Rational Definition of Existence

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I actually like your idea James. It’s the best piece I’ve seen written by you 👍. Most of what else I’ve read from you is rubbish, but I have only read a bit of what you’ve written.

But I also agree with Oreoracle’s first post, though he does get a little harsh later. I think when you say, “that which has” in your definition, James, hints to why it’s circular.

using your definition

Hypothetical 1: You point to a unicorn and say, “That is a unicorn.”
Well… “does it have the ability to affect?”
Why yes, “Yes it does have the ability to affect.”
Well then, “It must exist.”

Hypothetical 2: You point to a unicorn and say, “That is a unicorn.”
Well… “does it have the ability to affect?”
No, “No it does have the ability to affect.”
The unicorn vanishes.
“What the hell were we talking about again?”

In order for something to be a “that” and possess the function “to have,” it must exist. So to ask the question, your test, of any real or conceivable object is circular if you assume its existence, which you must using your definition in order to determine whether or not it effects.

I also disagree with you not agreeing that the best way to prove something is to provide evidence. Your own definition disagrees with you too.

Your definition is useful though as Oreoracle said. It fits into an empirical scientific mindset where, epistemological, the best way to know something exists is to find its effects.
 
Both you Hubriss and Oreo seem to not be able to distinguish a definition from an existence.

If something is DEFINED, then it can be evaluated as to whether it has effect or not, exists or not.
 
Both you Hubriss and Oreo seem to not be able to distinguish a definition from an existence.

If something is DEFINED, then it can be evaluated as to whether it has effect or not, exists or not.
But how would you use this to show that something like God exists? By definition, God’s effects, as it would be the first cause, would be everything, and anything we point to would be evidence of his existence. You’d have to show that there is a direct, necessary, and actual link between God and the effects. But before that, you’d need to almost concretely point to God and provide evidence that he exists and is the necessary cause of everything in the first place.

Imagine you and I were talking, and a ball flew across the air and hit you in the head. You would ask where the hell it came from. I’d say, “A Zaboomagron threw it at you. Which, of course, is like a horse except that it has two heads on each end and no excretion system, four fingered hands instead of hooves, and throws balls.”

You don’t see one and of course you call bull, yet you would have evidence of its claimed and defined effects. If this imagined scenario actually happened, would you even consider it evidence of a Zaboomagron? Of course not.

The point is you have to know of or assume the existence of a cause before you can link the effects to it. If you and I accepted that Zaboomagrons are the only things that cause balls to fly through the air, then the conclusion that Zaboomagrons exist would be logical. You have to assume the existence before you can even make the link!

A general scenario, yet basically the same thing. You observe an effect, yet have no idea what caused it. What do you know about its cause? The only thing you know about the cause is that it caused the effect.
 
But how would you use this to show that something like God exists? By definition, God’s effects, as it would be the first cause, would be everything, and anything we point to would be evidence of his existence. You’d have to show that there is a direct, necessary, and actual link between God and the effects. But before that, you’d need to almost concretely point to God and provide evidence that he exists and is the necessary cause of everything in the first place.
Not exactly. the West seems to have completely forgotten how to define anything along with whether it is important to do so.

If you wish to discuss God, or anything, it is important to be clear on exactly what you are talking about. the word “God” is meaningless without a concept behind it. Different people and religions have different concepts for it and thus they argue. But the notion as to whether God exists at all is another issue involving a meaningful definition and then logic applied. Of course, each religion would want to define “God” in such a way as to make their religion seem more correct than others, but at least it is more obvious that the issue for them is the proper concept, not merely who is right. Logic and Science can work out the who is right. As long as the word gets defined, at least the discussions make sense. Everyone is using a concept for the word anyway, the problem is that many are using different concepts but the same words. It is no wonder the Agnostic can’t settle.

But you mentioned that by definition God affects. Well certainly, why define a God that had no effect? but having effect is NOT the definition. Having effect is only the requirement for God’s existence. Many things, well actually everything real has effect. God is more defined by the properties of “First Cause”, omnipotence, omnipresence, and so on. To decide is such a defined God exists, one need merely figure out is that definition actually fits anything that has effect. A mere mental concept, for example, would not have the required effect. A “God” defined merely as a mental concept would only exist in the mental realm, and only be able to effect the physical through someone’s mind.

If God is defined as “First Cause” and nothing more, then the issue is whether there really was ever a “First Cause”. But then if it is found that something particular is that first cause, then by definition that would be God regardless of anyone liking what that turned out to be. The existence is discovered after the definition. In this case, the issue is discovering if there was a “First Effect”.

