.

When the moral object is venial (not gravely disordered), then the act is a venial sin, unless there is also a gravely disordered intention, or a second moral object that is gravely disordered, or if the bad consequences gravely outweigh the good consequences, in which case the act would be objectively a mortal sin.