I’ll get back to you after reading it.
Okay.
It might be argued that the rape victim wants to restore the status quo ante as “the state of not being pregnant,” but while such a desire on her part would be understandable, achieving that state does not license a second immoral act.12 More importantly, however, this is not the proper description of the relevant status quo ante. The actual status quo ante is not “the state of not being pregnant” but rather “the state of not having been raped,” and obviously the killing of the child will do nothing to restore that state.13 In such cases when restoration is impossible (e.g., rape, murder, etc.), then generally the best that we can do is to impose justice in a political context (e.g., imprisonment).
This is incorrect, because the actual status quo ante is being not-raped and not-pregnant. These are orthogonal qualities; a woman can be raped without getting pregnant; and if an already pregnant woman is raped, the rape does not justify her abortion. So while you can’t revert to being not-raped, but you very much can revert to being not-pregnant. In fact, this is what the discussion is all about.
That’s just an aside though. I must note that the author agrees with me on my core point. Observe:
Let us return to Thomson. She claims that, in affirming a woman’s right to control her own body but denying her right to an abortion, her pro-life opponents hold inconsistent views. However, Thomson’s claim only follows if we add in two further premises: (i) the right to control one’s body is tantamount to self-ownership (i.e., one’s body is one’s private property), and (ii) if a woman owns her body as private property she has the right to dispose of it as she sees fit, including the right to eject her unborn child.
So, in order to attack premise (i)…
Thus, (i) fails and Thomson’s pro-life opponents can affirm that women (and men) have a limited “right to decide what happens in and to” their bodies, without that fact entailing that they own their bodies. Accordingly her pro-life opponents are not guilty of inconsistency so long as the properly limited right of bodily self-control does not extend to the permissibility of abortion.
The important part is that
properly limited right of bodily self-control does not extend to the permissibility of abortion. In other words, the pro-life position requires
a priori limiting one’s control over her own body. In other words, state must be given jurisdiction to limit what you can and cannot do with your own body. The author himself concedes that:
Of course this line of argument does not prove the impermissibility of abortion. All that we have done in this section is to demonstrate that accepting a woman’s limited “right to decide what happens in and to her body” does not require us to accept that she thereby has a right to procure an abortion. We need a separate pro-life argument to show that abortion does in fact lie outside the legitimate limits of bodily self-control. In other words, we need a separate positive argument to show that abortion is analogous to an illegitimate use of the body, like selling oneself into slavery, rather than to a legitimate (if perhaps unsavory) use of the body, like extensive tattooing or piercing.
The author then proceeds to build a positive pro-life argument:
Let us consider a competing analogy, which cuts to the heart of the matter. Suppose you live in a cabin far out in the wilderness, cut off from civilization by extreme distance and weather for much of the year, say, nine months. You have provisions for yourself, but no large excess of stores. One day you return to the cabin to discover that an infant has been left at the door without explanation. You have done nothing to invite its presence, and certainly you have not given somebody permission to abandon it on your doorstep. Do you have an obligation to care for the infant, who will surely die if you do not take it in?
It’s a completely valid position, except that the author does not realize the obvious implication:
The Society of Music Lovers asks you (uninvited) to act as a dialysis machine for the violinist for the next nine months. Do you have an obligation to help him?
I would also answer that you DO have such a moral obligation.
So let’s now move to legislation. Should the state legislate that you MUST fulfill such moral obligation in case of:
- pregnancy from rape
- a child found at your door in winter
- a violinist needing dialysis
…and why?
In my opinion, if you believe that the state CAN legislate that in some cases, but not in others, then your position is inconsistent.