If God is defined with intelligence qualities, the there must be an effect found that matches those qualities, else there is not God. This is a common debate.

As I stated in the OP, this definition of existence does not directly resolve the God’s existence issue. It merely make all discussion concern any existence make more sense. It clarifies that when we say that something exists, we mean that it has real effect, it is not merely any dreamed up fantasy notion. It must display effect to be said to exist. And whatever is displaying that effect, IS GOD, like it or not.
 
You’re totally missing the points to my posts. I’m talking about applying your definition of existence to reality, with hypotheticals. Its application is circular, for the reasons and examples that I gave. The definition of God was not a primary message I was trying to get across. I’m asking how would you apply your definition of existence usefully to real life?

But one thing: Existence is not always discovered after the definition. Have you ever taken the trouble to completely define your mother? In fact, that is the worste method of coming to a conclusion about the existence of a certain entity, because in many cases you would have to search the entire universe to determine whether or not the definition of a conceptual entity exists.
 
A) You pointed out no circularity. Look up the definition of that word.
B) Your mind **functions **off of concept definitions long before you think to tell it not to bother.
 
A) You pointed out no circularity. Look up the definition of that word.
B) Your mind **functions **off of concept definitions long before you think to tell it not to bother.
A) I just showed you how the application of your definition is circular. In order to determine if something has a specific effect you must first determine if it exists in order to make a causal link between it and the effect. You can’t determine if something exists rationally by observing random effects, not knowing the causes, yet pointing to a supposed cause that you or no one else knows of. Your claim will always be unjustified.

B) Your mind functions off your senses long before it develops concepts and definitions.
 
A) I just showed you how the application of your definition is circular. In order to determine if something has a specific effect you must first determine if it exists in order to make a causal link between it and the effect. You can’t determine if something exists rationally by observing random effects, not knowing the causes, yet pointing to a supposed cause that you or no one else knows of. Your claim will always be unjustified.
A) No, you didn’t. Define the word “circular” as it applies to logic then point out the exact case stated in the OP.
B) Who is talking about determining specific effects? I thought we were talking about a definition.
C) In determining if “something” has a specific effect, one might want to first consider if its definition allows for any effect at all.
B) Your mind functions off your senses long before it develops concepts and definitions.
No, your senses do not constitute a mind. They are only an (name removed by moderator)ut that must be interpreted. The mind must interpret those (name removed by moderator)uts into relevance. What is a definition if not an interpretation?
 
What exists yet has no effect? What has no effect, yet exists?
As a definition, it perhaps begs the question because it excludes causally inert objects. For instance, sets, mathematical objects and platonic forms. Which is not to say that I’m making anyone commit to “quantifying” over these objects, merely that a proposed definition fails when it excludes objects over which we are disputing.

Next, it is at best a ‘marker’ and not strictly a definition. It may be true that all existent things are co-extensive with all things that may effect or be effected. Nevertheless, that does not make it definitional. For instance, I could pick out the set of all ‘risible beings’-- all beings capable of laughing-- and it would be co-extensive with the set of all human beings. Nevertheless, it would not be definitional. For that may pick out all the relevant objects, but it does not do so under the auspices of definition (genus + specific difference, in this case, would be ‘rational animal’).

I suspect that if your definition is true, then it is so only by ‘picking out’ the proper members of the set, but not by truly defining. For ‘existence’-- whatever we say of it-- seems to be prior to effecting or being effected. William Vallicella has a good blog post where he discusses the similar definition which the Eleatic Stranger offers in Plato’s Sophist. It is existence which seems to confer on things the ‘power’ to effect or be effected, and so it does no good to try to define existence in terms of power.

Has anyone here read the debate between W.V.O. Quine and Fr. Joseph Owens on what existence is? It’s well worth reading, and it may stimulate some thought. That sort of combination is rather rare. Quine has his famous doctrine that ‘to be is to be the value of a bound variable,’ i.e., what we ‘quantify over’ we admit into our ontology. Joseph Owens, iirc, talks about being and ‘presence.’
 
I think there are 2 things I should have included in the OP;
  1. A definition of “definition”
  2. An explanation of “realms of existence”
Merriam-Webster Online:
Main Entry: def·i·ni·tion
Pronunciation: \ˌde-fə-ˈni-shən
Function: noun
Etymology: Middle English diffinicioun, from Anglo-French, from Latin definition-, definitio, from definire
Date: 14th century

1 : an act of determining; specifically : the formal proclamation of a Roman Catholic dogma
2 a : a statement expressing the essential nature of something b : a statement of the meaning of a word or word group or a sign or symbol c : a product of defining
3 : the action or process of defining
4 a : the action or the power of describing, explaining, or making definite and clear b (1) : clarity of visual presentation : distinctness of outline or detail (2) : clarity especially of musical sound in reproduction c : sharp demarcation of outlines or limits
As a definition, it perhaps begs the question because it excludes causally inert objects. For instance, sets, mathematical objects and platonic forms. Which is not to say that I’m making anyone commit to “quantifying” over these objects, merely that a proposed definition fails when it excludes objects over which we are disputing.
As explained elsewhere in the thread, existence comes in “realms”. A realm is an association set and in this case, a set of mutual affecters. There is a conceptual realm and a physical realm. Each realm contains items existent to that realm but potentially independent of a different realm.

The concept of a straight line affects the concept of a square. The number 4 is only sensible with respect to another number such as 3 or 1. The effect of concepts upon each other is not through time, but through co-dependent characteristics. Logical construct reigns over all concepts. That is why a round square cannot exist either as a concept nor a physical object.
Next, it is at best a ‘marker’ and not strictly a definition. It may be true that all existent things are co-extensive with all things that may effect or be effected. Nevertheless, that does not make it definitional. For instance, I could pick out the set of all ‘risible beings’-- all beings capable of laughing-- and it would be co-extensive with the set of all human beings. Nevertheless, it would not be definitional. For that may pick out all the relevant objects, but it does not do so under the auspices of definition (genus + specific difference, in this case, would be ‘rational animal’).
The qualifier for a definition is that uniquely specify a concept category and thereby implying what something isn’t as well as what it is. That was the point of asking that question;

"What exists, yet has no effect? What has effect, yet has no existence?"

The two concepts cannot be separated. To have the potential to effect, is the significance of an existence. Which effect it has, is a different concern.
I suspect that if your definition is true, then it is so only by ‘picking out’ the proper members of the set, but not by truly defining. For ‘existence’-- whatever we say of it-- seems to be prior to effecting or being effected.
The potential to effect, is what “seems to be prior to effecting”.
…has a good blog post where he discusses the similar definition which the Eleatic Stranger offers in Plato’s Sophist. It is existence which seems to confer on things the ‘power’ to effect or be effected, and so it does no good to try to define existence in terms of power.
That is what we call, the “cart before the horse”.

Does it exist because it has power or does it have power because it exists? The definition is what shows that existence and power are merely different words for the same thing. You cannot say that one cannot be defined until the other because they are the same concept distinguished only by common usage.
Has anyone here read the debate between W.V.O. Quine and Fr. Joseph Owens on what existence is? It’s well worth reading, and it may stimulate some thought. That sort of combination is rather rare. Quine has his famous doctrine that ‘to be is to be the value of a bound variable,’ i.e., what we ‘quantify over’ we admit into our ontology. Joseph Owens, iirc, talks about being and ‘presence.’
My definition supersedes both of those concepts because they are each being too specific as you have described them.
 
As explained elsewhere in the thread, existence comes in “realms”. A realm is an association set and in this case, a set of mutual affecters. There is a conceptual realm and a physical realm. Each realm contains items existent to that realm but potentially independent of a different realm.
How does this help, at all, the problem of defining existence? Surely we can divide our ontology into different groups, i.e., physical objects, mathematical objects, immaterial objects. But if we say that all these objects exist, then ‘realm’ is a more narrow category than existence, and so it will not be definitive.
The concept of a straight line affects the concept of a square. The number 4 is only sensible with respect to another number such as 3 or 1. The effect of concepts upon each other is not through time, but through co-dependent characteristics. Logical construct reigns over all concepts. That is why a round square cannot exist either as a concept nor a physical object.
Please note that my usage of ‘object’ does not imply existence or physicality. My point in the section you quoted is that we cannot assume existence = power. Why? We are looking to know what existence is, in order that we might say whether certain objects exist. It is a disputed topic in philosophy whether inert objects exist (forms, mathematical objects, etc.). If you start by assuming a definition which excludes these disputed objects, then you are going in reverse: you are claiming to know what exists, and from this to deduce what existence is. There is a circularity here which cannot be easily escaped from.
"What exists, yet has no effect? What has effect, yet has no existence?"
The two concepts cannot be separated. To have the potential to effect, is the significance of an existence. Which effect it has, is a different concern.
As I said above, it seems that there are certain classes of objects, namely mathematical objects and forms, which may indeed ‘exist,’ but which if they exist are ‘inert’ objects. This is precisely what is in dispute.
The potential to effect, is what “seems to be prior to effecting”
And only things that are have the potential to effect…
Does it exist because it has power or does it have power because it exists? The definition is what shows that existence and power are merely different words for the same thing. You cannot say that one cannot be defined until the other because they are the same concept distinguished only by common usage.
Friend, exactly what is at stake here is whether they are “the same concept distinguished only by common usage.” I deny this. What good does it do to beg the question by simply stipulating that it is the case?
My definition supersedes both of those concepts because they are each being too specific as you have described them.
I think both of their definitions are problematic… but then again I don’t think that ‘existence’ is susceptible to a definition.

Rob
 
As I said above, it seems that there are certain classes of objects, namely mathematical objects and forms, which may indeed ‘exist,’ but which if they exist are ‘inert’ objects. This is precisely what is in dispute.
If it is that easy, then name something that we both agree exists yet has no effect whatsoever.
I think both of their definitions are problematic… but then again I don’t think that ‘existence’ is susceptible to a definition.
Since the definition of a word is its meaning, then a word with no definition is a meaningless word. Yet we know that “existence” has meaning. The issue is discerning what the significant features are concerning existence so that a meaning can be clarified.

The most essential and relevant meaning concerning something existing is that it has effect and a potential to effect even more.
 
If it is that easy, then name something that we both agree exists yet has no effect whatsoever.
I don’t think I need to prove that such objects exist. That such objects are disputed means that any stipulative definition to the contrary will merely beg the question.

But if you insist, I could offer a proposition like this:
  1. There is some x such that x + 3 = 5.
This seems to be a necessary truth, for denying it would be equivalent to saying that 2 +3 =/= 5. Thus we have at least one such object such that it exists, yet it is inert. (The reason I’ve been avoiding doing this is because it will undoubtedly cause much uproar now…)
Since the definition of a word is its meaning, then a word with no definition is a meaningless word. Yet we know that “existence” has meaning. The issue is discerning what the significant features are concerning existence so that a meaning can be clarified.
The most essential and relevant meaning concerning something existing is that it has effect and a potential to effect even more.
Why must this be the case? If being really is common to all things, then aren’t we right to assert that it is contained by no genus, and thus, is incapable of definition?
 
Pray tell me then James, how would you apply your definition to determine if something exists? You can use a hypothetical or real example.
 
  1. There is some x such that x + 3 = 5.
This seems to be a necessary truth, for denying it would be equivalent to saying that 2 +3 =/= 5. Thus we have at least one such object such that it exists, yet it is inert. (The reason I’ve been avoiding doing this is because it will undoubtedly cause much uproar now…)
The request was to name one thing that exists yet has no effect or visa versa.

What in that post is the example you are proposing? “x”, “2”, the equation itself, or what? :confused:
 
The request was to name one thing that exists yet has no effect or visa versa.

What in that post is the example you are proposing? “x”, “2”, the equation itself, or what? :confused:
Premise (1)'s point is to show that “2” exists. “2” is a mathematical object. It is causally inert. Hence it is both an existent and causally inert.
 
Pray tell me then James, how would you apply your definition to determine if something exists? You can use a hypothetical or real example.
Is there a 4th spacial dimension?
Is there a parallel universe?
Does God actually DO anything?
What does the proposed “spirit” affect after you die?
 
Premise (1)'s point is to show that “2” exists. “2” is a mathematical object. It is causally inert. Hence it is both an existent and causally inert.
That ws why I went through that explanation of the difference between the realms of conceptual affecters and physical affecters, which I can now see you didn’t comprehend.

the number 2 that you are referring to belongs in the conceptual realm because you are not talking about 2 of anything in particular. So as to how it affects within that realm, imagine what effect would result if the number 2 did not exist even conceptually.

Without the number 2, even in concept, how would any logical system work at all? Nothing could be divided into 2 parts. There could be no marriages of any 2 things. There could not even be opposites fore that would consist of 2.

I would say that the number 2 very substantially affects the coherence of logic and thus the entire universe.

But then on the positive side, I wouldn’t have to consider your :twocents: 😃
 
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